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# PHILOSOPHY

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### EDITORIAL

"MAN is born free, and everywhere he is in chains," said Rousseau. This, however, puts the cart before the horse. It is truer to say that man was born in chains, and everywhere he is struggling to be free. Notwithstanding, however, his long history, man has not yet got rid of his chains. Indeed, it would seem that nations sometimes, after having enjoyed for a period a large measure of freedom, return to their fetters when confronted with a crisis. Faith in a generous toleration and in the light of Reason is temporarily lost, and primitive forces once more rise to the surface and dominate the lives of men. Thus the tortures of Prometheus are renewed. But Reason, though exiled, cannot be slain. So long as there is life at a high conscious level, Reason cannot indefinitely be denied her proper function of guide and friend to the human soul, for without the wisdom which is her gift man cannot survive as a civilized being.

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Freedom for adventure in the realms of thought and practice would seem to be a necessity for human life. There can be no lasting satisfaction with any static order of affairs, however momentarily excellent. Life's insistent demand is for scope to advance to novel forms of achievement and expression. Its denial engenders restlessness in the soul and a deep discontent. Moreover, since living consciousness is essentially creative, it cannot be imprisoned in any permanent and unchanging form without ultimately sickening of the malaise *taedium*, and entering upon the path of decay.

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At the present time the creative soul of the world whose essence is freedom is sorely maimed. And this impairment of health is not



wholly due to the antagonisms of man with man. These, indeed, play a sinister rôle enough in hindering the growth of freedom. But the massive habits of physical nature also contribute their quota in the frustration of human purposes. Heat and cold, birth and death, disease and famine, earthquake and storm, constitute the background to the human drama which is being played throughout the ages. Further, the growth of applied physical science in our day has brought added dangers, making us acutely aware that the more complicated civilization becomes, the more it is open to attack.

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The essence of human freedom is the power to accomplish practical purposes, to achieve ends which satisfy deep-rooted human needs. But it is just this freedom of action which is so difficult to attain. Economic forces have played no insignificant part in this frustration. Hence to-day the primary demand made in the name of freedom is for economic security and a reasonable degree of social order. But since man cannot live by bread alone, freedom also demands an environment in which certain ideal ends bearing intrinsic values can be pursued. It is this blending of ideals and economic policies which constitutes the web of human history. One of the most pressing questions of to-day is whether economic freedom for the masses can be purchased without a large sacrifice of political liberty. Herein lies the significance of those experiments which are to-day being made in certain countries.

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Since in every modern state there are many types of individuals and groups, each having its own character and its own worth, freedom for all is impossible without mutual toleration. But intolerance is the besetting sin of every society. Times without number it has defeated the pursuit of freedom and brought disaster and ruin. In the modern state there cannot be freedom without a generous toleration of diversity. What is to be aimed at is not the destruction of different groups with their specific character in the interests of a false ideal of homogeneity, but room for each to make its contribution to the common life in its own way.

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This form of social freedom is the ideal of all great statesmen. Fortunately in the wide field of human activity represented by professional institutions it has been largely attained. The modern State has come to realize that it is not within its competence to decide upon matters which fall within the province of learning, art, and even religion, but only to provide opportunities for learning and




ability to flourish. Thereby it expresses its belief that sound knowledge can be trusted to banish error, a belief that has been increasingly justified. In many regions of human thought Reason has thus won a strong foothold, bringing as its gift a wider freedom to man.

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But beyond the ideal of social freedom, Plato teaches us there is a deeper freedom which the individual soul needs for its peace. This freedom lies beyond all temporal circumstances good or bad, being based on an intuition of the eternal order of things, and upon the conviction that human life is grounded in a realm of values changeless in the midst of change. This deeper freedom, according to Whitehead, can be enjoyed by all who, through understanding, come to learn that as individuals they are partners in the supreme adventure of the universe as a whole, an adventure which is concerned with the realization of all possible values. The possession of such an intuition is, in his words, "the reconciliation of freedom and the compulsion of the truth."

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Finally, it may be asked if the notion of freedom is justified by the constitution of Nature. In every human society there has been some liberty and some compulsion, and the values of human life have been won in an environment constituted by a synthesis of both in some compatible proportion. Is freedom as well as compulsion an operative factor in Nature as a whole? If this be the true view, then Nature is not merely the product of an inevitable causal process, but is also that which issues from the exercise of spontaneity; and if self-creativity be an ultimate metaphysical principle, we have here the ground for the conviction that the idea of freedom is not merely an idle play of the emotions, but is a belief justified by the ultimate constitution of reality.





## THE PRESENT NEED OF A PHILOSOPHY

MY DEAR EDITOR,

Your invitation to continue the correspondence opened by Sir Herbert Samuel in the last issue of the JOURNAL is one which I cannot in honour refuse; and I am the less reluctant to accept it, because the President's letter has expressed so many of my own convictions that I can follow his lead where I should have hesitated to venture alone. That philosophy ought in some way to help our generation in its moral, social, and political troubles; that epistemology and the theory of value are not directly contributing to that end; and that in this respect some special significance attaches to the idea of evolution—all this I fully and gladly accept; and I will try to say, as briefly as I can, what it is that in my opinion philosophy can do.

But first, there is something which it cannot, and must not be tempted to do. It cannot descend like a *deus ex machina* upon the stage of practical life and, out of its superior insight into the nature of things, dictate the correct solution for this or that problem in morals, economic organization, or international politics. There is nothing in a philosopher's special work qualifying him to pilot a perplexed generation through those rocks and shoals. If a mariner finds himself at sea without navigator, chart, or compass, the Astronomer Royal himself, discovered among the passengers, could do little for him; he would be wiser to hail some coastwise fisherman. Even Plato did not think otherwise. He never proposed that professional philosophers should be dragged, blinking, from their studies and forcibly seated on thrones; only that expert knowledge of political life and its practical difficulties should be illuminated by philosophical reflection on its ultimate end.

If nowadays we should hesitate to go even as far as Plato, it is not because our opinion of philosophy is lower, but because our opinion of the plain man is higher. Christian theology holds that the faith of a simple peasant, without any tincture of theological learning, is sufficient for salvation; modern philosophy, of whatever school, follows its example in holding that non-philosophical thought in all its forms—moral and political, scientific, religious, or artistic—is able to do its work without asking philosophy's help and to justify itself without awaiting philosophy's verdict.

In this opinion there lurks an opposite danger. It may seem that philosophy's only task is to analyse knowledge we already



possess, and theorize about activities we are already able to perform; that it is no more able to influence the processes which it describes than astronomy can influence the movements of the stars; that the only motive to pursue it is a pure disinterested curiosity, the only good to be gained from it, pure theoretical knowledge; and that Plato, Spinoza, and all others who have thought this knowledge somehow serviceable to our well-being were victims of a gigantic and inexplicable illusion.

The truth seems to me to lie somewhere between these two extremes. If the philosopher is no pilot, neither is he a mere spectator, watching the ship from his study window. He is one of the crew; but what, as such, is his function? In order to find an answer to this question, I suggest that we should look back three hundred years or more, to the infancy of modern science. At the beginning of the seventeenth century no one could foresee the triumphs which science was one day to achieve. It was not, therefore, a foreknowledge of these triumphs that encouraged innumerable men to persevere in almost incredibly detailed inquiries concerning the laws of nature, in a corporate effort shared by all parts of the civilized world and extending over many generations. The will to pursue those inquiries was not based on any conception of their future outcome, but it was based on something: it was based on the belief that nature is a single system of things, controlled throughout its extent by a single system of laws. In adopting this idea, civilized man was setting aside his immemorial belief in demonic agencies, magical influences, and the inscrutable caprices of individual things, and accepting a new view of the world, not received on faith, and not arrived at by scientific induction, but thought out and stated in a systematic form by the philosophers of the sixteenth century.

The notion of a uniformly law-abiding natural world is so familiar to ourselves that we are apt to forget how recent a thing it is in the history of thought, how hardly it was won by Renaissance thinkers—for example, with what difficulty sixteenth-century thought gave up Aristotle's doctrine that the law of gravitation holds good only in the sublunary sphere—and how dramatic was its verification by one scientific discovery after another. This philosophical conception of nature has played the part, in relation to scientific research, of a constant stimulus to effort, a reasoned refutation of defeatism, a promise that all scientific problems are in principle soluble.

There is a certain analogy between the state of things at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when the special problems of civilized life were concerned with man's control over nature, and the state of things in the modern world, whose special problems are concerned with human relations. Sir Herbert Samuel justly enumerates them: "personal and social morality, economic organiza-



tion, international relationship." These problems, like the problems of natural science, can be solved only by detailed and patient investigation, exhaustive inquiry, skilful experiment. But this arduous and slow labour, if it is to be undertaken at all, must rest on two things: a conviction that the problems can be solved, and a determination that they shall be solved. Of these two, the first is, I think, capable of being provided, in a reasoned form, by philosophy. Apart from such a reasoned conviction, the will to solve them is so handicapped by doubts within and opposition without, that its chance of success dwindles to vanishing-point. There is always a vast mass of opinion (and very respectable opinion) in favour of allowing established institutions to stand firm for fear of worse to follow; there is always a dead weight of inclination, however bad things may be, to enjoy what good we can snatch for the short time allowed us; but, more dangerous than either of these, there is the defeatist spirit which fears that what we are aiming at is no more than a Utopian dream. And this fear becomes paralysing when, not content with the status of a natural timidity or temporary loss of nerve, it calls in the help of philosophical ideas, and argues that the evils admittedly belonging to our moral, social, and political life are essential elements in all human life, or in all civilization, so that the special problems of the modern world are inherently insoluble. The philosophical ideas underlying this argument are connected with certain aspects of the idea of progress; especially the false conception of progress as due to a cosmic force which can be trusted to advance human life automatically, without the active co-operation of human beings, and (the natural reaction from this) an equally false denial that progress is possible at all.

As the seventeenth century needed a reasoned conviction that nature is intelligible and the problems of science in principle soluble, so the twentieth needs a reasoned conviction that human progress is possible and that the problems of moral and political life are in principle soluble. In both cases the need is one which only philosophy can supply. What is needed to-day is a philosophical reconsideration of the whole idea of progress or development, and especially its two main forms, "evolution" in the world of nature and "history" in the world of human affairs. What would correspond to the Renaissance conception of nature as a single intelligible system would be a philosophy showing that the human will is of a piece with nature in being genuinely creative, a *vera causa*, though singular in being consciously creative; that social and political institutions are creations of the human will, conserved by the same power which created them, and essentially plastic to its hand; and that therefore whatever evils they contain are in principle remediable. In short, the help which philosophy might give to our "dissatisfied, anxious, appre-



hensive generation" would lie in a reasoned statement of the principle that there can be no evils in any human institution which human will cannot cure.

This cannot be done in a day. But it has already been well begun. I will mention three writers whose work, taken as a whole, seems to me unmistakably converging upon a conception of man and his place in the universe which would justify that principle. There is Mr. Alexander's *Space, Time, and Deity*; there is General Smuts's *Holism and Evolution*; and there is Mr. Whitehead's series of books grouped round *Process and Reality*. These, with others hardly less important, seem to me the firstfruits of a new philosophical movement in which epistemological discussions and the old controversy between realism and idealism have fallen, as Sir Herbert desires that they should fall, into the background; in which the central place is taken, as Sir Herbert wishes it should be, by the idea of development; in which philosophy feels itself a collaborator with science, neither its enemy nor its slave, but having its own dignity and its own methods, while it respects those of science; and in which man is conceived neither as lifted clean out of nature nor yet as the plaything of natural forces, but as sharing, and sharing to an eminent degree, in the creative power which constitutes the inward essence of all things.

Yours faithfully,

R. G. COLLINGWOOD.

OXFORD.

April 24, 1934.

MY DEAR EDITOR,

A man is naturally disinclined to consider a theory important, unless it presents itself to him as a solution of a problem which troubles or once troubled him. I believe it is with some such notion in mind that Sir Herbert Samuel, in a letter to the Editor of this Journal,<sup>1</sup> suggests that contemporary philosophers leave epistemology "in the background." What troubles the average intelligent man most in the year nineteen hundred and thirty-four is not the problem of how he can perceive Sirius which is eight light-years from our planet, or of how he recognizes a friend's face, or of the basis of his inductive beliefs about existing things. He is far more concerned about, say, the problem of economic and political relations between men and nations. These, to him, lie near the heart of humanity, and in the aggravated form which they have now assumed are likely to touch off something which might irretrievably shatter the dignity—even the existence—of the human race. To him, that theory will appear important which throws light on such a problem. Any other kind will be "divorced from life."

<sup>1</sup> Vol. IX, No. 34 (April 1934), pp. 134-136.



I think the professional philosopher must admit the timeliness of Sir Herbert's invitation, and the truth of his main conviction. But he cannot help being somewhat bewildered by it, nevertheless. It gives rise in his mind to perplexing questions. If that philosophy is important which is in revolt against abstractions and against realities which transcend human experience, what about pragmatism? Why not refer the serious student of the present international situation to the writings of James or Dewey or Schiller? If philosophical humanism is needed, then certainly the emaciated intellect in search of *vital* pabulum should sit down to pragmatic meat. Now if pragmatism leaves the thoughtful economist or statesman cold—and it usually does—then perhaps we can turn to the philosophy which so describes human relations as to impress one with a warm sense of the integral unity of all men, their spiritual kinship in a universal order. Such an impression might yield the intuition that the good of a man or a nation lies in the good of other men or other nations, and would not such a theory throw light on the world-problem of to-day, in the sense of resulting in enlightened international agreements and attitudes? But if so, what about contemporary objective idealism? What about its theories of the state and its doctrine that the essence of any individual is not self-contained but implicated with the being of all others? This is a magnificent and stirring view of human nature and of the order of existence. Now if this is not what our average intelligent man wants—and he usually does not, granting he is a man of affairs, political or economic—then the professional philosopher begins to suspect that what this man considers important is economic or political treatises about specific subjects, such as, say, the gold standard or the present Anglo-Japanese relations. Of course, not any treatment of these subjects would satisfy his need. I believe that Sir Herbert's plea is, unwittingly, for such treatises where these are *enlightened by world-perspectives* or are engendered against a philosophic background. But is there not much in contemporary philosophy which, if patiently assimilated, will give a man a philosophic background? One could hardly expect philosophy itself to consist in enlightened economic or political treatises dealing with current problems. The production of such treatises is—if I may play with words—the business of the business man, taking "business" in its best and broadest sense.

Now if numerous and varied philosophic theories of human relations are being and have been formulated, such that the world-spirited and philosophically hungry individual has much to choose from, why not permit, even encourage, the philosopher to theorize about *any* class of problematic relations—as, for example, the epistemological? The difficulty is not that we have an insufficiency of philosophies about men and nations, but that too few men of



affairs care about becoming philosophical. Unfortunately, this is true of the average intelligent student of political and economic crises. But the student of world-affairs who does have a genuine hunger for that detachment and that integral understanding of human relations which the philosopher deals with, can well satisfy it by the assimilation of books written since the beginning of this century. (Just why our student generally demands *recent* books of this kind is not clear to me. Of course new attempts are always valuable, inasmuch as something better than ever may be achieved. But, philosophically considered, they will not be better merely for dealing with specific current problems. If they possess greater merit on a philosophical plane, it will be because they express more adequate solutions for the same problems that troubled Plato or Descartes or Kant.) And let no such serious student turn away from philosophy because the first book he picks up, or the first philosophical lecture he attends, is on epistemology. The theory of knowledge is by no means the whole of philosophy, not even of present-day philosophy, though it is an important part.

In conclusion, I shall attempt to justify that phrase "important part" by making what might be called a counter-suggestion. Though Professor Montague is correct in his contention that "philosophy's primary interest is in the ways of things rather than in the ways of knowing them"<sup>1</sup>—and Sir Herbert is evidently of the same opinion—yet there is a sense in which the typical modern temper urgently needs epistemology. Who has not sensed that widely prevalent apathy among our contemporaries with regard to anything theoretical? And what is one major reason for the consequent intellectual dilletantism? It is, it seems to me, the underlying "feeling" that either (1) human knowledge is through and through a pretty shoddy and futile gesture, or (2) if it is not, at least no one seems capable of giving a straightforward description of it which does not violate common sense, so the less said about it the better. Now, confronted with this situation, I am strongly inclined to believe that the greatest philosophical geniuses of our time should be enlisted in the field, not of the theory of social relations, but of the theory of knowledge. To clear the atmosphere at that point by a simple yet scientific account—such does not yet exist—of how men lay hold of reality in cognition and, by truly knowing it, find themselves in an intimate and ever-growing control over it—to do this would be doing yeoman service to the average intelligent man. Eventually, it might give him more zest even for dealing with international problems. It seems plausible that even pensive statesmen, or, let us say, delegates of the League of Nations, would think and live with an abandon which to them would be impossible had they not

<sup>1</sup> *The Ways of Knowing*, p. 413.



first arrived at something they could take to be the solution of the epistemological problem.

And if the patient for whom we are prescribing epistemology makes a wry face and says, in the words of Callicles, "Well then, proceed with those little cramped questions of yours," we shall remember the reply that Plato put into Socrates' mouth and say with Socratic irony, "You are fortunate, Callicles, in having been initiated into the Great Mysteries before the Little: I did not think that was the proper thing."

VIRGIL C. ALDRICH.

THE RICE INSTITUTE,  
HOUSTON, TEXAS.

May 24, 1934.

MY DEAR EDITOR,

By putting bluntly the vital question of whether philosophy, like the natural sciences, has a message for the comfort and encouragement of millions, or whether its sole legitimate function is to quench the speculative thirst of the few, I feel that our President has done a signal service to philosophers and laymen alike. Although I shall venture to disagree with much of the answer he proposes, I am none the less grateful to him for raising so fundamental an issue.

There would, I think, be little disagreement about the plain historical fact that the great philosophers seem, as a rule, to have regarded themselves as specially entrusted with the piloting of their fellow-men towards the haven of spiritual achievement. One remembers—calling to mind only a handful of the intrepid band—how Socrates followed his conscience against inexorable Athenian law, how Plato abandoned contemplative ease for a despot's court, how Aristotle became a schoolmaster to save an empire, how Rousseau prophesied the dawning of democracy while Condorcet sketched the lineaments of its educational system, how Fichte fired the patriotism of the German nation before Hitler and without reviling the foreigner or the Jew. How often, indeed, have philosophers sallied forth from their ivory tower into the dust and conflict of national or international turmoil; and even after withdrawal to its tranquil chambers, have they not beckoned others to share with them the wider sweep its balconies command, the purer delights and the more abiding peace that visit all those its walls embrace?

This sense of mission may, of course, have been an empty illusion bred of megalomania, but its generality among philosophers of the highest standing is at any rate a presumption in favour of authenticity. There is, however, one feature of philosophy common to both



Oriental and Occidental thinkers, that occurs as regularly among ancient cultures as in post-Renaissance Europe; and it is this, I believe, that constitutes the most essential bearing of philosophical thought on the day-to-day problems that confront and perplex the ordinary man.

For the attitude of mind cherished by the sage, and exemplified as much in his manner of existence as in the substance of his speculative conclusions, has been always and everywhere the same; his heart is filled with an unshakable conviction that the only life really worth being lived is a life resplendent with scientific truth, with religious vision, with moral and artistic beauty, and that, however crushing the weight of ignorance and however powerful the sway of selfish or destructive instincts, reason and love must ultimately prevail wherever humans dwell. Prometheus, according to the legend, snatched fire from heaven in order to bring warmth and comfort to the chilled bodies of men; philosophy is a second Prometheus, but the torch it bears was kindled in the flame of the ideal, and the invigorating warmth it engenders thaws the numbness of the questing spirit. I cannot for my part agree with Sir Herbert that philosophers are sufficiently unanimous on epistemological, ethical, or metaphysical issues to be able to present the public with a body of doctrine as unassailable as the discoveries of exact science, or that philosophy should be content to relate itself "directly and deliberately to the needs of life"; the former step would invite pronouncements on many delicate questions that are still *sub judice*, while the latter would degrade a purely theoretical investigation to the level of a mere technique. It is the temper of philosophy, rather than its actual findings, that should count in the world at large; in an age when men desire as never before to heap up riches, to gratify the passing whim, to subjugate their weaker brethren, to satisfy their dreams of personal ambition, and to hear the applause of the multitude in their ears, the supreme indifference of the sage to such pursuits and his single-minded devotion to the highest cultural values are the most precious gift he can bestow.

Yours faithfully,

LISTOWEL

LONDON.

May 1, 1934.



# TRUTH AND MODERN DICTATORSHIP

I. DONSKY, Ph.D.

THE Epistemology of dictatorship! This expression couples terms which seem to be utter strangers to each other. How could a political régime which is an eminently practical, often violent, hard-striking thing be concerned with a science which is an essentially unpractical, introspective business of secluded and subtle contemplation?

It could, however, be shown that it is natural for political régimes to be interested in the theoretical views of the populations they control, and even in the express or implicit epistemological views of the said populations.

Any political régime is interested in the loyalty, respect, and even love of the people for the government, for the form of government (the constitution), for the country, for the nation. Any political régime desires the citizens to be patriots and loyalists, monarchist, republican, fascist, or bolshevik, as the case may be. Now loyalty, respect, love imply formulated or vaguely felt judgments of value. And the judgments of value presuppose theoretical judgments, distinct or implicit. Supposing I hold the real quality  $\alpha$  to be a value and the real quality  $\beta$  to be a disvalue. Then if anyone wants to obtain my positive valuation for an object O, he is interested in evoking my theoretical belief that O possesses the quality  $\alpha$  and does not possess the quality  $\beta$ . If a political régime is interested in judgments of value, it is also interested in theoretical judgments which could serve as a foundation for the judgments of value.

The interest of the State in the views of the subjects assumes various forms. There are two fundamental and extreme types of State attitude in this matter; most States, however, occupy intermediary positions between them.

Tolerant, free, democratic States try to obtain loyalty and patriotism only by peaceful, non-coercive means. They use coercion only in exceptional cases of extreme danger. And their peaceful persuasion is of an unobtrusive, uninsisting character. It is also noteworthy that their attempts at influencing and determining the popular mind are usually restricted to special and somewhat reserved subjects. Large fields of thought are left free from any State interference. In dictatorial, intolerant States, loyalty is imposed coercively, although persuasion of a most obtrusive character is very largely used. Here State interference usually tends to embrace very wide fields of thought and even to control the popular mind in its totality.



It may be remarked that coercive opinion-control under intolerant régimes may assume both positive and negative forms. Positive control imposes the views the State holds to be desirable. Negative control prevents the diffusion of undesirable views. Positive control imposes some thought, negative control tries to obtain abstention from some thought. Sometimes the undesirable views constitute genuine knowledge. In these cases negative control means an attempt to promote ignorance.

Another remark. The interest of the State in the views of the citizens must be distinguished from its interest in education. The second is an interest in the acquisition of true or useful ideas. The first is an interest in the absorption of ideas, the assent to which serves the cause of the rulers. But there are possibilities of coincidence. The State may diffuse ideas which serve both aims. It is worth noting that the purely political, intrinsically non-educational thought-diffusion by government most often takes the form of education.

Later on we shall return to the State attitudes just sketched. Meanwhile the following question arises. The State seems to be interested in the contents of the popular views. But how is one to prove a State interest in popular epistemology which is not concerned with the contents of any thought, but deals with the formal problems of the truth or falsehood of thought? The State wants me to hold the thought that A is true. But is it interested in my holding particular views as to the nature of truth? And is there any popular epistemology? Are large popular masses concerned about the problem of truth?

Now the attitude of the spirit towards thoughts held to be absolutely certain differs from the attitude towards thoughts held to be doubtful. Generally our attitude towards our thoughts is influenced by the assumed truth-value attributed to them. These attitudes constitute an epistemology which must be rough and loose in untrained minds. This epistemology is inherent in the lowliest steps of the human mind and deserves to be called the popular epistemology. And this often hardly conscious epistemology may find expression in differences of behaviour which are at times of great importance to the State. Recognition of absolute truth may engender a kind of behaviour different from that bred by the denial of absolute truth. Here lies the practical relevance and the political importance of mass epistemology.

It is, therefore, quite intelligible that political régimes should try or tend to foster or to favour definite epistemological attitudes; that there should be a correspondence between the atmosphere of a political régime and the patent or latent epistemology it is inclined to encourage on the territory under its sway.



Let us try to outline the epistemology favoured by free democracy. Then we shall endeavour to delineate the epistemology of its opponent: dictatorship.

Free democracy is a régime where all kinds of thoughts are allowed to circulate freely. This is what a liberal régime really means. Now it is often suggested that the granting of the liberty both to say and write that A is B, and to say and write that A is not B implies the denial of absolute, objectively valid truth. If contradictory statements are equally admitted, so one may argue, it means that both are equally true and that truth is only relative. Does liberal democracy really imply relativist epistemology which teaches the relativity of truth?

It is very difficult to find out what relative truth really is. One may claim that any truth must be absolute truth because to be true means to be absolutely true. One may even claim that the affirmation that both "A is B" and "A is not B" are true does not depart from the principle of absolute truth because it pretends, for better or worse, undismayed by logical contradiction, that both these statements are absolutely true. The declaration that truth is true only under some special presuppositions and false under others does not imply relativity of truth: it seems only to affirm that truth is absolutely true, given this or that special presupposition. One may suggest that relativity of truth is included in the affirmation that judgments are held to be true by some and to be false by others. But this affirmation only claims the relativity of the recognition of truth, not the relativity of truth itself.

Despite the difficulty of defining relativity of truth, we cannot dispense with the use of this rather ambiguous concept. It could not be doubted that absolute truth is sometimes denied; and this denial may be held to be equivalent to an admission of relativity of truth, whatever that may mean. And although, as we have tried to show, even the affirmation of mutually contradictory statements is not necessarily tantamount to an affirmation of relativity of truth, such a defiance of the Law of Contradiction seems to be at variance with the notion of absolute truth and to suggest relative truth.

Now democratic régimes allow the free adherence to and the free exchange of mutually incompatible, mutually exclusive views. But this does not mean that the State accepts logical contradiction and denies logically self-coherent, non-contradictory, absolute truth. If I allow people to emit and to diffuse the mutually incompatible statements "A is B" and "A is not B," it does not mean that I hold both to be equally true, each in a relative way. To leave the utterance of a statement unimpeded does not mean to take it up as one's own.



Two possibilities are to be discerned. In some cases the State does not know which of the admitted alternative statements is true. Then it leaves the decision to free discussion. The free comparison of the arguments in favour of each of the conflicting propositions is likely to lead to the removal of the uncertainties, to the emergence of absolute truth. "Du choc des opinions jaillit la vérité." The untrammelled consideration of the various opinions is the necessary prerequisite of the discovery of the only truth. The admission of free discussion is not opposed to absolute truth; on the contrary, it serves the cause of absolute truth. In other cases the State knows the truth. It is aware of the absolute truth of the judgment "A is B." Even then it may allow free discussion and leave contradiction unrepressed. It assumes that free discussion will clear up the doubts and dispel the errors. Finally the hitherto unrecognized truth will triumph and win general assent. Moreover, the State may hold public adherence to the false statement "A is not B" to be politically and socially harmless. In no case does the liberal attitude imply the relativist denial of absolutely valid truth.

Yet, on the other hand, it must be recognized that the free admission of logically incompatible statements may spring also from a creed of Relativism. The very fact that a multiplicity of statements is allowed to circulate irrespective of their mutual agreement or disagreement suggests the possibility that the broad-minded government which is responsible for these liberties holds the conflicting statements to be of equal value, a value which is not that of absolute truth.

Now we have to take into account the fact that liberty of opinion in free democratic States is more or less limited in actual practice. There are "reserved subjects" the State takes special care of. The dissemination of some privileged views is enforced by compulsion. The utterance of statements in which the privileged views are exposed to doubt or denial is resented, discouraged, and in some cases prohibited and made impossible. The views in question are usually those in which the external and internal stability of the State is engaged. Patriotism and loyalty to the State are the keynotes of the regions of thought the State chooses to withdraw from the sphere of unfettered liberty. The more liberal the State the less place it leaves to this exceptional intolerance. But a fringe of intolerance exists even in the most liberal States.

When the State is in external danger, the compulsory enforcement of loyalty expands. The field of State-reserved thought grows very considerably; in some cases it may invade something like the whole of the intellectual life of the nation.

These developments have curious consequences. The obedience to some ideas is claimed as an unbreakable duty. It must be absolute.



In so far as this obedience presupposes assent to some propositions, the propositions must be adhered to without any wavering, doubt, or limitation. These State-protected, State-backed propositions are imposed as an absolute truth. But the same phenomena have another aspect too. The State-imposed propositions are to be held true independently of free investigation, independently of being tested by the standards of objective, absolutely valid truth. Such testing is excluded as dangerous to the absolute stability of the State-decreed beliefs. In so far the attitude of the State denies absolute truth in its logical necessity. The epistemology implied in this attitude is quite peculiar and utterly different from the normal and regular epistemological ways of the free democratic State. This epistemology is only an exception in democratic communities, although it is, as we intend to show, the ordinary rule in the modern dictatorial State.

The dictatorial State of our days claims absolute power over the whole of the lives of its subjects, and, first of all, over their minds. The dictatorship is firmly resolved to make any kind of opposition impossible and to guarantee the unlimited durability of its complete mastery over the minds. Accordingly, it must enforce a permanent and general adherence to a State-favoured system of thought. It must tend to subdue the whole horizon of popular thought to the supremacy of the dictatorial interests.

The State-imposed system must extol and glorify the nation and its dictatorial rulers, including the political party from which they sprang. The devotion of the nation to itself must coalesce with the devotion to the dictators, the latter being described as the superior incarnation or quintessence of the nation. In so far extreme respect for the rulers must appear to the mind of the people as the best expression of national self-respect. The State-desired devotion must find itself favoured by views in which the ruling group appears as the possessor of qualities implying perfection. These views deemed favourable by the dictatorship expand into a system of thought which is imposed as an unshakable, unquestionable, absolutely valid truth. But we shall see that dictatorship, at the same time, ascribes to the statements it lays down and to which it commands belief—only the value of a non-absolute, relative truth.

It is forbidden to doubt, to question, to criticize, to investigate, to test the dictatorship-imposed beliefs. The dictatorial ideas must be accepted independently of rational and empirical testing. In democracies the admission of rational and empirical thought-testing is the rule. Even the fitness of the government is subject to such testing under normal conditions. Under dictatorship both the perfection of the government and any other State-favoured object of belief are to be accepted blindly.



This untested dictatorial belief may remind us of traditional religion where we are exhorted to believe independently of Reason and Experience. There is, however, an essential difference. In religion the object of belief is transempirical. In dictatorship it is empirical, at least to a very considerable extent; the dictatorial government and its work are located in the world of common experience, and not among hidden noumena, not in a necessarily veiled intelligible world. And these empirical dictatorial realities are to be believed in unempirically.

This curious unempirical belief in empirical realities bears some analogy to a phenomenon in another field. The German psychologist N. Ach has noticed that sensuous presentational phenomena (images) can be thought of (*i.e.* judged about or remembered) without any sensuous imagery. I can remember a past sense perception without experiencing any images resembling the sense phenomena of the remembered perception. This non-sensuous representation of sense phenomena reminds us of the unempirical belief in empirical realities under dictatorial régimes.

It might be objected that the dictatorships do not exclude experience and do not rely on mere belief without empirical corroboration. We know that the dictatorial régimes indulge in spectacular display, in loud and gaudy advertisement, thus supplying their populations with experience likely to confirm the merits of the government and the veracity of its affirmations. Popular belief is in so far being given an empirical foundation.

But this experience is not a free experience. Only favourable instances are open to inspection and admiration. Their official description is often exaggerated and sometimes delusive. It is made impossible to question or to verify the State-recommended experience. The unfavourable experience is withheld, withdrawn from the public eye. To try to make it known is a punishable offence. These conditions hold for any views the State is determined to impose upon the popular mind; only exceptional, one-sided and strictly controlled experience in favour of these views is admitted. Free observation is excluded.

It could be remarked that the situation is not exceptional. In religion, too, we find corroboration of unempirical beliefs by some empirical evidence: the miracles. The miracles, too, are an experience which has to be accepted uncritically, without the possibility of free examination. There is, however, an unmistakable difference between religious and dictatorial belief: the miracles are empirical manifestations of a transempirical reality, whereas the objects of dictatorial belief could claim no such transempirical character.

What was said about experience is applicable to any other kind of proof, *e.g.* to reasoning. Dictatorships aspire to confirm their



views by all sorts of reasoning. To this end they encourage journalists, publicists, and scientists to be their spokesmen, regarding their offices as existing to support dictatorial views by reasoning. Here, too, reasoning is unfree. Only favourable trains of thought are admitted, and their impartial examination is impeded. Unfavourable reasoning is banned.

Again we find here a resemblance to some religions which admit reasoning within the boundaries of apologetic corroboration, but ban it in so far as it may question or contradict the tenets it is only allowed to confirm. But once more we must keep in mind the difference: religion deals with transempirical objects, while in dictatorship no such transcending of experience is involved.

Dictatorship excludes free reasoning and free experience. But it uses both reasoning and experience in its own work. *E.g.*, it uses them in its diplomacy, sometimes with much subtlety; and in its internal policy, often with much cunning. It favours natural sciences and their technical applications in which it sees a promise of increased economic and military power. And natural science, pure or applied, implies a very vast and intricate interplay of experience and reasoning. All this many-sided practical use of Reason and Experience in dictatorship does not alter the fundamental opposition of dictatorship to Reason and Experience as absolutely valid, universally recognized, and freely accessible sources of truth.

Dictatorship affirms and proclaims the absolute truth of its views. The absolute validity of this dictatorial affirmation is connected with the proclaimed absolute worth of the dictatorial State, with its veracity and trustworthiness. The absolute truth is somehow centred or rooted in the absolute worth of the government.

That truth should be held to flow from an assumed privileged authoritative source is a most widespread phenomenon. After all, we assume the truth of many judgments on the ground of our assuming the trustworthiness of those from whom we learn the said judgments. But, as a rule, the assumed trustworthiness is not the *ultimate* source of the assumed truth. Of course, while relying on information supplied by others, we found our assurance on explicit or implicit judgments about the knowledge, the erudition, the truthfulness, the sincerity of the person from whom the information is drawn. But, after all, we assume the trustworthiness of our teachers only because we hold them to be acquainted with a truth, inaccessible to ourselves, which is valid intrinsically and independently of its being affirmed by any set of persons, however qualified. The *ultimate* source of truth lies in its intrinsic nature, not in its being affirmed by authorities. This is our attitude towards scientific propositions we have to "borrow" without examination from those who are scientific authorities in our eyes. The described connection of assumed truth



and assumed authority is quite different from that found in dictatorship. In the latter case the truth is supposed to flow *ultimately* from the assumed value of the supreme authorities: the dictatorial government. There is no question about an intrinsic truth-value as different from that of the authorities. The absolute truth of the State-protected propositions and the absolute worth of the rulers are merged into an indissoluble whole. The official truths are true because they are pronounced by the absolutely trustworthy government; and the government is trustworthy because the assumption of its trustworthiness is one of the absolutely valid truths.

Under such conditions the dictatorship cannot admit any absolute valid truths whose validity is guaranteed by any other criteria but the proclamation by the dictatorship itself. Therefore dictatorship must ban objective logical validity as a criterion of absolute truth. Objective logical value is a source of truth different from that of the dictatorial truth-proclaiming State. The dictatorship is essentially jealous in matters of public epistemology. It cannot admit objectively valid absolute truth because it claims the absolute truth-value for its own propositions independently of their possessing objective logical validity.

The incompatibility of absolute dictatorial truth with logically valid objective absolute truth has various aspects.

First, dictatorship is afraid of admitting truth-standards extraneous to itself because the admission of such criteria does not strengthen the dictatorial prestige and may even weaken it. The prestige must be all-embracing, monopolistic, exclusive. The admission of non-dictatorial truth-sources would mean a sharing of the supreme intellectual authority of the State and might lead to dangerous movements of the popular mind. Some people might test the dictatorially backed propositions in the light of competing criteria, and the testing might lead to the rejection of the said State-favoured propositions. Logically valid, objectively absolute truth is such a competing and potentially dangerous, virtually subversive criterion, that dictatorship must oppose it.

Secondly, the recognition of objectively valid absolute truth may imply its recognition even in the case of its being discovered and propagated by persons or groups different from or hostile to the dictatorship. But dictatorship scorns the recognition of value in individuals or groups outside itself. It declares itself to be the *only* truth-producing or truth-announcing agency. Besides, hostility to other groups is often a very important and sometimes essential part of the dictatorial thought-systems. To recognize that strangers might be sources of truth is a dangerous heresy in the eyes of the dictatorship. We could mention the most violent Bolsheviki opposition to any non-Bolshevik, non-proletarian thought, scientific or artistic.



In Germany we witness the same violence of opposition to diverse products of thought on the ground of their being non-Nazi, non-German, non-Aryan. Now, as we said, the recognition of objectively valid, absolute truth may lead to recognition of truths emanating from strangers: objective validity of truth is held to be independent of the personal identity of those who discover or diffuse it. Here dictatorship finds another motive for its hostility to logically valid, objectively absolute truth.

The absolute dictatorial truth is not the logically valid, objective absolute truth. The two absolute truths are in mutual opposition. Objective absolute truth is opposed to political absolute truth. The assumption of a special political absolute truth as different from objective absolute truth is the most salient feature of the epistemology of dictatorship. We must add the following remark: Political absolute truth is the truth whose claims to be such are based on being issued by the dictatorial political authority. This does not mean that the contents of the political absolute truth must be political. The political authority of dictatorship covers also non-political subjects. Propositions of all kinds may be invested with political absolute truth.

The affirmation of political absolute truth means the denial of objective absolute truth. But the denial of objectively absolute truth is an assumption of the objective relativity of truth. The politically absolute truth of the dictatorship is objectively relative. The objective relativity of the dictatorial truth finds expression in its being grounded on the utterances of the chosen dictatorial leaders. The dictatorial absolute truth is relative to the dictatorship which is its source and criterion.

The dictatorial epistemology teaches both an absolute and a relative character of the same truths. And their absolute character (the political one) is logically rooted in their relative character (the objective one). Only the denial of the severe standards of objective absolute truth opens the way for an untested and unhampered display of political truth-creation. Only if objective absolute truth is discarded, political truth can be absolute in its relative way. Only if the dictatorial truth is objectively relative can it be a politically absolute truth.

We have attempted to give a general and rather abstract outline of the epistemology of dictatorship. This outline finds confirmation in the actually expressed attitudes of modern dictatorships.

The most popular epistemology in the Soviet Union seems to imply the repudiation of objectively valid absolute truth. There is, teach the Soviets, no universal truth common to all mankind. There is a bourgeois truth and a proletarian truth. Proletarian truth is to be imposed as an absolute truth. Bourgeois truth is to be rejected.



The search for an objectively valid, impartial, absolute truth is a bourgeois activity of a dangerous character. The exclusively proletarian, but absolutely valid truth is less an attribute of thought than a characteristic of action, of work. Every variety of activity breeds the corresponding truth. The Socialism-building proletarian work of the Soviet State has its own truth, the compulsory, practically absolute proletarian truth. This absolute truth is relative to Bolshevik dictatorship and to its activity.

Italian Fascism, as expounded by its philosopher Giovanni Gentile, declares itself to be a doctrine which tends and claims to control not only politics, but also the will, the feeling, and the thought of the nation. Having its centre of gravity in politics, Fascism deals with moral, religious, and philosophical problems. It denies value to a thought that is not expressed in action. It identifies thought and action. Furthermore, Gentile declares that religion and morals should be subordinated to and fused in the authority of the State.<sup>1</sup> Truth is thus made subservient to politics, to Fascist politics. Thought must obey action, the action of the Fascist State. This means the rejection of objectively absolute truth in the name of what is true on account of its being demanded by Fascist politics. The truth that is rooted in the active will of the State is relative to that will. It is absolutely valid (as a political truth) despite this essential relativity.

One of the leaders of Hitlerite Germany, Alfred Rosenberg, has sketched a philosophy of Hitlerism. Rosenberg denies science that is independent of race. Science must be determined by the blood. Thought and will must be brought into agreement with the German racial soul, with the Nordic tradition. National honour and national freedom must become the highest value, the beginning and the end of thought. These ideas must rule dictatorially; only on that condition could a nation be preserved and become a State. At the same time, Rosenberg declares the national honour, this supreme arbiter of thought, to be a myth. This myth has the character of a volition which must be our reply to all questions and doubts.<sup>2</sup> These views amount to a denial of absolute truth. The criterion of true thought is a will of a national group, rooted in its blood, in its conception of national honour. And this obviously relative truth is to rule dictatorially as an imposed politically absolute truth.

The attempt to give truth a purely practical character which seems to be a peculiarity of some dictatorial epistemologies reminds us of Pragmatism. An indirect influence of Pragmatism on the epistemological views of some dictatorships is not impossible. But there is a striking difference between the epistemologies of Prag-

<sup>1</sup> Giovanni Gentile, *Origine e dottrina del Fascismo*, pp. 35-52, Roma, 1929.

<sup>2</sup> Alfred Rosenberg, *Der Mythos des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*, pp. 22, 117, 139, 236-237, 486-493.



matism and of dictatorship. Pragmatism holds truth to be relative to practice, but does not hold it to be absolute at the same time. Pragmatism does not assume, like dictatorship, the absolute value of the relative truth. Besides, Pragmatism assumes different kinds of practice, different practical interests to which different kinds of pragmatically valid relative truths may correspond. Dictatorship knows nothing of peaceful and tolerant ways. It is essentially intolerant. Its truth is relative to one privileged kind of action, to one supreme practical interest.

One may argue that the dictatorial way of recognizing a statement not to be objectively true and of claiming its absolute value at the same time is a self-contradictory way of thinking. The denial of objectively absolute truth of a proposition and the affirmation of its absolute truth under the aegis of dictatorial politics seem to contradict each other. Now some psychologists (especially M. Lévy-Bruhl) describe primitive man as illogical and prone to contradiction. Primitive man is supposed to assume the same thing to be at the same time at different places. He is supposed to assume that a name is at the same time both identical with and different from the thing named; that a dream image of a person of which we dream is both identical with and different from that person. And one might be tempted to affirm that the attitude of dictatorship which deliberately enthrones contradiction as a foundation of publicly recognized truth is a relapse into the ancient attitude of accepted contradiction.

It is difficult to say whether the dictatorial attitude in epistemology is really contradictory. The denial of absolute truth and its affirmation at the same time is a self-contradictory attitude if the truth affirmed and the truth denied is the same truth. We might, however, assume that politically absolute truth is quite different from objectively absolute truth. In this case there is no logical contradiction in affirming the first and denying the second. At any rate, there is no proof of illogicality being limited to our remote ancestors or savage contemporaries. Indulgence in some contradiction is an attitude or a weakness that seems to haunt us even to-day. While perceiving physical things we both identify our sense percepts with the physical object and distinguish them from it. This is only one instance of our unmitigated logical carelessness. If dictatorial epistemology is self-contradictory, it might be a new expression of our perennial inconsistency.

While discussing the epistemological views in liberal democracy we have noticed that the liberal State admits objectively absolute truth as an ideal freely to be pursued, but takes up a different attitude in exceptional cases in which the search for objective absolute truth is hampered or made impossible, while a relative



State-proclaimed truth is given a coercive politically absolute value. We have seen that this situation, exceptional in freely governed communities, is the universal law under modern dictatorship.

The situations in which liberal democracy recurs to this back-sliding on its fundamental and usual principles are the situations of alarm and danger, sedition and war. War is the most characteristic occasion, and the last world war was a stupendous example of war-induced deliberalization of liberal democracy. The epistemology involved in such cases is the epistemology of war. In dictatorship the "war-mentality" which is only a tragic and heroic exception in liberal communities invades the very foundations of social life and becomes its natural horizon; dictatorships tend to be militarist. And they quite naturally develop the "epistemology of war" and adopt it as a normal and usual attitude.

Objective absolute truth is denied by mighty leaders and by the vast human masses they conduct. Of course, as pointed out above, objective truth is presupposed even under dictatorship in various branches of practical activity, and especially in applied science. But in deeper, less immediately practical, less technical matters objective absolute truth is discarded. New peoples may add themselves to the formidable multitudes that already embrace the dictatorial creeds and their epistemology. And even the universal adoption of dictatorship with its peculiar epistemology does not seem to be impossible.

But the value of objectively absolute truth is intrinsically inviolable (*e pur si muove*). This truth would retain its unimpaired validity even if there was no human mind to long for it and to recognize it. And the capacity for seeking objective truth and appreciating it after its discovery is an essential and necessary characteristic of the human mind. Human responsiveness to intrinsic values is a necessary counterpart of the validity of these values. And Man is necessarily responsive to logically valid truth, although he is also liable to error and, as we saw, inclined to inconsistency. If the epistemology of dictatorship succeeds in obscuring and oppressing the effectual exercise of this truth-seeking disposition, it will remain a potential and latently lasting possibility. And earlier or later the dormant possibility will blossom into actual fact. The attempt to change human nature by means of coercive decrees must fail even if the decrees are welcomed with continent-wide cheers and applauded by ardent millions. The unchanging intrinsic worth of the valid values will attract chosen heroic pioneers and, perhaps, martyrs of a new freedom that must follow the new wilfully servile age, darker than the Dark Ages of the past. Meanwhile we have to face the possible approach of an era in which human thought might endure the overwhelming pressure of the epistemology of dictatorship.



# GREAT THINKERS

## (II) PLATO

PROFESSOR G. C. FIELD

IT is really impossible to say anything worth saying about Plato in general within the limits of a single article. Indeed, the more one studies Plato the more impossible does it become—if the concept of degrees of impossibility may be used in a philosophical journal. The reasons for this are manifold. The first lies in the supreme greatness of Plato as a thinker. Hardly anyone who has made a serious effort to study Plato has escaped receiving the impression of him as probably the greatest thinker of all ages. The difficulty is intensified by the particular form in which his greatness is conveyed to us. One may make a distinction, a relative distinction at least, between different philosophers in this respect. With some, their message is conveyed to us with comparative rapidity, even perhaps on the first careful reading, and subsequent study adds little except in the way of detail. Among these it would perhaps not be unfair to place Hume. Others, on first reading, will appear obscure and difficult, sometimes even repellent. It is only after a much more careful study that their real greatness emerges, and they may go on increasing in stature at every subsequent reading. Such, I believe, to be the experience of the majority of readers with Kant. Plato is almost unique in that he makes his impression in both ways. Almost everyone is captivated by him at first reading, but it is only to those who take the trouble of reading him again and again with the intellectual effort that he himself would have demanded that his full store of riches is revealed, if, indeed, it is ever completely revealed to any one person.

To bring out the true width of range of his thought, we may suggest another distinction between the methods of different philosophers. There are some whose main contribution to thought consists in a few comparatively simple ideas. They take these as the basis of their system and apply them to all the particular problems with which they deal. Once one has grasped these fundamental ideas, it is relatively easy to see how the rest of their doctrine follows. With others, and these the greatest, we find a continually fresh approach from different aspects of experience and a continual readjustment of their theories to these. It is easy to see that this type of philosopher can be discussed from almost every angle of our experience, and that



we cannot really do justice to them until we have done this. Plato is emphatically of this latter type. He was a systematic thinker in so far as he was always striving to make his beliefs coherent with each other. But he continually considers them anew in connection with different particular problems, and to each of these particular problems he has a fresh contribution, from which we can always learn much, independently of his general theory. Thus, for instance, when he discusses the status of sense-perception in the *Theaetetus* or the psychology of pleasure in the *Philebus*, we can, it is true, see the connection of his results with his other theories. But we can learn a great deal from what he has to say on these particular problems, whether we accept his other theories or not. It follows from this that any attempt to summarize Plato within a short compass would inevitably do him a serious injustice.

We are not yet at the end of our difficulties. A further difficulty arises from the character of his writings. As everyone knows, he has left us no systematic treatise in which his doctrines are set out in the manner to which we are accustomed with most philosophers. Instead we have a series of dialogues, or dramatic conversations, dealing with a variety of particular subjects, in most of which Socrates is the principal speaker, and in none of which Plato himself appears at all. The significance of this fact has been very variously estimated. We need not linger here over the well-known Socratic controversy. It is still maintained by a minority of scholars that in most of the dialogues the views put forward are those of Socrates, and not necessarily those of Plato at all. The majority of scholars have not found this convincing. But in any case, pragmatically speaking, Plato and the Platonic dialogues are identical. The only Platonic philosophy to which we have access is the philosophy of the dialogues, and it is that philosophy which has been an influence and an inspiration for subsequent generations of thinkers.

But even allowing for this, to extract a philosophy from the Platonic dialogues is not always so easy. When we examine them we find that they take the form of a series of occasional essays, each in a special setting of its own, and each dealing with its own particular problem. The general points of view from which these problems are approached are very often implied rather than stated, and when stated, very rarely argued at length. I have elsewhere<sup>1</sup> compared the task of extracting a philosophy from the dialogues with the task of tracing the course of a submarine mountain chain by the peaks which appear here and there above the surface. And I still think that this metaphor is accurate, so far as any metaphor can be.

The result of all this is that there must necessarily remain a good deal of room for difference of opinion in the interpretation of Plato.

<sup>1</sup> See *Plato and His Contemporaries*, p. 58.



Still more, of course, is there room for selection of the particular aspects of his many-sided thought which appeal most to each reader. But even the differences and the difficulties of interpretation are themselves instructive and can afford a stimulus to our own thought. It is a tribute to the impression that Plato makes that so many different schools of thought have sought to find something in his writings which would support their own doctrines. They have often succeeded, though in some cases, it must be confessed, not without a good deal of manipulation of the evidence. But just as most doctrines of importance have had some truth on which they base themselves, so those who claim the support of Plato have generally found some element in the richness of his thought which has stimulated them in the direction in which they have gone. Yet it would not be paradoxical to say that Plato has often exercised his greatest influence on those who have misunderstood him. Certainly the schools which succeeded him and which bore his name represented only fragmentary parts of his real teaching. If we feel that we appreciate his thought more to-day than ever before, it is because we have learnt from the mistakes of our predecessors.

The conclusion is that, in an article such as this, it is only possible to indicate some of the chief lessons that the writer personally carries away from the study of Plato, with a warning that this is only a selection from a much larger whole, and that another individual might very likely make an entirely different selection.

I. Perhaps the first impression that we take away with us from the reading of Plato is of his faith in reason. This statement is open to possible misunderstanding, and it would be as well to say a word of what it does not mean before going on to consider what it does. It does not mean that Plato believed it was possible to find out all about everything by sitting in his study and thinking out a theory, without any reference to practical experience or to the observation of observable facts. This point of view has often been ascribed to philosophers, probably untruly in most cases, and certainly without a shadow of foundation in the case of Plato. He was perfectly well aware of the importance of experience and observation in their proper place. But he insisted that it was only by hard and systematic thinking that we could learn how to use them rightly. I have argued this point at greater length elsewhere in this Journal,<sup>1</sup> and I need not repeat the argument here. Nor does it mean that Plato had any exaggerated belief in the reasonableness of human beings. This belief, too, has often been supposed, with very little foundation, to be characteristic of philosophers, but it is certainly the last charge that one could make against Plato. It is clear that he thought that there would never be more than a small minority of human

<sup>1</sup> In an article "Plato and Natural Science," *Philosophy*, Vol. VIII, No. 30.



beings who were capable of reaching complete rationality, and only for them would it be possible after a long and strenuous course of training.

It does mean that he thought that hard thinking was the only way to arrive at truth, and that to arrive at truth was the most important thing for any human being. There was for him no alternative method, no short cut, to this goal. He was not, as has sometimes been supposed, a religious mystic, if by mystic we imply one who claimed to arrive at the highest knowledge by some special and direct kind of experience, different in kind from the experience of ordinary thinking. Still less would he ever have thought that any kind of truth could be revealed by the aesthetic experience, the "fine frenzy," of the poet. Many literary men who have not been over-fond of hard thinking themselves have tried to claim the support of Plato for some such point of view as this. Their knowledge of Plato rarely seems to extend beyond a few brief selections of special literary interest, culled from two or three dialogues. In Plato's own writings there is no vestige of support for this view. If we are to believe that he meant what he said, he would have repudiated it with scorn and indignation.

His belief in reason is one of the foundations of his general view of the nature of reality. He took over from Parmenides the fundamental principle that what is fully real must be intelligible and what is fully intelligible must be real, and he applied this unflinchingly throughout. This is a principle which has often made its appearance in the subsequent history of philosophy. It appears, for instance, in Descartes, in his statement that the clearness and distinctness of ideas was the test of their truth. How Plato developed it we shall see more in detail later. But we may observe here that he was saved from the danger of a too rigid application of this principle by his recognition of a realm of half-reality "rolling about between being and not-being," in his lively phrase. This is the fleeting and obscure world of material physical objects, which will always contain an element inaccessible to pure reason. But even this world we can only understand and deal with in so far as it approximates to the world of scientific and rational thought.

He applies this general point of view especially to the guidance of our own conduct, both in our private lives and in our social and political activities. He was born in an age in which critical examination of accepted standards of conduct was widespread. And the first results of this, as was natural, had been mainly destructive, so that many things which had before been taken for granted without criticism were now being doubted, and there seemed nothing certain left. There were many men in Plato's youth who were saying, as timid minds have said in all ages, that all this criticism was dangerous



and unsettling, and that men ought to go back to the unthinking acceptance of the old standards. It was probably from his master, Socrates, more than from anyone else, that Plato learnt the lesson that the only way to meet the dangers of critical thought was by further and deeper thought. There was nothing to be gained by an attempt to stifle the reasoning powers and to refuse to face the new ideas. His whole treatment of moral and political questions is based on a plea for the application of hard and systematic thinking to the problems of conduct and on faith in the possibilities of this. The advocates of "national planning" in our own day might well return to Plato for their inspiration. But he would have extended his planning very much beyond anything that is proposed by them.

II. There is another characteristic of Plato which is to be found in the thought of nearly everyone who has attained supreme eminence as a thinker. That is the combination of a keen interest in the results of the scientific thought of the time with an equally keen interest in the problems of conduct, and a conviction that our interpretations of both these aspects of human experience must somehow be connected with each other. The special form in which this was developed by Plato was in his famous Theory of Ideas, or, as it is sometimes and more correctly called, his Theory of Forms.

As far as one can judge, he came to this theory by working from two directions simultaneously. On the one hand, he realized that all our moral thinking implies the notion of an ideal of character or conduct to which our individual actions and our individual lives might approach nearer and nearer, but which it was impossible that we could ever completely realize. At the same time, we could not think of this ideal as merely something which we made up for ourselves, for the whole of our moral judgments imply that we are not free to make up our ideals of conduct according to our individual caprice, but that there is a right and a wrong in them; that is to say, they are something there to be discovered. In other words, they have reality, and for Plato the most complete reality possible.

Plato's investigation of the science of his time led him in the same direction. The most fully developed science in ancient Greece was, of course, mathematics, and it was to this that Plato turned for the type of true scientific knowledge. He found that in mathematical thinking also we are dealing with entities which are not completely found in the material world of sense-perception, but which are none the less real objects of knowledge. The most obvious and familiar instance of this can be found in geometrical figures. We know that we cannot draw an absolutely straight line or an absolute circle. We can, of course, make our lines thinner and thinner or straighter and straighter, but we can never reach the



line as geometrically defined. In the same way, in other branches of science, we deal with absolutely rigid bodies or absolutely pure fluids, though no such things are known in what we usually call the real world. Yet we certainly do not invent them. They are there to be found out about.

It is easy to see that we can come to think of the relation between the mathematical object and the approximation to it which we find in the material world as analogous to the relation between the moral ideal and our approximation to it in our own conduct. It was the discovery of this analogy which was the most characteristic feature in Plato's theory. These real ideals, whether found in the objects of mathematical science or in the realm of moral judgment, are called by Plato by a name which is most closely represented in English by our word "form." That is why we speak of the theory as the theory of forms.

This theory received many interesting and some extremely obscure developments at Plato's hands, and a number of points in its interpretation are still matters of dispute. But its main lines are pretty clear and were never departed from by Plato. On the one hand, we have the world of Forms, which Plato calls the world of Being (as we should say, the real world) or the intelligible world. This is the object of scientific knowledge; that is to say, our judgments about it are definite and unequivocal and, if true at all, are absolutely true. It is also permanent, in the sense that it is unaffected by the passage of time; for instance, a fact in pure mathematics is a fact always and everywhere and in all circumstances. And it exists independently of our knowledge of it, as something there to be discovered. On the other hand, we have what he calls the world of Becoming, that is to say, the continually changing world of physical nature, which he also calls the object of opinion or belief. None of our judgments about this world are absolutely and unequivocally true: they have only a limited pragmatic validity. They are approximately true, or true in certain senses, or true enough for practical purposes. But there is only this degree of truth and reality about them because and in so far as their objects approximate to the world of Being. Plato expresses this relationship, which we have here described as "approximation," by various phrases, such as "sharing" or "participating," or in other contexts "imitation."

The possible applications of this theory are numerous. It gives a special turn to the problem of the relation between the universal and the particular, which has interested so many generations of philosophers. For Plato the universal is never something which is completely in the particulars, but always an ideal towards which the particulars approximate, or in which they participate to a greater or lesser degree, without ever quite reaching. We can see, if we try it,



how fruitful this idea can be in our handling of the facts of the sensible world. When, for instance, we are looking for a definition of a class of objects, we shall often go astray if we try to look for a single quality which is fully present in all these objects and nowhere else. We shall find it much more helpful to look for a kind of ideal Form to which the particular objects approximate more or less nearly. Aristotle's philosophy, which was based on the belief that the universal existed in the particulars, broke down when the belief in the absolute fixity of natural species and their sharp distinction from each other had to be abandoned. Plato's theory would have been perfectly capable of dealing with this fact.

Again we may see how this theory was able to set modern scientific investigation on certain lines which it has followed since. For Plato, we can only deal with the physical world at all in so far as we can discover in it approximations to the nature of the intelligible world. And the special form which he gave to the notion was the demand for the expression of the results of our investigations in mathematical terms and the consequent insistence on the necessity of measurement as precise as possible. This is certainly an idea which has played a great part in the progress of science. We must not, of course, fall into the error of talking as if Plato had in any way anticipated modern developments of scientific and mathematical theory, but we may claim that his theory, or something very like it, could have come to terms with these later developments to a degree which would have been impossible for any other early philosophy. It is noteworthy how a thinker like Professor Whitehead, when he attempts to base a philosophical system on the results of modern physics and mathematics, produces, as he fully recognizes, something which is much closer to the system of Plato than to that of any other philosopher.

One of the most interesting special applications of this general theory is to our thought about human conduct, particularly political and social activity. We get the most complete expression of this in the *Republic*. There Plato insists that the first duty of a real statesman is to have a clear and definite conception of the ideal state at which he is aiming. Only so can we have any standard by which we can judge of actual or proposed measures and by which we can guide our practical efforts. But he is perfectly clear that this ideal state is not something which can be applied ready-made to actual conditions. Indeed, it is the essence of his doctrine that the ideal state is never absolutely and completely attained, any more than, to use his own comparison, a picture can be entirely identical with the original. Just as an artist who wishes to produce as good a likeness as possible works with his eye always on his original, so the statesman must always keep his eye on the ideal in order to attain



as nearly to it as the circumstances and material in which he works allow.

III. The third point on which something must be said is on the religious beliefs and attitude of Plato. And here perhaps more than anywhere it is necessary to beware of the temptation of trying to force Plato's thought into modern moulds.

Plato undoubtedly was a man of profound religious faith, but we must not necessarily assume that this faith took the forms with which we are familiar in Christianity. He believed that the existence of God could be rationally proved, and there are plenty of indications in the dialogues of the lines on which he thought this proof must proceed. The proof is based on the general nature of the material physical world. We have seen that he regarded this physical world as only an imperfect approximation to the real world of the Forms. But a further point of great importance is that even the relation to the real world that it has at any one moment is never permanent. In other words, the material universe is continually changing, both in its qualities and in its spatial relations. Now this fundamental fact of change and motion cannot be explained by relation to the Forms. The Forms are the principles of permanence and stability. Nor is there anything in the nature of matter itself which can set it in motion, or account for the fact that a particular material object at a particular time participated in a particular Form. In our own experience we find that it is only animate bodies which have the power of moving themselves, and we therefore come to the conclusion that soul must be working throughout the physical universe to account for the fact of change and motion. Further, this motion and change (especially when seen on a large scale, as in the motions of the heavenly bodies) are found to be orderly, regular, and subject to law. And this is a proof that it is not merely soul, but rational soul, or mind, which is working throughout it. And this rational soul or mind which works throughout the physical universe is what Plato calls God.

Now the activity typical of a rational soul or mind is activity with a purpose directed to some end. We must therefore consider the activity of the soul which is working throughout the universe as animated by a purpose. If we ask what that purpose is, the only reply possible is that it is to bring everything to the utmost perfection of which it is capable. We must add also that in accordance with the most probable interpretation of Plato's statements, the standard of goodness or perfection is to be found in the eternal Forms. These exist in their own right and are not themselves in any sense created by mind, even the Universal mind. They are rather the objects of mind's knowledge and provide an independently existing standard which mind discovers and towards which it directs its endeavours.



The idea that the Forms themselves are the "thoughts of God" is a product of later speculation, and according to the best modern scholarship is not Platonic.

Be that as it may, it is clear that for Plato all the processes of the physical universe are in some sense an expression of God's purpose, that is to say, they are controlled and directed by a mind or spiritual principle working through them. The lesson for us is that we have for our own sakes to co-operate with, or conform ourselves to, the working of this purpose. For Plato, as I should interpret him, there are two fundamental elements in the religious attitude proper to man. There is firstly the sense of our own insignificance and of the unimportance of our own private and personal desires as compared with the purpose of the whole; and secondly there is the sense that by the conduct of our own lives we are taking part in a great enterprise in which the soul throughout the whole universe is engaged.

We get the impression in certain passages that Plato believed that this attitude was to a certain degree fostered and expressed by various religious ceremonies. It is clear, however, that he did not think the particular form which these observances took mattered very greatly. Indeed, as far as we can judge from his writings, the whole matter of forms and ceremonies took a very secondary place in his mind. The primary and fundamental expression of this religious attitude was for him to be found in right conduct, the pursuit of virtue and the avoidance of vice in our daily lives. And this found its highest form in the activity of the true statesman. The highest good of which man is capable is to co-operate in the realization of the ideal community. This is, for him, the supreme expression of religion, and he nowhere assigns to religion any great importance apart from its expression in conduct. We may say that in general for him religion is not a form of activity distinct from morality, but a spirit in which morality is pursued.

It must be admitted that this interpretation of Plato's religious views would not meet with universal acceptance. There are certainly individual dialogues in which he appears to be taking a rather more other-worldly view. Yet, be it noted, when he does speak, in terms which suggest the language of religious mysticism, of a possible experience which has an independent value beyond that of practical morality, such language is used not of a specifically religious experience, but of philosophical and scientific understanding of the Forms. There is little or nothing in his writings about the personal relation of man to God which is such an important element in Christian religious experience. Such, at any rate, is the impression left if we read his writings as a whole, without letting our judgment be too much influenced by modern preconceptions.



These then are some of the impressions which are left most strongly on the mind of one reader at least by a study of Plato's dialogues. But, of course, they are only a small selection from a much larger whole. And no brief summary can do justice to the wealth of stimulating suggestions on almost every philosophical problem that anyone can derive from a reading of the dialogues. We may conclude with yet a further suggestion about the necessary incompleteness of our understanding of Plato.

It has been suggested above that Plato for us necessarily means, before all else, the author of the Platonic dialogues. Though we are well enough informed about the main events in Plato's life, and have a few precious indications of his personality from his letters, yet it remains true that as compared, for instance, with our knowledge of any modern philosopher, we know very little indeed about Plato apart from his writings. We know enough, however, to realize that for Plato himself and for his own contemporaries the writings would have seemed a comparatively minor part of his services to the world. He tells us more than once in his letters that the most important part of any man's teaching is what cannot be expressed in any single treatise or collection of treatises.

If Plato himself had been asked what part of his activities he regarded most seriously, he would, there is very little doubt, have named the establishment of the Academy, the school or college which he founded when he was about forty and presided over for the remaining forty years of his life. From the longest and most important of his letters we learn that his early interests and ambitions were primarily political, and though as time went on he found that there was no place for a man such as he was in the practical politics of his time, yet he always maintained the belief that some contribution to the welfare of society was the highest duty of any man. It is clear that his primary purpose in founding the Academy was to provide a training which might eventually produce a number of men of the type that he felt was really needed for the government of the state. As far as one can judge, there was no previous institution of exactly this type, and Plato may fairly claim to be the originator of the whole idea of the organized educational foundation.

How much actual practical effect Plato's work had on the political life of his time is very difficult to estimate. But one may say with confidence that the popular idea of him as a mere theorist, whose ideas had no actual or possible effect on practical politics, is founded on nothing but ignorance. We have excellent evidence that in many states in Greece Plato's pupils were recognized as expert advisers in questions of legislation. Plato's own intervention in the political affairs of Syracuse, the story of which has been told too often to need repetition here, was doubtless not very successful. But the



suggestion which is often made, that this was only one more example of the inability of the theoretical philosopher to apply his ideas with any effect in practice, is quite baseless. Plato himself, as is evident from his letters, never expected that very much good could come of it. The fact was that the practical men had got the situation in Syracuse into such a hopeless position that there was really no way out, and Plato's failure was no more conspicuous than that of anyone else who intervened in the affairs of that unfortunate city. But there is every evidence that in the object which he really did set before himself, namely that of educating the kind of man who might, when the opportunity arose, do really valuable service, Plato attained a considerable degree of success.<sup>1</sup>

At any rate, this may serve as a reminder that so far as our knowledge is restricted to Plato's writings, we only know half of Plato. It is interesting to wonder whether his stature would be increased or diminished in our eyes if his personality had been presented to us as vividly as, for instance, he himself has presented the personality of Socrates. Doubtless we might find in him, as in every human being, certain small weaknesses which would not show themselves in his writings. In one of his letters, for instance, there are traces of a not unamiable fussiness about small details. But this, as we can see from many modern examples, is quite compatible with the greatest intellectual attainments and moral elevation, though some scholars have been so shocked by the suggestion that a great philosopher could have any human weakness at all, that they have declared the letter must be a forgery. As far, however, as we can judge, the feeling he aroused in those with whom he came most closely into contact was one of almost religious veneration. At any rate, there is nothing in anything we know about him which need in any way detract from the profound impression that his writings make on all those who study them seriously. Indeed, they gain in their effect when we realize that they were written by a human being and not by a mere personification of philosophical and literary virtues.

<sup>1</sup> I have discussed this more fully in *Plato and His Contemporaries*, chapters ii and iii.



CHANGE<sup>1</sup>

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## I

§ 1. Of all the subjects which for well over two thousand years have remained the more or less constant topics of philosophical discussion, I can think of none which has not at some time by some philosopher been dismissed as a nonentity or an illusion. The history of philosophy seems to show that we cannot begin fairly to estimate the nature of any element in the universe until we have steadily contemplated a universe from which that element has been hypothetically eliminated.

§ 2. The theory that change is an illusion came very early in the history of Western thought—almost as soon as change ceased to be an unquestioned assumption and men began to wonder what it was. Parmenides' defiance of the senses, and his conception of the universe as a solid plenum without variety or change, were the main stimulus provoking classical Greek philosophy. Some consideration of them ought, I think, to preface any discussion of change, for the Greeks discovered most of the difficulties of the subject.

§ 3. Parmenides reached his paradox by pressing to its logical conclusion the general principle of his predecessors' thought. The monists of Miletus had each posited a single permanent substance as constituting the essential nature of the universe. It is commonly called a material substance—Thales, of course, said that it was water, Anaximenes that it was air—and they are commonly called materialists, but one must remember that within their substance, or in respect of their substance, there was for them no distinction of matter from form or from spirit. They were not materialists or atheists such as to rouse the indignation of a Berkeley; they were even ready on occasion to give their substance the name of "God." Perhaps "corporealists" would be a better name for them. The point here is simply that they regarded this substance as eternally underlying and explaining all the qualitative differences which display themselves to sense-perception at any moment, and from moment to moment unfold themselves in endless fresh diversity. They set out to explain the world in terms of what they thought

<sup>1</sup> The substance of two inter-collegiate lectures delivered at Oxford in January 1934.



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it was made of, assuming that such an explanation would be final; the process of the world's making, its transition from permanent substance to unceasing sensible diversification, they merely took for granted.

§ 4. Heraclitus, however, the last of the monists, was not quite so innocent. The ever-changing face of nature excited his imagination as it had failed to excite that of his predecessors. He took fire for his substance, but he put forward a relativist theory of diversity and change which is not really at all consistent with the notion of an eternal underlying substance. Almost one might say that in the hands of Heraclitus the underlying substance which had been posited to explain change became change itself. He remarked that one can never step twice into the same rivers, but he might have said even more plausibly that the flames which leap and fall continually, as they consume fuel and pass into smoke, have no bond of sameness in them to make them one.

§ 5. After this the retort of Parmenides was inevitable. If, he said in effect, what is fundamentally real is single and eternally the same with itself, then (a) it cannot be a unity of variously characterized elements, nor be in itself in any other way variously characterized; and (b) it cannot *become* diversified. For (a) we can only think what *is*; what *is not* is unreal and therefore unthinkable. If, then,  $x$  differs from  $y$ , we have to say that  $x$  is not  $y$ . But to predicate not- $y$  of  $x$  is to predicate not-being of  $x$ , which amounts to saying that  $x$  is unreal, is not itself; for if  $x$  is real it is *ex hypothesi* eternally itself. Hence the one real substance cannot be one as a unity of different elements each of which is none of the others; for it would then be a unity of unrealities. And it cannot be a unity of various characters; for to affirm any one character of it would be so far to deny its other characters of it, i.e. to predicate not-being of it.

In respect of (b) the argument is essentially the same. If the diversified world of sense is what the one substance comes to be, then the one substance comes to be other than itself. But that is again to predicate not-being, unreality, of what is *ex hypothesi* absolutely real. Parmenides actually puts this by arguing that whatever comes to be must come to be either out of what *is not* or out of what *is*. But it cannot come to be out of what *is not*; that is patently absurd. And out of what *is* it cannot *come* to be; for there is nothing but what *is*.

§ 6. Now the theory of the negative judgment on which these arguments are based will seem obviously untenable to us all, but it paralysed philosophy for nearly a century. Efforts were made to meet the charge of deriving change *ex nihilo* by multiplying the primary substance, or by positing a mass of corporeal atoms differing



only in size and shape; but they failed to overcome the fundamental objection against the very nature of diversity. Finally Plato in the *Sophist* showed that sameness and difference, so far from being incompatible, are only intelligible if taken together. He pointed out that the not-being which is predicated in any significant negative judgment is not unreality, but just that character of otherness which belongs as fundamentally as does sameness to anything in the universe, and indeed to the universe itself. As the Latin phrase *aliud aliud* aptly expresses, everything is just as much *not* anything else as it is itself: it is other just as much as it is self-identical.

§ 7. This immensely important advance in the analysis of negation does not, however, constitute any refutation of Parmenides as a critic of the eternal substance theory. Parmenides' logic is the logic proper to that theory, the only logic by which it can claim to be judged. If you maintain that the real essential nature of the universe is an eternal homogeneous stuff out of which it is made, then you will in the end be forced to admit that your stuff not only cannot contain diversity but also cannot transform itself into diversity. For your substance is fully real *as such*. It only *is*, and is self-identical: it cannot also be other. Plato's solution, on the other hand, makes the real as fundamentally other as it is self-identical. It implies that so far as the universe is a corporeal whole, change is no more secondary and derivative than is rest. Where they appear, the two characters are co-ordinate and inseparable: whatever changes rests from change—or at least, as is the case with the eternally revolving heavens, has in it a correlative stability—and whatever rests is *eo ipso* liable to change. The eternal substance theory in its present shape collapses, and the problem must assume a fresh form.

§ 8. This fresh form we shall shortly have to consider. In the meantime there is one last point to be emphasized in connexion with Parmenides. He held the universe to be one solid, motionless, corporeal plenum. But if we examine his view as a positive theory and not as a mere piece of criticism, it becomes clear that he has no right to assert even so much as this. For example, rest, or immobility, and corporeality are two diverse characters, and they are, moreover, general characters of sensible objects. How, then, can they be attributed to a real One, which, whatever it is, is at any rate not the object of our illusory sense-perception? Parmenides leaves us in no doubt that the One *is* corporeal, and he argues that it does not move because a necessary condition of motion would be void, and void would be not-being. But to call the One either corporeal or motionless is on Parmenidean premisses quite unjustifiable. Indeed, it cannot on his principles be the bearer of diverse characters at all, sensible or otherwise. If you push the One to its logical



conclusion, it must turn out to be a mere "thing-in-itself"; in fact, just nothing at all.

§ 9. We can now perhaps conveniently sum up what we seem so far to have learnt about change. Three closely connected conclusions emerge:—

(1) The problem of unity and diversity is one problem, whether it arises as the question how one substance can be the bearer of various qualities, or whether it comes before us as the problem of change, *i.e.* as the problem how a thing can *become* diversified and yet retain self-identity. That this is a single problem is what the multipliers of the primary substance, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and also the atomists, failed to see, but Parmenides makes it quite clear.

(2) It is one and the same in principle to attempt to explain what anything really is by analysing it in terms of an ultimate simple constituent or constituents, and to attempt to explain it by tracing it back to its temporal origin in something simple out of which it has come to be—or, if you like, which has come to be it. And in either case the effort is bound to fail: the simple constituent or the simple original source will inevitably turn out to be not a fundamental reality but simply nothing at all.

(3) Rest and change are characters which are inseparable in whatever they characterize. You cannot, therefore, derive change from rest: you cannot explain it in terms of that which is static. What has, in fact, to be explained is a world of alternating and correlated rest and change. Change implies a permanent which changes, but the permanent persists in and through the change; it does not underly it as the reality of which change is the secondary and perhaps illusory manifestation. This is so wherever there is change. If we praise the constancy of a lover or the enduring quality of a great idea, we do not thereby mean to extol a rigid fixity rejecting and refusing change. A passion or an idea which cannot renew itself does not constantly endure: it suffers the change of death. When we use such language we are taking the half to express the whole: by constancy we mean consistency, by endurance a continuance of fruitful vitality. And I think we can make no exception in favour of a material universe. Unless we steadily maintain this reciprocal implication of change and rest, we must either with Parmenides posit an ultimately static reality which will on closer inspection turn out to be nothing at all, or else we must deny the permanent altogether, as Heraclitus came near to doing, and put our faith in an absolute flux within which there is no tie of sameness to hold together its fugitive phases.

§ 10. Now we might suppose ourselves to possess in these results a satisfactory solution of the problem. The universe, we might be



tempted to say, is unity in and through diversity. And this unity in diversity in its essence is not the mere unity of a substance in a fixed diversity of qualities. So to view it would be to take it in abstraction from its own full nature. It is, in fact, both the outcome and the source of change in which it is throughout immanent. It is in its essence concrete change. In concrete change, we might go on to say, there is not mere flux or transiency, masking a purely static real from which it emanates in some mysterious and probably illusory fashion; nor in the world as concrete change are there static and transient elements co-ordinate and juxtaposed—a relation, incidentally, which I do not know how to express intelligibly at all. Rather, as Mr. Collingwood would put it, the two concepts overlap: what would by itself be merely static, and what would by itself be mere flux or successiveness, are fused in one nature, and that one nature is the essential nature of the universe.

§ 11. All this we might be encouraged to say, but should we have explained what change is? I think not. For if the universe were concrete change in the sense which I have tried to give the words, flux and permanence would be so fused in every phase of that change that there could remain no difference of phase from phase. The whole universe would, on this hypothesis, enter as a self-identical whole into each and every phase of itself. Perhaps in the end we shall find that in some sense it does, but on our present hypothesis it would so enter that its self-sameness would be total and consummate in each phase. It would contain no principle of differentiation in itself, and its phases would collapse helplessly into one phase, which would not be a *phase* but a changeless state—if, indeed, it would be anything at all. And the same would hold good of a limited subject of change, if it were possible on this hypothesis to distinguish any limited subject of change.

It seems, then, that we must cast back. We cannot maintain the complete fusion of permanence and flux in every phase of change.

§ 12. It might now be suggested that within each phase of any change there is partial fusion or overlap, but that the subject of change is complete only in all its phases taken together.

Here we must be careful. I think the first part of this suggestion is true, and perhaps also the second; but I do not think that the second part follows directly from the assumption of the first. It doubtless would follow if we could say that each phase contributed a part, and that the whole, the subject of the change, is gradually constructed of such mutually complementary parts. But that is impossible. It would mean that there was no whole until the last phase was reached. It would mean that there was neither any limited subject of change nor any universe until change was over, and that is scarcely what experience suggests. What our experience



of change does suggest is something different, and I confess that it is a paradox. It suggests that the subject of change does somehow fail to manifest its full nature in any given phase, and does require all its phases for its complete self-expression, but that it yet does enter into each and every phase as a whole. The phases are in some sense complementary, but they are not complementary parts; for each of them is a phase which the subject assumes *instead of* the previous phase, so that in every stage of change the subject is present as a whole, and yet in every stage it appears to have suffered a gain or a loss in completeness.

§ 13. This view of change, according to which the phases are in a sense complementary and yet in a sense alternative, does imply the partial overlap of permanence and flux in each phase. But it does not directly explain how the subject of change can be complete—if it is complete—in all its phases taken together. It is not easy to see how a whole can be a whole of phases which are at once complementary and alternative. It suggests something like a woman who possesses a complete wardrobe of clothes for all the day's occasions, and tries to attain the perfection of dress by wearing them all at once. Yet, difficult as this view is in itself and in its consequences, we seem to accept it every time we call a thing by the same name both before and after it undergoes a change; for we do then imply that the whole and not a mere part of the thing is present throughout the process. Therefore I think we must examine this notion of partial fusion or overlap more closely, and not at once reject it for its seemingly self-contradictory character.

§ 14. Certain corollaries, I think, follow obviously from this paradox of complementary yet alternative phases, for which we have had to relinquish the hypothesis of a completely concrete change. (a) If the phases differ from one another according to the less or greater completeness of the subject of change in each of them, then these differences will fall into an order of degree. (b) The ordered series of phases may proceed from less to greater completeness, or from greater to less; and this at any rate suggests that all change is transition to or from a climax, a culminating phase of completeness. In other words, we have reached the familiar notion of development. We are to work with a teleological hypothesis in respect of all change: to endeavour to explain it wherever it occurs as an ascent towards, or a decline from, the self-consummation of the subject of change.

§ 15. Now I wish to try to expand this interpretation of change for a few minutes, but I do not wish to give the impression that I find it easy. I will point out one obvious objection to be met which may in the end compel us to modify, if not reject, the whole hypothesis. It will be said that if at its climax the subject of change



is fully perfect and complete, then the comparatively imperfect phases must lose their aspect of complementation and with it all meaning and reality. They will become utterly otiose, and change will turn out to be no less illusory than Parmenides believed. We might perhaps evade this criticism in respect of any finite subject of change by saying that just because it is a finite thing it can never have a climax which is a complete perfection, but in the case of the universe considered as the subject of change that would be no answer. For if the universe at its climax is incomplete, if never and in no sense is it fully perfect, the problem is merely postponed: we shall be asked by what right, by what standard, we judge it to be always and in all senses incomplete. And if at any moment or in any sense it is complete and perfect, then that it should require complementation by lesser stages of its own perfection looks like a flat contradiction.

§ 16. However, let us for the present persevere. That all change is development or decay was the solution propounded by Plato, but elaborated in more definite detail by Aristotle. Aristotle's position is roughly this. All change is to be viewed teleologically. Any changing thing, animate or inanimate, is at a given moment either at a zenith of maturity in which its essential nature is fully expressed, or else it is either ascending to or declining from such a zenith. If you try to define a maturing or decaying thing, it is only by reference to its zenith that you can do so; so that what you are then in fact defining is just the essential nature, and all you can add to your statement of that essence is the mere negative reservation that the thing has not yet reached, or has already passed, its zenith; which is to say that it does not yet possess, or that it has now lost, its essential nature. A child and a dotard, so far as they have positive reality, are just that essence of manhood which the dotard once embodied, and the child gives promise of embodying. Thus potential and actual are on this theory strictly correlative terms. Potential being—as when a child is said to be potentially a man—is, as it were, a loan, a reality borrowed from actual being; but it is a loan on good security. At any stage of change before or after its climax the developing or decaying thing is actual in so far as it is not at maximum distance from its climax, *i.e.* in so far as its essential nature might be less fully realized than it is; the thing is potential in so far as it is unrealized and fails to embody its own essential nature. Thus the essential nature, which Aristotle calls the form, is (a) that in terms of which the changing thing must be defined; (b) it is the end, or final cause, which motives the development of the thing from imperfection to perfection. So Aristotle's teleology is an explanation of things strictly in terms of value. A thing can be defined only in terms of its own characteristic excellence, and this



characteristic excellence is the only cause which can be rationally assigned to a process of change.

§ 17. Moreover (c) this perfection which is at once the formal cause of the developing thing and the end, or goal, of its process, its final cause, is also the efficient cause of change, inasmuch as nothing begins to develop until a mature, actual, embodiment of the form sets the change going. *E.g.* a child develops into manhood, which is at once its essential nature and the end of its process of development. But the process cannot start until an actual adult man initiates it in the sexual act. In the realm of explicitly purposive change, *i.e.* the sphere of action, the principle is the same. An end to be actualized is the final cause of action, and the action is definable as good or bad according to the goodness or badness of that end, which is therefore the formal cause also of the action. Moreover the end, as a vision ideally present to the agent's mind before the action, is his motive, the efficient cause of his action.

§ 18. Even in the inanimate world an analogous teleology holds good. In all inorganic change which occurs necessarily and intelligibly Aristotle sees final and formal as well as purely *a tergo* efficient causation. When there is no apparent final cause, either our insight has failed—as is to be expected in the relatively imperfect and undeveloped world of inanimate nature—or else, as he sometimes seems to allow, something in its own nature really contingent has changed really accidentally. But such a contingent event, if it does occur, is not rationally explicable. It is no matter for science. In general, inorganic process, even where it is not obviously teleological, as it is where it subserves organic process within a living body, nevertheless does manifest final cause. I will spare you the details of an obsolete physics, and take only one example. According to the Aristotelian theory of gravity, earth, the heaviest of the four elements, falls because its essential nature is to move towards the centre of the universe. That is its *natural* place, and it most fully manifests its true form, its real nature, when it reaches the centre of the material world.

§ 19. One last point will connect this theory with Parmenides. According to Aristotle, if you analyse a changing thing at any given stage of its process, you can distinguish in it its matter and its form. So far as it is actual and developed it is form; so far as it is merely potential it is matter. Thus matter and form are simply the respective static aspects of potentiality and actuality. Matter is not a positive something at all: it is the element of potentiality which dwindles as a thing develops and increases again as it decays. It is called by Aristotle the material cause of the changing thing, and it is a necessary condition of change. But such positive character as it appears to possess is really only conferred upon it by form. Thus



you may analyse a living body into (a) the form of life, the unity of function which makes the living being what it essentially is, and (b) the material body which subserves life, and you appear to have reached two positive factors. But the material body is itself a union of matter and form, and upon further analysis into matter and form will reveal simpler and simpler constituents. Hence *logically* the ultimate term of this analysis will be what Aristotle calls primary matter, a matter bare of all form, a potentiality quite unactual; i.e. a logical limit and not a positive physical constituent at all.

Thus by Aristotle the corporeal eternal substance theory is exactly reversed. It becomes evidently useless to seek the essence of things in an ultimate constituent or a primitive condition—Aristotle realizes clearly that the principle is the same in either case—for that path leads not to reality but to nothingness, to primary matter. The real nature of things is revealed only in their climax.

§ 20. In this way Aristotle, developing Plato, replies to Parmenides with a thoroughgoing teleology. It can only be judged fairly in the light of his whole metaphysical system, and I do not suggest that even when so elucidated it offers a solution which wholly satisfies. I have sketched Aristotle's conceptions of potential and actual being, and of all change as necessarily a development or a decay, only for the purpose of indicating in outline how one may set about explaining change on a teleological hypothesis. I propose now, not to elaborate this quite general hypothesis, but to endeavour to test it in a sphere in which it seems *a priori* most unlikely to be verified. This will compel me, much against my will and far beyond my competence, to hazard some remarks about modern physics. For, if there be worlds in which there appears to be change without development, worlds whose elements apparently are in process, but do not in that process realize less or more of an excellence which is their own essential nature, one of them at any rate would seem to be the world of classical, or pre-quantum theory, physics. It is a world I come to as a stranger. Yet sometimes the impressions of a tourist have a vividness which continued residence tends to dull. In the hope that such an impression may be mine, and with the proverbial insolence of tourists, I shall dare to pass comment on some of the sights which may have grown too familiar to the natives.

(To be continued)



# THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICAL EMPIRICISM

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THE bearing of certain psychological doctrines upon ethical theory is important, and has been made use of especially by those who espouse empiricism in Ethics. It is the purpose of this paper to examine some of these leading doctrines and the ethical theory which has been connected with them. In doing so, it is appropriate to select for examination the views of Professor W. McDougall, as expressed principally in his *Social Psychology* and *Outline of Psychology*; and this for two reasons. One is, that these views are significant of much more than the opinions of one man. They may be taken quite fairly as representative, in the main, of a definite body of doctrine concerning the nature and development of moral experience. This doctrine inevitably contains much psychology, and in the hands of Professor McDougall it is expounded by a psychologist of eminence and with a good deal of detail; moreover, he often makes large excursions beyond the bounds of psychology into the domain of Ethics. The second reason is to be found in the widespread circulation which McDougall's writings (chiefly his *Social Psychology*) have enjoyed. I am aware that his position has often been criticized, notably and at some length by Dr. H. Rashdall; but I hope that what follows will be more than a going over old ground once again.

## I

It may be assumed that Professor McDougall's accounts of the nature of a sentiment and of the development of self-consciousness are so well known as to require no more than an outlined description. A sentiment is the organization of emotions (or instinctive dispositions) around the idea of some object, the idea being the nucleus of the sentiment. In this connexion we may notice the clear separation which he makes between cognition and conation. He refers to "the obvious fact that the development and organization of character, or of the conative side of the mind, is largely distinct from and independent of the development and organization of knowledge, the cognitive side of the mind." But if cognition and conation are largely independent, and if a sentiment is a system of conations, by what means is this system formed? One might be tempted to say that the bond of union is the nuclear idea, especially if every conation



is excited by a cognition, and if the energy of an evoked sentiment does not flow towards the idea but away from it.<sup>1</sup> This is not McDougall's explanation, however; rather does he say that "the oftener the object of the sentiment becomes the object of any one of the emotions comprised in the system of the sentiment, the more readily will it evoke that emotion again, because, in accordance with the law of habit, the connections of the psycho-physical dispositions become more intimate the more frequently they are brought into operation." This is an explanation in terms of frequency and habit. Frequency, however, is not indispensable, as a single experience of striking character may create a firm bond between idea and emotion.<sup>2</sup> In any case, we have here an appeal to principles of association and habit; but in the *Outline of Psychology* McDougall is careful to tell us that "I now see clearly that motor habits are not in themselves springs of action"; and that the only other form of association (*i.e.* other than neural, which produces motor habit) is "mental" association or association by meaning, which involves "the true thought factor."<sup>3</sup>

If, then, habit *does* nothing and neural association is ineffective, we must evidently explain the systematizing of emotion in a sentiment by "mental" association, the "true thought factor," which works in virtue of that continuity of interest which Stout also has emphasized. This means that there is a unity within which diverse items are associated together, and apart from which there could be no association. This unity has the character of "true thought," whatever other character it may possess. Why not admit that it is the original unity of the mind displaying itself in *cognitive* oneness? McDougall comes very near to this, not only when he relates thought to "mental" association, but also in his indictment of Associationism for its exclusion of "subject" or "self" as a necessary explanatory postulate. We must therefore come back to that which presented itself as the *prima facie* source of system in the sentiment—the nuclear idea, or (as McDougall in his later book prefers to name it) the cognitive disposition or system. If "cognitive system," by what means is this system formed? And does a sentiment now show itself to be made up of two systems, one cognitive the other conative? If so, how is the conative system formed, if simple association and neural habit must be ruled out? If it is formed by the activity of the subject, is this a different subject from that which is active in forming the allied cognitive system? But if it is the same, and if a sentiment is not two systems, but one, yet having two aspects, it may be claimed that systematizing activity belongs properly to the cognitive aspect

<sup>1</sup> *Social Psychology*, p. 126 (references throughout are to the 16th edition).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 127; pp. 163-4.

<sup>3</sup> *Outline of Psychology*, pp. 218 and 393.



rather than to the other. The various emotions are able to enter indifferently into an indefinite number of sentiments. If it be said that they are not precisely the same emotions in varying sentiments, then the only way of differentiating them is by their cognitive aspect. It is evident that there is no organizing power in the emotions if they are separate from cognition; and if they are not separate, it is because they have a cognitive element that they are susceptible of organization. It is to the cognitive activity of the subject (which McDougall admits is the one agent in all forms of mental activity) that we must trace the organization of its mental life: system lies there or nowhere.

Turning to McDougall's description of self-consciousness, we learn that to be self-conscious is to have a sentiment organized around the idea of the self. The distinctive thing about the self-regarding sentiment is in "self" and not in "sentiment": there are many other sentiments which in principle are the same as this, but there is only one self-sentiment. It is also clear that the system of this sentiment will be of a peculiar kind. Every sentiment is organized around and by a cognitive system, but that which lies at the centre of this sentiment is itself the active subject of all mental organizing. That is, the essence of self-consciousness is the cognitive system which the subject more or less, explicitly, elaborates. This has an important bearing on volition, which is closely related to self-awareness, and on the nature and origin of moral judgment, as we shall see. In the meantime McDougall's intention is to introduce order into the emotional and instinctive life by showing the unity and complexity of emotions in the sentiment; but he also aims to show that this unity is imposed from without, in true empirical fashion: how else are we to interpret his express statements as to the way in which a sentiment is formed? He desires also to exhibit the genesis of self-consciousness in the same empirical way, only here the matter is a little more complicated. Self-awareness is closely related to a certain sentiment. The sentiment grows in the prescribed way, but the *consciousness* of self is presumably a distinguishable element which (since it is "obvious" that the development of cognition and conation are largely independent) has to be separately accounted for in its growth. Particularly has it to be given an empirical origin: cognition is not peculiar to self-conscious beings.

But this empirical intention fails of success in several ways (i) The systematizing of emotions into a sentiment fails of accomplishment unless there is an internal, and cognitive, basis of the system: an *experienced* unity or system cannot possibly be created purely *ab extra*. If it be objected that the unity need not be experienced—it is a disposition—what point is there in claiming that sentiments deliver the emotional life from chaos to order? Doubtless



the chaos would be experienced, and therefore also the order. Further, the peculiar nature of the cognitive system which lies at the centre of the self-sentiment—a system elaborated by the subject—means that it must arise from within and cannot be taken over from without, or even receive its chief causal influence from without. This leads to the remark (ii) that the derivation of cognition of self from a cognitive condition in which there is no native readiness for it can succeed only on the supposition that selves (and things) are already fully constituted objects, and in their own right, upon the first attempted awareness of them, and that the mind displays no activity in this awareness. But this twofold supposition cannot be made. Before the mind can draw upon selves and things it must have consciously separated itself from them, and have become self-aware before and as a clue to awareness of them. Moreover, there is no such thing as passive knowing. In a word, there may be a genetic account of self-consciousness as to its content but not as to its form. To be sure, form and content are inseparable, and one may not be known without the other; but (a) it is certain that the *form* of self-awareness is not derived from without—it is known immediately and “internally” or not at all; (b) the very first *content* of self-awareness is derived internally; and (c) although an externally originating provocation may be necessary to (a) and (b), and so be part of their cause, it cannot be the essential part of the cause, else would it provoke a similar result in all other things whatsoever upon which it could have influence, *e.g.* stocks and stones. The essential part must be a native readiness to be a self: and this is formal. (iii) The separation between the cognitive and conational factors in self-consciousness will not march. For one thing, it savours too much of that atomistic psychology which McDougall rightly reprobates. For another thing, it is admittedly impossible to have either cognition or emotion *in vacuo*: are not the emotional qualities “the cognitive basis of self-knowledge”? The impossibility of sustaining the separation is so far acknowledged when with self-knowledge is closely associated a sentiment of self-regard, *i.e.* a number of impulses and emotions with their related cognitions.

Apparently the meaning of this is—or should be—that self-awareness is of a varied mental content displaying a certain form or system. Conceivably there could be the content without the form, under penalty of chaos—types of which are given and analysed in the *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*; so that it is the form which is the “self” element. It is well to remember this when we turn, with Professor McDougall, to consider the nature of volition. Facing the question why a weak impulse can be willed into action in the teeth of a stronger contrary impulse, he answers that the explanation is to be found in the sentiment of self-regard, which joins itself to



the weak impulse and secures its triumph. This is one more victory for order over chaos, since the life of a person who gives way to strong impulses continually is disorderly, and there is lack of order even on occasional giving way. But in volition "the man himself is thrown upon the side of the weaker motive"; to exert will and to be a man are identical, and will is character in action. Conscience is moral character, and character is "the system of directed conative tendencies": "the better organized and richer the intellect, the more efficiently will character work towards the realization of its goals."<sup>1</sup> In the light of these statements we have to understand—or challenge—certain others, to wit: "in considering the genesis of moral conduct and character we need concern ourselves with the empirical self only"; "the empirical self, the idea of his self which each man entertains, plays an essential part in volition"; "the effort of volition is . . . only a more subtle and complex interplay of those impulses which actuate all animal behaviour"; "it differs from other conations not in kind but only in complexity."<sup>2</sup>

We may accept the general account of volition, and be ready to accept the self in volition as the empirical self, *i.e.* "the idea of his self that each man entertains"; but taken in their context these words might imply the existence of atomistic selves, each of whom has a distinct idea of himself, and between whom there may be nothing common. Now the empirical content of the self may vary widely, as between one period and another of the one person's life, and as between one person and another. It is this content which is strictly empirical; but if we are to speak in this strict sense of the empirical self which plays an essential part in volition, we get no explanation of the matter at all. Volition surely means some degree of steadiness; it means action which expresses to some extent a policy; but there is no guarantee of getting steadiness or a policy out of "impulses which actuate all animal behaviour," or out of the kaleidoscopic variety of the empirical content of mind. Moreover, moral conduct admittedly has a reference beyond the self to other selves, and implies commonly acknowledged or valid standards—a common world of conduct to which the self has to conform. In this common world there must be a thread of identity: each self must treat other selves as selves. The essential identity lies not primarily in contents of empirical kind, but in oneness of the form or general "go" of the minds, or more correctly, in the contents as ordered by this form or "go." It is only if we disregard this form, or believe that man does not differ in kind from the animals, that we can assert that "the effort of volition is . . . only a more subtle and complex interplay of those impulses which actuate all animal behaviour." Professor McDougall

<sup>1</sup> *Social Psychology*, p. 240; *Outline of Psychology*, ch. xvii.

<sup>2</sup> *Social Psychology*, pp. 181, 246, and 237.



admits that we have no clear evidence of the exercise of volition on the part of animals. We for our part may go so far as to admit, for the sake of argument, that there is empirical identity between the higher animals and man, *i.e.* identity of instinctive material at the disposal of the will, so that, if animals do not will, the difference cannot lie in content but in something else. But what else is there, except that element which we have mentioned almost *ad nauseam*?

## II

McDougall does not claim, however, that the self-regarding sentiment is sufficient (though it is necessary) for moral conduct. He speaks also of moral sentiments, which are sentiments of dislike or liking for abstract objects, *viz.* moral qualities such as dishonesty, untidiness, justice, or truth. These "abstract sentiments alone enable us to pass moral judgments of general validity. . . . (They) are the specifically moral sentiments." The self-regarding sentiment of itself would not necessarily lead to moral conduct, *i.e.* to right conduct, since it might perfectly well consist with overweening self-regard in the bad sense. Neither are moral sentiments for abstract qualities of themselves sufficient; if they are not backed by resolute will they leave the person an ineffectual idealist. The best result is reached when these two sentiments unite under the master sentiment for a completely moral life. This sentiment is apparently an extension of that of self-regard, or is its qualification by the moral sentiments. We are brought back, therefore, to the rôle of the self in morality.

But what exactly do the moral sentiments do, and how do they do it? In themselves they are permanent emotional dispositions towards generalized moral qualities. McDougall's explanation would have us believe that they provide a thorough identification with the social point of view (including in the best type of case what society *should* require), and a conviction that action in accord with these qualities is right or wrong. It is also in keeping with his general genetic standpoint that we should believe the one to be the cause of the other, and in the order named, *i.e.* that conviction of social approval is the source of conviction of rightness, so that if the one comes definitely to us the other will inevitably follow. No doubt there is an intellectual process in forming the abstract sentiments, but this is irrelevant to their main functioning. After all, they are still sentiments, and are created and operate like any other sentiment. They are complex conations, but are only a more subtle and complex interplay of those impulses which actuate all animal behaviour; they differ from other conations not in kind but in complexity. And the intellectual process concerned must be discounted, in respect to its efficacy, in accordance with the general principle that "all the



complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is, but . . . the instrument by which instinctive impulses seek their satisfaction."<sup>1</sup> The intellect is the slave of the passions. We are brought then to this position: it is not enough to have sentiments in order to accept the social point of view and to possess the sense of rightness, nor can any intellectual process bring about this acceptance and possession. There must be some further factor which effectually socializes the self-regarding sentiment and endues the moral sentiments with their imperative control over one's conduct. Otherwise volition is egoistic and bad, and the moral sentiments involve at best a detached awareness that society declares certain actions to be right or wrong. This further factor McDougall will have to find on the conational side of our nature.

The missing link is supplied by "active sympathy." It is this which brings effective identification with the social point of view and produces the imperative sense of rightness. It gives the sentiment for self that which in its native egoism it lacks and the moral sentiments their hold upon our conduct. What, then, is this active sympathy, and how does it act? It is "that tendency to seek to share our emotions and feelings with others which is rooted in primitive or passive sympathy and in the gregarious instinct. (It impels a person) to bring his feelings and emotions into harmony with those of others."<sup>2</sup> It thus works to produce sensitiveness towards moral approval and disapproval, and it is this which "leads on some men to the highest plane of conduct . . . regulated by an ideal." Further inquiry elicits the information that active sympathy is peculiar to persons; and this means, if anything, that it is not one of those impulses which actuate all animal behaviour, and that if it is rooted in passive sympathy and the gregarious instinct, it is a plant which does not produce any flowers until it discovers the congenial atmosphere of human nature—in short, that it is a new factor in man as compared with the animals. Also we are told that it is egoistic, in that it is a seeking of one's own satisfaction. Quite so: how could it be otherwise if it is rooted in simple instinct, and if it is to be, *ex hypothesi*, something which is not an intellectual process? In view of this naïve admission it is hardly necessary to labour the point that a tendency to share our feelings and emotions with others has, as such, no ethical character in it, nor has the gregarious instinct or passive sympathy. To want to cease from loneliness may have no more ethical quality than to want the cessation of hunger or coldness; and there is no necessary moral character in the feeling of someone else's emotions—it comes by "passive" sympathy and simply cannot be avoided. Out of the simple impulse to be with others and the necessity of feeling their emotions, active sympathy is somehow

<sup>1</sup> *Social Psychology*, p. 44.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 200.



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derived. But if we remain with others and have our own emotions, the others will feel these in any case, in virtue of their passive sympathy, and we will feel theirs. The only alternative that I can think of is that we should desire, *as a result of thinking*, to bring our emotions into harmony with those of our group. This, however, gives an entirely new turn to the matter, in that it introduces the despised intellectual process, and makes active sympathy logically subsequent to thinking, and also to volition. But this cannot be an alternative, as it is non-empiricist. As to what is meant by an egoistic active sympathy which makes one take the point of view of society and distinguish between right and wrong, it is hard to fathom. No doubt there is a bond of feeling between members of a society, who are held together by something more than a coldly intellectual assent; but is equally without doubt that feeling, like patriotism, is not enough. It provides, as it were, an opportunity or a material, good for social cohesion up to a point, but requiring to be seized and amplified by clear-eyed purpose if it is to yield a human community.

In one place Professor McDougall refers to still another element in the mind as the source of disinterested judgment, viz. the tender emotion, which is the affective aspect of the parental instinct. This is the most powerful of the instincts (we are told), stronger even than fear, since it works directly for the conservation of the species. It is the central element in the sentiment of love and is its main support. Accordingly it is the mainspring of altruism, and McDougall points out, no doubt correctly, that in making this emotion a part of the native endowment of animals and men he is giving altruism its rightful place as an original and not an artificial feature of human nature. To derive altruism from egoism is certainly absurd; but why did he not notice this in dealing with egoistic active sympathy? But perhaps he means that sympathy becomes altruistic when joined with the tender emotion. It is more than doubtful, however, whether a simple instinct of parentalism, admirable though it may be, can function in the required manner. Parental tendencies in themselves are not sufficient to make a right relationship between parent and child, or between children themselves; it is enough to mention unwise parents and spoilt children. And if these tendencies produced harmony within one family, they could not guarantee that there would be harmony between that and all other families, *i.e.* communal harmony. It is the family with a strong sense of its own interest which social reformers have so often viewed with suspicion, and not the family which is such only in name. But any "sense of interest," good or bad, is much more than emotional, even though it include emotion. Disinterested beneficence and moral indignation—in so far as the latter is different from simple anger—demand that emotion be qualified by an attitude more detached and impersonal than itself;



If it be said that it is the sentiment which supplies the deficiencies of the tender emotion, then we are back at a problem which has already been discussed.

The problem which has been before us recently in this paper is that of the achievement of disinterestedness and the universal point of view in morality. It is the question how the idea of the self and the moral sentiments may be bound together so that each affects the other. We may see the problem most clearly by contrasting two persons, in one of whom there is the self-sentiment and therefore volition, and also the knowledge that society acknowledges certain moral qualities as right or wrong, and in the other of whom there is all this, together with the recognition that the right should be willed by him and the wrong avoided. I assume that the description of the second of these persons represents in a general way a person fully moralized. It would not be enough that the first person exercise volition merely, and be unaware of the standards of the community around him. For one thing, this would be to depict a thoroughly unreal person and make our problem artificial. For another thing, it is not the question to which McDougall seeks to give an answer. That question is more properly formulated in the general way mentioned, and in detail in the following manner:—

There will be certain respects in which the two persons will go together; and to begin with we will describe their states of mind in terms which are identical for both. Imagine either of them saying to himself: I am in a situation in which a certain act may be performed by me; this act will be irksome, and in itself makes me averse from its performance. Shall I will this act? (or perhaps our first person would more likely say, Why should I will it?—we must remember that he is a person who can exercise will). The persons about me call it a just act, and say that just acts are right; moreover they declare that right acts should be done by me. So far the mental processes of the two would be substantially similar, but at this point differences begin. The second will say: I recognize this social judgment as binding on me, and so I will perform the act. The first will say: I do not recognize this social opinion as binding; therefore I will not perform the so-called just act. (The case, however, would be different with this latter person if he believed that society would punish him for his omission; even so, his performance would not be properly moral: he would not do the act because he deemed it right.)

Why is it that the one man wills the act while the other does not? McDougall holds that moral judgments of general validity are based on the moral sentiments, and this apparently would govern his answer to our question. The one man possesses moral sentiments, the other does not, even though he may be aware that other persons possess



them. This, McDougall might say, is the kind of situation which arises precisely when you make moral judgment simply a matter of cognition, for has not the delinquent full cognition of the moral standard which he refuses to accept? No, he has not. What he knows is, that *other persons say* that just acts are right and ought to be done. What he does not know is, that this opinion is valid for him, or more simply, that just acts are right. He does not know the meaning of the terms "right" and "wrong," but confuses them with the expedient and pleasant, and the reverse; or else he misconstrues these terms as used by others, taking the one to mean that which is usually undesirable (to him) and the other to connote that which is generally desirable (to him). He has failed to establish a common measure between his own standards, according to which he wills, and those of society. What he calls right others call wrong, and *vice versa*. There is an absence of rationality somewhere, and if in this case society is in the right, it must be in this dissenter. (It would be in society if it were wrong, *i.e.* if the dissenter were a genuine reformer who could see ahead of current standards.) It is through this absence of rationality that he lacks *moral* sentiments, though he may have other kinds in plenty—though even this is doubtful. His standard is not the rational, as is that of society (or as his would be were he a moral reformer), but the desirable—that which brings agreeable emotions and feelings;<sup>1</sup> nor could the operation of "active" sympathy—which is "a seeking of one's own satisfaction"—make the case otherwise; active sympathy has nothing to say on the question of rightness.

If we inquire as to how society gets its common measure, we may get an answer by turning back to the other person in our illustration, the one who wills to do the just act. He does the act that society requires, not because it is a matter of opinion but because it is a matter of right. This means that he has not stopped at the

<sup>1</sup> For these reasons it may seem improbable that he can exercise volition at all. True, he has a self-sentiment, but the idea of self is "a social product," while this man appears to think of his self without contributory relations to other selves—a likely result if selfhood is a purely psychological and non-logical production. He may be willing to speak of the rationality or "reasonableness" of his actions, but as an egoist he restricts the empire of reason to himself, and so empties it of meaning. On the other hand, if willed action expresses a plan, he may be able to have a plan for his life and to suppress some desirable actions which do not fulfill it (cf. Gideon Sarn, in Mary Webb's *Precious Bane*). This certainly looks like volition expressive of reason. Perhaps the solution lies in the acknowledgment that there are degrees of selfhood and volition, and that there is not only the one total self which is fully rational, but there are also partial selves within this: so that a willed act may proceed from the self in a restricted form. The man in question will then be rational, but fail to see—perhaps from emotional causes—the implications of this in a wider rationality.



common judgment but has measured it by a further standard. He is implicitly or explicitly aware of the fact—highly significant—that the common judgments themselves may have the predicates “right” and “wrong” attached to them. And as a further point in Logic as applied to Ethics, if the proposition “this ought, or is right, to be done because everyone does it” were a valid ethical definition, it should be susceptible of simple conversion to “that which everyone does is what ought to be done”; and not even McDougall would assent to this. We have to admit that the moral sentiments attach themselves to ideas, and moreover to general ideas, *i.e.* to ideas which are the result of an intellectual process. We have to insist that these general ideas must exist first—in logical priority at least—before there can be anything to which the sentiments can attach themselves. And the intellectual process is much more than that of “discriminating and naming the abstract qualities of character and conduct,”<sup>1</sup> for the interest in which these qualities are discriminated and named is *already* a moral interest in right and wrong; for what other reason would the process ever be carried out? If I decide that some acts are just and others are courageous, it is because I have in mind a *summum genus*—right acts—to guide my classification. Even if we discern rightness and wrongness first of all in particular acts, we afterwards make classifications with some clue in mind, and it is the *summum genus* which acts as the clue. If we classify in inductive fashion, as no doubt we do to begin with, the clue will be more or less vague; but it will be none the less dominant, even though its fullness of content is increased as the classifying process proceeds. There is no need to deny the presence of emotional elements in all this, provided we take them as *signs* of the passing of moral judgments and not *criteria* of rightness and wrongness themselves. The obvious fact of progress from defective to more adequate criteria, and the related fact that both kinds of criteria have been accompanied by equally strong emotions, should be sufficient to remove the formation of criteria from the emotional to the rational sphere. Of course, reason may be at fault also in its detailed judgments: we admit its close connection with emotion; but it is not at fault in its major and most general judgment, that which makes the simple and ultimate distinction in ethical character; and we may be thankful that although emotion is able to blur this judgment in individuals here and there, it has not been able to do so in the race as a whole.

### III

We must now consider the part played by cognition in moral judgment. Professor McDougall, despite his separation of cognition

<sup>1</sup> *Social Psychology*, p. 219.



from conation, admits that it takes some part and that even reason has something to do in the matter. But these admissions are qualified in two ways: (i) by assigning to reason a subordinate position: it follows upon and does not direct instinctive tendencies; (ii) by showing that reason itself may be empirically derived from cognitive elements which are to be found in non-rational beings. The first of these qualifications has been dealt with, and we must now turn to the other.

McDougall's quarrel with Rationalistic Ethics is on the ground that it implants reason in the human mind *ab initio*, whereas it is the product of the slow processes of evolution. One of the main defects of this Rationalism, he says, is that it is incompatible with the principle of the continuity of evolution.<sup>1</sup> Presumably this principle requires that the apparently new features which emerge during the course of mental development are not really new, in the sense that they are different in kind, but are simply more complex forms of the more elementary processes which preceded them. So we are told that "the essence of all reasoning is that judgment and a new belief are determined by beliefs already established in the mind."<sup>2</sup> The beliefs already established have come through perception on the plane of "intelligence"; and we gather that reasoning comes about through, as it were, the clash of two or more of these perceptual judgments. This clashing is the only new feature in the business: the induction or deduction of the new belief is still brought about by the working of the old factor, intelligence. McDougall seems to make the nature of induction the cardinal question here, since he regards deduction as the combination of an inductive generalization with a perceptual judgment.<sup>3</sup> In regard to induction he says that "selectivity or sagacity, which is the all-important factor in reasoning of this kind, is not a new factor. It is the same kind of factor which, on the plane of trial and error, makes the process, whether in men or animals, other than a purely random process. It is the factor which at all levels, from amoeba to man, is the essence of intelligent adaptation."<sup>4</sup> Again: "the tendency to inductive generalization is fundamental, and is exhibited at all levels of mental life. At the lower levels, it is merely the tendency to react to similar things, things presenting similar sensory cues, as though they were essentially the same thing over again."<sup>5</sup>

The question for decision is whether reason reduces without remainder to intelligent adaptation, and is no more than a trial and error process on the perceptual plane. It is important to notice what exactly is the question to be decided, lest we waste our time over a question which is not relevant. We misrepresent the situation

<sup>1</sup> *Social Psychology*, p. 378.

<sup>2</sup> *Outline of Psychology*, p. 402.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 409.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 405.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 408.



if we think of it as an issue between continuity which discounts novelty and novelty which discounts continuity. McDougall stands for the first of these and represents Rationalism as standing for the second: but he misunderstands its position. The Rationalist has no need to deny that there has been a process of development, or to maintain that the coming of new factors means the denial or disappearance of the old. The old factors persist, and so far there is continuity; but they become subordinated to the working of the new, which makes (or may make) use of them for its new purpose rather than *vice versa*. In being so used they suffer a change which, however, does not mean entire alteration. They remain recognizably themselves and yet become different; the novelty into which they enter can be analysed so as to show their presence in it. Our quarrel with Professor McDougall is because he wishes to analyse novelty simply into old factors and nothing else. In point of fact, he does not succeed.

One of the prominent features of his general exposition is his insistence on the all-pervasiveness of purpose: he names his psychology "hormic." He is in rebellion against mechanistic explanations of behaviour. Conformably with this we recall his statement that intelligent adaptation (to which reasoning is equivalent) is other than a random process even at the beginning. We may admit the general claim and sympathize with the motive; but we may ask, what of the principle of continuity? Is not the intelligent behaviour of lowly animals continuous with the preceding stage of presumably mechanical action? If not, why deny the possibility of discontinuity at some succeeding stage in the history of intelligence itself? But if so, may we not expect that the evolution of intelligence, if it is a real and not a nominal evolution, will show a process of development from stages in which mechanism is present and predominant to stages in which, though still present, it is very subordinate? If this expectation is realized, it will be legitimate to describe the earliest stages of behaviour as mainly mechanical and the latest stages as mainly teleological. Now this is exactly the kind of description that McDougall gives. He speaks of "advance from action of the type of immediate response to the impressions made on the sense organs, and an approximation towards complete self-determination. . . . This advance involves also a progress from predominantly mechanical to predominantly teleological determination, a continuous increase of the part played by final causes relatively to that of purely mechanical causes in the determination of the behaviour of the individual."<sup>1</sup>

According to this, we must admit that behaviour has a mixed character, and that in its earliest forms it is more heteronomic than automatic. It is teleological, but not markedly so. By teleology is

<sup>1</sup> *Social Psychology*, p. 263.



meant "that power of mind to foresee the future in accordance with past experience and to govern action in the light of that foresight"; this is mind's fundamental nature, just as its primary attitude is prospective. Now, while man lives largely within a world created by mind, the animal lives almost entirely in a world constituted by external nature. The one therefore can, the other cannot, be mainly moved to action by causes internal to the mind. It is in this fashion that McDougall indicates imagination as the differentia between the two, for "most of the behaviour of animals is initiated and guided by perception." Imagination in turn gives rise to desire in the strict sense, and this is not possessed by animals. "The animal in which any instinctive impulse is excited does not suspend action, even though the action be remote; the impulse probably always expresses itself in action. In this respect our natural man would show his superiority to the animals. He would be capable of the higher form of desire, viz. impulse toward or away from a remote object, with suspension of action. . . . Such suspension of action . . . is the essential condition of all higher intellectual activity, of all thinking in the fuller and more usual form of the word."<sup>1</sup> Notice that action is suspended because thinking is in operation; perception is in abeyance in favour of a "higher intellectual process." And it ought to be plain that this is a description of the beginning of volition, which therefore cannot be explained in terms of the laws of appetite as these operate in the animals. It is a law of appetite in man that he looks before he leaps, and this looking makes all the difference.

This conclusion is reinforced when we consider the nature of thinking, taking it as McDougall presents it to us. He insists that perception is a veritable form of thinking: "to know, to recognize, to be aware of, any object is to conceive it, even when our knowledge is a perceptual knowing. To mean an object is to conceive it. . . . Perceiving is one mode of conceiving."<sup>2</sup> And he speaks of "the error of supposing that the primitive mind perceives particular individual objects, and that development proceeds by the coalescence of particular 'ideas' to form general 'ideas.' . . . The universal is already implicit in the thinking of the burnt child who dreads the fire, and in that of the animal who flees from all men after maltreatment by one." This reference to implicit universals is very significant; it is made in another way, in the remark that "we begin by cognition of the highly general and proceed gradually to the cognition of particulars." The universals which were implicit at first (in such wise that there is reaction to "things presenting similar sensory cues, as though they were essentially the same thing over again") become explicit as cognition grows. The animal perceives things as objects of certain kinds and as marked by some relatively simple

<sup>1</sup> *Outline of Psychology*, p. 207.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 254.



feature or sensory pattern. Man's knowledge, *per contra*, comprises a multitude of cognitive dispositions which do "not merely coexist, but form a logically ordered system."<sup>1</sup>

How can we explain this difference, whereby knowledge which is logically ordered supervenes on that which is not? And is not the logical, therefore, something new? What do we mean by the logical? It is evidently more than a dealing with universals; or rather it is dealing with them in a way that knows them for such, which knows their particulars as details in their systems, and not as though they are the same things over again. Perhaps we cannot explain how this difference comes about, but it is enough for our purpose to recognize it as having come about and as something distinctive. The primary universals are blurred and highly general, because they have not been thought into separation from their particulars, or *vice versa*. The animal who flees from all men because it has been maltreated by one does so because it does not suspend action in favour of cognition; and it fails to do this because it is unable to exercise imagination (to retain the word previously used). That is, imagination creates a mental world connected with, yet vastly amplifying, the perceived world, and within this new world the working of "intelligent adaptation" takes on a new character. Arrived at this point, the mind is freed from the necessity to confuse particulars with one another; it is able deliberately to compare them, *e.g.* to compare the one now present with others previously known, and in the interest of future action. In this way the mind comes into possession of the three temporal distinctions; and it is able to think, to form plans, and to will. But this is no other than the capacity which we call reason, theoretical or practical; and McDougall admits its correlation with logical capacity. In itself it is timeless and is able to transcend time, as we have seen, in the sense that it can grasp past and future in one thought-scheme; it is not tied down to the present and very near the present. It is able therefore to traffick with final causes, to survey its impulses in the light of a policy and choose amongst them, and thus to become predominantly teleological. All this because it has become rational and follows, not the laws of appetite simply, but those peculiar to its own human status. It is and yet is not continuous with the past, since it not only contains but *knows* the past.

This attribution of a *sui generis* character to reason has obvious bearings upon the nature of moral judgment. The impossibility of an empirical derivation of reason from non-rational elements is one with the impossibility of a similar derivation of morality from non-moral elements. Reason is inherent in the moral judgment, and is expressed in the predication of rightness which is the differentia

<sup>1</sup> *Outline of Psychology*, p. 382.



thereof. To judge morally is to take an impartial point of view, to relate a particular impulse to its universal of volition. Reasoning is not incidental to all this but is its very soul. It is of no value, therefore, to be told that reason "plays a part in all our moral judgments, though reason alone, without the aid of moral experience, of moral tradition, and of the moral character, is incapable of leading us to true moral judgments." This becomes, in the light of the preceding exposition, almost nonsense: moral experience, etc., themselves can come about only by the operation of reason, otherwise how are they made *moral*? On the other hand, it is not nonsense if it merely means that reason does nothing *in vacuo*, that in the moral sphere its occupation is with the whole economy of the mind, which includes instinctive tendencies and related sentiments as well as relatively detached cognitions. And we can assent to the claim that reason is not a conative energy; it is not one item amongst others, just as the moral end is not one end amongst others. Were it so, there could be no possibility of freedom, since there would be no one factor standing out from all others which could give a determinative turn to the course of events; reason would become just one more amongst the multitude of efficient causes. As it is, it is not an efficient but a final cause. It is related to all the other effective energies, not horizontally, as it were, and as they are related amongst themselves, but vertically, in such a way as to survey and embrace them all, and call them all into its service. It is indeed, like its congener volition, the man himself, his central self, and when this real man acts his conduct proceeds from himself and is free. It is reason that should be in mind when it is said that "by a long series of creative acts on the part of men, both small and great, the moral tradition—the highest product of organic evolution—has been painfully and slowly evolved. . . . The belief in a certain creative power of original determination is a necessity of our moral nature."<sup>1</sup>

Thus McDougall's attempt to give a purely empirical account of morality has not succeeded. In one way it has failed because it is not empirical enough. In professing to take account of all the relevant facts it has overlooked the most important bit of evidence—the testimony of our moral nature to an element which is other than appetite or perceptual trial and error. In another way it has failed just because of its empiricism. It has not escaped the principal defect of genetic explanation when this is applied to the human mind. Despite McDougall's disclaimer, he really explains human conduct in mechanical fashion, and has not worked out the full implications of the teleological principle to which he pays lip homage. In working for simplicity he achieves falsity of description; and in reacting against reason as utterly transcendent he has gone to the impossible

<sup>1</sup> *Outline of Psychology*, p. 448.



extreme of relegating it to an unimportant position, after having misconstrued its nature. It may have been noticed, however, that much of the criticism in this article has made use of his own words, which are sometimes available in such a form as to suggest self-contradiction, and to create the suspicion that he may have had qualms as to the validity of his exposition. This becomes more definite when, on the last page of the *Outline of Psychology* he asks, by way of indicating an *unsolved* problem: "Is there any innate basis of intellectual development other than the instincts, the plasticity of the nervous system, and that general power of adaptation to novel conditions which in these pages has been called Intelligence, or in its higher manifestations, Sagacity? . . . Is there anything in our innate endowment that in any manner or degree justifies the old doctrine of innate ideas?" This becomes more definite still in the last chapter of the *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, when, in reviewing the facts of multiple personalities, he asks: "How can we interpret this evidence if not by assuming with Kant and Driesch that the forms of knowledge or of thinking, the categories of thought, are innate in every mind, a character or possession of mind which is not acquired through experience, but is given in the very nature of mind and to which mind owes its capacity to order the data of sense-experience in the form of time and space and causation?" Had this been made a working assumption in the two earlier books, they would almost certainly have come to very different conclusions about volition, self-awareness, reason, and moral judgment.



# CAUSALITY

Y. H. KRIKORIAN

THE image of nature as causality has been a major theme of science and poetry. It has been a symbol of hope and fear, of progress and futility. Yet its meaning has seldom been clear. Prior to any statement about the relation of causality to physical nature, life, and mind, its meaning should be established. I shall therefore first define causality, and I shall then discuss its applicability to nature.

## I

Causality, like all other types of explanation, is a correlation of given phenomena. To understand the nature of causality, therefore, two questions need to be answered: (1) What are the characteristics of causal relation? (2) What are the properties of causal entities? These two questions are only relatively independent of one another. In our final interpretation of causality the two questions should not be too sharply separated, since the characteristics of entities and of relations are exhibited in their interrelations.

1. *Causal Relation*.—The simplest procedure to determine the nature of causal relation will be to analyse the major characteristics of instances of the causal order. There are different types of order or process. Certain processes are called causal, others casual, and still others purposive. Instances of causal order would be the following: fire melts ice; water quenches fire; bodies gravitate towards one another; a billiard ball strikes another, and the second ball moves. In more precisely stated instances of the causal order one observes that at a given temperature the volume of a given quantity of gas varies inversely as the pressure it sustains, and that the strength of an electric current varies directly as the electromotive force and inversely as the resistance.

There are three characteristics of the above instances of causal relation which are of special importance for the present discussion. Causal relation is non-anthropomorphic, it exhibits uniformity, and is deterministic.

In causal explanation, whether one considers the relations or the entities, anthropomorphism is eliminated. Causal relation is a name for a certain type of order of events, and not a name for the activity of an agency behind events. Causal correlation does not disprove purposes, ends, or wishes, but simply disregards them. It may very



well be, as great historic religions and idealistic systems have claimed, that the anthropomorphic interpretation of nature is a more fundamental and truthful one, and that anthropomorphism gives a deeper insight into the nature of things than causality; but this claim does not alter the fact that while limited to causal correlations one should not refer to wish, desire, and purpose.

The second characteristic of causal relation is uniformity. Causality refers primarily to the constant features of the given phenomena. The illustrations of causality which were mentioned earlier are all statements of uniformities or constant features which exist between phenomena. The uniformities of causal relations, however, do not deal with the universe as a whole but with specific processes under certain limited conditions. Before one can determine a specific causal relation there must be an isolated system within which it holds. The isolated system may be very broad, as the one in the first law of motion, which includes every particle of matter under all conditions; or it may be more restricted, as in the second law of motion, which is limited to bodies falling under specific conditions. But whether the scope of isolation should be broad or narrow, causal relation applies to limited spheres. There is no causal relation between the infinite whole and its parts. Causality refers to a relation between one part and another.<sup>1</sup> It should also be noted that uniformity or constant relations are sought in terms of numerical relations. In ordinary experience, and in the early stages of a science, the described uniformities are of a general character, such as that all unsupported bodies fall, fire burns paper, etc.; but causal explanation, in its advanced stages, is not content with such vague statements of uniformities. The uniformities which are sought are the ones which can be correlated with precise, numerical relations.

A third characteristic which has often been associated with causality is the concept of determinism or necessity. This third trait of causality has been violently criticized. From Hume to Russell it has been a common contention that necessity is a fiction and that causality merely means invariable connection of uniformity of processes. For the present, without analysing the objections raised to the necessity or determinism of causal relations, I shall limit myself to brief comments on the meaning of necessity, and on the specific sense of necessity in the causal relation.

Though necessity, or determinism, should be a fiction or a myth it is certainly not a meaningless concept. Hume, who presents the most effective objections to the concept of necessity, was quite certain that the concept had a meaning, since otherwise his criticism would have been of no importance. What then is necessity? Briefly necessity refers to deductive systems where from self-evident, post-

<sup>1</sup> S. Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity*, vol. i, p. 288.



lated, or "convenient" concepts other concepts are derived. The clearest illustration of the notion of necessity is the concept of classes where the implicative relation is that of inclusion, or that of from species to genus.

Causal relations are deterministic in the sense that cause and effect contain implicative relations. Causal laws connect the elements of experience in terms of some logical or mathematical pattern, and these mathematical patterns are fundamentally assertions of mutual implications between the parts of an equation. Causal laws assert something more than the sequence of events. Day follows night, but we never consider night to be the cause of day. Or cloven-footedness is co-existent with ruminance, but we never interpret this co-existence in terms of causal relation. In causality there is the assumption that a given result is due to, or is determined by, the existence of some other factor. This factor is the principle of identity. To say that the same thing may act on the same thing under the same conditions, yet produce different effects, is to say that a thing need not be what it is. But this is an untenable position. For a thing to be at all it must be something, and it can only be what it is. When we assert that there is necessity or determinism between  $A$  and  $X$ , what we mean to say is that  $A$  acts as it does because it is what it is.<sup>1</sup>

2. *Causal Entities*.—Most liberally, causal entities may be defined as perceptual entities. Causality begins with perceptual experience and attempts to make it intelligible. The entities of this stage may be called the pre-analytic entities.<sup>2</sup> The pre-analytic entities of causality are the events of the perceptual world. These events offer problems. How does wood float? How does reproduction occur? What is the nature of the movement of the heavenly bodies? Another way of stating the pre-analytic stage of causal entities is to consider them as the elements of nature, when nature means that which is "disclosed in sense-perception,"<sup>3</sup> and when at the same time it is assumed that nature is something that can be thought of as "a closed system whose mutual relations do not require the expression of the fact that they are thought about."<sup>4</sup> It is usual, however, to define the perceptual diversities as physico-chemical entities. This second stage is the post-analytic stage of causal entities. Is it possible to frame a definition of causal entities to include various kinds of entities? To select any one of them would be rather arbitrary. What is necessary is to present the most general traits of the different kinds of causal entities.

<sup>1</sup> H. W. B. Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic*, p. 408.

<sup>2</sup> J. Loewenberg, "Pre-Analytical and Post-Analytical Data," *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. xxiv, pp. 5-14.

<sup>3</sup> A. N. Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature*, p. 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.



## PHILOSOPHY

First of all, causal entities, both the pre-analytic and the post-analytic types, have their status within the space-time continuum. Causal entities are not purely logical entities; they are existences, that is to say, they can be located in space and dated in time. The spatio-temporal habitat of causal entities differentiates them from other types of entities, such as the logical or psychical. What, then, does status within the space-time continuum mean? For the present we need not settle the question whether space-time categories should be interpreted in terms of the absolute theory or the relational theory; nor is it necessary to determine the further metaphysical question whether space-time is, as Whitehead holds, merely an abstraction from events, or, as Alexander argues, the stuff of which all finite things are made. It is sufficient to say that causal entities have *position* in the space-time continuum. An example of spatial position would be: *A* is to the left of *B*. An example of temporal position would be: *A* stands in the relation of simultaneity or succession to *B*.<sup>1</sup> Causal entities require a system of reference; and whatever one's theory of space-time might be, these categories are taken to be a system of reference; and this is what is important for the present discussion.

Causal entities, in the second place, are physical quantities. By quantity, I do not mean the unchanging reals of the classic physics, but rather entities which are sufficiently constant to have numbers assigned to them by measurement. Causal explanation is functional correlation between variable physical quantities (numbers). Causal entities are therefore measurable. There are, of course, different theories as to what the fundamental physical quantities are. In the traditional mechanical theory of nature the physical quantity was the mass; in the electrodynamic theory it is the electric charge, or the electromagnetic field. The question as to how the property of the physical quantity represented by mass differs from the property of the physical quantity represented by charge is unanswerable in terms of immediate experience. Operationally, however, the difference between matter and electricity is that "the number called the mass of a body is assigned by methods which differ from those by which the number called the charge is assigned, and the mass and electric charge enter into different functional relations with other quantities."<sup>2</sup> Causal entities as physical quantities are symbols represented by matrices. Causal entities exclude, therefore, vitalistic or non-physical entities; but they should be interpreted with sufficient breadth to include heterogeneous physical entities.

A definition of causality can now be made. In a most general way *causality is a type of explanation which employs only functional*

<sup>1</sup> V. F. Lenzen, *Physical Theory*, pp. 50-84.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 283.



*correlations and only physico-chemical entities. Should one prefer a more specific statement about the nature of causal relations and causal entities, the definition of causality would be the following: causality is constituted in the non-anthropomorphic, uniformitarian, and deterministic correlations between sets of entities which are physical quantities within the space-time continuum.*

## II

In the preceding section the meaning of causality was analysed. We now come to another problem related to causality. Is causality applicable to nature? The question concerns the ontological status of causality. To claim the applicability of causality to nature is meaningless unless we can verify our claims. At the present stage of experimental science it is impossible to verify the universal applicability of causality. One has to wait with patience for this verification, should such a stage ever arrive. In absence of empirical verification, however, it is possible to strengthen the case for causality by meeting some of the arguments against it. This method is at best an indirect one. I shall not discuss all the possible objections to causality. Such an attempt would mean practically the rewriting of the history of philosophy from Anaxagoras to Whitehead. I shall limit the discussion to two current arguments raised against causality. For convenience the first may be called the argument from history, and the second the argument from uniformities of natural laws as statistical.

1. *History*.—The general claim of the argument from history is that causal or scientific knowledge presents merely a description or abstraction, whereas historical or appreciative knowledge gives a concrete insight and understanding of reality. Causality is, at best, only a useful and practical scheme in dealing with experience. "The world of appreciation is the . . . deeper reality," writes Royce. "Its rival, the world of description, is the result of essentially human finite outlook."<sup>1</sup> Scientific description is necessary, but abstract and inadequate; but as it is "anybody's world" it gives unity to experience. To make our description valid for all human beings, the fashions of causal or scientific description have to be universal. We cannot describe, however, "the unique, e.g. Shelley's 'sense that at the winds of spring,' etc. That we have to appreciate."<sup>2</sup> For Ward, too, it is history not science or mechanism which can give us reality in its concreteness. "With the experience in the concrete, we can deal satisfactorily in no other way," writes Ward, "and no competent thinker dreams of interpreting the history of the world by means

<sup>1</sup> *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 411.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 398.



of a scheme of universal laws."<sup>1</sup> In history "we find no mere repetition, no absolute fixity, small scope for measurement or for mathematics, the indispensables of all scientific *conception*; yet, though affording thus little foothold for positive and exact science, the historical is what we *understand best* and what concerns us most."<sup>2</sup>

The claim of the argument from history does not seem to me a well-founded doctrine. It may be granted that existing beings, animate and inanimate, are individuals; that they are concrete and unique. This belief, however, need not lead one to a sharp separation between the historic and the causal types of knowledge. All significant assertions about the individual or the concrete are in terms of universals and abstractions. No historical knowledge can possibly dispense with the disparaged abstractions. Take any historical event which is individual, unique, and unrepeatable, such as the invasion of Russia by Napoleon. Each incident and happening in this campaign, such as Napoleon's march through Poland, his encounter with Russians at Borodino, the setting on fire of Moscow by Russians before Napoleon's entrance, the enormous loss of men in the campaign, etc., is unique and unrepeatable. All these happenings, however, are described in terms of concepts and universals. Apart from universals, such as "encounter," "fire," "entrance," "loss," terms which are applicable to many other situations, the understanding of these unique events would be impossible. The proposition that reality is historic, individual, concrete should not be identified with the untenable doctrine that the individual is real apart from concepts or abstractions.

On the other hand, scientific knowledge, which is discredited because of its abstractions, does not dispense with the concrete or the individual. The aim of natural science is to understand the nature of the actual world, and not to construct the laws of all possible worlds. The geologist who is trying to determine and analyse the various stages of the evolution of the earth is dealing with something which is specific, unique, and individual. The incidents here are almost as unrepeatable as Napoleon's Russian campaign. In a more limited sense, the same is true with the physicist. The physicist in his laboratory experiments with individual objects. The fact that he is interested in laws, or causal connections, should not lead one to the belief that he has no concern with the individual or the concrete. The discovered laws are laws of specific realms of existence. It should also be noted that the historian, not unlike the scientist, is engaged in determining certain uniformities and laws of the human race. The acceptance or rejection of alleged facts, the weighing of evidence, is often determined in terms of these laws. In this respect

<sup>1</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. II, p. 280.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 280.



the method of a critical historian is very similar to that of an exact scientist.<sup>1</sup>

Yet one might agree on one point with Ward's and Royce's contention. It might be reasonably held that the same situation or object may be described from different points of view. Logicians have been long conversant with the peculiarities of the principles of classification, of which many are available for arranging objects of our experience. The smallest book in size in one's library may be the biggest in value. An object may exhibit different characteristics through its relation to different types of classification. To claim, as the materialists do, that existence should be classified only in terms of one *fundamentum divisionis*, namely, causality, shows, to say the least, a lack of metaphysical imagination. It is much more fruitful to assume the possibility of a number of principles of classification, and to determine in terms of empirical verification which are most relevant, fruitful, and enlightening in their application to experience. An object may be a model of causality, yet at the same time exhibit characteristics of purpose. In a situation like this there is no necessity to consider causality as appearance, or as merely practical. Causality is an objective aspect of existence, though existence may have other aspects.

2. *Uniformities as Statistical Averages*.—As a second objection to causality it is argued that the uniformities expressed in laws are only approximately exemplified, and never with rigid exactness. The relations between phenomena are constant in the sense that they hold within very narrow limits. We have no warrant, it is claimed, for saying that they are absolutely constant. The so-called uniformities of nature are only statistical averages. The actual course of events may conform to these uniformities within certain limits, but to claim absolute uniformity is to go beyond empirical knowledge.

The ground for the view that uniformities are of the statistical type is based first of all on the fact that the so-called rigid, causal relations are never verified in our experience. Taylor, for example, points out that "the undeviating conformity of the actual course of any concrete process to scientific law 'cannot be verified as an empirical fact by observation or experiment.'<sup>2</sup>" Similarly, Royce writes: "What we verify are more or less permanent rules relating to the routine of nature phenomena. In other words, our common experience discovers states, more or less persistent."<sup>3</sup>

Secondly, it is pointed out that the view that uniformities of nature are only statistical averages is strengthened by the consideration of the actual method of the scientists. In many cases,

<sup>1</sup> M. R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature*, pp. 12-15.

<sup>2</sup> *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 223.

<sup>3</sup> *The World and the Individual*, vol. ii, p. 186.



if not in all, uniformities have been obtained by statistical method. The measurements of molecules are all made in bulk. What is really measured is "the combined effect of millions, or it may be of billions, of molecules."<sup>1</sup> As we cannot deal with individual atoms but only with the aggregate or bulk, the fluctuations, if very small, are considered as non-existent. The physicist, like the sociologist, is confined to the statistical method. The only difference between the two is that the former deals with less striking individuals.

It is interesting to observe that the doctrine that nature is relatively indetermined and that the uniformities of nature are only statistical, a view which would have been violently criticized by most of the physicists not many years ago, is a fashionable and popular doctrine since the recent developments of the quantum theory. Eddington, for example, writes: "It is a consequence of the advent of the quantum theory that *physics is no longer pledged to a scheme of deterministic law*."<sup>2</sup> Similar views are expressed by Weyl, Heisenberg, and Reichenbach, to mention but a few. One suspects that the willingness of the modern mind to accept the doctrine that nature is indetermined is not solely based on the consideration of facts, nor mainly on the traditional motives for making place for God, freedom, and immortality. Our age dislikes strict laws of all types. We dislike strict laws in government, in morality, and in aesthetics. Our emotional lives are chaotic for innumerable reasons: we love primitive dances, unintelligible poetry, bizarre paintings, noisy music, and vague concepts. It is not strange, therefore, that we should also carry the same attitude into our descriptions of nature. A chaotic and indeterminate nature would be in harmony with chaotic and indeterminate experience. I do not mention these considerations to discard the doctrine I am considering. I admit the possibility that nature may be relatively, or wholly if one likes, indeterminate and chaotic. I see no reason for the impossibility of the doctrine. It should be noted, however, that the claim that uniformities are ultimately statistical is not a verified fact, but rather a certain interpretation of certain accepted facts. The very same facts have a different possible interpretation.

That measurements and physical comparisons are never exact, that uniformities have been attained by statistical methods, and that the invariant relations have never been completely verified, are facts which one should admit readily; these facts, however, are explicable without the denial of causality. The inexactness of measurements and physical comparisons may be due not to any indeterminism in nature but to the lack of finer instruments or precise formulation of the physical problems; in short, to the lack

<sup>1</sup> Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. i, p. 100.

<sup>2</sup> *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 294.



of knowledge. Even in the quantum theory, where, at the present stage of its development, the very nature of the problem demands the principle of indeterminacy, as the simultaneous determination of the momentum and of the position of the electrons are impossible, it should be noted that indeterminacy does not mean indeterminism in the sense of uncaused happening, but rather in the sense of immeasurability. As Turner points out, the implications of Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy are often confused, owing to the ambiguity of the expression to "determine."<sup>1</sup> Determinism usually means "unvarying causation." In the principle of indeterminacy "to determine" means not "to cause," but simply "to ascertain."

There is no conflict whatsoever between causality and the use of the statistical method. In physics, for example, the statistical method was first developed to deal with problems related to microscopic entities. Although molecules may be causally determined, recourse is made to the statistical method because of the crudity of our senses and the complexity of mathematical problems. Similarly, in meteorology and in social sciences complexities demand the use of the statistical method. Here again one need not forgo causality. Though the traits of the group are described by statistical laws, variations may have specific causal connections, and one may gradually ascertain these connections.

Theoretically we must admit the possibility that the ultimate laws of nature may be statistical. Causality, however, is equally compatible with the given facts, and pragmatically preferable. If statistical laws are ultimate, there is then no theoretical reason to find the causes of variation; but progress has been attained by looking for the causal connection of these variations.

<sup>1</sup> Turner, E., "Determinism," *Nature*, December 27, 1930, p. 995.



# THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE AND THE GOLDEN RULE

E. W. HIRST, M.A., B.Sc.

Is the assimilation of these two formulations of the moral principle by Kant and some of his expositors justified?

In the *Analytic of Pure Practical Reason* Kant claims that his view of morality agrees with the ancient command that man should love his neighbour as himself. Also in the *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals* he regards the Golden Rule as a deduction, though with several limitations, from the second version of the Categorical Imperative.

Abbott in his *Memoir of Kant* (*Kant's Theory of Ethics*, p. lii) assimilates to the Categorical Imperative both the Golden Rule and Clarke's principle of Equity. William Wallace in his small book on Kant does the same. Henry Sidgwick is very definite on the matter. After quoting Clarke's Rule of Equity ("Whatever I judge reasonable or unreasonable that another should do for me, that by the same judgment I declare reasonable or unreasonable that I should in the like case do for him"), he observes that it is the Golden Rule precisely stated, and adds that it appears to him to coincide to a considerable extent with Kant's fundamental principle of duty. Sidgwick's own formulation of the Rule of Equity is as follows: "If, therefore, I judge any action to be right for myself I implicitly judge it to be right for any other person whose nature and circumstances do not differ from my own in some important respects." He arrives at the truth of this by considering the relation of the integrant parts to a whole and to each other, and finding it thereby self-evident that the good of any one individual is of no more importance from the point of view of the universe than the good of any other. This seems to mean that difference of persons makes no difference to the reasonableness of any action that may be pronounced right in a definite set of circumstances.

We contend that there does exist after all a difference of meaning in the three formulations of the moral principle just mentioned. The Categorical Imperative seems to us to be *uni-personal*; the Rule of Equity appears to be *extra-personal* in the sense that the personal factor can be disregarded in judging what is reasonable in action; the Golden Rule, on the other hand, seems to be essentially *inter-personal*.

At this time of day further discussion of the Categorical Impera-



tive is apt to be wearisome; it might be thought that there existed general agreement as to its meaning. And yet as recently as last year (1932) Professor Field felt it necessary to give Kant's first statement of the Imperative a serious re-examination in the pages of *Mind*. Field agrees that in that statement Kant is saying not merely that if I think that I ought to do any action, I must also believe that anyone else ought to do the same action in the same circumstances; but is implying in addition that I definitely *will* that other people should act similarly in similar circumstances. This interpretation does not seem to us to mean more than that I wish that everyone else should be moral in the Kantian sense. The existence of other people does not seem to be essential to my own morality in any other way.

We ourselves take the first version of the Categorical Imperative to mean no more than that, if I can conceive my action universalized without contradiction, then the action is right. Morality depends upon a certain ability to will, i.e. to will without contradiction: what is universalizable is right. If this interpretation is correct, how exactly on this view is my morality related to other persons? The reference to other persons, we submit, is only indirect and instrumental in order to find out what is duty for myself. Consider Kant's own illustration—that of promise-breaking. Promise-breaking is wrong, according to him, not because of any disrespect, or lack of regard, or love, for other people, but because such a practice could not be universalized. Universal promise-breaking would, as a matter of fact, be impossible, not because of any contradiction of a logical kind, but because, human nature being what it is, an inevitable reaction would take place: faith in all promises being lost, promises would not be made. Now it is true that other people are in the picture all the time, but they supply nothing more than a background, and otherwise are not needed. Other people are even less conspicuously in the picture when Kant illustrates his position by the immorality of suicide. For the wrong of suicide, according to him, has nothing to do with the selfish disregard of the claims which others have on a man's life and service, but arises out of a kind of contradiction, viz. the contradiction of using the impulse which should secure the preservation of life for the purpose of its destruction. Again, the reason why it is wrong not to help others in their need is merely that we should by such conduct land ourselves in inconsistency when we required and called for help for ourselves. Here again wrong seems to rest upon a species of contradiction, the attitude to other persons being a subordinate consideration. Kantian morality is really uni-personal.

It might be thought that in the second version of the Categorical Imperative the social reference is direct and essential, inasmuch as



the formula runs: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, in any case as an end withal, never as a means only." Here, of course, the individual is definitely regarded as being in some relation to others: we are called upon to treat other persons as "ends." It will, however, be noted that Kant regards the individual as an end "*in himself*." "Rational beings," he says, "are called persons, because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves." . . . "Every (other) rational being regards its existence similarly." Surely the point of view is monadistic, and the type of morality uni-personal. Consider Kant's instances of breaches of the maxim. Suicide is wrong because the suicide, who should regard himself as an end in himself, uses himself as a means—as a thing. But, says Kant, "a man is not a thing, that is to say, something which can be used merely as means, but must in all his actions be always considered as an end in himself." The wrong of promise-breaking is declared to consist in using another man as a means, and failing to treat him also as an end in himself. Here the point of view does seem to be inter-personal rather than uni-personal. But it is scarcely *positively* inter-personal. There is inculcated the sound negative principle that we must avoid using other people merely as means. But the implication is that the positive task of realizing one's rational nature as an end is each man's own affair. The single self can be as truly moral as the self in association with other selves.

The third formula of the Categorical Imperative runs: "Act as a member of a Kingdom of Ends." By "kingdom," said Kant, "I understand the union of different rational beings in a system by common laws, i.e. a kingdom which may be called a kingdom of ends, since what these laws have in view is just the relation of these beings to one another as end and means." Here, again, it seems as though Kant had advanced beyond the uni-personal view of morality, inasmuch as he conceives of a social community of individuals each of whom is reciprocally end and means to the others. We find, however, that this system of selves is such only because of having common laws. There is no suggestion that selves are united in any sense other than that they are alike subject to the same idea of duty. Kant still regards the self monadistically, able to attain ethical perfection by itself. In the words of Edward Caird, "Kant implies that each individual, as a moral or rational being, is alone with himself, and that it is only through his sensuous or outward life that he comes into contact with others. . . . In spite of his idea of a kingdom of ends, reverence before the abstract law is still treated as the essential and necessary form of the moral standard."

In the *Critique of Practical Reason* there is at least one clear statement which definitely excludes from the nature of morality



any interpersonal regard or devotion. For Kant there declares that other persons are never in any case an object for our "respect." The object of "respect" or reverence is not, strictly speaking, another person, even though the situation may be a social one, but rather the "law" which the example of another person exhibits. Some might say that such a view of morality is not even uni-personal, but extra-personal, inasmuch as other persons possess only instrumental value as exhibitors of something considered in abstraction from themselves.

When Kant likens his own view of morality to the Jewish and Christian principle of love to one's neighbour, it turns out that what he means by love is "practical love," which, he adds, is "liking to practise all duties" towards the neighbour. But since Kant regards "liking" as suspect on the ground that inclination is tainted with hedonism, and therefore heteronomous, the love of our neighbour from the Kantian point of view reduces down to the practice of social duty, not from any regard for our neighbour as such, but from reverence or respect for the Moral Law. In the Preface to the *Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* Kant makes it clear that he has no other conception of love than that of a merely emotional or sentimental type, called by him "pathological." He definitely states that it cannot be a matter of will or volition.

Here we may interpolate a few words about Clarke's Rule of Equity, which according to Sidgwick is obtained by considering the similarity of the individuals that make up a Whole. The standpoint, we suggested, is really *extra-personal* in view of the fact that acts are considered apart from agents, and situations in abstraction from persons. The Rule of Equity appears to mean no more than that similar situations require similar acts. Indeed Clarke's whole attitude to moral questions was mathematical, or quasi-mathematical, as the following quotation from his works makes clear: "All wilful wickedness and perversion of right is the very same Insolence and Absurdity in Moral matters, as it would be in natural things for a man to pretend to alter the certain proportions of numbers, to take away the demonstrable relations and properties of mathematical figures." According to Clarke, individuals are merely so many units in a whole, who, because of their similarity as units, should practise similarity of behaviour in similar cases. On such a view morality is not a question of the direct attitude of one person to another; it is rather a quasi-mathematical problem.

When we pass to the Golden Rule we go beyond this extra-personal and abstract standpoint; we transcend even uni-personal morality; we definitely arrive at an inter-personal formula. The Golden Rule is, of course, a far more ancient formulation of moral principle than that attained by any ethical theorist. Indeed, it is



widespread as well as ancient, being found in Zoroastrianism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Hellenism, and in Christianity. A formulation so widespread, and so ancient, demands serious respect from the theorist in morals. Any theory of conduct that runs counter to its implications assumes a great responsibility and risks being unreal.

The Golden Rule implies more than an equality of consideration as between one individual and another; it makes the direct attitude of individuals to one another central and essential. It does not say merely that what is reasonable for one man to do to another is reasonable for any other man in the same circumstances. It does not primarily teach impartiality of judgment on acts considered in abstraction from the agents; rather does it inculcate impartiality of regard between the agents themselves. So long as we use the ideas of similarity and equality which pertain to the maxim of Equity, we relate acts and situations rather than persons. The Golden Rule relates to persons, and involves the idea of unity. Clarke's Rule of Equity could, we think, be applied by persons whose attitude to each other was one of indifference, or even animosity. All it requires is equality of treatment; whereas the Golden Rule implies community of interest, and teaches impartiality of regard.

The logic of the Golden Rule was appreciated by the ancient seers and prophets. Confucius interpreted it as reciprocity. A successor of his drew out the full implication about two hundred years later. Mo Tzu, as he was called (born about 468 B.C.), traced all evil to the one root of selfishness. The following is an extract from his principal treatise entitled, *The Love of All*:

"The source of disorder in a State lies in the lack of mutual love. . . . A thief loves his own family, but because he has not a similar love for the families of others, he proceeds to steal from their homes to add to his own. . . . Rulers of States love their own territory, but having no love for other States, they proceed to attack them in order to increase their own possessions. What is the remedy for this state of things? . . . If we were to regard the property of others as we regard our own, who should steal? If we were to have the same regard for the territory and people of another State as we have for our own, who would conduct aggressive warfare? . . . If we were to have the same regard for others as we have for ourselves, who would do anyone an injustice?"

That the real meaning of Mo Tzu's teaching was understood by his contemporaries may be guessed from the remark of one who reacted against its idealism in these words: "Excellent Sir, your theory is sublime, but it is impracticable"!



According to Mo Tzu the problem of conduct is essentially interpersonal, not merely in the sense that others are inevitably affected by our actions, but in the sense that the aim of morality is the unification of the wills of men. At an earlier date than that of Mo Tzu, advanced thought in Judaism had arrived at the idea of duty or righteousness as meaning the love of self and neighbour, albeit the term "neighbour" was for a long time limited to fellow-Jew, or resident alien. Jesus, in summarizing the teaching of the Law and the Prophets enunciated the Golden Rule in its then traditional form, and also the principle of love to our neighbour. So the presumption is that to Him these were not opposed or contradictory, but virtually equivalent.

The Golden Rule has met with plenty of criticism—some of it too subtle to be convincing. Kant observes that many a one would gladly consent that others should not benefit him, provided only that he might be excused from showing benevolence to *them*. It is a question whether we could really "will" such independence, which in any case is quite impossible as a matter of fact. If, again, it be said that a criminal might use the Golden Rule to argue against the judge who punishes him, the reply would be that such a use of the Rule would be naïvely literalistic. The Rule does not teach that, as between two persons there must be similarity in the details of behaviour, but rather impartiality of interest; from that point of view the criminal must endorse the verdict of the judge, as the judge must expect and approve the same verdict were he the criminal.

A common form of criticism of the Golden Rule is that it permits reciprocity in evil. Kant instances the example of a married couple bent on ruin, with the comment: "O marvellous harmony, what he wishes, she wishes also"! There is also the familiar illustration of fellowship among a band of thieves. "If," says Mr. Carritt, "we are to take seriously the contention that it is coherence which makes acts right, surely it must be actual coherence with actual desires and wills of actual people—even conformity with the ways of mankind, including among mankind the most barbarous tribes and races."

In our view the Golden Rule does teach a doctrine of coherence; it implies, to use T. H. Green's language, "a will of all which is the will of each." But it precludes a merely sectional coherence between a few, which, because it is sectional, is no more than an example of co-operative egoism, such as we can see in a selfish family, in a band of thieves, in an aggressive nation, or empire.

If we use the idea of coherence with which Professor H. J. Paton has made us so familiar, then we should maintain that the coherence inculcated by the Golden Rule is:

(1) Not sectional, but *universal* in its range. We are to do, not simply to a few selected individuals just the particular things we



wish them to do to us, but we are to do unto man as man what we would have any and every man do to us. In other words, it must be coherence with humanity as a whole which must inform and inspire every human attachment of narrower range.

(2) In the next place, the coherence implied by the Golden Rule is scarcely coherence with the "wills" of men. "Wills" suggests actuality and concretion; it implies the historic rather than the ideal aspect of volition. He indeed would be an optimist who looked to find morality in every phase and institution of social life. The quality of the sociality behind social institutions varies greatly from the ethical point of view. Some of it is largely of the instinctive type; some of it rises no higher than is necessary to realize the aim of mutual convenience. The object of coherence is more than the "wills" of other men; that is too abstract a conception. If we substitute the term "love" for that of "coherence," it will be at once realized that we cannot love a "will." Strictly speaking, we can love only *persons*. And to "love" a person is far more than to agree with his volition; it is to achieve a fundamental unity of life which may be quite compatible with disagreement with actual volition.

(3) Finally, the Categorical Imperative and the Golden Rule differ in regard to the nature of their dependence on Religion. The former is an autonomous principle; it is a law of reason which we impose on ourselves. "All moral conceptions," Kant tells us, "have their seat and origin completely *a priori* in the reason." Religion is thus far not essential as a basis for morality. Kant does introduce the idea of God, but only as a postulate for the purpose of making his theory complete. And "if there is no more profound and ultimate reason for my reverence for the good will than that it is my own will, does not absolute reverence for the good will and its law of duty degenerate into self-worship?" (A. E. Taylor: *The Faith of a Moralist*, i, p. 152). Now the Golden Rule, in its Christian setting and Jewish tradition (not to speak of other Faiths), relates the love of self and neighbour to the supreme love of God. Conduct and worship merge. To speak in terms of coherence, our coherence with each other is mediated by our coherence with the Whole regarded as Conscious, Intelligent, Personal, and Loving. Few would deny that the Universe is in some way a coherent Whole which maintains itself from moment to moment. Included in this Whole are the millions of rational beings whose own maintenance from moment to moment depends upon their connection with the Whole. Within this Whole they are able to introduce the kind of incoherence which we call evil, which, however, does not mean incoherence in the realm of fact. Evil is quite coherent with the Whole conceived as mere Matter or Energy. But if there are reasons for thinking that the Whole is the expression of Mind, if further this Mind is integrative in purpose and trend,



then so far as rational creatures can do so, they should themselves, in harmony with the Universe so understood, integrate their own lives with each other and with the Whole. If this seems like circular reasoning, if we are interpreting the Whole as Love in analogy with human experience of integration, and then resting the obligation of human love on the nature of the Whole conceived as loving, such circularity of thought is but the movement of faith. Deep calleth unto deep. The Divine without us and the divine within us act and react the one on the other.



## THE HEGELIAN ABSOLUTE AND THE INDIVIDUAL

P. T. RAJU, M.A.

THE aim of this paper is not to enter into a detailed discussion of the nature of the Absolute and the Individual, but to show that on the Hegelian conception of the Absolute the individual self is not saved. Hegel is fond of reiterating that his Absolute is not a bare one, but a one in many, an organic whole, a perfect and harmonious system of an infinite number of individual selves. The individual, as in Spinoza and Schelling, does not lose itself in the Absolute. The latter is not a lion's den into which all animals enter but from which none returns, not a mere darkness in which all cows are black, but a system of different individuals.

To say that the individual self is preserved in the Absolute is more an arbitrary dictum than a reasoned conclusion. From the fact that every existent thing is an identity in difference, we cannot argue that the Absolute too is so. Our world is a bundle of contradictions, but the Absolute is not such a bundle. Even one of the earliest Greek philosophers, Anaxagoras, arrived at the conclusion that his *oioimerae*, or the original particles, contained something of everything in themselves. If his solution is too physical, Hegel's is too logical. And if life is more than logic, the Absolute must be certainly much more.

It is still a controversial point whether Hegel held the view of personal immortality. Some like McTaggart believe that he did, but others do not. Says Stace: "It is a matter of dispute whether Hegel believed in immortality in the *literal* sense. I have only space here to indicate, without reasons, my own opinion, which is that he did not take it literally, but regarded it as a *Vorstellung* for the infinitude of spirit and the absolute value of spiritual individuality. Immortality is a present quality of the spirit, not a future fact or event."<sup>1</sup> Lord Haldane holds the same view. Dr. Haldar, too, expresses a similar opinion, though not exactly the same, in his *Philosophical Essays*.<sup>2</sup>

On one of his principles, it is true that Hegel could not have held the view of personal immortality. Dr. Haldar points out that, according to Hegel, the relation of body and mind is very intimate. One implies the other. So, when the body is destroyed, it inevitably

<sup>1</sup> *The Philosophy of Hegel*, p. 514.

<sup>2</sup> The chapter on "Hegelianism and Immortality."



follows that the mind ceases to exist. If so, how is the individual self preserved in the Absolute? Are we to be nothing after the continuous warfare of a whole life? Is our destruction a mere dissipation into elements to be reorganized by the Absolute into a new whole? Immortality cannot be a mere *Vorstellung* for the infinitude of spirit. It is absurd to contend that the spirit which is eternal will cease to exist after the death of the body.

Yet, on another of his principles, Hegel cannot deny personal immortality, though, unlike Rāmānuja, he is not explicit on the point. Western philosophers do not make any distinction between mind and self. And, according to Hegel, mind, as it is here, is a product of illusion or *Tauschung*. The final end is eternally attained in the Absolute; all our strife is due to illusion; mind is actually in strife here; hence mind as it appears here is due to illusion, and must have another aspect, which is perfect. From the absolute point of view mind is eternally liberated. So when mind realizes this state, it becomes immortal.

But even then it is impossible to retain the individual self in the Absolute. The latter, or Īswara, as it is called by Rāmānuja, is an organism. The innumerable selves are its members. But then, in the liberated state, how are we to distinguish one jīva from another? We can find no differentia. The paradox of relations, which Bradley raises, is not new to Indian philosophy. Sankara raises the same difficulty. And in the Absolute no contradiction can be left unsolved.

Here it may be objected that, when Hegel asserted that he has saved the individual, he means that the self, which is regarded as unreal by Sankara and others, is really the individual. Even then his position is not tenable. Besides the paradox of relations, and the objection that the striving self, according to Hegel, must be an illusion, there are many difficulties in his view. The theory of internal relations is a corollary of the organic conception. In a system any act of one member necessarily affects others. Its relations to the other members are constitutive, and therefore internal. As Bradley says, even spatial and temporal relations have to be regarded as internal. If an individual changes his place, there arises a change in his very nature, though imperceptible to our finite view. Thus individuality becomes only "a matter of content." The individuals "are only pipes through which the Absolute pours itself, jets, as it were, of one fountain." Each of them is only a "conflux of universals or qualities," mere adjectives of the Absolute. But then we cannot see how the individual is saved.

We can now understand why Bosanquet is forced to the conclusion that in the Absolute there is a blending of the individual selves, or, in Bradley's phrase, an "all-pervasive transference." The contents and qualities of the different selves are, as it were, shaken up together



and neutralized and supplement one another. But as the end is already attained in the Absolute on Hegel's view, the individuality of the individual must be a mere illusion, for the contents of the different individuals are already shaken up together and neutralized. The conclusion is necessarily implied in the premise that the Absolute is an organic whole.

Royce seems to have striven very hard to save the individual. Individuality is not merely a "matter of content," but has some uniqueness in it. It is impenetrable. It is not a conflux or system of universals only. If otherwise interpreted, it loses its very nature. Royce lays emphasis upon its uniqueness and indescribability in other terms. Thus far he seems to be very near the truth. But when he falls back upon the Hegelian conception of organism, and says that the individual, as a unique purpose, forms a member of a system of such purposes, he loses the ground he has gained. To be a member of a system means to be interpretable in terms of others. Though in society some of our actions can be interpreted thus, our ultimate nature cannot be. Royce thinks that the Absolute too is a purpose, though a system of our finite purposes and in realizing our aims we are realizing the Absolute aim. But as Aliotta pertinently remarks, if what seems our aim is the aim of the Absolute, it cannot be truly ours, and *vice versa*. If the individual is preserved, the Absolute is lost; and if the Absolute is preserved, the individual is lost. The conclusion is inevitable.

Pringle-Pattison, in criticizing Bradley and Bosanquet, says that the individual should be a substance in the Aristotelian sense, though not in the Spinozistic.<sup>1</sup> But if Pringle-Pattison remains a Hegelian, we do not understand what advantage can be gained by making the individual a substance even in the Aristotelian sense. Though we can attach predicate after predicate to it, its ultimate nature remains only a matter of content. Being a member of an organic whole, it is through and through pierced by others. That is why Bradley says that even spatial and temporal changes produce corresponding changes in the individual's nature. Bradley and Bosanquet make the Absolute the ultimate subject of every predicate, though they have no objection in keeping the individual as a proximate subject. According to them, the Absolute is the only real individual, and from the metaphysical point of view, we, as finite centres of experience, are its adjectives. And they are justified in their conclusions.

To avoid the above consequences, philosophers like McTaggart assert the ultimate and metaphysical substantiality of the individual. It is "a substance existing in its own right." Says McTaggart, "if the opponent should remind me of the notorious imperfections in the

<sup>1</sup> *The Idea of God*, pp. 270-1.



present lives of each of us, I should point out that every self is in reality eternal, and that its true qualities are only seen in so far as it is considered as eternal. *Sub specie aeternitatis* every self is perfect. *Sub specie temporis*, it is progressing towards a perfection as yet unattained."<sup>1</sup> But as a Hegelian, McTaggart cannot dispense with the organic conception. The Absolute is the unity of the selves, and the unity is not external to them. "The unity must be completely in each individual, yet it must also be the bond which unites them. But to attain such a unity the selves must be internally related to each other. It is not enough to say that all the selves form a complete whole. There must be something in the constitution of each self to be a member of a perfect system. Even pre-established harmony, as in Leibnitz, cannot explain the fact. The nature of the individual must be able to provide for such a harmony. The theory of internal relations is therefore indispensable. The result will be that no individual can exist in its own right. We cannot have both a plurality of self-dependent substances and an essential unity between them.

Besides, if there is an individual who can exist and act in his own right, there must be scope for possibilities in the universe. They must be due to the freedom of the individual. But Bradley is forced by the logic of his position to remove the difference between the possible and the actual. In the metaphysical sense, the possible and the actual are the same. "Chance is the given fact which falls outside of some given whole or system."<sup>2</sup> But actually there is nothing which can fall outside the harmonious system of the Absolute. Hence there is no chance. The conclusion strictly follows from the Hegelian view which cannot allow the individual the freedom even to err. Joachim in his *Nature of Truth* tacitly admits the charge. To call freedom self-determination in no way strengthens the position.

The Hegelians are obsessed by the principle *ex nihilo nihil fit*. Any action proceeding from an individual must have a cause. In order to save his freedom, the cause is regarded not as external to him, but as his very nature. Yet his nature is formed by the externality, the rest of the universe. In it lies the final explanation of his actions. Freedom is freedom of self-determination, but the self is determined by the not-self. So all that issues from the individual is already there in the rest of the world. Whatever be the causes that led the ancient philosophers to formulate the principle *ex nihilo nihil fit*, it is called in question recently. Even realists like Russell disbelieve in it. In Indian philosophy, Sankara too questioned its validity. Satkāryavāda, according to him, is not valid in the metaphysical sense. And his followers cite as an instance the ordinary fact that out of cowering scorpions are born. Whether we accept the

<sup>1</sup> *Mind*, N.S., Vol. XI, p. 388.

<sup>2</sup> *Appearance and Reality*, p. 388.



principle at the empirical level or not, it should not be applied in determining the nature of the individual, and must be considered invalid for the purpose.

Let us now examine Sankara's theory. We have seen that the chief condition of individuality is some unique indivisibility. Sankara's conception of *jīva* satisfies this condition in one way. On the principle of *māyā*, Sankara need not hold the theory of internal relations. They do not constitute the individual's nature. When one *jīva* is affected in one way, there is no corresponding change in others. Though his lower Brahman can be more or less compared to Rāmānuja's *Īswara* or Hegel's Absolute, Sankara asserts that the admission of its existence is only a compromise to some people's demand that philosophy should satisfy our religious instinct. In criticizing the Sāṅkhya conception of the oneness of Prakṛti on the ground that when one puruṣa (self) is liberated, all the rest also should be, the Sankarites point out that their *māyā* can be many.<sup>1</sup> On one's own *avidyā* ceasing to exist, those of the rest need not. *Māyā* can be one with regard to *Īswara*, and many for the *jīvas*. So far every *jīva* may be unique. It does not lose the quality in spite of the *vāsanās* and *samskāras* which are gathered through the round of deaths and births and enter into its nature.

Yet Sankara would say that our analysis is not complete. Though what is contributed by *māyā* for the *jīva* is unique, its contribution forms only a part of *jīva*'s nature. The *jīva* owes its consciousness to Brahman. Ultimately both are identical. Brahman is the highest universal. Without it the *jīva* could not have the sense of "I." So, as regards its conscious nature, it is not unique. Hence, on Sankara's view, the *jīva*, though unique phenomenally, is not so noumenally. There is no personal immortality, but only impersonal. Immortality for the *jīva* means realizing its own identity with Brahman, and thus losing its own personality.

Sankara's conception of Brahman satisfies our condition of individuality to the full. In the sense of being one among many, his Brahman is not an individual. But we have seen above in examining the view of McTaggart that a one among many cannot be an individual if the many are to be essentially interrelated. Bradley says that a plurality of reals is not possible, for each would be disturbed by the external influences which would create internal discrepancy, and, again, a plurality of reals cannot be reconciled with their independence. But it is obvious that the assertion holds good only when essential interconnection between the reals is posited. To put Bradley's view more concretely, an essential relation is constitutive, and thus each real can be explained in terms of others, and is determined by them. Each loses its uniqueness and becomes

<sup>1</sup> Saravadarsana Samgraha.



merely a form in which any content may be packed. But if the reals are not thus related, if the relations of each to others are external, they do not form members of a system, and each becomes independent. The external influences cannot create internal discrepancies, and a plurality of reals cannot be inconsistent with their independence. Pluralists with a realistic bent of mind hold exactly such a view. But here we are not concerned with them, but with the idealists of the Hegelian type.

Nor is Sankara's Brahman an individual in the Bradleyan sense. It is true that Bradley and Bosanquet are more logical and advanced than the other Hegelians. They have shown that the individual selves as members of an organism cannot retain their uniqueness. The individuals somehow transform each other, blend with each other, and form the Absolute which is the real individual. Thus they are lost in it.

A few steps can easily lead us from Bradley to Sankara. According to the former, the many as such are lost in the Absolute. They all blend and together form the ONE. If so, they cannot remain there as many. They lose their many-ness or bahutva in it. Strictly speaking, the Sankarites assert that the Absolute cannot be said to be the ONE. If many-ness disappears in the Absolute, one-ness also goes with it. They are categories of thought, but the Absolute is above thought, or, in Bradley's terms, more than thought. If thought as such disappears in the Absolute, the categories cannot exist. Hence, Brahman is regarded as indescribable, anirvachanīya. Bradley says that it is inexplicable how the appearances blend in the Absolute, and how they issue forth from it. It is this principle of inexplicability that Sankara calls māyā.

In this connection Bradley seems to occupy a position between Rāmānuja and Sankara, and is thus a little in advance of the former. It is true that what he rejected as appearances he reclaimed as forming part of reality. Also, his Absolute, like Rāmānuja's, is a one in many, an organic whole. The finite centres of experience or the jīvas are the adjectives of the Absolute in both. But Bradley seems to have recognized and to have been more impressed by the self-contradictory nature of our finite existence than Rāmānuja. The former points out that the finite selves are riddled with contradictions, and hence cannot exist as such in the Absolute. They must blend and undergo complete transformation. But in Rāmānuja there is no such conception. Had Bradley given up his Hegelian bias, rejected the appearances as in no way forming part of reality, and thus saved the eternal perfection of the Absolute, he would have joined hands with Sankara. Says Professor Radhakrishnan, "At the centre of Sankara's system is the eternal mystery of creation, a mystery in which every movement of life and every atom of the



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world are implicated.”<sup>1</sup> Bradley’s philosophy also has this mystery in its “somehow,” by which the appearances issue forth from the Absolute. But the mystery loses its force by his reclaiming the appearances as belonging to reality. It is only unwillingly, as it were, that he admits the impotency of thought to grapple with the mystery of creation and atonement. And the admission, therefore, remains a conspicuous inconsistency with the rest of his system.

The crux of all monism, says Professor Radhakrishnan, is the relation of the finite to the infinite.<sup>2</sup> And Sankara seems to be the most successful in defining the relation. He has saved the individuality of the finite self both in its phenomenal and noumenal aspects. It is sufficiently unique in both. Phenomenally the individual self is *māyā*. But *māyā* can be many for the *jīvas*. On the liberation of any *jīva*, its own *māyā* vanishes. Hence each *jīva* is unique so far. Noumenally, every *jīva* is the Brahman which is without a second. So it is also unique, and thus an individual, though much more. Sankara has also overcome the difficulty—which McTaggart could not—of bringing the different selves existing in their own right into essential unity. Both make a distinction between the eternal and temporal aspects. But Sankara makes all the selves identical, *sub specie aeternitatis*, and many *sub specie temporis*. *Māyā* permits them as much individuality as is necessary, and in no way impairs it in uniting them. In their eternal aspect the *jīvas* are one, and the problem of uniting them does not arise for Sankara at all.

<sup>1</sup> *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 656.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 715.



## PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

## PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE

## M. LE ROY ON INTUITIVE THOUGHT

IN his two volumes on *Intuitive Thought*<sup>1</sup> Professor Edouard Le Roy continues his idealistic interpretation of spiritual creativity, and turns from its 'products' manifested in biological and human evolution<sup>2</sup> to consider its most intimate character, as it is 'lived through' or directly experienced in intuitive and inventive thinking. The whole plan and its execution are determined by two characteristic themes of Bergsonism—intuition and the dynamical schema—though these are *repensés* in a quite original way. "Intuitive thought" and "metaphysical thought," M. Le Roy affirms in the preface, are "one and the same"; the latter is condemned only by those who misconceive the former. So by correcting misunderstandings he seeks to vindicate the method of intuition which Bergson advocated, and begins by attempting to elicit what is distinctive in philosophy. Its scope and character cannot be indicated with the same ease and sufficiency as those of any positive science. Once a field of objects, or a "subject-matter" is assigned, the construction of its science develops by procedures which involve abstracting from, and partitioning of, that field. Discovery of a new entity or adoption of a new point of view towards entities already known is sufficient to determine straightway a new science; the existence of the entity or the fruitfulness of the point of view entailing the legitimacy of that science. But what is most valuable and distinctive in philosophy cannot be conveyed in a similar way, by assigning some separate field of data. Its very history shows that there can be philosophy of any object whatever; any material admits of being studied philosophically. What is specific to the discipline, then, is a certain attitude or intent—"une disposition de l'âme"—which is "primarily a certain way of perceiving and thinking," hence, a "spirit" rather than a special content or 'private preserve.' The word properly denotes an activity or exercise, and not a structure of co-ordinated propositions. All philosophical thinking, no matter about what object, is "absolute thinking"; thinking not from this or that perspective, nor towards one or another restricted end, but thinking "dans une perspective d'unification intégrale." The single and vast problem confronting the philosopher, taken up by no special scientist, is "résorber la nature et l'histoire dans un éclair de conscience qui soit indivisiblement une vision et un acte." No one of the characterizations usually proposed adequately determines the nature of philosophical activity. To be sure, the philosopher is he who contends continually against imprisonment in any sort of prejudice; one who, in seeking simply to know, thereby liberates himself from every concern other than that of attaining full and certain knowledge, and one who aspires after a synthesis so synoptic and extensive that nothing of the wealth of thought and experience is sacrificed

<sup>1</sup> EDOUARD LE ROY, *La Pensée intuitive: I—Au delà du Discours* (pp. 204; Fr. 15); II—*Invention et Vérification* (pp. 296; Fr. 20), both in the collection "Bibliothèque de la Revue des Cours et Conférences." Paris: Boivin.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. "M. Le Roy's Interpretation of Evolution," *Philosophy*, IX, 33, January 1934, pp. 89-93.



or compromised. He is, moreover, one in whom reason has become, as with the ancients, "*habitude souveraine et vertu efficace*," and one who is particularly sensitive to spiritual realities and values. All three characteristics are indispensable to designate the peculiar nature of philosophic exercise, for its practice is a threefold effort of criticism, speculation, and wisdom.

Science furnishes materials for the assay of knowledge, the "ballast for speculation," for it is the data and findings of the natural and social sciences which nourish and sustain philosophy. But science, reciprocally, has need of philosophy, if it is to understand itself as being the "work of the mind" that it is. So, though the sciences give philosophy "weight and substance," it is through philosophy alone that science can liberate and illuminate. One intrinsic limitation of science, however, lies in its inability to pass beyond the confines of organized and transformed experience, effected in accordance with the utilitarian needs of common sense. For, though widening the range of normal perception, science exaggerates its precision and acuity. All absorbed in its objects, it ignores the contributions made by the interpreting subject. It ignores, too, that 'parcelling out' (*morcelage*) of experience which really derives from the analytic and abstracting character of our understanding, and errs precisely in taking this *parcelled* experience as the given, and as therefore both a material and a model for its operations. Science receives and utilizes, ready-made and without antecedent criticism, certain postulates or forms into which it forces experience in its effort to interpret it—thus remaining inescapably 'relative,' but without taking account of the fact. Thinking as restricted at the common-sense and scientific levels is incapable of grasping change in its very essence, "*dans sa mobilité même*"; its rôle is the auxiliary one of contributing to satisfy the demands of action and discursive reasoning, and it is in consequence more concerned with *states* than *transitions*—with that which is comparatively definite, stable, and suitable for utilization in discursive and industrial interests (thing, product, or effect) than with attaining a direct perception of the existent in its "immediate purity," freed from all "relativity" to perspective and situation, or to symbolic translation or utilitarian purpose. This "immediacy" we can never attain by thinking organized and limited as it is at the ordinary and scientific stages of cognitive evolution. Though the positive sciences (which are but an extension and refinement of common sense) do, indeed, aspire to theoretical disinterestedness, they must nevertheless remain, from their very procedure—by piecemeal revision, approximation, and partial self-correction—tributary to the anterior methods and habits of common sense. In sum, then, although it increases in precision and extent, correcting errors inherent in our perception and inference, science only succeeds in substituting for the "*morcelage commun*" another, more subtle and souple "*morcelage*," though no less infected with its own special 'relativity.' A critical revision of scientific results is therefore imperative. It must be a revision or substitution which shall correct the inherent tendency of science to immobilize and reify reality in its primitive fluidity, and, in order to disengage its "authentic essence," will institute what Bergson called "*une recherche d'immédiat*." In this search, no direct use can be made of the symbolism and devices found indispensable in action and discourse, and in this sense, intuitive thought which attains immediacy will be thinking "*au delà du discours*." Intuition alone can give "complete satisfaction to all the legitimate requirements of reason." It was Kant's erroneous assumption that in order to come by knowledge of ultimate reality a faculty independent of sensation and thought was required, and, failing to find such faculty, falsely inferred that no disclosure of ultimate reality was possible to minds constituted as ours. M. Le Roy maintains



against this that perception can attain to ultimate reality, and that this conclusion is free from the objections to which Kant's is exposed, precisely because Bergsonian intuition is not independent but emphatically dependent on sensation, and is immanent in the very conceptual nature of our discursive thinking. "*Pensée vivante*" is essentially "history" or becoming, dynamically continuous—"an uninterrupted growth of vital maturation"—and no mere conjunction of images and concepts. Consequently it is not these into which it can be analysed without remainder; for in so resolving it what is essentially the thinking will escape us. To characterize this process from which images and concepts flow—"la réalité vécue"—M. Le Roy introduces the dynamic schema, which is in fact "*idée en marche*." The notion is a difficult one and is elucidated by reference to William James's distinction<sup>1</sup> between "substantive parts" and "transitive parts" in the stream of thought. In a flow of actual thinking, the images, the concepts and their verbal expressions, which we retain, dwell attentively upon and abstract, are merely stopping stages ("*stations conceptuelles*," "*époques d'arrêt*") which we habitually mistake or substitute for real thinking activity. To conceive it so is to misrepresent it. For in attending to a set of interconnected concepts, we are no more attending to *thinking*, than in attending to several points on a curve already drawn we are attending to the *motion* of the body whose trajectory that curve describes. To overlook this is to confound the steps of a staircase with the action of ascending it. What such a description leaves out is just the content of the intervals between the successive awarenesses of concepts. And that content is not, indeed, just more 'filling' of the same kind (conceptual, imaginative), but that from which the "substantive parts," conceptual and sensory, arise, and therefore something prior to them. This underlying process, thinking "*prise sur le vif*," is that dynamic schema which Bergson describes as "*développable en images ou concepts multiples sous forme implicite et potentielle*." It is upon the dynamic schema in activity that an act of creative thought (intuition) so intervenes as to complete it. Since, in speaking of the dynamic schema we are speaking of the "transitive" and not of the "substantive" parts of '*la pensée vivante*,' its character cannot be defined by concepts and through discourse, but only indicated indirectly. Examples of its presence, however, are plentiful; as, *e.g.*, when Racine declared "*ma tragédie est faite*," though not a line of it was written; when, trying to recall a name which is 'on our lips' yet does not come, we reject wrong names suggested but cannot utter the right one; wherever, in short, there is a "*démarche de pensée productrice*" creative of hypothesis, as in playing at chess, there is the dynamic schema in activity.

In view of this account of dynamic schematism and of the aim of philosophic practice, we are now in a position to understand in what "the return to immediacy" consists. As I understand it, it consists in intervening in any stream of discursive thinking, piercing through its conceptual texture to the dynamic schema itself, and experiencing the content of the lived moment on which is overlaid the interpretation that we read off conceptually at the next instant (*i.e.* "*avant que la tension intérieure de l'invention s'y soit cristallisée en résultat formulable*"). It is to the 'cogito' that return must always be made. Plainly, then, the intuition in question is not the 'intuition in imagination' of Kant, nor the 'intuition of simple natures' of Descartes. Immediacy is evinced at two levels in epistemological evolution. At the earlier, before the continuous real has been broken apart and parcelled-out in thought in deference to the utilitarian motives of common sense and

<sup>1</sup> William James, *Principles of Psychology*, I, ch. ix, especially pp. 243-244.



science, it is exemplified in a less pure form, as co-existent with, but opposed to, the conceptual and imaginative contents of thinking. Immediacy occurs again, in a purer form, at the term of our discursive thinking, where it is disclosed in a genuinely creative act—purified from all the incrustations, conceptual, sensory, verbal, that concealed it in the meantime—as the fruition of a long and arduous process of discourse, analytic and symbolic, and therefore both posterior and superior to the discursive process from which it has issued. At its reappearance, it transcends not only the discursive process but also that opposition which discourse institutes and which its conceptual description presupposes—the distinction between subject and object, the knower and the known—so that conscious activity and creativity are ultimately seen to be one and the same. At the moment of insight there is no distinction of knower and known, then nascent reality in its primitive fluidity is *vécue*—hence the idealist character of M. Le Roy's philosophy. Full intuition is one with absolute existence, for these are simply two descriptions of a single process which is reality, the 'duality' of the descriptions corresponding to nothing in that unbroken reality itself, but only to something ineradicable from our *conception* of what it is to 'know reality.'

It remains to notice briefly the consequences, practical and theoretical, of this theory of intuitive thinking. Intuition is always in some degree inventive, and never is there invention in any field that does not issue in an act of insight. Here, as before, to comprehend the inventive character of thought is to know its *démarches*, not its *œuvres*. Life and thought are a gradual realization, not a summed reality, and philosophy is simply the spirit of invention become cognizant of its own initiatives and powers. The whole material of the sciences—its propositions, laws, principles of inference no less than its objects and facts—are through and through relative. What is at one date regarded as 'a fact' becomes modified by subsequent theory and inventive 'discovery.' Thus the whole practice of positive science is a process in which revision continually supersedes revision. Any one such revision is essentially a new vision of old facts in a new arrangement, and successful rearrangement is the discovery of new truth. But no new re-organization is ever a final and absolute arrangement, it marks only a stage towards some still further revision; hence any arrangement is a "verification" of some further revision, in the sense that it was solely from *that* arrangement a passage to the subsequent revision was possible. Invention and discovery consist, then, not simply in the perception of a 'new fact' ("substantive part"), nor simply in imagining a fresh arrangement of facts with which we are already familiar. There is no hard and fast division between 'fact' and 'form of organization.' An 'already-known fact' can only be a constellation of certain concepts organized in a certain way; discovery of a 'new fact' can be nothing but a more suggestive and fruitful *re-conception* of what was reified in our previous concepts, or a new *organization* of such re-conceptions. Novelty is in that sense relative. In so far as our present thinking about a field of 'parcelled-out' objects continues to employ or to presuppose the same fundamental concepts as our earlier thinking about that field, this present thinking only *develops their consequences*, and so far has not the character of genuine discovery or innovation. Only when the former field is contemplated under new concepts which themselves 'innovate' a new distribution, and a new definition, of the objects of the former field, have we discovery. And innovating imagination ("imagination novatrice") cannot operate until the former field has become so familiar that we can experiment in imagination upon it, dissociating at will what we had accepted as conjoined, and come in this way to envisage alternative possible systematiza-



tions. There must elapse a period of 'incubation,' during which all possible organizations are contemplated but none is chosen. Soon or late there then issues an anticipation or vision of the potential development of one, as against the other alternatives, and therewith its provisional and temporary acceptance. The whole process is continuous, the attainment of one organization of concepts being but a resting-stage and starting-point for the transition to another. Thus the processes of discovery and verification are themselves but "transitive parts" in the continuous stream of intuitive thinking or actual becoming.

S. V. KEELING.

## PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY

THE main interest of BERNARD BAVINK'S book on *Discoveries and Problems of the Natural Sciences*<sup>1</sup> lies in his comprehensive survey of scientific theories and his consideration of philosophical problems in relation to these theories. His method is to raise philosophical problems after presenting the scientific views which give rise to them. And accordingly it is unjust to concentrate on his philosophical opinions, as I intend to do. One can roughly indicate these opinions by saying that he believes the philosophy of science to be concerned with facts about existent things, and not with *a priori* forms of thought, nor with conventions adopted for convenience. He believes in "*metaphysics a posteriori*."

The book is divided into four sections dealing with chemistry, physics, astronomy, biology, psychology, and the sociological sciences. I shall only consider two of these sections—Section 1 (concerned with chemistry and physics) and Section 3 (concerned with biology)—so the reader must realize that the book contains a great many more problems than are here considered.

In Section 1 Bavink raises a number of philosophical problems, in particular about scientific hypotheses, substance and causality. He maintains that our view of these must depend on physical discoveries, and that we shall see when we consider the course of physical development that philosophy should change its beliefs as a result of changes in physics. Accordingly he gives a detailed survey of the development in physical views, considering first the classical mechanistic theories (*e.g.* of Newton and Laplace), then passing to such later developments as the kinetic theory of temperature and the electromagnetic theory of light, and coming finally to the theories of relativity and quanta.

How do these changes affect the philosophic view of hypotheses, substance and causality? Let us first consider hypotheses. The main question Bavink wishes to raise about these is, How do they differ from statements asserting some fact? Is it simply that we are certain of the latter but not of the former? or is the difference more radical—are hypotheses simply "conventions" or "pictures" which enable us to predict facts? If now we consider the development of physics, we shall see that certain hypotheses have been verified, and this will help us to answer these questions. Bavink takes the atomic theory as an example. This remained an hypothesis for a long time, as there was little experimental evidence to support it. But experimental evidence increased to such an extent that now, so he believes, it is certain

<sup>1</sup> *Ergebnisse und Probleme der Naturwissenschaften*. S. Hirzel. Leipzig. 1933. 5th edition. Pp. xii + 650.



that atoms exist—they are real as water waves are real, and the proposition “matter consists of atoms” is of the same kind as “plants consist of cells.” The fact that no one has ever seen an individual atom is irrelevant, for we should not take sight as the only criterion of existence. We can see its action, and this is a sufficient criterion for its existence. And what, in Bavink’s view, does this prove about hypotheses? It proves that an hypothesis only differs from a statement about fact because we are not certain that what it supposes is true. It proves that an hypothesis is not merely a “convention” which enables us to predict.

Bavink then considers substance. The traditional philosophical view drew a sharp distinction between substance as that which filled space and the changes it underwent, which occurred in time and required “forces” to bring them about. This view conformed with the classical view of physics. Laplace regarded the world as an enormous system of particles whose only property was inertia, and which were related to each other by measurable forces acting as attracting and repelling agents. But modern physics does not distinguish between space-filling substances and their temporal changes. Its elements are four-dimensional quanta, and these are ordered in certain ways, e.g. to form electrons, atoms, molecules, etc.—the “eternal substances” of the classical view are replaced by four-dimensional events. And thus philosophy, basing itself on physics, must abandon the traditional distinction between substance and its changes.

And for similar reasons philosophy must abandon causality. Here again its traditional view agreed with the classical theory of physics. According to Laplace, if anyone knew the exact positions and momenta of every particle at a given instant, and knew also all the causal laws determining their interactions, he would be able to overlook all past, present, and future events with absolute precision. It was obvious, of course, that no one did know these laws, but such knowledge was the ideal which physics put before itself. Now, however, physics believes that the world consists of quanta, not of particles, and it is nonsensical, not merely practically impossible, to obtain exact measurement of the place and momentum of a quantum at a given instant. The “initial condition” which Laplace presupposed simply doesn’t exist. Physics, accordingly, is giving up its old ideal and looking for statistical instead of causal laws. Such laws allow the physicist to make very exact statements about collective wholes formed by large quantities of electrons and occurring frequently—and this explains why we can predict so accurately both in science and ordinary life—but they do not permit of any such accuracy in statements about an individual electron or about a collection of any electrons which is too complicated to recur. Thus we have to choose between two types of explanation—causal or statistical. It is quite wrong to suppose that statistical laws alone do not provide an explanation or that they imply chaos or free will or miraculous intervention. And physics must determine our choice. In Bavink’s view the physics of to-day leads to the statistical explanation. It now appears that the world is ordered according to statistical and not according to causal laws. And we must realize that we are simply deciding about a question of fact—we are neither asking whether one hypothesis is more convenient than another nor discussing *a priori* forms of thought.

In the third section Bavink considers among other things the biological experiments which bear on the controversy between mechanists and vitalists. Here, too, the issue has been changed by recent developments. When the classical view prevailed in physics, it was thought that such processes as nutrition, growth, and reproduction could be explained in the same way as



material processes. But it is now realized that living bodies are not machines, and that the laws which explain them, even if chemico-physical, must differ from the laws that explain material processes.

The main point in the controversy is whether vital phenomena involve only a new and peculiar combination of physical factors, or whether they involve an altogether new kind of factor. Bavink cannot agree entirely with one side or the other. Within the last thirty years there has been a great deal of experimental work which bears on the subject, and which Bavink reviews in considerable detail. We know, for example, that the individual cells of an embryo usually have the capacity to develop along several different lines—transplantation of cells from one part to another has revealed most startling results—and tremendous progress has been made in giving these and similar phenomena a chemico-physical explanation. But, on the other hand, there is no doubt that vital processes in most cases are purposive—they subserve the preservation of the individual or species; and this fact is the best defence of the vitalists' case. Another point in their favour, Bavink thinks, is the difficulty of explaining the original appearance of life in purely chemico-physical terms. Finally, however, he suggests a third alternative, based on the belief that both mechanists and vitalists are taking a wrong view of chemico-physical explanation. Both have taken such explanation to be strictly causal. The vitalists have assumed additional causal factors, entelechies, which fill up the gaps left by chemico-physical explanation, and they have not been successful in showing how entelechies are related to chemico-physical processes. But we must bear two points in mind: first, that causal explanation is ceasing to be the physicist's ideal, and, secondly, that biological phenomena are certainly determined through being parts of an organized whole. It may be that the ideal of chemico-physical explanation will alter to such an extent that it embraces determination through organized wholes. And so, Bavink thinks, the controversy may be settled through a difference in the conception of chemico-physical explanation. But he admits that he can only give the vaguest idea of what this difference would be like.

HELEN KNIGHT.



## NEW BOOKS

*An Essay on Philosophical Method.* By R. G. COLLINGWOOD. (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. xii + 226. Price 10s.)

Mr. Collingwood's discourse on method is different from that of Descartes. Descartes expounds his method by applying it to clear up various metaphysical problems. Mr. Collingwood expounds his by applying it to clear up the problem of method. Thus his book is an application of philosophical method to the problem of philosophical method. It appears to owe a good deal to the Crocification of Hegel.

If philosophical method is to be different from scientific method, this must be because philosophical concepts are different from scientific concepts; and this is the first point to which Mr. Collingwood attends. He starts with the fact that any general concept has various specifications, which are its kinds. In the case of scientific concepts, such, *e.g.*, as lines and triangles, the kinds are mutually exclusive. If a line is straight it is not curved. If a triangle is scalene it is not equilateral. The case of philosophical concepts is quite different. It is not possible, *e.g.*, to separate affirmative and negative judgments as mutually exclusive kinds. Think out the nature of affirmation and you will see that it involves an element of negation; again, negation involves an element of affirmation. Similarly we cannot regard the pleasant, the expedient, and the right as mutually exclusive kinds of good. It cannot be said that whatever is pleasant is both inexpedient and wrong, or that what is right is both unpleasant and inexpedient.

This difference between scientific and philosophical concepts Mr. Collingwood expresses by saying that philosophical concepts involve overlap of classes, scientific concepts do not. And it seems that he intends this distinction to be a precise and universal distinction between philosophical and non-philosophical concepts. Where there is overlap the concepts belong to philosophy and not to any other study. Where there is no overlap the concepts belong to some other study and not to philosophy (54). [If so, then the classification of concepts into those belonging to philosophy and those not belonging to philosophy is itself one where there is no overlap, and therefore one which does not belong to philosophy, even though philosophical method essentially depends on it.] If there are any concepts that seem to belong both to philosophy and to some other study, close investigation will show that they are interpreted so as to show overlap in philosophy and not to show it in the other study (35).

What Mr. Collingwood's positive conception of overlap involves is not clear, I think, from his chapter on overlap, where on the whole it seems to have primarily negative rather than positive significance; and it is necessary to proceed to the next chapter, on the Scale of Forms, for further information. Here the writer is concerned in the first instance with a further difference between scientific and philosophical concepts [this difference again showing no overlap and therefore not belonging to philosophy].

The kinds of a particular concept can differ in degree as well as in kind. Thus ice water and steam are all kinds of  $H_2O$ , differing in degree of heat. In the case of philosophical concepts the kinds not only can differ in degree,



but must do so. And in their case the different kinds falling under the concept are different degrees of the concept itself. *E.g.*, the pleasant, the expedient, and the right are kinds of good, and they differ in degree of goodness. Ice water and steam do not differ in degree of  $H_2O$ : they are all equally  $H_2O$ . The pleasant, the expedient, and the right are not all equally good.

Mr. Collingwood expresses this by saying that in a scientific concept the variable is extraneous to the essence of the concept, while in a philosophical concept the variable is identical with the essence. And he generalizes and says that all philosophical concepts have this character: their kinds are not coordinate kinds, all equally specifications of their concept, but they differ in the degree to which they are specifications of their concept. Thus, *e.g.*, pleasure is only in a low degree good; it is not as good a kind of goodness as is rightness, which is good in a higher degree. Nevertheless pleasure is a distinct kind of good (73-4).

Mr. Collingwood brings out the peculiar relations involved in philosophical concepts by distinguishing between "opposition" and "distinction" in regard to kinds. By "mere opposition" he appears to mean the relation between different instances, when these instances differ only in degree and not in kind. As, *e.g.*, hot and cold water are not different in kind, but only in degree of heat. Since with philosophical concepts difference of degree is always also difference of kind, it follows that in regard to them opposition is always at the same time distinction; it cannot be "mere opposition." Good and bad are different degrees of goodness, and hence opposed. But they are also distinct. Badness is a definite kind of goodness, as well as being opposed to other kinds. So error and truth are different degrees of truth, and hence opposed. But error is not merely the absence of more of something, whose presence would be greater truth; it is also a distinct and positive kind of truth.

Thus a philosophical concept gives rise to a scale of forms which differ at once in degree and in kind, the difference in degree being inseparable from the difference in kind. Each form is at once opposed to and distinct from all the rest. But there is thoroughgoing overlap, since that in respect of which the forms vary is the essence of them all. The kinds of truth differ in degree of truth. The kinds of reality differ in degree of reality. The kinds of pleasure differ in degree of pleasure. The kinds of beauty differ in degree of beauty. [And so on indefinitely. The kinds of overlap differ in degree of overlap. The kinds of philosophical concept differ in degree of philosophical conceptuality. The kinds of philosophical problem differ in degree of philosophical problematicness; so that some concepts and some problems belong to philosophy in a higher degree than others. Thus if scientific concepts only overlapped a little with philosophic concepts, we could allow the distinction between scientific and philosophic concepts to be at least to a low degree a philosophical one].

Mr. Collingwood interprets this general situation in a special way. Pleasures which are different in degree of pleasure he regards as pleasures which are different in the adequacy with which they embody or exhibit the essence of pleasure. Beauties which differ in degree of beauty, he takes as beauties which differ in the adequacy with which they embody the essence of beauty. And so in general. Each kind, of a philosophical concept, is trying with all its might to shine forth as the whole essence of the concept, but succeeding only to a degree of adequacy.

This generalization leads at once to the determination of the method proper to philosophy. For it is clear that the proper method of dealing with concepts, whose essential differences are differences in the adequacy with which



they express the nature of the concept of which they are the different kinds, will be to put them in the setting of the scale of forms, and see them as marking a point of achievement on that scale with respect to all the forms lower down, and a point of failure with respect to all the forms higher up.

Again, philosophical inquiry will not be a process of adding new knowledge to old, but one of passing from less to more adequate knowledge. Its affirmations will be negations as well. Indeed, each affirmation will mark the occupation of a point on the scale of forms, by being a rejection of all the occupants of points lower in the scale, and especially the rejection of the occupant of the point just lower in the scale, while being an affirmation in a more adequate way of what they were managing less adequately to affirm. The affirmations of philosophy, again, will not be merely hypothetical, but hypothetical and categorical at once, with the categorical predominating, since this is the more adequate form.

Further consequences of all this in regard to philosophical method become clear in Chapters VIII and IX. There is a final chapter on philosophy as a branch of literature. I have no space to discuss these chapters, but the result is to justify the method of studying philosophy by studying the philosophic tradition through the history of philosophy, and thinking out the degrees to which the various types of philosophy (which are not mutually exclusive, but overlap, are not only opposed, but distinct, having their proper places on the scale of forms) succeed in being adequate embodiments of philosophy. With luck the student should (at least occasionally) succeed in showing that some of the great philosophers of the past were trying to say inadequately what he is saying much better (even though what they said was a different kind of thing).

L. J. RUSSELL.

*Hobbes*. By JOHN LAIRD. (Leaders of Philosophy Series.) (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd. 1934. Pp. xii + 324. Price 12s. 6d.)

An intelligent reader of Professor Laird's earlier books would have expected from him an excellent volume on Hobbes, and the expectation is amply fulfilled. The book presents the same combination of appreciation, critical shrewdness, and wide erudition which marked the author's earlier work on Hume, and should take a permanent place henceforth as a worthy companion by the side of Croom Robertson's little monograph, so long recognized in this country as a model of all that a work of this kind ought to be. To be sure, no production of man is flawless, and I trust Mr. Laird will not take it ill if I mention a few points in which I think his admirable book might have been made even better than it is. There are the inevitable errors of the press which have escaped detection. Most of them are trivial and easily remedied, but it is unfortunate that some of them occur in the dating of events in the hero's life. Thus (p. 11, last line) 1664, as the context shows, means 1646; the date given on p. 21 for Sorbière's visit to England should be 1663 (not 1653); the statement on p. 48 that Descartes's *Monde* was written "about 1634" is refuted by its own context, since the condemnation of Galileo, which led Descartes to suppress the book, and Galileo's abjuration took place in 1633. I could wish to be sure whether the author has verified the name of the Nottinghamshire gentleman to whose son Hobbes acted as tutor (p. 6). He, like Leslie Stephen, gives it as Clinton, but in the *Vita* and *Auctarium* it appears as Clifton; which is the true form? The printer has played Mr. Laird a worse trick at p. 111, where Hobbes is said to have hesitated between



defining force as  $v$  or as  $mv$ ; the words of the text show that  $v$  here should have been  $v^2$ .

In his generosity to the reader, Mr. Laird has documented his statements and quotations very fully. But I fear his methods of reference, as described in the *Prefatory Note* on p. xii, may too often prove baffling. Since his habit is on the first mention of a book to introduce an arbitrary abbreviation of its title for use in all subsequent citations, there should obviously have been a complete list of these *compendia* given, either after p. xii or at the end of the volume; without such a list no one can be expected to recognize the numerous recurring abbreviations. And perhaps other readers may, like myself, be a little annoyed by the trick of constantly referring to really famous books merely by the volume and page of some standard edition of *Complete Works*. It is difficult to remember throughout 300 pages exactly what writings of Hobbes himself are contained in each of the volumes of Molesworth, and confusing to find Bacon's *Advancement of Learning* disguised as *E. and S. III*. Again, it is not easy to check references to Galileo's *Dialogo* when they are given by the pages of the seventeenth-century English version, a book few of us are likely to have at hand. But these are, of course, very minor faults.

A "devil's advocate" might make more of the point that Mr. Laird here, as in his book on Hume, suffers from a certain inability or disinclination to tell a simple tale in the simplest way. He likes to tell his story by indirect allusion, and has a fondness for epigrammatic "point" which is the more irritating that the epigrams often refuse to "come off." One example shall suffice. We are told (p. 17) of Seth Ward that he said "he had rather be the author of one of Mr. Hobbes's books than be King of England," by which, Mr. Laird added, "Ward did not mean that he would rather be dead." Now what is the drift of this facetious comment? As the remark was made—if it ever was made—under the Commonwealth, I can only conjecture that the meaning may be that Ward was looking forward to a possible Restoration, and showed it by the implication that there was still a "rightful King." But if this is what Mr. Laird means, he has chosen a curiously obscure way of saying it; point is bought too dear at this price.

For the amazing industry with which Mr. Laird seems to have read everything which might throw any light on Hobbes there can be nothing but grateful admiration. I am particularly grateful myself for what I have learned from him about some of Hobbes's opponents who had hitherto been to me mere names, or not even names. But the very range of this multifarious reading has, I think, inevitably led to occasional misunderstanding of authors quoted for comparison. To take a striking example, we are told (p. 112) that Galileo (a reference is given to the opening pages of his *Dialogo*) "had held with Aristotle that circular motion, being 'perfect,' could alone be 'natural.'" The very passage to which Mr. Laird sends us is enough to show that Galileo did not "agree with Aristotle." Aristotle is there adversely criticized for his well-known doctrine that there are two "natural" motions, circular revolution of the celestial spheres and rectilinear uniform ascent and descent of the "elements." Galileo's own point is not, as Mr. Laird's language would suggest, that there are no rectilinear motions in nature, but that those there are are *accelerated*.

Probably Mr. Laird's inspection of Galileo was too hasty, since he goes on to tell us (p. 113 n.) that possibly Galileo never contemplated genuine continuity of acceleration. Yet in the very context to which he has referred, Galileo says in so many words that in passing from one velocity to another an accelerated motion *traverses all intermediate velocities without remaining*



in any of them. Again, at p. 164, n. 2, I remark a curious but palpable error, plainly due to hurried reading, about Aristotle's view of appetitions. It is said that Aristotle held that *ὀρεξις* is always for the agreeable, and we are referred to *De Anima*, 414b, 6, where what is really said is something quite different; that concupiscence, *ἐπιθυμία*, is always for the agreeable because this (*αὐτή*)—viz. concupiscence—is *ὀρεξις* of the pleasant. It really looks as though Mr. Laird has misread the *αὐτή* in this phrase as *αὐτῇ* and mistranslated "*ὀρεξις* itself is for the pleasant." It is notorious that Aristotle's view was that *ὀρεξις* may be for any one of three things, the *honestum*, the *utile*, the *dulce*. Similarly there are one or two remarks about the schoolmen which would not perhaps stand pressing. We are told (p. 155) that "even an Aristotelian like Suarez" maintained that reasoning proceeds by "compounding and dividing," as though this were something exceptional about Suarez. But since "compounding and dividing" was the standing description of affirmation and negation, it is hard to see how any "Aristotelian" could have spoken differently. On the other hand, should not the sweeping statement that most "scholastics" regarded "phantasms" as quasi-corporeal be better supported than by a solitary reference to Suarez? And should the statement that Bacon believed in the possibility of *vacua* be made without justification, on the strength of *N.O.* II. 48, when Bacon elsewhere in the same work "denies the fact"?

These are all comparatively small points, and I only mention them because they do suggest to me a doubt how far one can rely implicitly on other statements about writers whom I have not read, when the passages referred to are not quoted at some length.

I may now proceed to the much pleasanter task of expressing my high appreciation of Mr. Laird's positive achievements. His book falls into three main divisions dealing respectively with the life of Hobbes, with his doctrines, and with his influence. In all of them, with some allowance for a certain carelessness about dates in the first section, due presumably to hurried proof-correction, the work is of a very high order. The biography calls for particular commendation on its successful vindication not merely of the respectability, but of the real honesty and attractiveness of a character systematically maligned by opponents. (They had, however, the excuse that Hobbes was, after all, the aggressor by his derision of the Universities and the clergy, and an aggressor with a sharp and not too scrupulous tongue.) The whole account of Hobbes's philosophy is admirably done, and will, I think, take rank as the best exposition we have so far in the English language. It is conscientious and careful, and there is no serious attempt either to blink the contradictions in which Hobbes entangled himself by his stubborn corporealism, or to exaggerate them. Indeed, I think when Mr. Laird pleads that there is no real inconsistency between the materialism of the theory and its phenomenalism, he is probably letting Hobbes off rather too good-naturedly. This seems to me at least a hard saying, and I doubt whether it can be defended without a more elaborate examination than Mr. Laird has been able to bestow on the point. I had also hoped that the next monograph on Hobbes might contain a brief but serious account of his singular excursions into geometry. I should have liked some account of the methods by which he squared the circle and duplicated the cube, and some illustrations of the genuine acumen of many of his observations about the principles of mathematics, rightly commended by De Morgan. Even without such going into detail, the reader might have been informed that the value on which Hobbes finally pitched for  $\pi$  ( $\pi = \sqrt{10}$ ) is by no means peculiar to himself, and that the remarks so highly appreciated by De Morgan are a protest against that illogical



recognition of "real infinitesimals," which was an unfortunate, though perhaps inevitable, stage in the development of the Calculus, so that the old circle-squarer is also a sort of distant precursor of Weierstrass. But I suppose the limitations of space imposed by the character of the series to which Mr. Laird's book belongs compelled the exclusion of this interesting matter. A critical study of Hobbes as would-be mathematician is still *à faire*, and might be an excellent subject for a Ph.D. thesis.

For Mr. Laird's treatment of the *historically* important thing in Hobbes, his ethical and political thought, I have nothing but praise. I fully agree with him that the whole theory can only be properly estimated in the light of "scholastic" political philosophy, and in his view that the schoolmen are the best political theorists modern Europe has ever seen. It is most refreshing to read his admirable demonstration that Hobbes was intensely in earnest in insisting on the necessity of a morality not merely of justice but of mercy and benevolence, and equally sincere in his conviction that the "sovereign" is morally bound to strict observance of the "law of nature." Hobbes's principles, therefore, as Mr. Laird rightly says, are absolutely opposed to the "Machiavellianism" sometimes loosely imputed to him, and they were never meant as an excuse for "libertines." Indeed, as Mr. Laird observes, the great difference between Spinoza and Hobbes as political theorists is that Spinoza really does teach an immoral "Machiavellianism" (when, for example, he denies that a State has any obligations of good faith), and Hobbes does not. The contempt of the modern *Realpolitiker* for "scraps of paper" is Spinozistic and Machiavellian; it is condemned altogether by Hobbes's view that the *sovereign* is obliged "before God" to fulfil the "natural law," and that it is "natural law" that covenants must be kept. In view of the deification of Spinoza by his devotees, I think another remark of Mr. Laird's as pertinent as true, that (p. 303) Hobbes had a very strong sense of duty, though he tended too much to identify duty *in the subject* with the mere keeping of the civil law; while Spinoza, for all his appreciation of "values," writes as though he had no sense of duty at all. (This is, in fact, exactly what the worthy Blyenbergh found wanting in his doctrine, and it is significant that though the *Ethics* has some excellent things to say about certain virtues, it never once mentions duty.)

I am particularly glad that Mr. Laird has given a fairly full account of the dispute between Hobbes and Bramhall about Liberty and Necessity, which, as he says, is one of the best pieces of philosophical controversy in any language. I am not *quite* so sure as Mr. Laird that Hobbes would have been pronounced the victor if the issue had been decided "on points." Much depends, I should say, on how the points are to be counted. In view of the simple-minded faith of Leslie Stephen, the last English historian of the controversy, in "scientific determinism," it is to the good that the matter had been reviewed by a philosopher who is neither wedded to determinism nor under the delusion that because Bramhall was a trained "scholastic" his views must be philosophically negligible. In the main I think I agree with Mr. Laird that Bramhall did not fully make out his own case, chiefly because he was not quite clear what his case was. But I think that Hobbes's identification (forced on him by his obstinate corporealism) of all determination with determination from *outside*—an identification freely confessed by Mr. Laird—made his position frankly absurd, and that Bramhall fairly exposed the absurdity. So I suppose the "points" on which Hobbes is pronounced to have scored are those mentioned on p. 195 ff., as replies to Bramhall's ethical objections to determinism. I doubt if Hobbes was quite as successful on *all* these points as Mr. Laird thinks. "Determinism does not



imply that praise and dispraise are meaningless." Perhaps, but does it not imply that the meaning to which they owe most of their effectiveness is false? The very reason why they work on us so powerfully is that they are understood to imply recognition of good or ill *desert*, and is *desert* more than an illusion on a determinist theory? And I should think Mr. Laird himself, on reflection, would admit that "the right to destroy what is noxious" is a dubious basis for a sane theory of punishment.

Hobbes's general social theory is so well known that it is unnecessary to follow Mr. Laird in his careful and lucid exposition of it. I would merely direct attention to the excellent remark that the whole conception of man as a calculating egoist, on which the doctrine is based, is ruined if we take Hobbes's account of determination as purely *extrinsic* seriously. (Commonly the materialism and the egoism are spoken of as inseparable; as Mr. Laird rightly points out, the one, in fact, destroys the other.)

The account of Hobbes's opponents and critics is full of interest. I think I agree with what is clearly the author's view that of all the better known British opponents Cumberland is the best, as well as with his high estimate of the criticisms of Pufendorf, who can hardly be called an opponent at all. But I think some of Hobbes's Anglican critics are disposed of rather too summarily. I do not believe it a sufficient reply to Cudworth to argue (p. 274) that even if a moral law is simply an enactment, it is "eternally" what it is, viz. an enactment. This does not seem to me any rejoinder to Cudworth's contention that no arbitrary enactment can make that *good* which is not antecedently good in its own nature. Butler, in particular, I fear, gets much less than justice. In view of the language used about the services of Shaftesbury to ethics in the Preface to the *Sermons*, it strikes one as hard to accuse the Bishop (p. 283) of being "tepid" in his acknowledgments, and to explain that the "tepidity" is accounted for by the Deism of Shaftesbury (who always professed to be a "Broad Church" Anglican). Nor do I believe Butler would have found any difficulty in answering the question (p. 284) why, if *all* "passions" are alike "disinterested," a man is not free to stop being benevolent, as he is to stop drinking his wine, as soon as benevolence ceases to please him. It is not its disinterestedness but the fact that conscience enjoins it which, according to Butler, makes benevolence a duty. Conscience requires me to go on being benevolent; it does not require me to drink a second glass of wine if I will to leave off after the first. And to say that Butler "conceded the point" in the well-known paragraph at the end of the eleventh *Sermon* is, I am sure, to miss Butler's grave irony. A man does not introduce a statement of his own principles with a "let it be conceded that." The meaning plainly is "*even though* we were to concede, as I do not, that self-interest must be paramount, a man would still be wise, even from this point of view, in taking the trouble to be benevolent."

To conclude with a passing reference to two very minor matters: If Disraeli's reference to "Hobbism" in *Vivian Gray* is to be chronicled (p. 247 n.), why is Fielding's Parson Barnabas, with his horror of the *Leviathan*, forgotten? And why does Mr. Laird think that the "Cimon" of Berkeley's *Alciphron* should be Hobbes? (Locke's Archelaus, I may remark, ought not to have been honoured with inverted commas on p. 281; he was, of course, an historical man, a disciple of Anaxagoras, and the teacher of Socrates.)

A. E. TAYLOR.



*Experience and its Modes.* By M. OAKESHOTT, Fellow of Gonville and Caius College. (London: Cambridge University Press. 1933. Pp. viii + 359. Price 15s.)

In size and quality of writing this is as considerable an essay in idealism as we have had from a native in recent years. Mr. Oakeshott ascribes his indebtedness chiefly to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and to Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, the impress of the latter being the more obvious. His most general principles are that all experience involves judgment (which passes into the assertion that all experience, even volition, is judgment), that in consequence it consists of ideas, and that these ideas demand to be made coherent. Since reality is something judged it must be experience, but experience as a "world." If we could attain to it we would find it to be a complete experience completely organized in terms of coherence, but as none of us can attain to it we may define reality formally as the ground, immanent in experience itself, of our demand for coherence, or of the aptitude of ideas to expand into a system. This effort after coherence, however, has a tendency to run into blind alleys, to seek limited unifications, and—which is worse—to rest content with one or other of these as final. The limitation is one not of extension but of initial categories: each unification is an interpretation of the whole, but in terms of an arbitrarily restricted set of notions. Such a unification is called by the author, doubtless for lack of a better word, a "mode" of experience. Three modes—historical, scientific, and practical experience—are examined in turn at some length, the main purpose being to exhibit their formal characteristics and show that these disqualify the respective mode from being a satisfactory synthesis of all experience.

Historical experience is a mode because it is not a mere series but a "world," for the process of criticism by which it is constructed determines the temporal order by a non-temporal one: nothing is admitted as historical fact until, through being evidenced, it is integrated with what is really a logical scheme. And it is a mode of *experience* because every element of it, being the product of a judgment, is an idea, an idea being, of course, inseparable from experience. (Mr. Oakeshott's odd charge that some historians make independence of *all* experience the criterion of objectivity both imputes to historians a philosophical sophistication which they neither have nor want to have, and implies that they are too stupid to know that experiences *eo nomine* form a great part of their subject-matter.) History is the past considered in its pastness; any motive or consideration that relates to the bearing of the past on the present is an intrusion from the side of practical experience, harmful, as well as irrelevant, to the historical judgment. Nevertheless, just because it is experience it is a *present* world of ideas, and its being a present which is conceived as past is the contradiction, or one of the contradictions, that should prevent us from regarding historical experience as the completely "satisfactory" experience.

Science is defined as "the attempt to think a common, uniform, and impersonal world," the mark of scientific ideas being "absolute communicability." The only type of idea that has this mark is the idea of quantity, or rather quantity in the specific form of motion. Hence science is the interpretation of the whole of experience as mechanical, so that "science and physics are identical." Being constituted as well as defined by the category, it has no differences of subject-matter; it is just a body of coherent ideas of quantity. Neither past nor future (that is, neither history nor prediction) enters into it, nor even present events as perceived (that is, there is no such thing as experimental verification). It is incurably though quite consistently abstract. Con-



sequently it cannot lay any pretensions to being that coherent whole of experience which is perforce concrete.

Practical experience is all experience regarded as alterable by the action of will, and since volition is concerned with the present as present and always involves judgment, practical experience is the "world" of present fact or ideas made coherent with a view to action. Art falls within it, and religion is its fullest expression. It is not, indeed, the world of value, but since this is limited by the nature of the practical world within which it is to be actualized, the two worlds are inseparably linked. But even in their conjunction they have no claim to be, or to be able to become, that coherent totality which thought in its integrity demands, the reason being that the detailed transformation of the "ought to be" into the "is" is essentially an endless and therefore an ever-incomplete process.

We have, then, at least three "modes" of experience, each, because experience, composed of ideas; each a "world" of homogeneous ideas because defined and organized by a single category; each therefore logically distinct from and consequently irrelevant to the others; each autonomous; and each displaying some essential abstractness, incompleteness, or contradiction when put forward as the total outline or ground of experience.

Despite my sympathy with certain aspects of Mr. Oakeshott's idealism, I have to admit that I find his exposition unhelpful. One reason is that, like his master Bradley, he is more expansive in criticism than in construction. Certainly his primary affirmations are left undeveloped. The inseparability of reality from experience needs to be safeguarded *argumentatively* from solipsism. To say that "all experience is somebody's experience," "but no experience is merely the experience of a particular mind as such," is to state, not to solve, the problem. There are many thinkers who are convinced that what makes experience experience is precisely its being somebody's, so that when its particularity is removed what is left has no title to the term. But Mr. Oakeshott's position appears to be that what makes my experience more than mine is judgment, and this leads to the coherence theory of truth. This too, unfortunately, is reaffirmed rather than reargued, and reaffirmed without any appreciation of the difficulties which realists have found in it. The author's tendency is to suppose that it is established by exposing the difficulties of the correspondence theory; and the theory so defended is characterized much more vaguely than the theory attacked. One would have welcomed an attempt to define exactly what sort of coherence is meant, and to explain why, if there is never datum but only inference, completion of inference has to wait for further experience in any sense that retains the notes of immediacy and novelty. Do we need the future to provide only more time for reflection, not more data? Are incoherencies removed and gaps filled by further experiences when these are construed as judgments without data? These may be imperfect questions, since the case really rests on the *inseparability* of datum and inference, of matter and form, but they are the kind of question which Mr. Oakeshott's emphatic affirmations provoke, and I am sorry, for the sake of idealism, that he holds his idealism so serenely that he has failed to gauge the strength and quality of the realist reaction to the coherence theory.

The doctrine of modes is peculiar. Most philosophers would agree that science, etc., are products of different categorial selection from concrete experience, and are therefore inevitably partial, but few would conclude that they have nothing to give to philosophy. But the most peculiar feature is Mr. Oakeshott's way of designating each mode by a familiar term which he redefines with a narrowness for which I can find no warrant. For example, science is defined as the study of motion; consequently it has nothing to do



with the past; consequently cosmogony and biology are not science but "natural history." Whatever they are they are connected very massively with experience and therefore deserve to be examined; merely to note their categorial difference from mechanics and ignore their profound similarity of attitude and method is not quite in keeping with the concreteness which Mr. Oakeshott's idealism desiderates. Moreover, the reduction of physics to theoretical mechanics comes ill from Cambridge, which has done so much to dissolve mechanical physics into an electromagnetic theory for which motion is a secondary concept. On the other fields of experience also he dogmatizes, though always brilliantly, almost aphoristically. The assertion on pp. 98-9, repeated in a sequence of beautifully turned but synonymous sentences, that many historians suppose that every new fact is just added fact, not one that may call for a drastic overhaul of other facts, is a case in point. Damning charges of this sort should give names, to enable us to discover the real culprits. A whole paragraph (p. 112) on Bury's judgment on Gibbon is a plain caricature of it. The statement (p. 309) that no one "aware of the conflict involved" is likely to try to establish both the practical and the ultimate truth of religious ideas is a high-handed condemnation of all theologians and of many very able philosophers. It is a rhetorician, not a philosopher, who writes (p. 129) that the battle of Salamis and the birth of Christ fall outside history because, having considerable human importance, they fall under the category of practical experience; that science is "a folly to be fled from" (p. 219); that consequently the task of thought is not the "synthesizing of its own indiscretions" (p. 218); and that "all attempts to find some practical justification for philosophical thought . . . must be set on one side as misguided" (p. 355). There is something elusive, elusive because indeterminate, about an ultimate truth that is unrelated to history, science, and the inevitable needs of living—for, again, one of the author's cardinal contentions is that the "modes" are not only irrelevant to one another, but also have no contribution to make to the whole truth.

Mr. Oakeshott was moved to write by the neglect into which idealism in this country has fallen. That we have not refuted idealism but only dodged it, and that either the rearguing or the refutation of it is needed to give life to our current discussions, is my own conviction. If the book helps to revive the problems which idealism formulated it will be of great value. But I doubt if it will make converts. The general attitude and principles which it restates are presented with that superior certainty and highly polished verbal indirectness which robbed some of the older idealists of the influence which they might have exerted. It is not conciliating to be liberal with terms of disparagement like "confusion," "nonsense," "gross," and "grotesque," even when they have been shorn of vulgarity by the literary refinement of their setting; and sentences like the following show a concern for verbal effect at the expense of simplicity and directness of thought: "What is achieved in experience . . . not in the sense that it is ever actually achieved"; "Fact is not what is given. Or, rather, fact is given (because there is nothing given which is not made)"; "To know in part is at once to know something less than the whole and to know it imperfectly." Stylistically the writing is brilliant throughout, but the beautiful sentences are spoiled with an emphasis and a balance that arise more out of preoccupation with literary craftsmanship than out of the meaning to be expressed. I believe that the quite remarkable repetitiousness of the book, which could be cut down by half with great gain, is connected with this interest in and truly high capacity for literary art. To this capacity I gladly pay a very respectful tribute; my regret is that it has too often thwarted instead of serving Mr. Oakeshott's able philosophical thinking.

T. E. JESSOP.



*Descartes*. By S. V. KEELING, M.A., D.-ès-L., Officer d'Académie. (London: Ernest Benn Ltd. 1934. Pp. xi + 282. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

This original and scholarly work is written for the "Leaders of Philosophy" series, and both the author and the editor are to be congratulated on its conspicuous freedom from the faults usual in works written for a series. It is neither hospitably eclectic nor amiably superficial, and it scorns the tepid affectation of impersonality. It is closely knit and closely argued, it is definite and consistent in its point of view, and its whole approach to the subject is strongly individual. More than once it throws new light on the most familiar positions of Descartes by "snapping" them from an unfamiliar angle. Its sufficiently methodical exposition is varied by cross-vistas, which are among its chief attractions, and constitute a notable tribute to Dr. Keeling's intimacy with the mind of Descartes.

It is Dr. Keeling's avowed intention (p. ix) to restate Cartesian problems in modern terms, and he has succeeded in doing so without allowing his interpretation to be influenced by modern analogies. By this device he enables the modern reader to review Descartes without anyone's prepossessions except his own, and in particular to escape from the "history of philosophy" tradition, which has thrown across all the pre-critical philosophers the omnivorous shadow of German Idealism. Occasionally, as in the discussion of substance, a more historical treatment might be helpful; but it must be admitted that the modernity of presentation contributes largely to the freshness of insight which is Dr. Keeling's most valuable quality.

The book falls into three parts: a historical and biographical introduction, an analytic and comparative exposition, and a critical epilogue concerned partly with the later history of Cartesianism, and partly with its philosophical importance. Of these the second, which is by far the largest, seems to me to be also the best. As an interpreter Dr. Keeling has all the virtues: he has a complete mastery of his material, and his selection is therefore extremely apposite; and he follows the affiliations of his main themes into the remoter parts of the Cartesian system with insight and pertinacity. His review of Descartes's successors is of necessity condensed, though it is detailed enough to reveal his scholarly aversion from obvious (and fallacious) interpretations; as in his discussion of Arnauld's alleged neo-realism (p. 220). His critical estimate is so condensed as to leave little room for subtleties which he could certainly have handled with distinction, and at times is distinctly summary both in form and content. This is doubtless his misfortune rather than his fault, and it is good news that he has in preparation a volume of Cartesian studies in which he will be able to expand at leisure.

I should wish to preface the statement of my disagreements from Dr. Keeling, which in any case I submit in the spirit of dialectic rather than by way of censure, by recording my admiration of his achievement, and also my conviction that the main body of his results is substantiated beyond dispute, and that not least when he is most original. Particularly compelling and suggestive are his distinction between experimental and methodical doubt (p. 80); the contrast between Descartes's "qualitative dualism" and his "existential pluralism" (p. 117); and his most acute and revealing discussion of "simple natures" (p. 68 ff.). His work, moreover, abounds in felicitous summary: for example, the deft formula, applied against Leibniz, that theism combined with monism inevitably turns to pantheism (p. 227). But there are several contentions of importance in which I cannot follow him, and as his exposition is splendidly homogeneous, they are for the most part interconnected.



(i) Dr. Keeling complains (p. 236) that both Descartes and his commentators lay stress on his doctrine of "simple natures" while expounding his method, and ignore it when they come to deal with his metaphysics. There are quite good reasons for this procedure. As Dr. Keeling points out (it is a most important contribution to the subject), "the initial terms of a series are its 'absolute terms,' and these may or may not be also 'simple natures'" (p. 69); and as he further points out (pp. 90-91), the *cogito* is not the expression of a "simple nature" being composed (p. 94) of the simple nature of "existence" and the "thing which thinks." The *cogito*, on the other hand, is "an ultimate limit of formal analysis," in which thinking is recognized as the sort of attribute which belongs to, and characterizes, a substance. Now it is largely with substances and their characters that Descartes's metaphysics are concerned, and as, for example, the clear and distinct conceptions of mind and extension are none the less clear and distinct for our failure to analyse their constituent "simple natures," our tendency is to leave the question of simple natures behind us. Dr. Keeling's treatment seems to me to slur this change of emphasis, and thus, though he admirably stresses (p. 121, cf. p. 223) the supremacy of "metaphysics" over "physics" in Descartes's "philosophy," he does not quite bring out the discontinuity of the two sets of conceptions, or the conflict implied in it between mediaeval influences and those of seventeenth-century science.

(ii) There is a remarkable, and perhaps a significant, omission in Dr. Keeling's account of Descartes's proofs of the existence of God. In addition to the proof from the existence of the idea of God in the human mind, and the proof from the very nature of the idea of God, both of which Dr. Keeling describes, Descartes introduces, as an addendum to the former (*à quoi j'ajoutai, . . . Discours, Adam et Tannery, VI. 34*), what is really a third proof, which starts from the real existence of the thinking self. This proof Dr. Keeling completely omits, both in exposition (p. 107) and in criticism (pp. 240-245), presumably because he is pressed for space and does not regard it as significant. It has, however, this importance: that it alone passes from reality to reality and not from idea to reality, and thus presents as a relevant factor the qualitative continuity of the self which exists and the God whose existence is to be proved. The reason why I stress this point is that it is for me the only consistently acceptable indication in Descartes's own writings of a way of escape from the Cartesian circle. It is doubtless less interesting to Dr. Keeling for the reason that he does not believe in the Cartesian circle.

(iii) Dr. Keeling denies the circularity of the argument for the existence of God on the grounds (a) that the *cogito* is in itself a final criterion of truth, competent to deliver all ideas of equal clarity and distinctness from the wicked genius without the intervention of God, and (b) that the guarantee of God applies only to the *memory* of an intuition, and not to the truth of the intuition at the moment of its occurrence (pp. 245-248). The nerve of the whole argument is (b), for if (b) is not true (a) cannot be true either, even though Descartes may think it to be true, as he sometimes undoubtedly does. Now (b) is really not true. No doubt the guarantee of God is required for memory, as only under God are the moments of time continuous; and, further, in reply to objections on the score of circularity, this is the point which Descartes stresses, presumably because he sees, like Dr. Keeling, that if the guarantee were required only for memory there would be no circle. But Descartes also wrote: "If we did not know that everything which is true and real in us comes from a perfect and infinite being, however clear and distinct our ideas might be, we should have no reason to assure us that



they had the perfection of being true" (*Discours*, A.T., VI., 39). That is to say, the guarantee of God is required to sustain the truth of clear and distinct ideas, not merely to vouch for their clarity and distinctness; and I cannot admit that this plain reading of a plain text rests on a "careless misinterpretation." But if this is so, argument (a), that the *cogito* alone suffices, is untenable, and the circle is closed; for unless clear and distinct conceptions are finally certified as true before they are relied on in the proofs of God's existence, we assume in our argument what only the conclusion of the argument can justify.

Descartes, however, does accept (a) in so many words: "Having noticed that there is nothing at all in the formula, 'I think, therefore I am,' to assure me that I am telling the truth, except that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to be, I concluded that I could take it as a general rule that the things we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true" (*Discours*, A.T., VI. 32). If, then, we could afford to ignore his denial of (b), there would be no circle, and Dr. Keeling would be right without qualification. But such a simplification of the issue seems to me unwarranted, especially as the denial of (b) is bound up closely with Descartes's cherished doctrine that God is supreme over the eternal verities. There are, in fact, two inconsistent tendencies in Descartes's thought, of which Dr. Keeling recognizes only one; and the one which he overlooks, while it involves Descartes in the Cartesian circle, which he can then escape only by stressing the implicit apprehension of God in the *cogito*, has the advantage of being consistent with the extreme Cartesian theory of divine omnipotence, and of giving the wicked genius the extended trial which he surely deserves if he is to be invoked at all.

(iv) Dr. Keeling rightly observes (p. 57) that the boundary between metaphysics and theology is determined for Descartes by the mode in which propositions about God and the world are certificated. But he alludes so rarely to the details of Descartes's religious metaphysics that the reader might be forgiven for supposing that much more was made over from reason to revelation than is actually the case. Some of the discussions on the attributes of God (*e.g.*, the distinction of the infinite from the indefinite, the insistence on God's "positive amplitude," and His supremacy over the eternal verities) are more closely affiliated to his philosophy as a whole than Dr. Keeling indicates.

This list of objections must appear somewhat churlish, so I hasten to affirm again my admiration of Dr. Keeling's cogency and originality, and to acknowledge, as a fellow-researcher, how much I owe to him.

A. BOYCE GIBSON.

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*The Nature of Mathematics: A Critical Survey.* By MAX BLACK. (International Library of Psychology and Philosophy. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1933. Pp. xiv + 219. Price 10s. 6d.)

The two aims of Mr. Black's book on *The Nature of Mathematics*, to give a critical exposition of *Principia Mathematica* and to report and criticize the analysis of mathematics made by the formalist and intuitionist schools of mathematicians, are more adequately realized in the first instance than in the second. In general, the book does not carry out the task of philosophy, "to clarify by criticizing knowledge . . . organized into systems",<sup>1</sup> in nearly

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<sup>1</sup> P. 1.



as deep-going fashion as the author's sense of the problems involved gives promise. We shall take up in order the three views discussed, beginning with the "logistic" thesis (A) of *Principia Mathematica* that pure mathematics is a branch of logic. Mr. Black traces the historical development of logic through to the stage when it became amenable for use in analysis of mathematics, and describes the attempts by Dedekind, Frege, Peano, and Whitehead and Russell to analyse the concepts of arithmetic and theory of functions. "Philosophic" analysis in its double aspect of analysing meanings, and, when necessary, altering these to avoid contradictions connected with the continuum, and "formal" analysis which replaces the concepts with a new set having the same interconnections, are suggested methods of approaching the important problems for the philosophy of mathematics still unsolved, namely, analyses of the notion of natural number and of the mathematical continuum (neither of which Mr. Black quite succeeds in treating adequately). The description of types of analysis is followed by a chapter on "logical" analysis, important in itself but not clearly related to what precedes it. Mr. Black's account states that "the materials for the actual practice of logical analysis are partly available in the propositional calculus and calculus of relations, . . ." without carefully setting out to which parts of mathematical symbolism the described aims of logical analysis, namely, exhibition of structure, distinctions in significance, and multiplicity, are relevant. Instead, the further treatment of pure mathematics is of a subject-matter amenable to formal analysis. "The theorems of pure mathematics are true of any objects and relations which satisfy the axioms. . . .<sup>2</sup> All that needs to be known of these objects is stated in the axioms. . . ."<sup>2</sup> One only wishes that some further account of the "objects" of such a formal system had been provided in explanation of the claim that mathematical symbols had a "reference"<sup>3</sup> to a "subject-matter",<sup>3</sup> and some hint at this point as to the ground for the important limitation set to the adequacy of formal analysis: (1) because natural numbers occur as constants in all axiom systems and are therefore to be understood in a different sense from terms occurring in special branches only; (2) because no complete axiom system can be provided for real numbers.

The propositional calculus, as foundation for the logistic construction of real number and prerequisite for the proof of the logistic thesis, Mr. Black rather awkwardly introduces as "the appropriate symbolism for all statements of how propositions can be deduced from other propositions by reason of their logical form, together with the appropriate rules for manipulating such statements. . . ."<sup>4</sup> Important relations between propositions are described, the use of the entailment relation in the development of a calculus is discarded in favour of the implication relation (one needs here a description of the sort of difficulty which the former relation is claimed to introduce), and tautologies are supposedly defined. That the analysis of tautologies in inadequate shows up forcibly in the analogous definition of tautologies in the algebra of propositional functions as "propositions . . . [which are] . . . true whatever propositional functions are substituted (just as the tautologies of the propositional calculus yielded true propositions for all values of  $p, q$ , etc.)."<sup>5</sup> A clear and simple description of the principles of manipulation used in the propositional calculus of *Principia Mathematica* completes the account of this calculus, and then as a preliminary to an account of the calculus of propositional functions contained there, Mr. Black discusses the variables and functions occurring in mathematics, in analogy with which

<sup>1</sup> P. 36.<sup>2</sup> Pp. 39, 38, respectively.<sup>3</sup> P. 37.<sup>4</sup> Pp. 42-43.<sup>5</sup> P. 66.



latter propositional functions are introduced into the logistic system. The various usages of variables are tabulated as "illustrative", "formal", "determinative", and "apparent", the first three being innovations on *Principia*. In particular, the determinative use seems important, but is unclear.

Definitions of mathematical functions, extensional and intensional, are then described, with mention of the difficulties in the former where correlations between infinite fields of variation are required. An intensional definition of a mathematical function which "regards the use of variables as fundamental"<sup>1</sup> is then formulated: "A symbol is . . . said to be a function of a second symbol if it contains the second symbol as part of itself, e.g., the symbol  $x^2$  is a function of the symbol  $x$ ."<sup>2</sup> This calls for a further explanation of the notion of "containing". The asserted relevance of the type-token ambiguity of the word "function" to the various views of functions is left in obscurity, and one cannot gauge the seriousness of the criticism of Russell for considering the function  $x$  as a function of one argument instead of two, as Mr. Black holds.

From this point forward we have a critical exposition of the functional calculus of *Principia Mathematica*: (1) of the symbols ( $x$ ) and  $(Ex)$ , "descriptions", and "incomplete symbols"; (2) of the theory of types and the axiom of infinity; and (3) of the axiom of reducibility. In (1) the derivation of mathematical functions and classes from descriptive phrases as part of the logistic scheme is traced through, and the difficulty in the notion of identity used in analysing propositions in which descriptive phrases occur is remarked. It seems unfair, in light of the discussion in *Principia* of the contexts in which symbols for classes could be used in the relations "is a member of" and "contains," to hold as Mr. Black does, that limitations on its uses are not discussed. The claim that the ground for this supposed omission is "insufficient recognition of the distinction between formal and non-formal analysis"<sup>3</sup> is obscure.

Views on the ontological status of classes have affected logistic developments: (1) so long as symbols for classes were considered to denote real things, by requiring an axiom asserting the infinity of such objects (to permit the definition of natural numbers); (2) when such symbols came to be considered meaningless in isolation, by shifting emphasis to the consistency of their use. Mr. Black suggests the possibility of the contradictoriness of their use unless the system proves, as *Principia Mathematica* does not, that in general (and not only in the cases where the theory of types has already been seen to be necessary) a contradiction is impossible. The difficulty of establishing this he considers due to the vagueness of the notion of propositional function, but the precise source of difficulty is not clear.

An interesting section tracing the historical development of the notions of continuity and real number shows how the logistic construction culminates in confusion of "types" in certain general theorems about collections of real numbers defined by Dedekindian section. Discussion of the different kinds of logistico-mathematical contradictions and their solution through limiting the field of variation of the variable concerned follows. Mr. Black criticizes the attempt in *Principia* to remedy the inadequacy of the theory of types by the introduction of a hierarchy of orders among functions of the same type, and suggests as an alternative to the latter an alteration in the conception of propositional function in accordance with the intensional definition given above. But it remains obscure how this, as is claimed, ensures absence of circularity.

<sup>1</sup> P. 56.<sup>2</sup> P. 57.<sup>3</sup> P. 73.



In forbidding the treatment of symbols of different types as though they had the same type in such cases as the proof of a least upper bound to an aggregate of real numbers, the theory of types makes the proof impossible without a supplementary axiom asserting the existence of a propositional function of lower type to which the given function is formally equivalent. As Mr. Black points out, previous difficulties over the meaning of "existence of real numbers," seemingly eliminated by Russell's construction of real numbers from the rationals (as against Dedekind's "postulation" of them) recur now over the existence of a propositional function asserted by the above formulated axiom of reducibility. He has in an interesting analysis shown that if the existence of the real numbers is to be secured, this axiom must assert the existence of a non-denumerable infinity of propositional functions, and the axiom of infinity, in securing the existence of the integers, a denumerable infinity. A suggested means of eliminating the theory of types is the employment of symbols themselves *showing* how such symbols may be combined, *e.g.*, a system of wooden rings (for propositional functions) showing that no ring of given radius could fit into another of the same or lesser radius (functions of the same or lower type). Similar considerations are tentatively suggested for the elimination of the axiom of infinity, though the way of effecting this is not clear. The axiom of reducibility, however, as yet defies elimination. And the proofs of Ramsey and Waismann that it is a contingent proposition are held to be fallacious, and its logistic derivation is as yet unaccomplished.

The conclusions drawn concerning the logistic system in *Principia Mathematica* are: (1) that a distinction between the philosophic and systematic (non-formal and formal) aspects of the calculus is necessary. In the former aspects symbols are used as words with meanings, but the calculus is to be developed formally, using symbols as "substitute signs" without meaning. This involves discarding the view in *Principia* that certain formulae are primitive, and in consequence (2) that the logistic notion of deducing mathematics from logic must be abandoned. The relation of mathematics to logic is that in its systematic aspect mathematics must be used in the latter's development. In its philosophic aspect mathematics is "the syntax of all organized systems [and logic] the syntax of possible states of affairs".<sup>1</sup> This thesis would bear further elucidation. (3) That the axiom of reducibility in its assertion of existence is to be considered a meta-mathematical statement that the addition of a new symbol will not produce contradiction.

(B) The formalist view of mathematics is that it is concerned with the structural properties of symbols independent of their meaning, at any rate that its theorems have their meaning only in exhibiting the structure of indeterminate systems. Meaningful statements about these systems belong to "meta-mathematics". This view leaves unexplained the nature of the initial axioms and the reason for their choice. If the interpretation of the "ideal elements" which occur in these is to be ignored, a meta-mathematical proof of their consistency must be provided. With Gödel's proof that any proof of the non-contradictoriness of the entire calculus of functions itself leads to a contradiction, the hope of complete formalization seems to collapse.

(C) The clarity and simplicity of this too brief section on formalism is rather offset by the mistaken emphasis one feels to be present in the exposition of the intuitionist view. As an *attitude* toward mathematics ("dynamic" as against "static") and as an analysis of social origins of

<sup>1</sup> P. 142.

P. 144.



mathematics, one feels that considerations are stressed which, in formalist language, describe neither mathematics nor meta-mathematics but something several removes from both. Certainly the responsibility for this lies originally with Brouwer, but one wishes that less space had been devoted to the "basic intuition", which is claimed to generate the natural numbers, and more to the actual demands *within* mathematics supposedly actuated by it, *e.g.*, that the objects denoted by the subjects of general and existential statements be "constructible" if the latter are to be properly significant, that argument in accordance with the law of excluded mean is sometimes impracticable, that the integers cannot be formally grounded, that certain processes and axioms in the theory of point sets and the theory of transfinite ordinals and cardinals must be abandoned. In the history of intuitionism which Mr. Black gives, discussion of such strictly mathematical considerations does appear. The relationship of Brouwer's views to Kant's, in the grounding of the natural number series on the "basal intuition" of the multiplicity of the intervals of time, stands in need of further elucidation from Brouwer and criticism from Mr. Black. The latter holds this view to involve that mathematical judgments are synthetic and *a priori*, but such a claim is obscure in general. It is important to see, as Mr. Black has done, that Brouwer's "denial" of the law of excluded mean is not properly a denial, but expresses a requirement that mathematical statements shall have a clear meaning guaranteed by the constructibility of the concepts about which the statements are made. But exactly what constitutes constructibility, what meaning for general and existential statements is secured thereby, how this meaning is bound up with a finite method of verification—all such underlying questions are left almost untouched. Accounts of the intuitionist construction of a real number as an arbitrary choice-sequence, the denial of significance to general statements about the continuum (constructed from such choice sequences), and illustrations of propositions in the position of being neither true nor false are suggestive; but no adequate treatment of them throws light on the above questions. Mr. Black has succeeded in providing a simple and clear summary of Heyting's intuitionist calculus of logic (in which — —  $a \supset a$  cannot be proved from the axioms nor the symbols  $(x)$  and  $(Ex)$  defined in terms of each other) and of the difficult view of sets. One could wish, however, that the way in which sets are constructed precludes the classical axiom of inclusion and thereby Burali-Forti's contradiction had been made a bit clearer; and also precisely how the denumerably infinite cardinal  $\aleph_0$ , the number of any set whose ordinal is  $\omega$ , can be accepted on the intuitionist view as having a definite meaning, and why, if so much is admitted, a cardinal number corresponding to a denumerably infinite set of denumerably infinite ordinals to which a new denumerably infinite ordinal may always be assigned, cannot also be admitted. But for students without great knowledge of the subjects treated in this book, and for whom the book was intended, the broad analysis given is on the whole appropriate.

ALICE AMBROSE.

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*Religion and Theism.* By CLEMENT C. J. WEBB, F.B.A. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1934. Pp. 160. Price 4s. 6d. net.)

This volume consists of "the Forwood Lectures delivered at Liverpool University, 1933, together with a chapter on 'The Psychological Accounts of the Origin of Belief in God.'" It has all the qualities of lucid and attractive



style, orderly arrangement, consistent argument, and assured conviction which one has learned to expect from the author.

The four Forwood Lectures deal with the relation of Religion and Theism, and the added chapter which follows the third lecture, though not part of the original argument, is quite relevant to it and consistent with it. Paradoxical as the phrase, "a religion without God," sounds, the author in the first chapter admits the possibility of a religious attitude to the world and life which stops short of any belief in God, and cites Buddhism in its earlier form, Confucianism, and the piety of Spinoza as instances. What is common to these instances and theistic faiths is provisionally described by him as *ullimacy* and *intimacy*, the inmost life of man relates itself to what is recognized as the inmost reality even if not called God; but this is a divorce of two elements usually united, the *subjective* fact of religion, the *objective* fact of God, the second not being an inference from the first but the content of it. Man apprehends God in religion, and does not infer His existence from it; but the apprehension of some sort of reality may persist, even when the content becomes indefinite. Theism, as a philosophical doctrine about God, may be held even where no religion corresponds, and so religion may survive even where theism has been abandoned.

The second lecture deals with Naturalism as a religion without Theism, and mainly consists of an examination of Professor Julian Huxley's *Religion without Revelation*. Its intentions may be stated in the author's own words: "I shall attempt in my following remarks to show (1) that Professor Huxley's own account of religious experience rather suggests a theistic background than is intrinsically inconsistent with it; (2) that his contrary belief is based upon a misapprehension of what is meant by Theism as a philosophical theory; and (3) that the 'Humanism,' as we may call it—although Professor Huxley does not use the word, and although his objections to Theism are based rather upon its supposed incongruity with our knowledge of Nature than upon its alleged incompatibility with the dignity of Man—this Humanism, which is implied in his own alternative theory of the nature of religious experience, is itself by no means easily reconcilable with his own account of that experience, or with his general philosophical position" (pp. 41-42). In my judgment the intention is excellently fulfilled.

In the third lecture the author turns to Humanism as represented by Mr. Walter Lippmann's *Preface to Ethics* and the *Ethics* of Professor Nicolai Hartmann. Of the first he says that it "is the work of an American author who reflects a mood of the moment without, I venture to think, evincing either an adequate apprehension of the difficulties inherent in the position which he defends, or such knowledge of what has in the past been thought upon the subject of his choice as might have emancipated him from what may perhaps be called without offence a journalistic pride in his modernity." Of the second he says that it "is, on the other hand, a highly important contribution to the literature of moral philosophy, combining learning with originality and acute criticism with genuine insight into moral experience" (pp. 60-61). His judgment of the former author commands my assent; as regards the latter, he argues that his rejection of Christian theism is due to an inconsistency in not recognizing that the 'eternal values' of reverence and gratitude he recognizes demand a personal God as their object (p. 74), and to a misunderstanding of what Christian theism is, and its consistency with an ethical view of the world (p. 75). On page 80 there is an obvious misprint, *majority* for *majesty*. The inserted chapter need not detain us, as it covers familiar ground; it is an acute criticism of the views of Leuba and Jung.



The fourth lecture which then follows is a vindication of theism. The argument is thus summarized by the author himself: "I shall, then, only endeavour to suggest that, the religious consciousness being taken as a normal feature of human life, the interpretation thereof as a consciousness of the presence of a Being with whom what we may naturally call personal relations, are possible is not only the most obvious interpretation but also one which there is no necessity laid upon us to reject on either of the two main grounds which we have seen to underlie current criticisms of theistic language and doctrine. On the other hand, I am convinced that neither of the suggested alternatives, a religion of 'cosmic emotion,' or a religion of what may be called in a general way 'humanism'—though this may take more than one form—can so well satisfy as does Theism the actual demands of the religious consciousness in its maturer forms" (p. 131). The author does succeed in showing that a properly understood theism, in which the immediate object of the religious consciousness, God Himself, has been intelligibly related by reason to the world and life is not inconsistent with either the interpretation of the world to which science leads or the position of significance which humanism assigns to man, and that it is in such a personal relation to that personal object that the needs of the religious consciousness are met, as they cannot be in any substitution for God of the universe itself or of humanity within it. For the misunderstanding of theism by naturalism and humanism, I may add, the opponents of theism must bear some of the blame, as they direct their criticism against popular misconceptions rather than competent expositions of Theism; and the Church must share some of that blame so far as it preserves and diffuses inadequate and superseded representations of the belief in God. It is a tragedy that through mistakes on either side, insufficiently appreciative scrutiny of the conception Theism offers and insufficiently critical presentation, any believers in religion should be denied the full satisfaction which belief in God can offer. The author deserves the gratitude of all who desire this conflict to be closed for his candid and considerate *eirenikon*.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

*Idealistic Logic: A Study of its Aim, Method, and Achievement.* By C. R. MORRIS, M.A. (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1933. Pp. x + 338. Price 12s. 6d.)

This is a useful and timely book. Mr. Morris is in sympathy with the aim of Idealistic logic, but he is not blind to some of its deficiencies, and, following Cook-Wilson, he has much to say of the inadequacy of its method and achievements.

No one to-day would agree with Kant's famous statement, namely, "Since Aristotle, Logic has not had to retract a single step and to the present day has not been able to make one step in advance." During the last hundred and fifty years two widely opposed conceptions of the nature of logic—each somewhat unfortunately dubbed "modern logic"—have been developed; Idealistic logic and mathematical, or symbolic, logic. Whilst the germ of the latter may be found in the logical doctrines of Aristotle himself, the former marks a sharp reaction against the traditional logic, a reaction initiated by Kant, whom Mr. Morris regards as "the founder of Idealistic logic."

Mr. Morris agrees with the Idealists in regarding logic as the theory of the forms of thought. "Logic," he says, "seeks to discover certain forms within the process of experience determining the structure of that experience"



(p. 317). He attempts to distinguish clearly between the province of logic and that of psychology, whilst at the same time insisting that "it is vital to the Idealistic logic to maintain that there is only one experience, and that all experience is one. Unless this is the case, logic, arguing as it does from the possibility of unity, has no method left to it, and therefore no existence. Logic cannot allow that there are two *kinds* of real experiences: thinking or apprehending, which it is the province of logic to investigate, and other experiences, such as imagining or dreaming, on which empirical psychology may try its hand" (p. 319). Logic and psychology are held to examine "different *aspects* of one and the same experience." It is from this point of view that Mr. Morris considers the deficiencies of pre-Kantian logic.

After two brief introductory chapters dealing respectively with the Aim and the Method of Logic, Mr. Morris gives an extremely good account of the traditional logic as derived from Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. He suggests that "Aristotle caught a theory of Plato's at a moment of arrested development, as it were, and perpetuated it in essentials in a logic which no subsequent philosopher for two thousand years felt the necessity of criticizing in its fundamentals" (p. 35). This theory is that the act of knowing is always the recognizing of a universal in a particular. Hence the traditional logic laid stress upon the search for definitions, and was led to regard every statement as asserting an attribute of a subject. Closely associated with this is the doctrine that all thinking is syllogistic. Thus thought was taken to be "*deductive*, in the sense of drawing out conclusions from simple, general, true premisses" (p. 76). Mr. Morris contends that Hume tacitly accepted this view and was thus forced to become a sceptic since he could not find the required fundamental first principle or premiss. The traditional logic was fashioned to fit the theory of knowledge put forward by Socrates and Plato and handed on by Aristotle; it does not fit the Idealist theory of knowledge, since the Idealist regards thinking as discursive, denies that any judgment can be incorrigible, and insists that the mind is spontaneously active in *producing* a systematic unity. Mr. Morris recognizes the difficulty of explaining how mind can be thus spontaneously active and at the same time capable of knowing a world independent, in some sense, of the thinker. He has many illuminating things to say about Kant's theory of judgment (Chapter VI) and about the transcendental unity of apperception (Chapter VII). He gives a useful account of inference in the Idealistic logic (Chapter IX) and an interesting criticism of the coherence theory of truth (Chapter X).

The grounds of Mr. Morris's own dissatisfaction with the Idealistic logic are set forth in two chapters (XII and XIII) dealing with the "reactionary criticism" of Cook-Wilson. He argues that Idealistic logic, taking its starting-point from Kant, has analysed the actual operations of thought in physics, but has reached conclusions concerning the necessary forms of thought which are not in conformity with the thinking exemplified in non-mathematical sciences such as biology. In particular, Idealistic logic must be criticized for leaving unexplained the element of immediacy in knowledge. "The arguments of the Idealistic logic," Mr. Morris says, "are not competent to refute the contention that there is an element of immediacy in knowledge, so long as it is not maintained that the faculty of immediacy can of itself alone contribute *statements* which are pure statements of knowledge, carrying the guarantee of immediate apprehension" (p. 314). His conclusion is that the large claims of Idealistic logic to establish *a priori* how the character of experience is determined by the forms of thought must be abandoned. He maintains that its achievement lies in its having provided a defence against the scepticism of Hume, which scepticism—so Mr. Morris seems to believe—was the inevitable



outcome of the traditional logic and the theory of knowledge upon which that logic rested. This contention cannot, in the opinion of the present reviewer, be admitted. But every logician should be grateful to Mr. Morris for his clear and interesting presentation of the Idealistic attitude to those problems which are traditionally regarded as constituting the subject-matter of logic.

L. SUSAN STEBBING.

*Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism.* By C. D. BROAD, M.A., Litt.D. (Cambridge: at the University Press. 1934. Pp. 48. Price 2s. 6d. net.)

This pamphlet constitutes the inaugural lecture given by Professor Broad on his appointment to the Chair of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge. He has chosen as his subject the timeworn but still acute problem of moral freedom, and while he does not claim to provide a solution for it he states the problem in a way which will make it much clearer to many readers,—I do not say “to all” simply because the same way of statement is not likely to suit everybody, and the analytic, formal way common at Cambridge, while providing perhaps the best possible method for very many readers, may somewhat repel and mystify others. When I have said this I have said that the pamphlet has done as much as any single discussion of the problem is likely to do, especially when confined to 48 short pages. It is well worthy of the reputation of the author and of his previous works, and ought to be read by all serious students of the problem.

Professor Broad makes it clear that the question is not whether “ought” entails “can,” for that it does so *in some sense* is universally admitted,—a point often forgotten by indeterminists,—but *what* sense of “can” it entails. (In discussing this problem “ought” itself is throughout used in the sense in which it entails moral responsibility, but on pp. 21–24 there is a most illuminating account of other senses of “ought.”) Again, it is generally admitted that it can never be true that I ought to have acted differently from the way in which I did act where it is the case that the action in fact performed would have taken place however strongly I had willed not to perform it, as, *e.g.*, in a case of really uncontrollable sneezing. In this sense, as the author points out, “ought” clearly entails “can.” But suppose, although I could have avoided doing it *if* I had willed sufficiently strongly, I could not at the time have willed as strongly as that? In that case again Professor Broad is almost certain that it could not be true that I “ought” to have acted differently from the way in which I did act. Nor, he urges, is the difficulty removed by saying that I should have then willed otherwise than I did if my volitions on previous occasions had been different from what they were in fact. Consequently he concludes that “could” in the sense in which it is entailed by “ought” cannot be reduced to “would have if.” While this seems clearly true, I am not altogether satisfied with Professor Broad’s assumption that the determinist really must analyse “could” as “would have if.” Might not the latter, while denying that a different action was ever possible if you take all conditions into account, hold that it was possible relatively to certain conditions (*i.e.* all the conditions except some of the psychological ones), and effect the analysis in terms of this relative possibility? He might thus say, “A could have acted differently” means “a different action would have been possible though all conditions except A’s state of will remained the same.” In that case “I could have willed harder than I did” would become “it would have been possible



for me; to will harder though all conditions except my immediately precedent state of will remained the same," which may well be true according to many forms of determinism. There would still be cases in which a person wills with the maximum degree of strength compatible with other conditions, and other cases where he does not; and in the latter cases he might still perhaps be held to be morally responsible despite determinism if a wrong action occurred through his not having willed more strongly, but not in the former. Again, some determinists, *e.g.*, I think, Locke, would say that the question whether a man could have willed otherwise than he did is meaningless because it implies that a man can will to will, which is impossible, and that therefore the distinction made by Professor Broad between, *e.g.*, the man who is just beginning to adopt the drug habit and the same man when his will has already been undermined by the drugs so that he "cannot" resist them, must be analysed in some different way.

Professor Broad then proceeds to analyse further the alternative "indeterminist" view, according to which the degree of the agent's "desire" (I am not clear why he now ceases to talk of "will" and starts talking about "desire") is not completely determined by the laws of nature and other facts about events, dispositions, and "background conditions." But he is inclined to think that, besides this negative condition of indeterminism, a second, positive condition is necessary if an action is to be morally obligatory, for otherwise the action would be a mere accident. The view which admits both negative and positive conditions he calls "Libertarianism," and defines as follows: "(i) Some (and it may be all) voluntary actions have a causal ancestor which contains as a cause-factor the putting-forth of an effort which is not completely determined in direction and intensity by occurrent causation. (ii) In such cases the direction and the intensity of the effort are completely determined by non-occurrent causation, in which the self or agent, taken as a substance or continuant, is the non-occurrent total cause." Against this view Professor Broad raises the objection that, if an event is to be determined at all, it must be at least partly determined by precedent events; but I should have liked him to discuss the reply that the advocate of "Libertarianism" need not claim that even the direction and intensity of the effort are *wholly* determined by the self, but only that they are *partly* so determined, and expressly point out the difficulties in this rejoinder. But there is so much for which to be thankful in this last pamphlet that it is perhaps ungrateful to ask for more.

A. C. EWING.

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*History and the Self: A Study in the Roots of History and the Relations of History and Ethics.* By HILDA D. OAKELEY, M.A., D.Lit. (London: Williams & Norgate Ltd. 1934. Pp. 286. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

It is in accordance not only with the recent trend of speculative thought, but with the still more recent course of political events, that we should envisage the task and nature of philosophy historically, and that our most urgent problem should be the relation of the individual self to the supra-individual concepts of the nation, and of civilization, and of reality itself. Dr. Hilda Oakeley states that she was urged to the writing of her book by "an intense impression of the paradox of our contrasting attitudes in historical and in ethical interest and judgments," and by dissatisfaction with the historical doctrine of the Hegelian tradition. That, presumably, was before the triumph of Hitlerism in Germany, which has provided most of us with a still stronger 'practical argument' against the submergence of individual



personality in the Idea. It is a prime merit of Dr. Oakeley's volume that one feels this sense of vital issues underlying the course of her argument.

She starts by making pluralism axiomatic. The experience of the individual is the primary material of history, and the bases of knowledge and ethics are in the recognition of the *Thou*, over against the *I*. "An idealistic interpretation (of history), far from implying, is incompatible with monism." But how is this plurality of individual selves to be reconciled with the unity of history, a unity which the very term 'history' seems to postulate? The question is tackled on the several planes of epistemology, ontology, and ethics. On the first plane she distinguishes the self as subject, which, she declares, cannot be known directly, from the self as object of knowledge; and goes on to emphasize the limitations and defects of our historical knowledge, such as the loss of the actual experience of past individuals, which is history in the primary sense; the relativity of the categories of objective history (race, nations, institutions) which we substitute for the actual individual or event; the animistic attribution of personality to the non-human elements in history. An example of this animism she finds in Croce's identification of the Spirit with history. Turning then to the 'substance of history' she discusses the relation of personal activity and purpose to the blind factor of chance, and to the life of nations, institutions, and 'historical forces.' Her conclusion is that "the blind factors in human history may partly proceed from the minds of men themselves," and that "if there could be banished from the process of events all that we have discussed under chance . . . there remain in the very sanctuary of history the creative mind itself, possible sources of impediment to human progress." Individual freedom she assumes to be of the very nature of personality; but (she argues) without some transcendent principle history loses its meaning, and our freedom is of no avail. This principle she finds, though recognizing that all ethical systems are historically relative, and that the Platonic type of ethical objectivity involves a kind of animistic personification, "in the idea of a future united with that of the creativity of selves which lends it its value." "In the illimitable future . . . the dualism inseparable from history would not be eliminated, but . . . its unfavourable effects might be incalculably diminished." This conclusion is supported by the postulation of a supreme person who is *not* equivalent to the All, and whose nature supplies "a necessary principle of order in our idea of history."

The book is written with sober fullness and good sense: there is no attempt at metaphysical subtlety or obscurity, and some interesting points are made. But I cannot help feeling that the argument as a whole is lacking in logical coherence, and this lack of clearness and coherence is reflected in the frequent clumsiness of her English style. It seems to me that Dr. Oakeley as a pluralist is still too much of a monist, and that a far more radical analysis of historical concepts is needed if the discussion is to escape verbalism and ambiguity. For instance, the word 'chance' has two opposite and contradictory senses according as it is contrasted with the abstract logical scheme of an *onlooker*, or with the individual purpose and foresight of an *agent*; and any argument which fails to analyse this distinction must fall to the ground in logical vagueness. Again, the claim that there must be a transcendent principle in history is surely to accept a postulate from which the whole system of Crocean monism necessarily follows. In general I think there is a failure adequately to distinguish the category of history as thought from the category of history as lived, or actuality. On the denial and the confusion of that distinction monism rests, and on the analysis of it pluralism must rest. Dr. Oakeley refers more than once to that great-hearted doer and thinker, Dr. Albert Schweitzer;



but she does not notice the summarizing sentence of his autobiography: "To the question whether I am a pessimist or an optimist, I answer that my knowledge is pessimistic, but my willing and hoping are optimistic."

ADRIAN COATES.

*Speech Disorders: A Psychological Study of the Various Defects of Speech.* By SARAH STINCHFIELD, Ph.D. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1933. Pp. xii + 341. Price 15s.)

This book is a conglomerate of miscellaneous information, nomenclature, and statistics relating principally to the handling of Defective Speech in America.

Of its three hundred and twenty-four pages, the first twenty-four are devoted to a sort of general "talk" on the Speech of Infancy, then come about forty pages on the Common Speech Difficulties of Childhood, followed by ninety pages of descriptive pathology bristling with nomenclature, hopeless prognosis, and, naturally and sadly enough, very little either about cases or treatment.

That makes up half the book. Part II (157 pages) contains six chapters of miscellaneous statistics for the most part inconclusive even for America, and of doubtful relevance elsewhere.

The sketch outline of the book given above is sufficient to indicate that the sub-title is something of a misnomer. It is "various" enough, but it is not a psychological study.

Nevertheless, Miss Stinchfield's general principles, as far as one can be sure about them, are sound. Her fundamental general description of language as a mode of behaviour shows the right attitude and is in harmony for instance with the views of Professor Karl Goldstein, who insists that the human organism functions as a whole, and that to treat a Speech Defect you have to treat the whole man. Many patients with speech defects are *malades*, and any treatment they are subjected to must be clinically above suspicion.

As Miss Stinchfield points out, the child's speech efforts are "socially motivated," and "an expression of his various activities or responses to environment." Speech has almost magical effects on those around him, and he either gets what he wants, or what he deserves. Words work wonders. Speech becomes integrated with the whole of his social behaviour and the expression of his social personality. Hence the importance of studying not merely the local disturbance of speech, but the whole patient in his habitat. This is particularly important in stammering or stuttering.

In this connection the author also asks the highly important question, "What is the child's native tongue?" but she apparently underestimates the importance of the speech habits formed before the age of seven. Speech it is true is dynamic, changing to serve changing needs, "subject to change without notice," but there remains the dialect of home, village, community, and class, closely correlated with the socio-economic organization in which the speaker functions in his various rôles. It is becoming increasingly clear that the democratization of the culture and speech of the upper classes by downward infiltration and progressive dilution, eventually reaches a stage when a sort of normal line has to be drawn and the whole wretched crop of defectives, deficient, and delinquents has to be reaped. It is also more than likely that a considerable amount of nervous strain or at any rate unhealthy reactions are caused by the impact of the native culture and speech with a more successful or alien culture. This is certainly true of "native" races, and probably also of the lower middle and more ambitious working classes who



propose to make use of the "educational ladder." A great deal of emotional instability, cultural and linguistic sterility, widespread negative attitudes and cynicism must be put down to the downward democratization of national and imperial cultures.

And here some of the tables in Part II are suggestive. About one-third of the students in groups at Mount Holyoke College "expressed themselves as dissatisfied with their speech." They were asked to describe the chief characteristics of cultured speech and evaluate their own. They were asked such questions as: "Are you a leader in your social group?" "Have you ever felt inferior because of poor speech?" "Is your accent and pronunciation like that of most of your friends?" It is enlightening to consider the cultural background of such questions as these, and to imagine the sort of answers you might get from the products of our big public schools, from secondary school-boys in Bolton, Bradford, Burslem, and Bangor, from elementary school teachers, people in evening classes all over the country, and the pundits of culture democratization at the B.B.C. It is also significant that in the speech correction groups of two colleges more students came from the semi-professional classes than any other. In Hunter College 45 per cent. were of semi-professional and 55 per cent. skilled occupational origin—only 5 per cent. professional.

Miss Stinchfield finds it surprising that in the correction groups there should be more girls from homes with some pretensions to culture than from lower-class homes with no such pretension. It would appear to be a natural consequence. It can be an awful strain to have to look up to people, but it is some compensation to have people to look down upon. If you have nobody but a moron to look down on it's no good looking at the ladder. But with organized democratization of culture downwards you must beware of the dividing line; a whole army of "deficiency" specialists with highly systematized "deficiency" techniques have grown up on the frontiers. It is to be hoped we shall someday be able to do without them, as they are the scourge of all public education.

On a very much larger scale there is the lively interest we take in "backward" and "inferior" races, and quite recently the measure of "fitness" for citizenship has been found in nordicism, which means very little in itself, but something quite definite when taken with its correlative opposite—the second-class citizen or subman.

There are many speech disorders which are not attributable to functional disturbances, but we know so little about the whole mechanism of speech, that the classificatory nomenclature of this book cannot be said to rest on or to correspond to any scientific systematized knowledge. These labels in "pathological" Greek are little more than convenient temporary trade names—rather like the abracadabra of the apothecary. For example, if you have a provincial or foreign accent, according to this American measure, you are not "normal," you are "suffering" from *Dysrhythmia barbaralalia*. Among the more unpleasant vocal disturbances you will recognize the virago in *paraphonia amazonica*, and the lemon-coloured voice in the *eunochoidia* type. And then there are the very prevalent complaints of *polylogia* or *logorrhea*.

At the present moment there is a semi-official committee deliberating on Speech Training and Speech Defects. It is to be hoped they will realize, with Miss Stinchfield, that some of these disorders "may appear for the first time in early childhood, or in later childhood, or in adolescence, but the majority of speech disturbances of remedial type appear in childhood."

It is mainly a social and educational problem. Of the many Speech Disorders in which the prognosis is definitely bad, there is little if anything to be said except sympathy and mercy.

This is a very American book. In Part II there are chapter headings like



"Personality Schedules" and "Trait Inventory." And—as one has come to expect in this twentieth century with its "A1-C3" problem—there are speech tests.

And yet, in spite of its special American appeal, the book is a valuable one. Speech disorders are described, and the importance of regarding them as disturbances of personality with due regard to heredity and environment, fully recognized. Every Speech Teacher should have it, and it is to be hoped in the near future he will be better qualified to assess its real value and use it with discretion.

J. R. FIRTH.

*God or Man? A Study of the Value of God to Man.* By JAMES H. LEUBA.  
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1934. Pp. xii + 338.  
Price 10s. 6d.)

Professor Leuba is concerned (and who is not?) for the moral, and incidentally for the social and physical betterment of man, and he feels that the chief hindrance lies in the pre-occupation of men with Gods. Instead of resorting to psychologists for psycho-therapy, they continue to pour out time, money, and strength in seeking benefits from the "God of the religions." Now for this God, conceived as a being with whom social relationships are sought and enjoyed, there is—the Professor holds—no shred of evidence: a vaguely defined "Life Urge" somehow involved in man's ideals he can concede as scientifically respectable, and hence as perhaps existing. The benefits, however, are admittedly forthcoming, but they are really due to men, and not to God; they might more advantageously and less expensively be had from Professor Leuba. To this disadvantage must be added grave positive evils attendant upon religion as such which far outweigh its benefits. Religion (we are informed) opposes or neglects knowledge, encourages prejudice and hypocrisy, saps self-determination and self-help: notably (a chapter being devoted to this) it spreads, "False teaching concerning the source of the virtues." In the past religion was useful, and Professor Leuba is not ungrateful for having been brought up in it, but he judges that it should now give way to clinics and (perhaps) ethical societies.

The author eschews ultimate questions (while by suggestion dealing with them) in order to remain "within the range of human knowledge," but he does not seriously consider whether or not this range is truly taken. So far as there is an argument running through the book it is this: men have taken themselves to be healed, strengthened, inspired by God, but scientific psychology has shown that these effects are explicable (and repeatable) in terms of normal human psychic forces; therefore belief in the existence of God is very probably false and incidentally a nuisance.

Since Professor Leuba quotes (p. 199) a Lambeth Committee as conceding the factual position of his book, namely, that "spiritual healing" is not an ecclesiastical monopoly, the reviewer is moved to wonder at his uncritical confidence concerning the interpretation he builds upon these facts.

As against some excessive erotic mysticism and much prevailing anthropocentrism in religion his strictures are timely. But religion is essentially *theocentric*. It is not founded in the satisfaction of man's needs, except in so far as it satisfies what the author describes as the "appalling desire" for God for His own sake. Thus the utilitarian attack upon religion is wide of the mark. No religious man would think of asking Professor Leuba's question,



"Of what value is God to man?" The question which puzzles him is, "Of what value is man to God?"

The Christian doctrines of the Incarnation and the Holy Trinity are shortly dubbed "all that abracadabra." Perhaps it is not astonishing that one able to judge thus can also see the Church as "drunk with lust for power" (p. 328) simply because Pope Gregory VIII "claimed the right of sitting in judgment upon the conduct of kings . . ." when what the Pope was rightly claiming—namely, that man's spiritual life is the end of his civil life—Professor Leuba, in his own terms, would assuredly insist upon.

The author contrasts Christianity with "The noble and simple religion of Christ." Has he noticed how radically non-utilitarian Christ's religion is? or how deeply it is rooted in the religion of Israel? or how essential to it is communion with God? In sum, has he noticed that the religion he admires involves the denial of what he asserts, the assertion of what he denies?

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

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*Counter Attack from the East.* By C. E. M. JOAD. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1933. Pp. 269. Price 7s. 6d.)

The attraction which military metaphors have for so many ardent votaries of peace has led Mr. Joad to misname his latest book. It should have been rather "Sanity from the East," or even "Salvation from the East." For he is concerned to argue that what contemporary Western civilization needs, if it is to escape from its profound inner malaise, from its futilities and frustrations, and the jeopardy into which they have brought the world, is the recovery of the sense of values which can only (it seems to be implied) be learned from the philosophy of Hinduism as expounded by Professor Radhakrishnan. In this remarkable personality and gifted thinker Mr. Joad sees a "liaison officer" uniquely fitted to interpret the West and the East to each other, and with a message of hope which the West cannot afford to ignore. Apart from a vigorous prologue and epilogue in which the moral is applied, the whole book is occupied with expounding Radhakrishnan's philosophy, and draws copiously upon his writings, especially the Hibbert Lectures, *An Idealist View of Life*. Out of some 160 citations from Radhakrishnan nearly a hundred are from this book.

Mr. Joad remarks that "it is a defect of his method that the reader is sometimes not as clear as he would like to be, whether Radhakrishnan is speaking his own mind or revealing the mind of others." The same criticism must certainly be made upon this book. Occasionally the author interposes an explicit caveat or frank note of dissent. More often we are left rather vague as to how far he accepts the contentions he states with such lucidity. In the main, however, he clearly does accept much of the Indian thinker's philosophy as of particular importance and relevance to-day.

Many readers will feel that Mr. Joad has exaggerated, if not the importance, at any rate the novelty of his discovery. That Radhakrishnan's philosophy is original in the best sense of the word, that is, a piece of thinking at first hand, it would be an impertinence to question. But that many of the positions he has reached, and which are here proclaimed as a gospel for our times, are new to Western thought even in the expressions that clothe them is far from obvious. The symbolic nature of religious creeds; the reconciliation of God and the Absolute; the treatment of the problem of evil and the problem of freedom; the validity in principle of religious knowledge; on these and other



matters Mr. Joad surely did not need to go so far east in order to find the doctrines he so much appreciates.

What is more, he is most grotesquely unfair to the philosophy of the Christian religion, which he appears indeed never to have attempted to study sympathetically (*e.g.* see two foolish comments, pp. 91, 208). Nor for that matter is he fair to Christianity as a whole, which seems to mean to him chiefly the Inquisition and the wars of religion. It is very different with Hinduism. Apart from a few perfunctory references to its perverted and debased features, we are asked to judge it from the exalted eclectic idealism of Radhakrishnan. Western sectarian intolerance is then effectively, and easily, contrasted with "the Hindu theory that every human being, every group, and every nation has an individuality worthy of reverence." When we look eastwards we are, it appears, to ignore such practical comments upon this theory as temple prostitution and untouchability, just as when we look at the West we are to ignore the interpretation of the meaning of Christianity of a Francis or a John Woolman. But in truth there is something meretricious about this sharp contrast of West and East. Mr. Joad, obsessed with contemporary tendencies, simplifies his chiaroscuro altogether too drastically. Monism since the time of Parmenides has been as native to the West as pluralism; and very naturally, for it expresses one of the most fundamental human needs. It is certainly *not* "obvious" (p. 142) that the affirmation of an unchangeable reality "comes from the East."

On the whole the book does more credit to the author's enthusiasm than to his judgment. It seems to have been written in a hurry and contains some hasty comments which the author would probably admit were inaccurate, *e.g.* the linking of "theories of the Alexander or Bergson type," on p. 142, or the reference to Plato, on p. 136. Yet, when all is said, the author is, if he will pardon a figure of speech so flagrantly Christian, upon the side of the angels. And for his pungent comments upon "the need of the West" many readers will be grateful.

J. W. HARVEY.

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*Goldsworthy Lowes Dickenson.* By E. M. FORSTER. (London: E. Arnold & Co. 1934. Pp. x + 277. Price 10s. 6d.)

Mr. Forster has produced a singularly interesting portrait of his friend, one of the most considerable thinkers and writers of the age. In what sense was he a philosopher? Throughout his life, inspired first by Shelley, then by Plato and Goethe, he brooded over what may be termed the deeper problems of man in the universe, diving into them by various approaches, the ordered reasoning of his friend McTaggart, the mysticism of Plotinus, the values disclosed by poetry, music, and painting, with more timid glances at the sciences of physics and psychology. He never attained, or believed in, the possibility of winning a philosophic system, was not concerned with the absolute or ultimates. He realized himself as a questioner in a changing world, unlikely to get full satisfaction to questions the validity of which was always qualified by the limitations of his nature and understanding. When young "I thought that there must be some way of reaching ultimate truths (or perhaps I should say ultimate experience) by some short cut. I suppose the principal thing that happened to me, in the course of my life, was the disappearance of this idea" (p. 229). "The world is incomprehensible, and must remain so to us animalcules, though the best thing about it is our shots to comprehend it" (p. 231).



It is significant that most of his early writings as a young Cambridge Don were poems, usually sonnets. For this meant that imagination, kindled by emotion, was to him a better mode of self-realization than reasoning in getting at the values of life. But he was capable of close, clear thinking, with a wonderful vigour and beauty of expression in the fields of personal and social conduct, as illustrated in his dialogues in *The Meaning of Good*, *A Modern Symposium*, and *Justice and Liberty*.

But a deep concern (in the Quaker sense) for civilization drew him out of his donnish seclusion. *The Letters from John Chinaman* won him a wide acceptance as a critic, and his tours in America and in Asia opened new vistas of experience to his sensitive mind. He began to feel an obligation to turn his studies of history and political institutions to practical utility for the education of a wider public opinion. Though continuing to write on "The Greek View of Life" and on religious topics, he found himself drawn into the political field as new issues of Peace and Liberty came up. When the immediate shock of the War subsided, he set himself with courage and pertinacity to plan for the salvation of the world by means of a League of Nations. The so-called "Bryce scheme" for internationalism was mainly his production, and he lent his mind and pen for years to the furtherance of this policy, subordinating to it all other interests. His great book, *The International Anarchy, 1904-1914*, published in 1926, is the most powerful exposition of the deeper causes of the War that has appeared. In the last years of his life, he returned to Plato and Goethe, even putting Plato for the first time on "the wireless."

He had a free, rich, shy, but truly social nature, with great tolerance and a faith in the goodness and reasonability of man sufficient to warrant a belief in human progress.

J. A. HOBSON.

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*Religion and History*. By JAMES CLARK MCKERROW, M.B. (London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1934. Pp. ix + 193. Price 6s. net.)

The two essays which make up the volume do not fulfil the expectation which the title awakens, that there will be an adequate consideration of the influence of religion on history, or of history as a factor in religion; nor have they the close connection with one another that the words on the paper cover suggest: "Two essays, one dealing with religious history from a secular point of view, the other with secular history from a religious point of view." The first is a sociological study of the evolution of society in history, and religion is mentioned as one element in the evolution; the second is a theory, not original, for similar views have been before advanced, but eccentric, of the origin of Christianity; the first is decidedly the better, though much the shorter of the two, as it offers an interesting discussion of the *Principles of Sociology*. The author rejects the view of Sociology as a study of the relations of individuals in a society, and insists on the unity of society as an organism, a body, and a mind. He describes two types of social bodies, the *polities* (Greek) and the *economies* (the older empires); he recognizes that society has a "mental" aspect, which is not to be identified with its civilization. He maintains that in society there is an economic evolution, and that there is continuity in evolution. The economic evolution is towards a world-economy, a mutual dependence in this sphere of all nations, but on the mental side he does not expect an international evolution, but closes with a discussion of national economy. His attitude is that of naturalism; he recognizes



causality, but not teleology. Changes simply "happen." Evolution produces persons and events, and not the reverse, and we should offer no judgment on them.

The second essay is entitled *Evolution in the Light of Religion*; but this title has no necessary relations with the contents. The thesis maintained is that there never was actually an Apostolic Age, that Christianity began between A.D. 70 and 135 in Gnostic Christianity, a blending of pagan philosophy with Jewish Messianism, that for the cultured the ideal Saviour sufficed, but for the simple folk belief in a historical personality was necessary; that Catholic Christianity emerged out of the Gnostic, but turned against it, and claimed a basis in an Apostolic Age. He maintains that Christ is "mythical," not an historical figure, that "modernist" criticism has not left much of the historical Jesus, that "whether Christian doctrine and legend crystallized about a real person of that name (Jesus) is a matter of some historical interest, but of no importance for Christianity whatever; a mere man cannot be the Saviour." "What is important for those who have the cause of religion, which is the cause of humanity, at heart, is the ever-increasing scepticism among the educated—and we are all educated now—as to the alleged historical basis of Christianity. The hungry sheep look up to hireling shepherds (pp. 88-89). This statement which offers the reason for the reconstruction of history which follows calls for comment. There is a large number of competent, responsible scholars who would deny the negative position of extreme modernism in regard to the historical Jesus; it is simply not true that there is "an ever-increasing scepticism among the educated," if among the educated are included all Christian scholars and thinkers; to describe the ministers of the Christian religion as "hirelings" is not evidence, but abuse, which discredits the writer himself. He expresses his concern for religion, and does on several occasions mention God; but on page 56 he omits from the quotation from Micah the words "with thy God," in view of the doubtful convenience of the fiction of a corporate religious consciousness in modern, as contrasted with ancient societies, and seems to regard theism as unnecessary. His theory cannot be combated in detail in the pages of *PHILOSOPHY*; but even were his theory not as arbitrary as it is, he does not show the competence of knowledge which would justify the confidence of judgment he allows himself; assumptions for the most part usurp the place of argument. His essay can claim no value as a contribution to the discussion of a subject of so great importance.

A. E. GARVIE.

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*Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Pierce*. Vol. III. Exact Logic (Published Papers). Edited by CHARLES HARTSHORN and PAUL WEISS. (Cambridge, U.S.A.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. xiv + 433. Price \$5; 24s. 6d. nett.)

These collected papers are concerned in the main with the logic of relations, the logic of mathematics, the devising of a suitable symbolism for dealing with both, and the ultimate analysis or philosophy of symbolism, mathematical proof, and the forms of facts.

Most of the book is now of mainly historical interest, showing how Pierce, starting with the work of Boole, "developed the logic of propositions, propositional functions, and the logic of relations, up to the point where these approximate to a calculus which is adequate to the actual deductive procedures exemplified by mathematics."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Lewis and Langford, *Symbolic Logic*, p. 16.



The editors' claim that Boole was one of the most original and prolific logicians of the nineteenth century is well substantiated; apart from the developments mentioned above, one is constantly surprised by remarks which anticipate the best modern work. See for example 20 on the logic of mathematics, and 361, 418, and 419 on the diagrammatic function of language.<sup>1</sup>

Although Pierce accepts with an unquestioning *naïveté* characteristic of the symbolic logician "an ideal world of which the real world is but a fragment" (527), yet on the whole he is anxious to remove the superfluous; sometimes he believes symbols to illuminate more than they do (e.g. 444); but his faith is not blind (e.g. 515).

Pierce was not merely a man of great ability. He thought afresh. And it is worth reminding oneself at the present time that the study of first-rate and first-hand thinkers of the past is often very fruitful even when they were concerned with subjects in which advances have since been made.

Besides a table of contents and general index, the editors have provided a list of topics of historical interest and another list of topics of general interest. The latter should, I think, have included *Propositional Function* 420, 421, and *Material Implication* 374, 441 f. Pierce is illuminating on the propositional function and thus on the variable, though *Nature of the Variable* 94 is pretty useless. *Demonstrative Symbols and Hecceities (particulars)* are mentioned in 361, 419, and 460. A more complete table of references to topics of general interest would have been welcome in view of the disjointed presentation entailed by the chronological order.

JOHN WISDOM.

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Books received also:—

- Various. *Philosophy of Society* (Papers of American Catholic Philosophical Association, Ninth Annual Meeting). Editor: C. A. Hart, Ph.D. Philadelphia: The Dolphin Press. 1934. Pp. xii + 203. \$1.50.
- M. C. NAHM. *The Aesthetic Response. An Antinomy and its Resolution*. Philadelphia, U.S.A.: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1933. Pp. 56.
- J. T. PEDDIE. *The Economic Mechanism of Scripture. The Cure for the World Crises*. London: Williams & Norgate Ltd. 1934. Pp. xvi + 381. 10s.
- N. BOHR. *Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature*. London: Cambridge University Press. 1934. Pp. 119. 6s.
- A. K. COOMARASWAMY. *A New Approach to the Vedas. An Essay in Translation and Exegesis*. London: Luzac & Co. 1933. Pp. ix + 116. 5s.
- W. McDUGALL, F.R.S. *Religion and the Sciences of Life*. London: Methuen & Co. 1934. Pp. xiii + 263. 8s. 6d.
- M. LOEWENTHAL (Foreword by J. S. Macdonald, F.R.S.). *Life and Soul. Outlines of a Future Theoretical Physiology and of a Critical Philosophy*. London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1934. Pp. 291. 8s. 6d.
- E. G. HOWE, M.B., B.S., D.P.M. *Morality and Reality. An Essay on the Law of Life*. London: Gerald Howe Ltd. 1934. Pp. 136. 6s.
- W. R. INGE. *Liberty and Natural Rights*. (Herbert Spencer Lecture, 1934.) London: Oxford Clarendon Press; Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. 38. 1s. 6d.
- J. C. GREGORY, B.Sc., F.I.C. *Combustion from Heracleitos to Lavoisier*. London: Edward Arnold & Co. 1934. Pp. vii + 231. 10s. 6d.
- R. G. LEGGE (Rev.). *Christian Theism in Contemporary Thought*. Copies from the author, St. Mark's Vicarage, London, E.9. Pp. 92. 2s. 6d.

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<sup>1</sup> My references are throughout to the numbered paragraphs.



- R. G. LEGGE (Rev.). *Seer, Scribe and Sage. Being Studies in Judaism during the Greek Period.* Copies from the author, St. Mark's Vicarage, London, E.9. Pp. 24. 1s.
- G. SPILLER. *The Ethical Movement in Great Britain. A Documentary History.* London: The Farleigh Press. 1934. Pp. 95.
- A. *Bibliography of Aesthetics and of the Philosophy of the Fine Arts from 1900 to 1932.* Compiled by W. A. Hammond. (Revised edition.) New York: Longmans Green & Co. 1934. Pp. 205.
- C. LAMBEK (Tr. by A. Kortsen). *Government by the Principle of Moral Justice.* London: Williams & Norgate Ltd. 1934. Pp. 96. 4s. 6d.
- R. V. FELDMAN, M.A. (Preface by C. C. J. Webb.) *The Domain of Selfhood.* London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1934. Pp. 212. 10s. 6d.
- SIR HENRY LAMBERT, K.C.M.G., C.B., F.S.A. *The Nature of History.* London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. viii + 94. 5s.
- R. CARNAP (Tr. by M. Black). *The Unity of Science.* (Psyche Miniatures.) London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1934. Pp. 101. 2s. 6d.
- H. A. WOLFSON. *The Philosophy of Spinoza. Unfolding the Latent Processes of his Reasoning.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1934. Vol. I. Pp. xix + 440. Vol. II. Pp. xii + 424. \$7.50 (31s. 6d.) the two volumes.
- H. P. FAIRCHILD. *General Sociology.* New York: J. Wiley & Sons. London: Chapman & Hall Ltd. 1934. Pp. x + 633. 23s.
- E. E. RICHARDSON, B.S., M.S., M.D., Ph.D. *The Philosophy of the Future.* (Society of Philosophical Enquiry of Washington, D.C., Publications.) Pp. 22.
- A. C. EWING, M.A., D.Phil., Litt.D. *Idealism: A Critical Survey.* London: Methuen & Co. 1934. Pp. viii + 450. 21s.
- MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, D.Litt., M.A. *Outlines of Buddhism: A Historical Sketch.* London: Methuen & Co. 1934. Pp. ix + 117. 5s.
- T. E. JESSOP, M.A., B.Litt. *A Bibliography of George Berkeley.* (Inventory of Berkeley's Manuscript Remains by A. A. Luce, D.D.) London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. xi + 99. 7s. 6d.
- G. LAWTON. *The Drama of Life after Death. A Study of the Spiritualist Religion.* New York: H. Holt & Co. 1934. Pp. xxvii + 668. \$3.75.
- E. S. RUSSELL, O.B.E., D.Sc., F.L.S. *The Behaviour of Animals. An Introduction to its Study.* London: Edward Arnold & Co. 1934. Pp. viii + 184. 10s. 6d.
- G. COSTER. *Yoga and Western Psychology: A Comparison.* London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. 248. 5s.
- P. S. DESHMUKH, M.A., D.Phil. (Foreword by A. B. Keith, D.C.L., D.Litt.). *The Origin and Development of Religion in Vedic Literature.* London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. xvi + 378. 22s. 6d.
- H. TREVELYAN. *The Popular Background to Goethe's Hellenism.* London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1934. Pp. xii + 107. 7s. 6d.
- J. C. FLÜGEL. *Men and their Motives. Psycho-Analytical Studies.* (With two essays by Ingeborg Flügel.) London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1934. Pp. vii + 289. 10s. 6d.
- W. JAEGER (Tr. R. Robinson). *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development.* London: Oxford Clarendon Press; Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. 410. 18s.
- W. D. LAMONT, M.A., D.Phil. *Introduction to Green's Moral Philosophy.* London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1934. Pp. 224. 7s. 6d.



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- HAR DAYAL, M.A., Ph.D. *Hints for Self-Culture*. London: C. A. Watts & Co. Ltd. 1934. Pp. ix + 366. 5s.
- M. G. PARKS. *Introduction to Keyserling. An Account of the Man and his Work*. London: J. Cape Ltd. 1934. Pp. 287. 7s. 6d.
- Various. (Editor: F. Mason; Introduction by Sir J. A. Thomson, LL.D.) *The Great Design. Order and Intelligence in Nature*. London: G. Duckworth & Co. 1934. Pp. 324. 8s. 6d.
- Various. *Individual Psychology and Practice (II)*. London: The C. W. Daniel Co. 1934. Pp. 57. 2s. 6d.
- C. D. BURNS, D.Lit. (Preface by Dr. G. P. Gooch). *A New Faith for a New Age*. London: The Ethical Union. 1934. Pp. 22. 2½d.
- P. N. SRINIVASACHARI, M.A. *The Philosophy of Bhedābheda*. Madras: Srinivasa Varadachari & Co. 1934. Pp. xvi + 366. Rs. 5; 7s. 6d.
- W. BROWN, D.M., D.Sc., F.R.C.P. *Psychology and Psychotherapy*. (3rd ed.) London: E. Arnold & Co., 1934. Pp. vi + 252. 12s. 6d.
- W. M. TEAPE. Supplement to *The Secret Lore of India*, consisting of Additional Selections from the Upanishads, with Notes. Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons. 1934. Pp. 32. 2s.
- A. J. SUNAVALA (Prefatory Note by F. W. Thomas; Foreword by S. Lévi). *Ādarsha Sādhu: An Ideal Monk*. London: Cambridge University Press. 1934. Pp. xiv + 185. 5s.
- C. F. HARROLD. *Carlyle and German Thought: 1819-1834*. New Haven: Yale University Press. London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. xii + 346. \$2.50.
- M. É. BRÉHIER. *La Notion de Renaissance dans l'Histoire de la Philosophie*. (Zaharoff Lecture, 1933.) Oxford: at the Clarendon Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. 23. 2s.
- G. LAKHOVSKY. *Le Racisme et l'orchestre Universel*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1934. Pp. 153. Frs. 15.
- G. BACHELARD. *Le Nouvel Esprit Scientifique*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1934. Pp. 179. Frs. 10.
- L. BRUNSCHVICG. *Les Ages de l'Intelligence*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1934. Pp. 150. Frs. 10.
- D. DRAGHICESCO. *Vérité et Révélation*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1934. Pp. xiv + 491. Frs. 40.
- P. CHATIR. *Les Dix Causeries occultistes d'El Dalil*. Paris. Editeur: Albert Messein. 1934. Pp. 177. Frs. 15.
- G. DE RUGGIERO. *Filosofi del Novecento. Appendice a la Filosofia Contemporanea*. Bari: G. Laterza & Figli. 1934. Pp. vii + 297. L. 20.
- A. COVOTTI. *La Metafisica del Bello e dei Costumi di Arturo Schopenhauer*. Napoli: Casa Editrice Rondinella Alfredo. 1934. Pp. xiv + 206. L. 15.
- A. N. WHITEHEAD. *Nature and Life*. London: Cambridge University Press. 1934. Pp. 96. 3s. 6d.



## THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

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## INSTITUTE NOTES

THE syllabus for the Session 1934-35 is in course of preparation, and copies will be sent to all members in September.

During the Session which has just closed members have again been privileged to listen to many distinguished lecturers in the various branches of philosophy. Both in regard to the Lecture Courses and Evening Meetings the Session has been successful.

The Annual General Meeting will be held on Wednesday, July 4th, at University Hall, 14, Gordon Square, London, W.C. 1, at 5.30 p.m. Short speeches will be made by the President, the Chairman of the Institute, and Professor John Macmurray.

The Editor begs leave to remind all interested in the work of the Institute that donations of any amount, to supplement the inadequate income from subscriptions, will be greatly appreciated by the Council of the Institute.

### EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

The Eighth International Congress of Philosophy will be held this year at Prague in Czecho-Slovakia from 2nd to 7th September, as announced in *Mind* (July 1933) and in *Philosophy* (October 1933). Anyone desiring to attend should communicate with Professor Radl, Charles University, Prague, who will send him an official invitation and information regarding the proceedings.

In order to facilitate the work of the British Organizing Committee, those attending the Conference should also acquaint Professor J. H. Muirhead, at Dyke End, Rotherfield, Sussex, of their intention.



# PHILOSOPHY

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The British Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

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- (2) Issues a quarterly philosophical Journal (free to members).
- (3) Proposes to form a philosophical Library.
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THE Institute has no endowments, and its work, which includes Lecture Courses and Study Circles in the various Centres as well as the conduct of the JOURNAL, is carried out on the most economical lines, but it cannot be expected that a liberal service be provided entirely from revenue derived from subscriptions at £1 is. per annum.

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# PHILOSOPHY

## THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. IX No. 34.

APRIL 1934

### EDITORIAL

FROM the days of Thales it has been a common taunt against philosophy that it is a form of star-gazing without relation to earthly things. Yet it would be strange if the study which Plato defined as "the contemplation of all time and existence" had nothing to say of that portion of time and existence that is passing before our eyes. As a matter of fact the revolutionary changes that are going on and taking different forms about us are each proclaimed in the name of a philosophy of life—a theory of what makes life worth living, and of the means to attain it. If, moreover, the main issue that is being fought out in the politics of nations at the present moment is that of democracy *versus* one or other form of dictatorship, the relation between it and the main issue of philosophy leaps to the eyes.

\* \* \* \* \*

From the days when Parmenides declared that all things are one and the heart of the world at peace, Heraclitus that things are many and that war is the father of them all, the problem of philosophy has been to see how these two elements in things can be united, how the unity and order of the whole can be made compatible with the freedom of the parts, permanence and stability with the freshness of new creation. Have unity and peace their principle in the depths of human life itself because it partakes of the wider harmonies of Nature at large whose child it is? Or have they forever to be enforced from without? There were those who saw in the Great War just the struggle between these two principles. On the one hand was a new Heracliteanism whose chief prophet was Nietzsche. Pitted against it was a new Parmenideanism of an innate



## PHILOSOPHY

reasonableness in men strong enough in the end to permeate and take the sting out of their differences: all that was needed was that the world should be free from the menace of force in order to give reason scope to operate. On the one hand, as Lord Sankey put it the other day, belief in *one* man (or one class), on the other hand, belief in *man*. What has changed all this and clouded this great hope?

\* \* \* \* \*

It would take more than a few editorial paragraphs to tell the whole story, if it could ever be told at all. But one or two things stand clearly out. What has been called "the art of living together," as the highest and more difficult of all the arts, requires, as they do, long preparation. It is the child of a long tradition and of self-discipline in peoples. It cannot be acquired by any one at a moment's notice. In the second place, for a century now the question has been no longer merely a political one. Men have found that political freedom is bound up with economic. Besides the domination by individuals or classes, there was the domination by industrial circumstances and by the power that control of them gives. Yet this too might yield to reason; and the turn of the century seemed to open a way of extending the reign of reason and conscience over the abuses of industry by the establishment of social services and safeguards against the appeal to naked force. Into this prospect of orderly progress broke the War. One might have thought that it would have taught on a large scale the futility of force. So to some extent it did. It awakened a new sense of the solidarity of mankind and of reason as the only way. Unfortunately the lesson was little more than skin deep. Force was relied upon for the maintenance of peace. The belief in it was scotched but not killed. The War itself had even accustomed men to the idea of it as a means of getting their ends, and when the political and economic hopes the War had stimulated were delayed the idea recurred.

\* \* \* \* \*

It is unprofitable to ask Who began it? Whoever did forgot that force begets force, and can in the end beget nothing else, and now the appeal to it is spreading like a conflagration from nation to nation on the Continent. Whether the flames will be allowed to leap the Channel depends on the wisdom and firmness of our Government. Meantime philosophers may see in these revolutions something that goes far deeper than a conflict between parties. It is the conflict which Whitehead has described in his great book *Adventures of Ideas*, as that between Force and Persuasion. If, as he says, "The creation of the world, that is to say the world of civilized order, is the victory of persuasion over force," then it is no less than the



existence of that world that is at stake. Are what the same writer calls the "gentler modes of human relation" and the "inherent persuasiveness of ideas" *alias* "the divine persuasion," which religion calls Grace, to be allowed to continue their creative work, or are we to be doomed to the stagnancy and stale repetition which is all that a ~~dictated~~ culture can offer to our afflicted hearts? Let us not deceive ourselves by specious arguments which strive to make the worse appear the better cause. The truth that the recurrence of force, however unavoidable, is the disclosure of the failure of civilization, confronts us in its austere simplicity and shatters all such sophistries.



## THE PRESENT NEED OF A PHILOSOPHY

(LETTER TO THE EDITOR FROM SIR HERBERT SAMUEL,  
*President of the Institute*)

MY DEAR EDITOR,

You have suggested that the *Journal* of the Institute might render a useful service if it could become a forum of discussion on living issues, and you have done me the honour to invite me to open a correspondence which would have that aim. But I make no pretence to be a professional philosopher; I am only, as George Moore puts it, "prone to philosophy"; and if I accept your invitation, it is less with the hope of making any positive contribution of my own, than with the desire of urging upon philosophers of authority, on behalf of the ordinary man, the need of an effort more effective than hitherto, to give direction in these difficult times to a troubled world.

We are experiencing now the results of the freedom of thought which has been established during the last two or three centuries. The old ontology, the old ethics, and the old social order, based upon systems of theology that were generally accepted, are crumbling under the influence of new ideas inspired by the discoveries of science. Urgent practical questions—of personal and social morality, of economic organization, of international relationship—press upon the peoples, but the leaders of thought give little guidance for their solution. This generation is dissatisfied, anxious, apprehensive. It feels itself as in a ship, launched on an unknown sea, without navigator, chart, or compass. Since the old theologies cannot meet the new problems, and since science cannot claim to deal with the larger issues, men are asking what philosophy has to say to the present age.

What indeed has it to say? When I am asked by some young man or woman to suggest one or two books which will convey the message of philosophy to these times, what books are there that I should recommend?

There is no doubt that the ordinary man is repelled from philosophy by its incessant discussion of epistemology. Common sense declares that the objective world is real, as real "in its own right" as, for example, the existence of the planet Neptune before anyone had discovered it; that our minds and their capacity to perceive the objective world are real also; that the media through which the perceptions are invoked are real as well; and that our ideas are the product of



the three. Is it impossible that that should be accepted as a working basis, and that we should then pass on to the things that are urgent?

Books of philosophy detain us with lengthy and subtle discussions on the nature of "the Good," on the problem of "Evil," on the proper understanding of conceptions such, for example, as "Colour." But the ordinary man is beginning to suspect that the philosopher is obsessed by generalizations of his own creation, that represent nothing actual or existent.

Take "Colour" for example. The physicist has discovered that various groups of atoms have the capacity of absorbing rays of light of certain wave-lengths which happen to fall upon them and of reflecting rays of other wave-lengths. Those groups of atoms which constitute, let us say, the surface of a table may reflect a set of rays of one of these wave-lengths so that it passes through the retina of my eye to my brain; they may be of that wave-length which produces there a sensation which I am accustomed to call seeing the colour yellow; when another set of rays of a different wave-length impinges upon the eye, I say that I see the colour green. Consequently the table is said to be yellow or green as the case may be. Human beings generalize from a number of such incidents and say that there is such a thing in the universe as "Colour." We then begin to formulate a series of philosophic problems about "Colour," and are disappointed to find that they never lead to any clear and agreed conclusion. May it not be that no conclusion is possible, and for the reason that we are trying to start from a point which is imaginary to reach a non-existent goal?

So also with "Evil" or "the Good." There are things, thoughts, or deeds which, for reasons of our own that can be explained, we describe as "evils," and others which we describe as "goods"; and it may be convenient to classify them into groups, and finally to bring the groups together into comprehensive units, and to call them "Evil" or "the Good." But such generalizations are only what Vaihinger termed "fictional abstractions." They may be useful for purposes of discussion; but philosophy, I venture to suggest, has lost its influence upon the world largely because it has persisted in treating them as realities. "Values," says Alexander, "are human inventions." May it not be largely for the reason that the ordinary man recognizes that that is so, while the philosopher would have him treat these "fictional abstractions" as fundamentally important, that there is the present divorce between philosophy and life?

It will not be disputed that one of the greatest gifts, perhaps the greatest, that science has made to philosophy in the modern age is the establishment of Evolution as the key to one part of the cosmic mystery. So far as it relates to human development, such evolution had not been self-conscious; it had been largely the outcome of what



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Whitehead calls "senseless agencies." But now philosophy, basing itself on science, may bring us into an era of Conscious Evolution. Cannot the philosophers give to a generation that is intellectually starved some sustenance drawn from that conception, leaving epistemology, at all events for the time being, in the background; relating itself directly and deliberately to the needs of life; seeking to answer the anxious questionings of the individual, of the society, of all mankind?

Yours faithfully,  
HERBERT SAMUEL.

*February 26, 1934.*



## THE LEADERSHIP OF PHILOSOPHY<sup>1</sup>

HILDA D. OAKELEY, M.A., D.LIT.

THE positions that I would support in regard to the question whether philosophy has any relation to practice are as follows. In the first place, there are certain problems of modern civilization, and those amongst the most crucial, with which philosophy alone can deal. In the second place, in spite of appearances to the contrary, the present age will not be deaf to the voice of philosophy, if it can speak with sufficient clearness and power to secure a hearing. The problems to which I refer do not belong to the sphere of science, in the strict modern sense. Science is triumphant in its own sphere, but it is not concerned primarily with the values of human existence, or the activity of the mind by which they are discovered, pursued, enjoyed. But it is in respect to the values, the ideas we have inherited from Greece and Palestine, the conception of the future of our civilization, or whether it has any future, that we are in greatest confusion to-day. This confusion can be dispelled neither by contemplating the unparalleled additions to knowledge concerning the nature of things, which we owe to science, nor the astounding transformations in the conditions and forms of our life, which the application of new knowledge is bringing about. So far as can be discovered in history, no closely similar situation has previously occurred. Crises having certain analogous aspects have no doubt existed. Such a crisis there may have been—in miniature, though incomparably important for subsequent history—in the Athens of the late fifth and early fourth centuries B.C. Its importance was largely due to the fact that a supreme philosophic genius was there to point to it, and to the function which philosophy was called upon to perform. It must be admitted that from an immediately practical standpoint Plato failed. It might possibly be argued that as regards the application of his teaching to his own day he worked in consciousness of failure. He knew—as might be maintained—success to be impossible in his attempt to realize his ideal of philosophic government at Syracuse, in any case on his last visit. Only his conviction that it was the proper business of philosophy to show a remedy for the ills and wrongs of men and states induced him, when over sixty, to leave the Academy and the free and serene

<sup>1</sup> This article contains a line of thought presented in a paper given to the Manchester University Ethical Society, December 5, 1933, and entitled "The Leadership of Philosophy," but it has been recast.



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pursuit of truth and wisdom for the storms and discomforts of a misgoverned city. And, in spite of the unrivalled persuasiveness of his language, was there not something of the spirit of failure, in his exposition in the *Republic*, of the way to reform the state? Even, however, if Plato was not convinced of the unpracticability of the pattern of the ideal *polis*, has not history wholly rejected it, whether with the ridicule of students, Sophists, and mob that Glaucon anticipated, the melancholy resignation of the Emperor-philosopher Marcus Aurelius, or the tragic blindness of the actual course of events for over two thousand years? For I venture to disagree with the Dean of St. Paul's suggestion of a similarity between Plato's *Republic* and any modern theory or practice of dictatorship.

The view, nevertheless, that the philosopher, though spectator of all time and all existence, is also particularly concerned with his own age, to which Plato's life, teaching, and constant criticism of tendencies of the day undoubtedly testify, seems to be true. We cannot be content with the idea of philosophy as *only* arising at the close of an age—the owl of Minerva which, in Hegel's saying, appears in the twilight, when the shapes of life have grown old and cold. We might ask, What has the owl been doing in the daylight? Has it been asleep, and would this state qualify it for the analysis of that which has vanished with the day? The chief tendencies of what Professor Hartmann terms in his last book, *The Problem of Spiritual Being*,<sup>1</sup> the "Objective Mind" of a people or an age, cannot be known in all their actuality except by those amongst whom they prevail. Hartmann refers to the chief provinces of objective Mind as the following: Language, production, technique, the existing moral customs, recognized law, predominant valuations, prevailing morals, traditional form of education and culture, ruling type of sentiment, prevalent tone determining taste, tendencies of art and of artistic understanding, the position of knowledge and science, ruling world outlook in every form, myth, religion, philosophy. "These provinces of content," he adds, "are not only incomparable" (or incommensurable) "but highly unequal in value. . . . Also at different times we have the domination of one or the other, and the subordination of the rest." He conceives Objective Mind as historical in nature, in a sense which renders his conception different from that of Hegel. Essential to it is that as living mind it is in a state of continual change. It cannot outlast its time. Only "objectified mind," including the objects of art, literature, law, science, moral concepts, is in some respects and degrees super-temporal. I refer to this conception not to examine or criticize it, but because as a catalogue of the domains of objective mind it gives a fairly comprehensive summary of those contents and characters of an age

<sup>1</sup> *Das Problem des geistigen Seins.*



which must be interpreted by contemporaneous philosophy if the interpretation is to have value for historic development, or even to be truly understood by posterity. For whether or not we find their source in "objective mind," we may agree with Professor Hartmann that in their inmost nature they do not outlive their time. Also there are qualities and tendencies, taken for granted as self-evident by the majority of those living in their midst, which only the philosophic mind can discern as not self-evident, except under conditions relative to the age.

Plato's view, then, of the necessity of philosophy to the sanity of the world in any period appears still to hold good, however little it has been acknowledged or realized in history. The purpose of this article, however, is not to attempt any sounding of the depth of his meaning, in the thesis that cities would never cease from ills until they submitted to the rule of philosophy. It is possible, or even probable, that he looked far beyond the creation of the perfect Greek community which must be assured in security even against other Greeks and is charged with no mission to the world. It is not the constructive but the critical line of his thought on which I propose very briefly to dwell, the significance of those hints he gives in regard to the profound critical work which philosophy must undertake, whether or not construction is yet possible. In the terrible indictments of Sophistry which occur in the *Dialogues* we may see the denunciation of a certain state of mind which he found to be very prevalent. This is characterized by loss of the sense of value and reality in life. In argument it is illustrated by preference for half-truths and the specious type of ratiocination which plays with high abstractions in those provinces in which the concrete grasp of things and events is most demanded. These are maladies of the mind which are found in all ages of civilization. It may be that they appear in most insidious forms at times when the efforts of man appear to be directed with greatest determination to the use of reason in the control of the modes of living and of human intercourse. Plato's criticisms apply to Sophistry, conscious and unconscious, wherever it occurs. The "Sophist" in the Dialogue with that title is always escaping the efforts of the "Eleatic Stranger" to define his nature. He hides himself in "Non-being." After discussing the various kinds of imitative arts in which the imitation is taken for the reality, the Stranger speaks of an imitative art of reasoning. "Is it not possible to enthrall the hearts of young men by words poured through their ears, when they are still at a distance from the truth of facts, by exhibiting to them fictitious arguments and making them think that they are true, and that the speaker is the wisest of men in all ages?"<sup>1</sup> In this Dialogue, as elsewhere, Plato insists on the principle

<sup>1</sup> *The Sophist*, 234. Jowett's translation.



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that the chief disease of error is that which has its source in involuntary or unconscious ignorance. But it is in the *Republic* that he pierces to this state of mind, as with the sharpness of a surgeon's knife. It is due to the "Lie in the Soul." This concept is introduced in connection with the criticism of the poet for representing people as appearing in different characters; above all, for suggesting that the gods will either change themselves, or cause us to believe that they change, and go about in various forms. "That lie which is lie in very truth (if I may so speak)," says Socrates, "is hateful to both gods and men. To lie with the highest part of himself, and in regard to the highest matters, no one willingly would do. . . . What I mean is that to lie in the soul concerning realities, and there to be ignorant and to cherish falsehood, all would most avoid and abhor."<sup>1</sup>

This passage, which expresses something that is fundamental in Plato's philosophy, seems to make clear that his conception of the meaning of truth went beyond that which we endeavour to make precise in our efforts to determine its nature in theory of knowledge. It is inseparable from an interpretation of the significance of human existence as consisting in the contact of the individual with the real sources of his being. Misunderstanding in regard to those parts of experience in which the essential self is less implicated is not so fatal. It may more easily be removed. It does not affect that part of his being which, underlying all his experience, can only with the greatest difficulty suffer a complete change. This it is which, constituting (as we may perhaps interpret) personal identity, can only escape from the false view of life, which is the worst evil and error, by the type of process described allegorically in the Myth of the Den, when the individual is brought out of the den and turned to the light, thus leaving behind illusions and unrealities, and entering a different world.<sup>2</sup>

Following the indications which are given by Plato of the method of philosophic criticism of an age in its own present time, we need not necessarily assume that either in his time and society, or in any other on which the searchlight of such criticism is cast, there was or is present a larger measure of Sophistry, a more incurable falsity in the soul, more widespread illusion than in other periods. The Prophet and Idealist will discern these phenomena in any society. The Pharisees of Jerusalem and the Sophists of Athens would have been found in other times and cities by the great Teachers who made them to be universal types. The increasing self-consciousness, however, which is characteristic of a civilization which has had a long and turbulent history, alike in the practical sphere and the sphere of mind, may make it less difficult for

<sup>1</sup> *Republic*, II. 382.

<sup>2</sup> *Republic*, VII.



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reflection to-day, using the glasses which Plato lends, to realize some of the powerful illusions of the times, and ask for that further criticism which may help towards their exorcism. I would take as a single illustration the idea which seems widely prevalent that by some necessity, against their will, men will be driven to destroy their own civilization. This spectre stalks through much popular literature, and affects, perhaps unconsciously, many who would not admit it as a reasoned belief, or even a sufficiently caused foreboding. It appears to result from influences mainly due to great illusions. Professor Whitehead, in his *Science and the Modern World*, refers to a "radical inconsistency at the basis of modern thought . . . which accounts for much that is half-hearted and wavering in our civilization." "The enterprises produced by the individualistic energy of the European peoples presuppose physical action directed to final causes. But the science which is employed in their development is based on a philosophy which asserts that physical causation is supreme, and which disjoins the physical cause from the final end. It is not popular to dwell on the absolute contradiction here involved."<sup>1</sup> Sir James Jeans has recently said that since Professor Whitehead made this observation (in 1926) the contradiction has been removed, since science has given up determinism. But it seems very doubtful whether the undermining of the "mechanistic" view in the work of some modern physicists is in fact a contribution to the solution of the ethical question. Whatever view, however, we may take in regard to the forms in which the free-will problem appears in relation to the changing background of science, the purposive form will continue to characterize practical life. It is inescapable, because the self is an active creative principle. The contradiction indicated by Professor Whitehead is injurious to clear thinking, or, to use his words, "enfeebles" it, "by reason of the inconsistency lurking in the background," but it cannot, unless in abnormal cases, hamper action. There is an analogous contradiction in which lies, I think, a more insidious danger to the vigour of action, because it occurs wholly within the directly practical field of conduct. I refer to the combination of assumptions of moral freedom with the implication of historic necessity. We may be ethical determinists, but it is hardly possible for this creed to affect in any essentials our course of action. The ethical determinists do not refrain from the exercise of creative gifts in art or adventure. They may call upon theory to explain how such acts are, nevertheless, necessitated, but their works and deeds in form and spirit reveal that man is, as Aristotle says, a principle of action. Yet from the beginning of recorded history a certain fatalism has pervaded man's attitude in respect to the possibility of important changes

<sup>1</sup> *Science and the Modern World*, Chapter V.



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in the tendencies and doings of men when acting together as crowds, nations, peoples, and the difficulty of maintaining respect for the great values of life when individuals are merged in such groups and in rivalry with each other. In the famous reflections of Thucydides on revolutions,<sup>1</sup> it is said that the terrible calamities which war brought upon the Greek cities are such as "always will be while human nature remains the same." History up to our own day testifies to the truth of his picture of the effects of revolution. Also we feel as we read that, in the judgment of Thucydides, human nature *will* remain the same. This may be termed a belief in historic necessity. The contradiction to which I would call attention exists when this creed is held, whether clearly or obscurely, by individuals, whose activities and mode of life testify to the assumption of practical freedom, whether or not they have thought out a philosophy which entails this principle.

Now, however deep our impression may be as we turn over the pages of history or of our daily newspapers, that obscure forces whose workings seem quite incalculable play a formidable part in the historic process, whether we speak with some historians of contingency and chance, or with Professor Whitehead of "senseless agencies,"<sup>2</sup> it is generally agreed that the energy or creative activity of human individuals is the most important factor. Yet, as already noted, there seems to exist at least a deep-seated doubt whether this creative energy can be consciously exercised by peoples in the mass or humanity as a whole, if not a conviction that this is impossible. A voluntary advance to a higher level of life would accordingly be inconceivable, except as an individual effort, or, if made by a community of like-minded persons, as enduring but for a limited time. The more permanent of such advances, it might be pointed out, have, on the whole, taken place unconsciously, and of none can it yet be said that they *are* permanent. The fatalism of which I have spoken accepts this by implication as inherent in the process of events, a kind of historic law, and inescapable. The sources of this tendency to believe in historic necessity are not those of ordinary scientific determinism, and it may be questioned whether if the latter could be removed this would affect the former. Scientific determinism, as I should maintain, is not applicable to history, because history in its essential truth is concerned with the individual, and scientific determinism belongs to the generalizing, categorial function of our understanding. It is valid, on the whole, for large-scale events in nature, the elements of which the laws hold good being the closely similar processes of the individual events concerned. In history such uniformities may be found roughly or in general to prevail when the subject is treated as a science dealing

<sup>1</sup> Book III. 82.

<sup>2</sup> *Adventures of Ideas*, Part I, Chapter I.



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with historic categories, nations, civilizations, economic society, etc. These uniformities are, however, of a highly empirical character, because the real subjects of history, individual selves and deeds, may irrupt, as it were, in unforeseen ways into the scheme, and the similarities on which the law was based in this respect disappear.

What is signified, then, by historic necessity is that there can be no "creative advance" in history. This type of fatalism or necessitarianism may be characterized as one of the great illusions which is, in Plato's language, a lapse into non-being. Or, if combined, consciously or unconsciously, with a belief in moral freedom, it reveals a contradiction at the roots of our practical attitude, a contradiction, moreover, which enfeebles not only thought but practice. We meet with it in the sense of despair in regard to the improvement of international relations, the tendency to discover in present conditions signs of the decay of modern civilization, to seek out analogies between the later state of the Roman Empire and the state of leading modern peoples.

I would suggest that amongst the grounds for the failure of belief in historic liberty is the peculiarity of our experience of the passage of time. The past seems to have a certain kind of being or existence,<sup>1</sup> the future to be nothing except for imagination. The past exists as unalterable for knowledge or for action. It is irrevocable, irretrievable. Consciousness of the full significance of this fact is one of the chief roots of ethics, as leading to remorse and the perception of moral obligation. In reflection on history, and the actual process of past events, continued by the imaged series of the future, we are deeply conscious of this irretrievability. Also, in accordance with principles of our understanding in the attempt to complete the past process for knowledge and get beyond the irrational factor in the temporal series, by forming the concept of history as a whole, we incline to assimilate the future in its broad characteristics to the past. In this procedure the irrevocability of the past tends to be transformed into the necessity of the whole course of history, the fact that we, the observers, are situated midway between past and future being irrelevant. This concept of the necessary character of the process of events seems to approach in meaning the Greek "Ananke," or fatal necessity, a notion deeply charged with the quality of Greek genius in the dramatic interpretation of human life. The more philosophical method, however, is not to carry the necessity of the past from the standpoint of our present into the future, but to project our essential consciousness of present free energy into every stage of past history as always *possible* or potential. Our predecessors were free in their present, and their history was

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Scientific Thought*, C. D. Broad, Part I, Chapter II. *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, Chapter V.



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not in its dynamic course necessary, as the same history is now necessary in its static form for knowledge. To realize this is to be conscious of a heightening of free energy for the action of our own present. Our position in the series between past and future is not then irrelevant. The principle of freedom in relation to history demands a more positive characterization than has been given to that concept of moral freedom over which ethical analysis has always been in conflict. Professor N. Hartmann, in his book on freedom asserts that if history shows in many respects retrogression, "historical experience cannot be decisive. The creative element in man is necessarily in opposition to it."<sup>1</sup>

History cannot decide. With this we may certainly agree. But the voice of history must be heard, since we are in its midst, and in our own nature largely constituted by history. I should maintain that, rationally contemplated, history need not lead to a conclusion of despair. It presents a tragic character because the nature of man, whose activity as thinker and doer has been the instrument of bringing value into history, seemed to promise so much more than has been achieved. This would hold whether we regard personality as creative in the sphere of value, or as "carrier" (or bearer), to use the term chosen by some modern thinkers, that is, as human means of conveying something of the eternal values into the temporal process.

"Why," asks Professor Rostovtzeff, in his work on Rome, "did such a powerful and brilliant civilization, the growth of ages, and apparently destined to last for ages, gradually degenerate? In other words, why did the creative power of its makers wax faint?"<sup>2</sup> It is for the analysis of philosophy to examine whether there are rational grounds for the view that such energy must in the course of time, wax faint. I do not think that the ultimate ground of the decay of a people, any more than of its advance, can be found through study of biological, racial, or economic factors, but into this question it is not possible here to enter.

In conclusion, it has been argued in this paper that the detection of illusions of the age, tending to weaken the springs of action, is a function which belongs to philosophy. The idea of historic necessity or doubt of the possibility of historic freedom has been selected as an example of the first importance and relevant to the present time. In so far as such a concept is concerned in the determination of our apprehension of events through which we are passing—their form and significance—it may be termed a first order category of illusion. To contribute to the removal of such an illusion, by analysis

<sup>1</sup> *Ethics*, translated by Stanton Coit, Vol. II, p. 337.

<sup>2</sup> *A History of the Ancient World*, M. Rostovtzeff, translated by J. D. Duff, Vol. II (Rome).



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the conditions which give rise to it, would be to contribute to the destruction of a lie in the soul, as conceived by Plato. For it involves the kind of contradiction which, as he shows in the *Sophist*, is one chief source of evil in the soul. Whether in the precise sense proper to philosophy we can speak of the soul of an age or people, or, with Professor Hartmann, examine the true or genuine and the false elements in this, makes no essential difference to the problem as treated in this paper. It is a question of fundamental importance for social philosophy and, in the end, for metaphysics. But the considerations which have been here adduced will be equally applicable, whether there be any such common or "objective mind" or only the many minds of individuals similarly affected.



## SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

W. R. INGE, K.C.V.O., D.D., D.Litt., F.B.A.

THE subject which has been chosen for me is sufficiently comprehensive. Several years ago I wrote the last of a series of essays in a book called *Science, Religion, and Reality*, in which, as requested, I tried to sum up the contributions of the other writers, with reflections of my own. I have also given a short statement of my opinions in the first volume of that interesting book, *Contemporary British Philosophy*. Lastly, I have tried, in a book published in the autumn of 1933, to consider the religious and philosophical implications of recent scientific theories and discoveries, and particularly of the conviction held by our leading astronomers and mathematicians that the Second Law of Thermodynamics is unassailable, so that the ultimate extinction of the universe as we know it is certain. I showed that the acceptance of this verdict raises important questions for the philosopher and theologian. The philosopher cannot avoid considering with increased interest the very difficult problem of the status of Time in reality. The theologian, who has already abandoned the notion of a geographical heaven above our heads, must reconsider the popular identification of eternity with unending duration. These are not new questions; but in a democratic age a problem becomes practical when it is brought before the eyes of the man in the street.

The reviews of *God and the Astronomers* (I apologize heartily for that dreadful title and for the star-spangled jacket) have not helped me very much—reviews seldom do. One of my critics, Lord Rutherford, has evidently not read the book, since he supposes it to be an attack upon the Second Law. That eminent man is no doubt much better employed than in reading my books, but in that case I think he might be better employed than in reviewing them. I expected to be torn limb from limb by Professor Alexander, if he deigned to notice the book at all. But that kindest and most courteous of men has dealt very gently with me, in the *Manchester Guardian*. Of course, he objects to my philosophy of values on the ground that a value must satisfy somebody, and that I will not allow this criterion to be applied. This, however, only makes clear the main crux of the whole problem—the question of Time. If God is only encountered towards the end of a temporal process, and if we can hardly say that He exists till He is so encountered, there is no conscious subject for whom the supreme values are truly real, and so they are not



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truly real. But the Great Tradition in philosophy—at any rate in Platonic and Christian philosophy—finds the actualization of the supreme values in the mind of an unchanging and eternal God. Immense difficulties remain; but this particular objection does not trouble me.

The Professor's admiration of Bergson shows that he must be considered to have thrown his great weight into what I have called the Modernist scale, and against what Catholics call the *philosophia perennis*. Again, the question is how far we ought to "take Time seriously." The problem is complicated by the mathematical theory that Time is a fourth dimension, and that instead of Space and Time we should speak of Space-Time. Professor Alexander is no mean mathematician, and he understands Einstein and his supporters far better than I can hope to do. But when we try to build a philosophy on this mathematical theory, I cannot help thinking that the synthesis of Time and Space is the synthesis of the lion and the lamb or the lady and the tiger. They return from the ride with the lady (Space) inside, and the smile on the face of the tiger (Time). Bergson does not seem to care about Space, and Professor Alexander relegates it to a very subordinate position. Bergson accuses the old philosophy of spatializing Time. He himself makes Time into an absolute, and I cannot make out what he wants to do with Space.

In fact, I do not think the old antinomy—and the old impasse, "Are Time and Space infinite or bounded?"—have been transcended or solved by the Modernist Science and Philosophy. I know I am out of my depth when I try to understand Einstein's statement (accepted by Jeans, Eddington, and others) that Space is "finite but unbounded." The only explanation, adapted to the meanest intelligence, my own, that I have seen is that if you walk round the edge of a circle you will come back to the place from which you started. This is from Sullivan's excellent but misleadingly named book, *The Limitations of Science*. Well, we all knew that without Riemannian geometry. We have even known circular arguments. But perhaps I don't want to walk round the circle; perhaps I prefer to dig through it. Then I shall not come to the place from which I started. Or perhaps I want to leave the circle altogether. A disrespectful but by no means negligible American critic says: "If Einstein thinks that nobody can jump off his circle, he can't know much about fleas."

We are told also that Space is expanding. As far as I can understand, by Space they mean Space occupied by matter. The nebulae are receding from each other and from what we may call their centre. Is it really a foolish question to ask, Into what are they expanding? Does not the whole theory rest on the familiar Euclidean and Newtonian conception of Space? And does not the idea of



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Space imply that there is no point anywhere with nothing beyond it?

Similarly with Time. Eddington very candidly says that his theory demands that Time "started off with a bang," and that he cannot believe this. If it did not start off with a bang, at a date which we could name if we knew it, why did Entropy not run its course much sooner, or, if it had no beginning, how can its entire content consist of a process with a beginning, middle, and end? I would go further and ask, Is it not part of the conception of Time that there is no moment within it which is not preceded by one moment and followed by another? Does the mathematical synthesis of Space-Time do anything to answer these questions? I venture to think not.

If I am right in thinking that mathematics gives us no help in solving a contradiction which inheres in our very ideas of Space and Time, it follows that the solution must be sought outside Space and Time. In other words, Space and Time proclaim themselves that they are not ultimates, either separately or in conjunction.

There is another point which, though it is no business of mine, since it is a purely scientific difficulty, I cannot refrain from mentioning. The theory of an expanding universe seems to be quite inconsistent with the time-scale which numerous converging arguments have almost established for the solar system. Most of us know that the age of the sun has been estimated at about seven or eight billion years, and that of the planetary system at about two thousand million. But the greatest age compatible with the theory of an expanding universe is one of some thousands of millions of years. If the galaxies are receding, it has been calculated, by tracing the process backwards, that all the universe would have been a compact mass long before we get back to billions of years. To the outsider, this looks like the famous old quarrel about the age of the earth, between physicists and geologists, and about the age of the sun before radio-activity and the annihilation of matter were thought of. In this case the advocates of the longer period won. It may be a matter of temperament, but I expect the long period will win again. If, however, the shorter period wins, it is the opinion of some scientists, such as Sullivan, that the theory of a building-up process, from smaller atoms into larger, may become acceptable. In either case, since the degradation of energy and the recession of the nebulae seem to be well established, and since they are incompatible with each other, there seems to be no escape from believing that some very important principle is yet undiscovered.

I have read carefully Sir James Jeans' new edition of *The Universe Around Us*. He does not use the very perplexing theories about Space-Time, and he does not discuss the scientific difficulty which I have just mentioned. He accepts the usual estimates of the past



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life of the sun and of the planets. He thinks that the sun may continue to shine for some fifteen billion years, and that the dwellers on earth may drag out a rather chilly existence for a billion years or so. It is, however, possible, as he reminds us, that the sun may suddenly blaze out into a *nova*, or shrink into a white dwarf. Either of these would extinguish our precious race at once.

He will stand no nonsense about the Second Law. "Imagination sees new heavens and a new earth coming into being out of the ashes of the old. Science can give no support to such fancies. She cannot prove that the fanciful will not happen—she can only calculate the odds against it happening. And these prove to be so enormous that we may safely disregard altogether the possibility of its occurrence." He adds: "Perhaps it is as well. It is hard to see what advantage could accrue from an eternal reiteration of the same theme, or even from endless variations of it." This seems to me an odd point of view—a kind of prejudice against endless duration. Eddington shares it.

For most of us the prospect that the whole of history will one day be as if it had never been—that nowhere in the vast universe will there be life or intelligence or consciousness—is rather chilling. We may have to accept it; Jeans and Eddington say we must; but I do not find it easy to say, "So much the better." Whitehead, without expressing any preference, leaves a large loophole for future discoveries. "The moral to be drawn from the general survey of the physical universe, with its operations viewed in terms of purely physical law and neglected in so far as they are inexpressible in such terms, is that we have omitted some general counter-agency. This counter-agency, in its operation throughout the physical universe, is too vast and diffusive for our direct observation. We may acquire such power as the result of some advance. But at present, as we survey the physical cosmos, there is no direct intuition of the counter-agency to which it owes its possibility of existence as a wasting, finite organism." He implies that there must be such an agency, though I do not think he has joined those who find a *deus ex machina* in the cosmic rays.

I may be asked: "Why, since you end your discussion of the doom of the universe by reminding your readers that the Christian tradition has always predicted such an end, and has expected it to come very much sooner than our men of science think probable, should you have gone out of your way to study subjects which are not in your line, and to prefix to a defence of the traditional philosophy of religion a discussion the issue of which, as you say yourself, is not of vital importance to religion?"

I have asked myself this question. I admit that the withers of the orthodox theologian are unwrung. But the orthodox theologian



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believes in an endless *future*; and when once you use the word *future* you have to find a stage for whatever the future may bring forth. Science can hardly find such a stage, either on this planet or anywhere else. I have in my book answered this by accepting Bosanquet's dictum that to throw our ideals into the future is the death of all sane idealism, only adding that if we attempt to picture our ideals without using the categories of Space and Time they will have a very ghostly existence for us.

But my trouble is rather metaphysical than religious. Let us grant that "earth is but the shadow of heaven"; that "every truth is a shadow except the last"; that "life like a dome of many-coloured glass stains the white radiance of eternity." Here we are on the lines of the Platonic tradition. "Let us fly hence to our dear country." But the visible world is no deceiving phantom; it is the creation and the copy of a higher sphere of existence. "Time," say the Platonists, "is the moving image of eternity." But is a wasting, doomed universe the moving image of eternity, and not rather a moving image of something very different? How can a dying world be a symbol of a world which knows no change or beginning or end? Does not the Second Law, with all that it implies, cut the cable between the Intelligible or Spiritual World and the World of Sense?

That this misgiving is not baseless is shown by the remark of Thomas Whittaker, one of the ablest expositors of the Neoplatonic philosophy. He thinks that the establishment of Entropy as the supreme and final law of the universe would "disprove" the philosophy of Plotinus.

Well, we none of us like to hear that our philosophy has been disproved, and we are not very ready to believe that any discovery in physical science could disprove a time-honoured type of idealism. I think Whittaker puts it rather too strongly. It is true that if the whole of creation can be summed up as the progressive realization of one great divine purpose, and if the end of this stupendous scheme, with all the labour and blood and tears, all the faith and hope and love which it has cost, is to be not the achievement of some splendid result, but final stultification and universal death, we should probably be driven, not towards Platonism or Christianity, but to some Asiatic world-renouncing creed like Buddhism. Human effort having been proved to end in nothing, we should have to admit that man walketh in a vain shadow and disquieteth himself in vain. But a cosmic law of unending progress has never been part of Platonism or of Christianity. It is merely the aftermath of the revolutionary fever of the eighteenth century and a substitute for the Christian hope of eternal life, which was then burning very dim. If, on the other hand, it is the lot of all that is born into the world to fulfil in some measure a finite and temporal purpose in the mind of God, and then



to take its place in the eternal order, there is nothing fatal in the discovery that the life of stars and planets, like the life of individuals, has its destined term. Some modern philosophies, which give an absolute value to Time and history, are, it seems to me, hard hit by the doom which Science pronounces on the universe; but Platonism is not. The way in which this prediction hurts us is rather different. Plotinus teaches that all grades of being, in their various degrees, flow forth from the primal source of Being, the One or the Good or Perfect; and that this overflow from the divine nature is no arbitrary fiat but a necessary result of the Supreme Being or First Principle being what He is. It is no accident that all things are linked together in an unbreakable chain. God creates because, being God, He must; "it is His nature to"; and as long as He is God He must create beings in His own image, though imperfect copies of His perfection. Thus for the Platonist the visible world is good, beautiful, and holy, and we can hardly believe that there will ever be a time when no rays of the divine perfection will shine in any part of the universe, for intelligent creatures to behold and enjoy. If life and soul and spirit are the result of a strange and unlikely accident in one corner of the universe, a mere evanescent flicker which will soon disappear and leave no trace behind, a local symptom of the disease of dissolution, it hardly seems as if God can be what we have supposed Him to be. I do not say that it destroys my philosophy, but it does to some extent chill my faith.

My way of escape is to remember that we do, as a matter of fact, frequently ascend in heart and mind above the world of time, space, history, and even personality. This is what I mean by reality as a kingdom of absolute or intrinsic values. They are very much the same as Plato's Ideas, as I understand them. I have tried to explain my philosophy of Values in my recent book. But since Professor Alexander is far from satisfied with it, I will offer some comments on his new book, *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, which has come out since mine was published. This may perhaps make my own position clearer, though the Professor is not likely to regard them as serious criticism.

"Nature is beautiful," he says, "only if we see it with the artist's eye." The nature we find beautiful is not beautiful in itself; we select and combine; we construct and interpret." Yes, but who gave us the standard? What makes us recognize that this selection, combination, and interpretation of external nature lifts us out of ourselves, makes us happier, and is an enrichment of our personality? The Professor expresses a great deal that I mean when he says: "The beautiful, as that which satisfies an impulse become contemplative, is *disinterested*. . . . In essence, the beautiful is shareable because it is not *personal and practical*." This is in fact the distinc-



tion, immensely important, between absolute or intrinsic and instrumental values. This characteristic of the higher values is emphasized in other parts of the book. "In science the mind depersonalizes itself." "Truth is the satisfaction of disinterested curiosity." "The distinctiveness of morality lies in its disinterestedness." This is very welcome as an answer to the pragmatists. In the higher values the "I," the form of reference in the instrumental values, is forgotten. So it is in our religion. "What is the Cross?" said a witty Bishop, speaking to children. "It is the 'I' crossed out." But in philosophy we have to consider the meaning of this self-transcendence, and it can only be found in the real status of the human soul or spirit in a super-individual order. The same characteristics, as I have shown, are found in, and determine, all the absolute values.

But I am unable to follow this great authority when he makes Time and public opinion the arbiter of value. For instance, of Christ he says: "While goodness is the artistry of the gregarious instinct, there is room for the revolutionary moralist, the man who, putting forward a scheme of goodness new and paradoxical, like Jesus, is in fact forecasting a social scheme, who is in truth a genius of a social life which has yet to be, and which if sound wins its way from derision to acceptance." Alas, that is not at all what Christ expected, nor what has happened. "When the Son of Man cometh, shall he find faith on the earth?" Was it the Galilean who conquered with Constantine? "Right for ever on the scaffold, wrong for ever on the throne." Christianity is something much more heroic than an intelligent forecasting of the way the cat will finally jump. We cannot imagine Christ saying, like Jerome of Prague to his judges, "Post centum annos vos cito"; nor like Martial, "Si post fata venit gloria, non propero." No; as Anatole France says, "L'avenir est un lieu commode pour y mettre des songes"; but it is not to posterity that the brave man appeals. There is, I am afraid, no doubt that Professor Alexander makes public opinion, which he frankly calls the tyranny of the majority, the supreme arbiter. "The only rights," he says, "are claims that have been recognized." So there are no natural rights, no absolute standard of justice and injustice. When Socrates is bowed out at the door, Thrasymachus comes in at the window.

I wish he had carried the principle of the objectivity of value to its conclusion. "Morality is objective because it is determined by the adjustment of individuals, and has *therefore* authority over any one individual." Is this "objectivity"? I prefer the independence of Catholic casuistry. "Lex iniusta non est lex," says Suarez.

Before proceeding further in a defence of my conception of absolute values I should like to say something in reply to an exceedingly kind review of my book by the great mathematician Professor Whittaker of Edinburgh. He thinks I have paid too much attention to Entropy,



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which, he says, "is not established beyond dispute. For the argument of Eddington and Jeans is based entirely on the classical or non-relativistic thermodynamics. . . . Tolman has shown that in certain cases a universe expanding or contracting can do so reversibly." Well, more power to Tolman's elbow; I have suspected something of the kind myself; but relativistic thermodynamics is out of my depth.

He then says: "The distinction between finiteness and boundedness is obvious to a mathematician, but seems to be very difficult for everybody else." It certainly is; I am afraid our ignorance is "invincible," as the Roman Catholics say in their charity to poor Protestants.

What follows is more important still. I have argued that a scientist has no right to take refuge in Berkeleyan mentalism. Professor Whittaker says: "Our knowledge of the objects treated in physics consists in the study of the relations between pointer-readings. Atoms, electrons, and so forth are not, strictly speaking, necessary in physics at all; they are introduced merely as picturesque aids to the imagination. The mathematics, on the other hand, is inherently necessary." Now no one disputes the right of the mathematician to make what patterns he pleases out of hypothetical or imaginary entities. But if he is really indifferent to the question whether these entities exist *in rerum natura* or not, I cannot help asking why he takes such infinite trouble to weigh, measure, and count material objects which are not mathematical but are given to him as brute facts. We all know the story of the Frenchman, the Englishman, and the German who were set to write an essay about the camel. The Frenchman visited the Jardin des Plantes, and produced a lively sketch of the appearance and manners of the animal. "Voilà le chameau." The Englishman travelled in Africa, and wrote an ill-composed treatise about the habits of the camel as he had observed them. The German retired to his study, and evolved the idea of a camel out of his inner consciousness. He could do this better—as Hegel and Fichte knew—without any exhausting preliminary research. But our scientists are genuine researchers, and they begin with ponderable matter assumed to be real. In the course of their investigations they find that matter, in its ultimate analysis, is not, in the ordinary sense, material. It is defecated to a transparency. Whereupon they say, "Avaunt, ye materialists; I am an idealist!" They have got rid of the dog, tail and all; but they want to keep the wag. The Cheshire cat is gone, but the grin remains. I really don't think we can disprove materialism by making positive and negative electrical charges devour each other like the Kilkenny cats. Besides, are there not queer things called neutrons, not electrically charged, and possessed of weight? Begin with mathematical symbols, and you can end with mathematical symbols; but if you begin with



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concrete stars and atoms, you cannot end with pure mental concepts. I suppose there is an answer to this, but at present I am unconvinced.

To return to my main point in constructive philosophy. The old canon that *ens est unum, verum, bonum* is still to be maintained. Reality is *one*, against dualism and pluralism; it has degrees, but they are degrees of approximation to a fixed and absolute standard. It is *true*: "the perfectly real can be perfectly known," as Plato says; there is no conspiracy to deceive us. It is *good*: the axiological standard is a real standard; being and value cannot be separated. To quote a modern writer, what we recognize as value when our life is fullest and our soul at its greatest stretch, that we may confidently accept as real.

In opposition to this traditional philosophy, our modern guides turn the absolutes of the moral, artistic, and religious consciousness into the relatives of an evolutionary process; they make history the self-development and self-revelation of the divine Spirit, and the eternal values mere instincts in the service of life. This sceptical relativism has invaded Science itself, which, as we have seen, is infected with illusionism, the "as if" of *Vaihinger*. *Bosanquet's* warnings against futurism have been disregarded. Neither the abandonment of the old superstition about progress, so naïvely accepted in the last century, nor the dysteleology so emphatically proclaimed by physics and astronomy, have prevented the Time-philosophy of *Bergson*, *Croce*, and *Gentile* from winning many adherents in this country.

There is a natural metaphysic of the mind, which refuses to separate value and reality. It does not seem to me to matter much whether our new guides call themselves realists or idealists; that opposition is not fundamental. But to give us a philosophy without an ontology,—this is indeed a vital matter.

Is it not the timeless order of values which alone gives the time-process significance? Are there not many things which we feel to be real, but which do not belong to the world of space and time, and which cannot be communicated in the idiom of space and time? We recognize these as part of our knowledge; they are not prejudices, but the foundation of any intelligible theory of reality. *Bergson* bids us overcome our "prejudice" in favour of the permanent over the changing, and proceeds to make the changing the ultimately real, doing violence to our deepest convictions. As *Pringle Pattison* says, we must start with a logically unsupported judgment of value. It is logically unsupported just because it is fundamental. These are the bricks out of which we must construct our fabric.

What is the metaphysical status of values? I dislike the word "validity," which *Urban*, to whom I owe much, uses freely. I entirely agree with him when he says that "the indefinability of value means



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merely that we have to do here with one of the ultimate and underivable concepts with which we think or understand the world, and it shares this lack, if one wishes so to call it, with other concepts, such as being, existence, and reality." But "validity" for him seems to mean what ought to be, as opposed to what is, and this makes value a non-existential concept. He seems to deny static values, though these are obviously present in aesthetics, and entangles his value-philosophy with ideas of evolution and progress, which belong, I should say, to the school against which his book (*The Intelligible World*) is a sustained polemic. However, as he agrees with Bosanquet that "ultimately Time, and the Time process, are irrelevant to value," and says, "There is no such thing as entropy of being, or entropy of value," I think he is really on my side, though there are a few expressions in his book which do not seem to me quite consistent.

The doctrine of Values implies, I think, a super-individual subject, for whom the values are actual. The notion of an emergent Deity seems to me part of the futuristic error of which I have already spoken. The words God and Deity ought not, I venture to say, to be used in this way. It is an attempt to retain the religious meanings and values which are attached to the word while denying the assumption of existence or reality on which all religious values depend.

The word "substance," I suppose, has become a scandal in modern philosophy. But it simply means, as Lossky says, "something living and real, something that has in it no merely intellectual significance." To a Platonist, values are "substantial," and they are far from being merely ideals, because there is a spiritual world in which they are at home and operative. I know well that in all that we try to say about "heaven" we use grotesquely inadequate and crudely pictorial language. It is a pity, because astronomy spoils our pictures. But it does not spoil what we mean by them. Plato was not ashamed to speak of *τόπος ἀτόπων*, and we must do the same, for we cannot help it.

A great difficulty in the philosophy of values is the doctrine of degrees of reality. The principle of *scale* is, as Urban rightly says, an *a priori* character of value as such, and in existence apart from value there is no scale. I have also pointed out that whereas in the Being there are no negative signs, in values and most distinctly in moral values evil is no mere defect of being, but, to our minds at least, positive disvalue. This does make the identification of existence and value difficult. I fancy the new Time-philosophy is an attempt to insert a value-scale into existence as such by assuming that the later in time is necessarily better than the earlier. It will not do. Time has no essential connection with value-judgments, though most values need some duration in which to actualize themselves. We must insist that, though they do not belong to Time,



Values are indissolubly bound up with reality as it is presented to our minds.

Traditional philosophy has always made ultimate reality non-spatial and non-temporal. But, you will say, traditional religion has done nothing of the kind. Well, I have tried to answer this. When our feelings are deeply stirred, we use concrete imagery, clear outlines, and bright colours. We must do so; we need not be ashamed of it. When I think of heaven, or of Plato's intelligible world, it begins to look very like an improved duplicate of the world that I know. "The swan on still St. Mary's Lake floats double, swan and shadow." I am fond of quoting Isaac Pennington's words: "Every truth is shadow except the last. But every truth is substance in its own place, though it be but shadow in another place. And the shadow is a true shadow, as the substance is a true substance." Moreover, in popular teaching we must not disdain picture-book theology.

I agree with Urban that the weakness of the whole group of philosophies which make evolution itself creative is the false assumption that time, process, tendency themselves carry meanings and values. This packing of time or space-time with meanings and values is the only thing that gives to modern doctrines of emergence the apparent intelligibility they seem to have. Time and Space are as real as the objects for which they form a framework. But they cannot lead beyond themselves except by mere repetition of themselves; they have no "sufficient reason" in themselves. You cannot endow Time with a *nisus* without transforming it into something quite different from the *becoming* either of common sense or of science. So treated, Time becomes a mysterious entity endowed with some of the attributes of divine Providence.

Mathematical science clearly wants to substitute a logical order for the empirical space-time order; and with this we have no quarrel, for it means that the intelligible world is not spatial or temporal. But what room is there for historicism in a logical order? Bergson gives plausibility to *la durée* by de-temporalizing it, packing it with extraneous values, though of course he does not see this himself. He also errs, I think, by making biological categories world-categories, for life is a very rare and sporadic phenomenon in nature.

In conclusion, I believe with Lotze that our judgments of absolute value are "the inspirations of reason," and this is the highest kind of authority. We add nothing to their claim upon our confidence by translating them into any subordinate concepts. We see dimly before us a still higher form of experience in which all contradictions are harmonized. This, if we could attain it, would be the goal of religion, philosophy, and science, all three. The beatific vision can be seen by few and described by none. Nevertheless, it is a fact. As Whitehead says, "The fact of religious vision is our one ground for optimism."



# INTRODUCTION TO EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AESTHETIC

SENATOR B. CROCE

THE dominant feature of eighteenth-century aesthetic is the inquiry and discussion concerning the theory of "taste." There is material or bibliographical evidence of this in the rapid sequence of treatises, essays, inquiries, observations, and controversies on this subject, extending from the close of the seventeenth to the last years of the eighteenth century, and bearing the names, in France, of Dacier, Bellegarde, Bouhours, Rollin, Seran de la Tour, Trublet, Formey, Bitaubé, Marmontel, and, still more eminent, of Montesquieu, Voltaire, d'Alembert; in England, of Addison, Hume, Gerard, Home, Burke, Priestley, Blair, Beattie, Percival, Reid, Alison; in Italy, of Muratori, Calepio, Pagano, Corniani; in Germany, of Thomasius, J. U. König, Bodmer, A. von Schlegel, Wegelin, Heyne, Herz, Eberhard, J. C. König, and, by German influence in Hungary, Szardahely; and, greatest of all, Immanuel Kant, whose *Critique of Judgment* consists in the main of a critique of the aesthetic judgment of taste. This list of names is intended to give examples merely, not a complete catalogue. During that century the word, originally a metaphor from the sense of taste, the palate, though not unknown before, acquired an altogether new and extremely wide popularity;<sup>1</sup> and the liveliest interest was taken in the problems connected with taste, whose solutions, however, gave rise to increasingly acute controversies and perplexities. "Il n'est point de société," wrote Seran de la Tour, and he was not the only one to say it, "dans laquelle on ne parle du goût; rien de plus commun que les conceptions sur ce sujet; chacun alors s'empresse de dire ce qu'il en pense; mais à peine s'est-on arrêté à une proposition pour en expliquer l'idée, que la contradiction suit immédiatement l'assertion."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Hungarian aesthetician, G. Szardahely, named in the text, observes: "... ista hominis facultas sentiendi pulchrum et turpe dicitur *gustus*, non penitus novo, sed magis usitato nomine: constat enim mihi, ac eadem intelligentia locutos aliquando fuisse Graecos Latinosque veteres, metaphora a gustu palati facta. Modus iste loquendi tunc erat infrequens, deinde penitus cecidit iacuitque, dum tandem ab hominibus antiquae originis et spiritus suscitaretur et illa hominis proprietas facundo hoc Latinismo cognominaretur. Iam modo nomen illud gentium praecipuarum civitate est donatum, habetque sensum non adscititium sed proprium" (*Imago Aesthetices seu doctrina Boni Gustus breviter delineata*, Budae, 1780, p. 8).

<sup>2</sup> *L'art de sentir et de juger en matière de goût*, nouvelle édition revue et corrigée par M. Rolland (Strasbourg, 1790; ed. 1, 1762).



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It is desirable to grasp and define the exact nature of this problem, and to that end it must chiefly be said that the problem was only the new form of a very old one, first raised by the sophists and dealt with in various ways by the Greek philosophers, further discussed by the Fathers and Schoolmen, and taken up again by the Platonists and Aristotelians of the sixteenth century: "What is the beautiful?"

This ancient problem had to this extent been approached in the wrong way, that the attempt had been made to define the character or characters of beautiful things, natural or artificial, that is, to conceive the beautiful out of relation to the human mind; hence the impossibility of a satisfactory solution. The doubts and dissatisfactions expressed in the *Hippias Major* may be taken as a symbol of the debate that occupied the succeeding centuries.

The same faulty approach persisted, in spite of appearances, in the new form of the problem, when the question "What is the beautiful?" was replaced by the question "What is taste?" Taste meant the pleasure felt in the presence of certain objects, and since it could not be simply identical with pleasure as such, nor with the pleasure excited in the mind by the true or good or useful—for without these exclusions, implicit or explicit, the problem would not have arisen—the question "What is the pleasure of taste?" turned into the old question once more: "What is the character, or what are the characters, of the objects that produce the pleasure of taste?" It was comparatively rare for a treatise to take the nature of the beautiful for its direct subject and title, though this was sometimes done, for example, by Crousaz, André, and Hogarth; but all, or almost all, discussions of taste developed into theories of the beautiful, natural and artificial, essential and arbitrary, intellectual and moral, visible and audible, of bodies, of spirits, of God, and so forth; even Kant's, which, as is well known, distinguishes the beautiful into "free" and "adherent," as well as into natural and artificial, and ends by explaining it as a symbol of morality.

It was no doubt both significant and important that the eighteenth century put first the inquiry into the pleasure of taste, that is, of a psychological movement, thus effecting in aesthetic, as elsewhere, the transition from ontology to psychology, or rather from physics and metaphysics to the philosophy of spirit, in the tradition of all modern philosophy since Descartes. That path was bound to be followed as the only promising one, the only one which did not seek a goal outside itself, since in it alone every stage was both goal and starting-point. But the attempt at a philosophy of the aesthetic spirit was fatally hampered by its initial assumptions. Pleasure, the pleasure of taste, was not an active form of the aesthetic spirit, but a passive moment of it, and was therefore helpless to determine its proper nature. So far as pleasure is concerned, one spiritual activity is like



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any other; trying to distinguish these activities by means of pleasure is like—to use a fanciful parallel—trying to distinguish the different kinds of fish by means of the water in which they all live and move. This is why the eighteenth-century writers were unable, as I have said, to avoid being drawn back into the old, hopeless attempt to determine the nature of the beautiful—of things objectively, physically or metaphysically, beautiful.

There is a concept which is at once the evidence of this unsatisfied but constant effort towards a theory of the aesthetic spirit, and the tomb which holds its mortal remains: I refer to the concept of feeling, which rose during that century to the status of a theory and the dignity of a category of the spirit. There were no doubt exigencies in moral philosophy and the theory of knowledge, becoming acute and as yet unsatisfied, which contributed to the formation of this concept; but the main contribution came from the inquiries into aesthetic, on taste and the beautiful, and these were what led to the erection of feeling into a third spiritual form alongside of, or intermediate between, the form of knowing and the form of willing. The concept of feeling (in the German writers *Gefühl*, or sometimes *Empfindnis*, to distinguish it from *Empfindung*), so understood, is nothing but the systematic expression of an absurdity: passivity placed alongside of activity, as if it were one activity of a special kind, co-ordinate with the others. Historians of philosophy have erred in praising the eighteenth-century philosophers and psychologists for discovering this category of the spirit; for the supposed discovery was in fact a rash adventure which distracted them from genuinely discovering that of which they were in search. Defeat no doubt has its glory, but not the glory of victory.

In another respect, much praise is due to these inquiries concerning taste: not for the conclusions to which they led or in which they halted, but for observations and thoughts by the way which still possess a positive value. Concealed beneath the ill-formulated problems, the real problems made themselves felt, albeit through a distorting medium. For that matter, there was positive value in the ancient and medieval and Renaissance discussions of the beautiful, in so far as they held firm, in spite of inevitable waverings, the notion that beside the values of intellectual truth, moral goodness, and practical convenience there was another value, not capable of reduction to any of these or of analysis into a combination of them, namely beauty. And certain characteristics of the beautiful had been noted, such as its connection with contemplation and those senses which were thought especially contemplative; the unity which it gives to variety without abolishing the variety itself, but on the contrary adding life to it by harmonizing it; and so forth.

Far more fertile were the eighteenth-century inquiries concerning



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taste, with their demarcation of a spiritual realm belonging neither to intellect nor to practice. What the previous century had expressed by asserting a *pulchrum* distinct from the *verum* and *bonum*, the eighteenth repeated in a more profound form by distinguishing a "sense of order and proportion," a "moral sense" of the good and the beautiful at once, an "inner sense" as detected within the human mind by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and others, or "feeling," the word most commonly used to denote the aesthetic sphere: to denote it in a manner still obscure and hesitant, but yet to denote it and to warn all comers against denying or forgetting its existence. And the general tendency of all these writers was hostile to the old saying, *De gustibus non est disputandum*, a saying which, in its secondary application to the facts of beauty, had the effect of denying and ridiculing their claim to originality and reality, and reducing them one and all to the caprice of sensation and individual fancy, or (as we should say to-day) to a hedonistic and utilitarian level. More or less successfully, by various expedients and with frequent contradictions, these writers of inquiries and treatises defended the rationality or absoluteness of taste, as a thing about which there is and ought to be disputation because it has its own criterion of value.<sup>1</sup>

It is equally characteristic of them to insist on the difference between the pleasure of taste and the pleasure caused by stimulation of the senses; the disinterested nature, or freedom from reference to utility, which belongs to this pleasure; the absence of end in a unity-in-variety which is an end in itself, that is, the peculiar synthesis effected by the beautiful, which Hemsterhuis, confusing ideal power with temporal rapidity, defined as "the greatest possible number of ideas in the shortest possible time." Burke, for instance, a strongly empirical and not highly philosophical mind, and as an empirical psychologist tending towards the position of a physiologist, none the less insists on the disinterested character of aesthetic pleasure, its difference from the judgment of "fitness" or purposiveness and from that of the perfection of a thing according to its end, and upon the difference between "love," which has beauty for its object and is contemplative, and "desire," which has affections of sense for its object and seeks possession; and so forth.

All these and other propositions, made by eighteenth-century

<sup>1</sup> E.g. Gerard (*Essai sur le goût*, French tr., Paris, 1766, p. 241): "On dit communément qu'il ne faut pas disputer des goûts. Cette maxime est vraie si par goût on entend le palais, qui rebute certains aliments et qui en aime d'autres. . . . Mais la maxime est fausse et pernicieuse, lorsque on l'applique à ce *goût intellectuel* qui a les arts et les sciences pour objets. Comme ces objets ont des charmes réels, de même qu'il y a un bon goût qui ne les apperçoit point; et il y a certaines méthodes dont on peut se servir pour corriger ces défauts de l'esprit qui corrompent le goût."



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theorists of taste and the beautiful—including the invention of a third spiritual form, namely feeling, and the reference of the aesthetic and of beauty to that—unite in the Kantian *Critique of Judgment*, which, analysed into its components as by recent historians of thought, appears to offer little or nothing fresh;<sup>1</sup> yet the whole of it is fresh, and has led to the forgetting of those previous treatments which Kant knew and used. The novelty lies in the critical and philosophical sense with which he worked out and raised to the rigour of systematic concepts this confused and fluid mass of ideas; and it was a follower of Kant, and a notable aesthetician, Heydenreich, who shortly after the appearance of the *Critique of Judgment* proclaimed the new glory of German philosophy, which by contrast with English philosophy had introduced into the theory of taste, hitherto usurped in part by the dogmatic philosophers and in greater part by the empiricists, the “critical” method, combining speculation and experience.<sup>2</sup> And the provisional completion given by Kant to this succession of efforts took its place in the general process which I have described elsewhere, being indeed one of its most brilliant phases, by which modern thought bridged the gulf created on the one hand by ancient philosophy and on the other by Christian thought between reason and sense, morality and life.<sup>3</sup>

None the less, there remained in the *Critique of Judgment* something not critically worked out, but put together empirically: a legacy taken over from its predecessors. Such was the dualistic treatment of the beautiful and the sublime, handed on to Kant chiefly by Burke, who regarded the beautiful, which he held a social and sociable feeling, a love and sympathy for small and delicate things, as opposed to the sublime, which seeks for great and impressive things and is the pleasure we take in painful and terrifying emotions when we are safe from their practical effects and protected from harm. There remained or reappeared, too, a certain contradiction in substance, at least in the shape in which Kant expounded the theory; for example, in the exclusion from the beautiful of all interest, all purposiveness, and all concepts, as compared with the

<sup>1</sup> See the researches of O. Schlapp, *Kants Lehre vom Genie und die Entstehung der K. d. U.* (Göttingen, 1901), and more lately those of Baeumler, *Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft, ihre Geschichte und Systematik* (Halle, 1903), and Cassirer, *Die Philosophie der Aufklärung* (Tübingen, Mohr, 1932), to omit others of less importance.

<sup>2</sup> See the preface and especially the appendix (I, 185–197) added by him to his translation of a work by one of these empiricists: Archibald Alison, *Ueber den Geschmack, dessen Natur und Grundsätze, verdeutscht und mit Anmerkungen und Abhandlungen begleitet von K. H. Heydenreich* (Leipzig, Weygand, 1792).

<sup>3</sup> See my essay, *Le due scienze mondane, l'Estetica e l'Economia*, in *Critica*, xxix (1931), part vi.



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final conclusion that the beautiful is a "symbol of morality"; a contradiction which Herder was quick to remark.<sup>1</sup>

But, setting aside these secondary aspects and problems, what must be emphasized in the *Critique of Judgment*, both in its own shape and as representing the outcome of the eighteenth-century inquiries concerning taste, is that the truths laid down concerning the aesthetic or beauty, reached as they were indirectly and by the concealed working of the actual aesthetic consciousness operating in despite of the false statement of its problem, remained detached observations, never closely bound up and identified with the fact to be explained. It would be a caricature, but not an unfair one, to express the characteristics of the aesthetic fact which Kant collected and defined in the form of a riddle: "What is it that pleases without a concept, without a practical interest, as purposiveness without purpose, and is the object of a universal pleasure? If it is not intellectual truth or moral goodness or economic utility, what is it?"

To-day we know the answer: it is poetry, or in general art. But Kant never gave it, and in fact did not know it; certainly it was not art for him. It was not art for the eighteenth-century theorists of taste, who for the most part treated the theories of art and of the beautiful separately, when they did treat both; or connected the two by defining art as imitation of the beautiful or the beauty of imitation. Nor was it for Kant, who conceived art as beauty adhering to a concept, a result produced by the combined play of intellect and fancy, and poetic genius itself as thus producing, combining, and playing.

This, too, was a necessary consequence of the point from which the inquiry set out, namely pleasure, though a peculiar pleasure, that of taste: for pleasure is a passive moment, not an active or productive. A study of pleasure as such could not lead to the concept of poetry or art, or at least could do so only surreptitiously, indecisively, and by snatches; a study of the productive process of poetry and art led thither directly, and offered a bridge to the concept of taste and so to the explanation of what had been thought external to poetry and art, but was yet beauty, and was felt as beauty, and therefore could not be thus external, but must be itself a creature of the human imagination, like the things or rather images that used to be called "beauties of nature."

<sup>1</sup> "Da es vorher noch vier Kategorischen Momente ohne Begriff und Interesse, ohne Vorstellung des Zweckes u. f. nicht nur allgemein gefallen musste, sondern sogleich vom Schönen hinabsank, sobald man an Güte dachte; jetzt im letzten Paragraph des Werks wird das Schöne ein Symbol des Guten, des Sittlichen sogar, und zwar *alles* Schöne: schöne Formen, schöne Kleider, schöne Farben, schöne Gebäude" (*Kalligone: vom Angenehmen und Schönen*. Leipzig, Hartknoch, 1800, III, 259-260).



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This study of the nature of poetry and art had been going on for centuries, forming a scientific tradition parallel to that concerning the beautiful, and remaining distinct and separate from it even when the two approached and interlaced. It was here that a true and genuine aesthetic was moving and growing; and it is strange—or rather, not strange to one who considers the prejudice as to the priority of the ideas of the beautiful and of pleasure—that historians of aesthetic have placed this tradition in the background, when they have not left it out of the picture altogether. Thus Zimmermann, to name one only, leaps from Plotinus in the third century after Christ to the eighteenth, and finds in the history of aesthetic “eine grosse Lücke” fifteen centuries long;<sup>1</sup> a gap containing all the ardent labours at the theory of poetry, literature, and art that were pursued at the Renaissance and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, especially in Italy, but also in France, Spain, and elsewhere. Even the concept of taste, “judgment without discourse,” arose in the seventeenth century in Italy,<sup>2</sup> and precisely in the attempt to describe the judgment of poetic criticism, as did the concept of “genius,” as distinct from intellect, to describe the faculty of poetic creation. The “sublime” belongs to the same tradition, being taken from the highly prized and deeply studied work that went under the name of Longinus,<sup>3</sup> where it was clearly and unambiguously expounded and meant, at bottom, nothing but that “excellence” or “beauty” of artistic expression for which the ancient critic had so exquisite a sense.<sup>4</sup>

In the eighteenth century this theory of poetry and art excited less interest and was less widely discussed and less highly valued than the theory of taste; but, in compensation, it worked hard to raise itself to the level of philosophy and organize itself into a system. It may suffice to recall the theory of poetry or “poetic logic” stated by Vico in his *Scienza nuova*, a logic of language or poetry which

<sup>1</sup> *Geschichte der Aesthetik als philosophischer Wissenschaft*, p. 147.

<sup>2</sup> It is sometimes incorrectly attributed to the Spaniard Gracian, who, as I have elsewhere pointed out (*Estetica*, p. 209), refers the term not to the sphere of the beautiful and art, but to that of practice. Before and after him, the Italians, with or without the word in question, asserted a special aesthetic power or faculty, capable of judging without logical reasoning; this was very clearly defined by Zuccolo as early as 1623. See my recent researches into the history of aesthetic ideas in seventeenth-century Italy, in *Storia dell'età barocca in Italia* (Bari, 1929), pp. 160–210, 217–232.

<sup>3</sup> For the authorship and date of the *De Sublimitate* see the recent and important investigations of Rostagni, *Il sublime nella storia dell'Estetica antica* (Pisa, 1933).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the way in which he remarks *à propos* of an ode of Sappho that the things said in it are the things said by every lover, but that the excellence of the poem lies in choosing the culminating points (ἡ λήψις . . . τῶν ἀκρων) and combining them (ἡ εἰς ταὐτὸ συναρπείσ): *De Subl.* 110.



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enabled him to interpret Homer and Dante,<sup>1</sup> and the theory of *cognitio sensitiva*, or *Aesthetica*, for which Baumgarten a few decades later claimed the position of a special science.<sup>2</sup> But neither of these thinkers had pupils or followers to develop and pursue their new and highly fruitful ideas.

One of the two, a German professor and the founder of a school, certainly had pupils to repeat and disseminate his doctrines; but in general they misunderstood them and reduced them to superficiality, and replaced Baumgarten's definition of poetry as "perfect sensuous discourse," which ascribes a peculiar and autonomous "perfection" to "confused" or "sensuous cognition," sometimes by "representation of sensible perfection," sometimes by "sensible representation of perfection"; so that *cognitio sensitiva* or *poetica* finally assumed the aspect of a weakened or mutilated intellectual knowledge, as appears already in Meyer and still more clearly in Mengs, Mendelssohn, and others.<sup>3</sup>

When Kant in the *Critique of Judgment* undertook to combat the theory of "eminent philosophers" that "beauty is nothing but perfection confusedly thought," and pointed out that a confused cognition of perfection is still an intellectual cognition and distinguished from it, at most, as the plain man's judgment differs from the philosopher's,<sup>4</sup> he was certainly right; but he was arguing against Wolff or the misunderstandings of Baumgarten's school, not against Baumgarten, who never maintained any such view, and always meant to speak of the *perfectio* of *cognitio sensitiva qua talis*, though doubtless he did not wholly avoid the danger of falling back into intellectualism and conceiving poetry as the sensible representation of the distinct concept.<sup>5</sup> Kant's confusion is of importance

<sup>1</sup> Even now most German historians of aesthetic (Baeumler, Cassirer, etc.) persist in ignoring Vico or brushing him aside, because (they say) he was unknown and did not influence the Germans. None the less, he lived and thought; and the history of thought is not the history of influences on German writers, or any others.

<sup>2</sup> That Baumgarten belongs to another tradition than that of the theory of taste emerges even from what Baeumler writes, though intended to connect him with that tradition: "Baumgarten hat für das Geschmacksproblem im engeren Sinne nicht viel Interesse gezeigt" (*op. cit.*, p. 87).

<sup>3</sup> Mendelssohn, *Ueber die Hauptgrundsätze der schönen Künste und Wissenschaften* (*op. cit.* Zimmermann, p. 181), expressly says: "Ist die Erkenntnis der Vollkommenheit sinnlich, so wird sie Schönheit genannt . . . die verständliche Vollkommenheit erleuchtet die Seele und befriedigt ihren ursprünglichen Trieb nach bündigen Vorstellungen. Wenn sie aber die Triebfeder des Begehrungsvermögens in Bewegungen setzen soll, so muss sie sich in eine Schönheit verwandeln."

<sup>4</sup> *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 15.

<sup>5</sup> Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61 (cf. p. 433), says that for Baumgarten beauty is "sinnlich erkannte Vollkommenheit," but neither these words nor



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only as proof that he overlooked or failed to understand the concept of poetry which Baumgarten's system involved; just as he overlooked or failed to grasp the similar concept of poetry or language which, to say nothing of Vico, was gaining ground here and there in the early Romantic movement in Germany. Hence Kant, like the theorists of taste and even the writers of Baumgarten's school such as Riedel, his own immediate precursor in the tripartition of faculties and the connection of beauty with feeling, instead of grasping or even guessing the importance for the philosophy of spirit of Baumgarten's idea of a *cognitio sensitiva* distinct from *cognitio intellectiva* and prior to it, and indeed the whole realm of *facultates inferiores* in Wolff and *petites perceptions* in Leibniz; instead of using these ideas to work out a more organic and concrete connection between the terms of the old antithesis, theory and practice, or knowing and willing, fell back on postulating a third realm of "feeling," a mere pigeon-hole for the facts he had failed to understand.<sup>1</sup>

Among the post-Kantian aestheticians, no one pursued the inquiry into these fundamental elements of the aesthetic activity which had been discerned by Baumgarten, studied more deeply by Vico, and apprehended to some extent by other thinkers; no one except Schleiermacher, who for that very reason was misunderstood, slighted, and forgotten. True, while some like Herbart stood by the

this notion are to be found in §§ 15-16 of the *Aesthetica*, to which he refers; it is always *perfectiones cognitionis sensitivae*. Von Stein (*Die Entstehung der neueren Aesthetik*, Stuttgart, Cotta, 1886, p. 358) rightly observes that if Kant means to allude to Baumgarten he is misunderstanding him; thus also Sommer, *Grundzüge einer Geschichte der deutschen Psychologie und Aesthetik von Wolff-Baumgarten bis Kant-Schiller* (Würzburg, 1892), p. 345. Perhaps the explanation is to be sought, as by Baeumler (*op. cit.*, pp. 113-119), in the fact that Kant knew the references to the subject in the *Metaphysica*, where Baumgarten on this point was confining himself to Wolff's definition, and also knew Meyer and Mendelssohn, but perhaps had not read, or not read with care, the *Aesthetica*.

The difficulty was felt by some writers of the time; cf. the following quotation from Meiners, *Revision der Philosophie*, pp. 226 *seqq.*, in the learned work of K. H. Politz, *Die Aesthetik für gebildete Leser* (Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1807, I, 22-23): "In der Aesthetik ist die Hauptquelle unserer Kenntnisse noch streitig. Eben so zweifelhaft ist es bisher ob die aesthetischen Begriffe zu dem Foro der bis jetzt von den Philosophen entdeckten Kräften oder einer eignen von den Griechen und Römer nicht wahrgenommen Fähigkeit gehören. Es giebt Männer, die einen angeborenen Geschmack des Schönen und Guten vertheidigen, und dabei unsere Idee von Schönheit u. s. w. als etwas ganz Relatives ansehen. Umgekehrt sieht man wieder unveränderliche Ideale des Schönen und Guten von solchen behaupten, die den Geschmack für eigentümliche kraft hatten. So lange diese Punkte unausgewacht bleiben, scheint die Aesthetik in die Form einer Wissenschaft nicht gebracht werden zu Können."



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eighteenth-century tradition, started from the judgment of taste and sought a concept of the beautiful in formal or formalistic determinations of the object, most of them abandoned the discussion of taste and placed the centre of gravity in their treatises upon art, thus in a certain degree identifying aesthetic with the philosophy of art. In a certain degree, not altogether, and not essentially, because they retained as more or less distinct from this theory of art, although somewhat confused with it, a "callology" or metaphysical theory of the beautiful and a theory of natural beauty or beauty in natural objects. There was no consciousness of the truth that aesthetic is concerned with art and art alone, that outside art there is nothing really beautiful, and that therefore there can be no theory of the beautiful independent of, or parallel to, the philosophy of art. Even when, in the second half of the nineteenth century, psychological or empirical aesthetics took the place of metaphysical or philosophical, these new aesthetics still combined a theory of the beautiful with a theory of art, a combination due to misunderstanding the nature of the things combined; naturally, therefore, this is the view current in the *Aesthetica vulgaris* of to-day.

It was only in Italy, at the beginning of the present century, that this dualism was resolved with full consciousness of what was being done, and an aesthetic brought into being which was a philosophy of poetry, imagination, language, art, and pure intuition and expression; an aesthetic which put the productive process first, showed the beautiful as this process itself in its free development, and reduced to terms of this process the so-called beauties of nature, as themselves spiritual acts and not natural facts. As a result, no one in Italy, not even scholastics or neo-scholastics (and that is saying a good deal), dreams any longer of devising theories of the objectively beautiful, for there is now no place for such theories within our mental horizon, filled as it is by others which have consigned to oblivion the very name of the former occupants and have blotted them out as with a deluge.

In Germany, on the other hand, although the intense study of the history of art has created a demand for a philosophy of art to clear up its main concepts and standards, the problem of the relations between this so-called science of art (*Kunstwissenschaft*) and the theory of the beautiful has been solved in the most superficial and artificially simple manner imaginable: art is assigned to *Kunstwissenschaft*, beauty to aesthetic; as if the whole problem did not concern the relation between the concept of the beautiful and the concept of art, and as if, by handing one of them over to "specialists" and confining one's own attention to the other, one could ever rightly and thoroughly understand either. In the last resort, the root of the error lies in the false conception of a non-



philosophical or as it is called merely "scientific" (*Kunstwissenschaft*) treatment of an ideal category.<sup>1</sup>

So toilsome and slow is the progress of thought, still in places congealed and arrested at the same false statement of the problem of beauty at which ancient philosophy and eighteenth-century aesthetic once laboured.

<sup>1</sup> For this school of separate *Kunstwissenschaft*, cf. what was already to be said about it in 1911, in my essay on Fiedler (*Nuovi saggi di estetica*, Bari, 1926, esp. pp. 240-241), and in 1915, à propos of a book by Utitz, my *Conversazioni critiche*, I, 20-22; cf. also a short recent book by Utitz, *Geschichte der Aesthetik*, Berlin, 1932, pp. 70-73, where he expresses himself with more caution and reserve.

(Translated from the Italian by R. G. COLLINGWOOD.)



# ARISTOTLE'S DEFINITION OF MORAL VIRTUE, AND PLATO'S ACCOUNT OF JUSTICE IN THE SOUL

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NICOLAI HARTMANN, in an interesting discussion of Aristotle's account of moral virtue,<sup>1</sup> has called attention to the difference between the contrariety of opposed vices and the contrast of certain virtues. The *ἄκρα* or extremes, somewhere between which Aristotle thought that any morally virtuous disposition (with the possible exception of justice) must lie, are not conciliable. The same man cannot combine or reconcile, in the same action, cowardice and bravery, intemperance and insensibility, stinginess and thriftlessness, passion and lack of spirit. These are pairs of contraries, between which a virtue lies; but the virtue is not a synthesis of the extremes in a pair. It is true that on one interpretation of the doctrine of the mean, the mean is a synthesis of contraries, but not of contrary vices. According to this interpretation, which Burnet adopted, there are contrary tendencies or impulses, *e.g.* fear and delight in danger, and the virtuous disposition combines these in right proportion; but the vicious dispositions also combine them, in other and wrong proportions, the contrariety of these dispositions arising from the fact that either impulse may be unduly preponderant over the other. In support of this interpretation Burnet appealed to Aristotle's theory of bodily health, which was held to depend on a proper *κρᾶσις* or combination of the primary contraries or *πρῶτα ἐναντία*, hot and cold, moist and dry. Many objections might be brought against this theory of health, both speculative and empirical, though they do not concern us here;<sup>2</sup> and it may also be doubted whether the theory of virtue is to be interpreted in analogy with it. Among other reasons for rejecting that view it may be noted that to the only illustration of the relativity of the mean to the individual which Aristotle offers it is quite inapplicable; the right quantity of meat for one man is not the right quantity for another, though it is always a mean between too much and too little. I have only mentioned the view here in order to point out that, even if it were accepted, the synthesis of contraries which, according to it, is involved in a virtuous disposition is not that of contrary bad dis-

<sup>1</sup> *Ethik*, c. 61, Gegensatzverhältnis und Wertsynthese.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *infra*, p. 176, n. 2.



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positions, the Aristotelian ἀκρα. These cannot be combined in an action, neither do we think that they ought to be; they ought both to be avoided.

But there are contrasted dispositions that we approve, from which, however difficult it may seem to combine them, issue actions both of which may seem to be required of us. A familiar instance is afforded by the respective claims of justice and forgiveness. Hartmann does not mention this, but he mentions justice and love of one's neighbour (*Gerechtigkeit* and *Nächstenliebe*). These stand contrasted; and the action to which a man with a strong sense of justice might be prompted in a given situation may be one from which neighbourly love by itself would hold him back. It is quite possible for a man to have this neighbourly love in strength, with very little regard to the observance of justice, or to have a strong sense of justice and lack any love of his neighbour. But both are good dispositions; and virtue would not be shown, in a particular situation, by an action displaying neither, as it would be shown by one displaying neither of the related and contrary vices, the ἀκρα to the μεσότης. Rather we think that we ought somehow to satisfy the claims of both. The case, therefore, is different with antithetic *Werte*, "values," and with antithetic *Unwerte*, "disvalues." Other examples of such antithetic "values" are purity (*Reinheit*) and fullness of life (*Fülle*); or love of one's neighbour (*Nächstenliebe*) and love of posterity (*Fernstenliebe*).

This antithetic of values is neither so frequently recurrent as the antithetic of disvalues, nor do the two correspond; i.e. the opposed virtues are not respectively contrary to the opposed vices, to both of which, as Aristotle said, in spite of their contrariety to each other, the one virtue which is in a mean between them is, in another way, contrary. Courage is in this way contrary both to cowardice and foolhardiness. On the other hand, the ideally courageous man should display both stout-hearted endurance (*behertztes Ausharren*) and thoughtful foresight, cool presence of mind (*bedachtsame Vorsicht, Kaltblütige Geistesgegenwart*); and it is the former which is specially lacking in the coward, the latter in the foolhardy. So again self-control (*Beherrschtheit*) is valuable, and a development of the emotional life (*Entfaltung des Affektlebens*) is valuable; but these are opposed "values," or at least capable of competing. Intemperance, ἀκολασία, and insensitiveness, ἀναισθησία, are opposed disvalues. The virtue of σωφροσύνη or temperance should somehow combine self-control with the development of the emotional life. But since there is a kinship between insensitiveness and a self-control that is not combined with the contrasted "value," the Stoics made insensitiveness itself into a virtue; and because of the likeness between intemperance and development of the emotional life uncom-



bined with self-control, the emotions have sometimes been rejected altogether.

Strict parallelism here would require Hartmann rather to point to some who had made intemperance into a virtue; perhaps Polus in the *Gorgias* might be cited in this sense; or Alfred Barratt, who said that "the highest virtue consists in being led, not by one desire, but by all," the cause of repentance being "never the attainment of some pleasure, but always the non-attainment of more: not the satisfaction of one desire, but the inability to satisfy all"; though, very inconsistently, he called the highest virtue, as just defined, "the complete organization of the moral nature."<sup>1</sup> But I do not wish to press this as a criticism, nor yet to ask how far anything like what Hartmann has said in regard to courage and temperance could be paralleled for all the virtues in Aristotle's table. That to which I wish to direct attention is Hartmann's suggestion of a synthesis of "values" being involved in the Aristotelian mean; for a synthesis of values is very different from a mean of "disvalues" or κακία.

I think that Hartmann's observation is a good one, but that it points to a more thoroughgoing criticism or restatement of the Aristotelian doctrine that he gives. In his "doctrine of the mean" Aristotle seems to me to have been trying, and failing, to improve on the account of virtue offered by his master Plato. Assuming what I have to say on this head to be sound, it would follow that the necessity for a synthesis of opposed "elements of value," to which Hartmann draws attention, is a special case of a more pervading necessity. I believe that no action is obligatory independently of relation to any good, but that this good may be, and in the last resort is, connected with a life to be lived, to the form of goodness, in which the particular obligatory action is necessary. If so, a man's particular actions should be such as will together make a life in which this goodness can be realized; their "values" are connected with the goodness of the whole; and the synthesis of *Werthelemente* which Hartmann requires in a particular action is really the suiting of the particular action to the wider plan of life to which it belongs, in a situation of a sort that seems sometimes to call for exercise of one and sometimes for exercise of the other of two "opposed" virtues.

It is Plato's teaching that you cannot unexceptionably define any virtue by naming the sort of acts it requires of you. A man's courage should not always make him stand in the ranks and fight, nor his justice always make him restore what he owes. The statement that justice, in the widest sense of that word, will make him do his proper job, τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν, may seem open to an objection

<sup>1</sup> Cited by C. M. Williams, *A Review of the Systems of Ethics founded on the Theory of Evolution*, p. 117 (Macmillan, 1893).



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just the contrary of what lies against the attempt to define virtues by naming their works; for while one method assigns to a virtue acts which do not belong to it, the other fails to say what do. Plato tries to meet this objection by describing the life of a good state and the constitution of the soul. By the first description we are helped to divine the particular acts that should be done; by the second to see through the development of what capacities in us and through what inner discipline we may do the acts belonging to us in the life of the state, and not other acts. This discipline and development bear fruit in all right actions, and the "inward and spiritual grace" from which the "outward and visible" deed issues is different because of them from what it would be if the agent were not thus "just," even though the outward and visible deeds might yet be on occasion the same. In that sense, virtue is one; though this unity involves, as Plato is careful to maintain, distinguishable constituent excellences in distinguishable forms or parts (εἶδη or μέρη) of the soul; and though also we may distinguish many virtues, according to the kinds of situation that repeatedly occur and the kinds of deed which for the most part are required in them. But that such deeds are right in such situations is true only for the most part; that is why the virtues cannot be unexceptionably defined by naming the sorts of acts they require of us.

Now Aristotle was more interested in the multiplicity of virtues than in the unity of virtue. To this we owe it that he devoted a book and a half of the *Nicomachean Ethics* to the detailed description of a number of particular moral virtues, and the vices alternative to them in their several fields. These are so many "values" and "dis-values," *Werte* and *Unwerte*, in the phrase of Hartmann and other exponents of "axiology." If all these "values" ought to be actualized, are *seinsollend*, and certain situations allow of one's actualizing more than one, but only alternatively, then antithetic relations and "antinomies" arise, and the need for "synthesis." If, however, virtue is one, it should not require of us incompatibles. That is why the synthesis of antithetic "values" which Hartmann finds to be involved in some moral virtue described by Aristotle as a *μεσότης* or mean is only a particular case of what must be always necessary for determining the right act in a given situation, if the unity of virtue is to be sustained against the multiplicity of the particular virtues.

And Aristotle, though more interested in the multiplicity, does not deny that unity, the belief in which led Plato to offer a definition of justice "in the soul" which would make the just man the man of complete moral virtue. Only he will not give to this all-pervading unity the name *justice*. If we ask ourselves whether anything corresponds in the *Nicomachean Ethics* to the Platonic distinction between justice in the state and justice in the soul, we must, I think,



admit that the distinction between ὅλη δικαιοσύνη, complete justice, and ἠθικὴ ἀρετή, moral virtue, as the generic identity of the various particular virtues in his table, so corresponds. Aristotle himself really says as much; for justice, in this comprehensive sense, is, he says, not a part of virtue, but the whole, οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετή: all virtue is contained in it, as the proverb says; the man thus just has "fulfilled the law."<sup>1</sup> And then, in the last section of the chapter, he gives its relation to moral virtue. They are the same thing differently regarded; i.e. what this same is, as justice and as virtue, are not the same; in relation to other men, it is justice; merely as a disposition in the man who is just, it is virtue.<sup>2</sup>

This is not really different from what Plato had written in the fourth book of his *Republic*, at the end of the passage in which, assuming that we mean the same when we call a state and when we call a man just, he has gone on to analyse the soul, and shown how the three sorts of excellence, whose display by different men holding different functions in the state make the actions just which we regard as corporate acts of the state, enter also into every action of a just man. Therefore they enter—and this, if we are to understand Plato, we must never forget—into those very actions of different men, by which they co-operate in a corporate act of the state. The statesman whose wisdom, the soldier whose courage, the others whose temperance contribute to make a corporate act of the state just, will each make his contribution as he should only because, in so ordering his own soul and his own life that he may do so, he displays all three excellences. The justice of the state, therefore, is an expression of the justice in the souls of those whose several actions are concerned together in what we call the state's acts; for Plato knew that only individuals act. And this is what he says in the passage to which I am referring. "Something of this sort is in truth, it seems, what justice was"—the justice of which he has been so long speaking—"concerned not with the outward doing of one's own duties, but the inward: in very truth with a man himself and what is his, that he should not allow the kinds"

<sup>1</sup> *Eth. Nic.*, V. i. 12-19.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, § 20, 1130<sup>a</sup> 10, τί δὲ διαφέρει ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὐτῇ, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὐτή, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ἡ δὲ τοιαύδε ἐξίς ἀπλῶς, ἀρετή.

<sup>3</sup> I italicize words supplied in translation, after the manner of the authors of King James's translation of the Bible. The Greek—οὐ περὶ τὴν ἑξω πράξιν τῶν αὐτοῦ ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντός—is ambiguous; for τῶν αὐτοῦ may be either one's own duties, or the "parts" of one's own soul; in the next words—ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ—it is the latter; but there is probably a shift of meaning (one might almost say a play upon the words) indicated by ὡς ἀληθῶς.

<sup>4</sup> γέννη: i.e., what are also called the εἶδη, or μέρη, parts, of the soul.



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within his soul to do each another's *work* in him, nor to interfere with another, but having verily set aright what is his and gained rule himself over himself, having ordered and come to friendship with himself and conciliated *these kinds* in their triplicity, just as if it were three strings in a scale, top and bottom and middle, and any there may be between, having bound all these together and become out of many one, temperate and ordered, so at length should act, if he do some action whether concerned with getting money or with the care of his body or with some affair of state or transaction of private *life*, in all these counting and calling just and noble whatever action preserves and helps to complete in him this disposition, and wisdom the knowledge that presides over this action, and likewise unjust whatever action at any time undoes this *disposition*, and folly the opinion presiding over this."<sup>1</sup>

Such is Plato's account of the disposition which is virtue, in whatever particular sort of virtuous action and in whatever dealings with others it is shown. Aristotle, in the passage cited above, as often elsewhere, has but put into a succinct phrase or formula what Plato had set out at length. He does the same when he contrasts appetite and purpose, saying that a man's purpose may be contrary to his appetite, but that he cannot have contrary appetites at once.<sup>2</sup> This statement sums up the result of the argument by which Socrates, in the *Republic*, 436B-439D, convinces Glaucon that what makes it possible for a man to refrain from gratifying an appetite he does not cease to feel, and so to be contrarily affected in himself towards the same thing at the same time, is that there is a rational or considerative as well as an appetitive principle or part or form or kind in his soul. It is of course to similar experiences of contrariety within the soul that Socrates appeals in arguing further for a principle of spirit distinguishable alike from the appetitive and the considerative forms of the soul's being.

It is not necessary here to expound the reasoning by which this account of the soul is commended, nor to discuss the value of the account. All that I wish to do is to consider how Aristotle's definition of moral virtue is related to Plato's definition, based on this account, of "justice in the soul." I have suggested that the most famous feature of Aristotle's definition, the doctrine of the mean, expresses an attempt—I think an ill-advised attempt—to improve upon Plato's account of the part which "temperance" plays in "justice in the soul." I have so far offered reason for saying that anyone looking for Aristotle's treatment of the facts to which Plato directed our attention, when expounding justice in the soul and its

<sup>1</sup> *Rep.*, IV. 443B-444A.

<sup>2</sup> *Eth. Nic.*, III. ii. 5, 1111<sup>b</sup> 15. καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ.



relation to justice in the state, would expect to find it in the definition of moral virtue, ἡθικὴ ἀρετή, and the exposition of the relation of this to ὅλη δικαιοσύνη or complete justice.

But we cannot judge this question fairly without bearing in mind what Plato never points out in so many words, though the *Republic* contains several definite statements implying it, viz. that the three forms or parts of the soul are not merely co-ordinate: that the division as it were does double duty, and if not a "physical," is anyhow as well a "metaphysical" as a "logical" division. To call them parts suggests that the unity of the soul is by way of addition to an appetitive of the other principles. But the spirited and rational are not merely added to the appetitive, as an appetite for grass might have been added in Nebuchadnezzar to his existing appetites for other foods, instead of being substituted for them. It is itself modified by the presence of the other two, as the spirited also is modified by the presence of the rational. Besides this, in any action they are all involved; to crave, to be angry, or even indignant, to consider or approve, none of these is to act. And the co-operation of them in action—how the soul is at once in some respects the same in all action, in other respects differs according as a man acts more or less justly—this is one-half of Plato's teaching; that we may understand this is one purpose of his division; and so far as the human soul shows its being in all these modes at once, we might call the division metaphysical. But the appetites which Socrates in *Republic*, 436A, describes as for the pleasures of nourishment and procreation and their like, though, if the soul were merely appetitive, they would be the only sort of desire it would feel, are by no means this in fact. Other kinds of desire belong to it as spirited, and yet others as rational. This is most explicitly asserted in IX. 580D. Socrates there offers, as a further proof that a man's soul may be divided according to three "kinds," this: that there are pleasures of three kinds, each proper to one mode of the soul's being, and likewise desires and principles.<sup>1</sup> There are, that is to say, desires that belong to a soul as spirited, and again as rational, not only those which belong to it as appetitive; so that ἐπιθυμία has a generic as well as a specific sense, and so far as the soul is an ἀρχή, or initiates change, the threefold division is a logical division into three principles in virtue of which it does so.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Τήνδε· τριῶν ὄντων τριταὶ καὶ ἡδοναὶ μοι φαίνονται, ἐνὸς ἐκάστου μίαν ἰδίαν· ἐπιθυμίαν ὡσαύτως τε καὶ ἀρχὰς. ἀρχὰς here presumably are movers to action; they "take the initiative."

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle again finds a way of expressing this, by distinguishing in the genus ὄρεξις the three species of βούλησις, θυμός and ἐπιθυμία. Vide *De Anima*, γ ix, 432<sup>b</sup> 5-6; *Magn. Mor.*, I. xii. 1187<sup>b</sup> 38, ὁρέξεως δ' ἔστιν εἶδη τρία, ἐπιθυμία, θυμός, βούλησις. When Aristotle says, *De Anima*, γ ix, 432<sup>b</sup> 6-7, criticizing Plato for dividing the soul into parts, εἰ δὲ τρία ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἔσται ὄρεξις, he says what Plato would have readily admitted.



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The importance of all this is as follows: The function of the rational or considerative "part" in the soul is not merely to regulate the appetites, i.e. the activities of the appetitive "part," from which, at the outset of his analysis, Socrates proves its distinctness, by calling attention to its withholding a man from the gratification of his appetites. It has to regulate all a man's desires, including those of which it makes him capable itself, like desire of knowledge, and those, like desire of power, whereof the spirited "part" makes him capable. Similarly, the function of the spirited "part" is not only to hold a man steadfast to an approved course when this course involves rejecting the gratification of some appetite, but equally when it involves refusal to gratify a desire of which the spirited "part" itself, or even the rational, makes him capable; for a man may on occasion judge it right, in the interests of the community or of his own soul, that he should sacrifice some pursuit of power or knowledge.

Though it lies aside from my main thesis, it may perhaps be worth while to suggest here that this distinction between the generic and the specific senses of *ἐπιθυμία* might well be borne in mind by Freudian psychologists when they speak of the *libido*. When the direction of a man's energies into some other channel than the gratification of sexual appetite is described as a sublimation of the *libido*, it seems often thought that this appetite is being somehow transformed, say into a devotion to good works. But though such devotion may fill a larger part in the life of a man who has been disappointed in love, or in whom sexual appetite has been repressed, than otherwise it would have done, it is not itself a transformation of the specific appetite, but an alternative manifestation of the generic capacity of desire, and one of which another "form" of the soul than the appetitive makes him capable. To suppose that sublimation of the *libido* is transformation of appetite is like supposing that to draw a circle is to transform a drawing of a triangle.

The soul then, according to Plato's account, as rational or considerative, has at any moment, if it is to act justly, to divine what is best in the situation and act accordingly. But it has in it all sorts of impulses to action, some springing from its appetitive, some from its spirited, some from its rational nature. Any of these may move it towards doing something of which as rational it disapproves, or from doing something of which as rational it approves. What Plato calls courage, the excellence of the spirited "part" as this functions in all action, will sustain him in following his judgment, when thus moved contrarily. But the man of formed and settled "justice" will not be moved by appetite towards that of which "consideration" would never approve pursuit,<sup>1</sup> and his desires for what in suitable circumstances he would approve pursuing, in whichever "part" of

<sup>1</sup> Or, as Plato says, *Rep.*, x. 571B, by *παράνομοι ἐπιθυμίαι*.



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the soul they originate, will not be so strong as to make it difficult for him to hold fast to the course approved by him. To determine, however, what place in the scheme of his life the indulgence of any particular desire, the development of any particular interest, the devotion to any particular occupation, should hold is to determine that scheme; and is the task of his rational nature, of the λογιστικόν. The inclusion in or omission from that scheme of any interest or occupation, the indulgence or disregard of any desire, must be so determined as may make his life the best that it can be; though what this is again cannot be settled without regard to what is best for the community of lives in which his must take its place; and there are of course, as Plato recognizes, certain "necessary" appetites, without whose indulgence the individual cannot live, or the race cannot continue. But some men in some situations ought to reject the indulgence even of these. No rule can be given by which to determine either when their indulgence should be altogether rejected, or how largely any desire, interest, or occupation admitted to have place in the scheme of a man's life should be allowed to bulk there.<sup>1</sup> That is what a man's wisdom, the excellence of his rational or considerative nature, is to enable him to decide, or at least to recognize when a wiser than he has decided it for him. And that his divers desires and interests should be developed in such mutual adjustment and relations of degree as the scheme that his wisdom approves requires is what Plato calls σωφροσύνη, or temperance: an excellence, as he says, not of the appetitive alone but of the whole soul, just because it involves desires or moving powers, ἐπιθυμίας τε καὶ ἀρχαί, belonging to each of its "parts" or "forms."

Now how far does Aristotle recognize all this in his definition of moral virtue? Does he, too, see in moral virtue the union of three sorts of excellence, wisdom, courage, and temperance? It seems to me that he does, but with a profound difference in his view of the last; and this difference is shown in his doctrine of the mean.

He defines moral virtue as a disposition displaying purpose, in a mean relative to the agent and determined by a rule, whereby a wise man would determine it.<sup>2</sup> That it is a disposition, ἕξις, agrees

<sup>1</sup> It will be noted that the question *when* a desire should or should not be indulged is the question *ὅτε δεῖ*, whereas *how largely* is *ὅσον δεῖ*, and only the latter is a question of degree.

<sup>2</sup> *Eth. Nic.*, II. vi. 15, 1106<sup>b</sup> 36. ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὕσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρονιμὸς ὁρίσειεν. Burnet, taking the mean to be a combination of contrary impulses in the right proportion (as explained above, p. 1), took λόγος here to mean ratio, viz. the ratio in which they were combined. But these impulses would themselves be capable of varying in degree of strength, and it is difficult to see how the ratio in which they are to be combined, in order to secure the "mean" required, can be fixed unless the strength of each is first fixed. Yet this strength might in turn



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with Plato's language about justice in the soul, which he speaks of as *ταύτην τὴν ἔξιν*. And in calling it *ἔξις προαιρετική*, a disposition displaying purpose, Aristotle recognizes in it the factor which in justice in the soul Plato called courage, *ἀνδρεία*. For Plato defines this courage as holding fast in everything to a right and lawful opinion concerning what is and is not to be feared.<sup>1</sup> By this he means that the just man, whatever loss or suffering or unpleasantness may threaten him from the course which he approves, will by courage hold fast to the right opinion that these are less terrible than not to do what he approves. And when Aristotle says that moral virtue displays purpose, he means that a virtuous man abides in action by the judgment he has formed after deliberation, *ἐμμένει τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν*,<sup>2</sup> whatever there may be moving him to act otherwise, though of course it is not this resoluteness that makes his judgment correct; and thus to abide comes, in his opinion, of courage.

Further, Aristotle assigns a part to wisdom in the constitution of moral virtue, as Plato does in that of justice in the soul. For the mean is determined by a rule, namely, by that whereby the wise man, the *φρονιμός*, would determine it. It is true that a man may be virtuous without being capable of discovering the rule for himself; he may rely on the wisdom of some teacher or confessor; but at least he must have wisdom enough to accept the rule and think

be regarded as involving a combination of contraries in a certain ratio, and so *ad infinitum*. Others have interpreted *λόγος* to mean "reason," i.e. the faculty, *τὸ λογιστικὸν* or (as Aristotle calls it) *τὸ λόγον ἔχον*. Apart from the question whether *λόγος* ever means this in Aristotle's writings, it seems a fatal objection to such an interpretation here, that it would make the last six words of the definition redundant. For a fool misuses the same faculty as a wise man uses, when he (the fool) misjudges the mean. Moreover, § 7 of the chapter, 1106<sup>a</sup> 36-<sup>b</sup>5, where Aristotle illustrates what he intends by a *μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς*, supports the interpretation "rule"; rules for training, it seems to be meant, would fix limits that an athlete should not overstep in either direction to the amount of food or exercise to be taken; but for particular athletes the precisely right amounts will fall at different points between these limits, and these niceties cannot be fixed by the rule. The late J. Cook Wilson held that *ὁρθὸς λόγος* in Aristotle's *Ethics* meant "right reason"; but Professor J. A. Smith, another eminent Aristotelian, has argued strongly for the interpretation "rule," and I have borrowed the last argument from him.

<sup>1</sup> *Rep.*, IV. 430B. *σωτηρίαν διὰ πάντος δόξης ὁρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου δεινῶν τε περὶ καὶ μὴ*.

<sup>2</sup> *Eth. Nic.*, III. ix. 1110<sup>a</sup> 31, in the discussion of *ἀνδρεία*; cf. *inter alia*, *ibid.*, VII. ix, where *ἐμμένειν τῇ προαιρέσει*, *ἐμμένειν τοῖς δόξασιν* also occur. The weak or incontinent man, *ὁ ἀκράτης*, under the influence of the desire or impulse of the moment, fails to abide by his resolve or purpose; the virtuous man, in whom it is necessary *τὴν τε λόγον ἀληθὴ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὀρεξίν ὁρθήν*, *εἴπερ ἢ προαίρεσις σπουδαία* (*ibid.*, VI. ii. 2, 1138<sup>a</sup> 24), will abide by his purpose.



it correct; ἐμμένειν τοῖς δόξασιν<sup>1</sup> is ἐμμένειν τοῖς αὐτῷ δόξασιν. And in this Aristotle is not differing from Plato, who says that courage is holding fast not knowledge but a right and lawful opinion, δόξα. For very few know good and evil; and if a man did really know what is good, he could not, in Plato's belief, voluntarily do what he did not think its attainment required of him; though on this question, which is the question of incontinence or ἀκρασία, Aristotle's view is not so clear. There is indeed a very important difference between Plato and Aristotle regarding the wisdom involved in moral virtue or justice in the soul. For Plato thought that it was the same intellectual excellence as is shown in science or speculative philosophy, whereas Aristotle did not, and consequently drew a distinction, unknown to Platonic usage, between φρόνησις and σοφία. But this difference does not affect the fact that they agree in holding wisdom, an excellence of the λογιστικὸν or λόγον ἔχον μέρος in the soul, to be a factor or moment in what the one calls justice in the soul and the other moral virtue.

There remains the question whether Aristotle recognizes as the third factor or moment "temperance" or σωφροσύνη. And it seems to me that he does so, but takes a different view from Plato's of what this factor is, when he says that this disposition is in a mean relative to the agent, ἐν μεσότητι τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς; and also that in this he is not, as I take him to have believed, improving upon, but spoiling the analysis which he follows.

It is, of course, no objection to this conjecture that temperance, σωφροσύνη, figures in Aristotle's table of particular virtues, as one among a number of means or μεσότητες. For it is quite consistent with the unity of virtue implied in Plato's account of justice in the soul that this disposition can show itself in, and give a special, character to, some group of a man's actions distinguished by their being concerned with a special kind of appetite or desire, or a special kind of situation. So Aristotle distinguishes one particular virtue from another by reference to what kind of affection or action, πάθος or πράξις, displays the general character of being in a mean. And there is no more difficulty in giving the name σωφροσύνη both to a factor in all virtuous action and to a particular virtue than there is in admitting, as Aristotle does, a distinction between justice as a whole, ὅλη δικαιοσύνη, and particular justice, ἡ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνη. Nor is the double use of the words mere equivocation; it points to a peculiar complexity in the facts.

We saw that, according to Plato, measure or moderation must be imposed on each appetite, interest, and desire; but that in what measure it should work or be indulged in a man's life depended on the plan, or form, of that life as a whole; and that such a dependence

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 177, n. 2.



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affords no rule by which to determine its measure, or in accordance with which to moderate it. For what life is just for a man can only be known by knowing what pursuits, indulgences, and occupations are to be included in it; since till this is known, the life to be pronounced just or unjust is not before us for judgment. Rules indeed there may be that hold good for the most part; but in the cases where they hold no longer, this is because of what else is required of a man—actions of other kinds than fall under the rule and constitute the field of the particular virtue in question. Such rules therefore are not criteria. The only criterion would be the just life; but what that is cannot be known until we know what ought to be done in the case for which a criterion is sought, and therefore the just life cannot be a criterion.

I conjecture that Aristotle was dissatisfied with this position, as we all may well be, even if the matter really stands so; and that he sought to go further, and show that the matter is susceptible of a more exact treatment than this, though he admitted that the exactness possible in moral questions falls very far short of what is to be demanded in mathematics. To secure this greater exactness or precision, he substituted for the notion that the measure, *μετρίότης*, required in action or indulgence or emotion of any kind is to be determined by reference to the whole scheme of a good life, the notion that it can be determined to a certain place, upon a scale of quantity or degree, on which all actions, indulgences, or emotions of the kind in question must have a place; and he suggested that there may be rules, by help of which we may limit the range upon the scale within which that place falls for the agent concerned. It seemed to him easier to fix the mean by reference to contrary extremes or vices displayable in the same kind of action, indulgence, or emotion than by reference to anything so vague and hard to seize as the form or plan of life to which the required action must belong.

The doctrine of the mean has been often criticized. To one criticism Aristotle himself points out the answer. It does not imply that the difference between virtue and vice is one of degree. Characters not differing among themselves in degree may be grounded in conditions that do differ in degree or quantity, as beauty and ugliness of visible form depend on ratios between the quantities of the several parts of what is beautiful or ugly. It is a more serious objection that the differences in which virtuous and vicious acts are grounded are many of them not of degree or quantity, according to Aristotle's own account. The even-tempered man, or *πρᾶος*, will show anger not only in the right degree, but with the right persons; the generous man will give not only as much as but to whom and when he should. Such conditions fit well enough into Plato's account



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of "temperance," but not into the theory of the mean.<sup>1</sup> Again, even if differences of quantity or degree more pervasively distinguished the "matter" of actions in the mean from those in either extreme than in fact they do, it would be a mistake to think that by directing attention to this Aristotle helps us to discover what is right in a given situation. No doubt if we knew already what was too much or too little, that knowledge would help us towards knowledge of what virtue requires, and the more so, the less difference there was between the excess and the defect. But in fact the knowledge that this would be too much and that too little is often reached through recognizing something else than either to be right or nearly right. And right rules are no better guides because they determine a mean than if they were like the commandments, "Do not kill," "Do not steal," "Do not lie." These hold good for the most part; but our difficulties arise when taking life, or ignoring rights of property, or saying what is false, seems the least evil course in the circumstances; and the rule does not help us to know when it should be broken. So a rule that fixes limits beyond which one should not go in either direction holds good only for the most part; the mean may fall between them for most agents in most situations; but relatively to a particular agent in a particular situation the rule may fail.

For if we consider a virtue that is especially patient of being presented as depending on the degree of certain impulses or *πάθη*, viz. courage, we must admit that there are situations in which the courageous man should avoid all danger, or again none. And we remember the man to whom Jesus said, "Sell all that thou hast." If then the limits between which, when we consider all occasions for a certain sort of action or affection, *πρᾶξις* or *πάθος*,<sup>2</sup> we must admit that the mean may lie are all and nothing, there is the same range for the virtue which is in the mean and for the vices which are not. We may have rules, as has been said, holding good for the most part, but so much is compatible with Plato's exposition. If we want more, and ask to what we should look, when the rules do not apply, Plato has at least something to say. We should look to what other acts, indulgences, pursuits seem required of us or commendable in our course of life. This will not tell us how to act now; but it will direct our attention to that of which consideration is necessary, if we are to reach a judgment. Aristotle substitutes for this reference to the play which should be allowed in one's life to other impulses, desires and interests a reference to the different possible extents of play that may be allowed to the one whose part is in question;

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 176, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle says that his *μεσότητες* are *περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις*, and the particular virtues differ according to the sort of *πάθη* and *πράξεις* they concern.



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and in consequence he has nothing to say regarding cases where a rule applicable for the most part should not be observed.

And in the *Eudemian Ethics* this is acknowledged: "When a man's action is rightly irregular, it is in the mean; for in a way the extremes fall within the mean."<sup>1</sup> Nothing is now left of the doctrine of the mean, except that there are useful rules of conduct, to be followed for the most part. What was intended, as I believe, to give more precision to that part of the analysis of moral virtue which concerns the description of the "acts and affections," approved by wisdom and sustained by courage, than Plato's account of *σωφροσύνη* gave, has turned out to give less. Indeed, it affords no guidance whatever. For if I were to ask what scope I ought to give in my life to the indulgence of my love of music (say), or travel, it is of some use to be told: Look beyond that activity, and consider what else there is for you to do and enjoy in life, how different determinations of your question will affect the rest of your life, and with which adjustment you think you will be living best. But it is of no use to be told: The degree or extent of scope to be given it must lie in a mean, and the mean lies between giving it none at all, and giving it all possible scope and the first place in your consideration.

For these reasons, while I think that Aristotle in his definition of moral virtue was following and trying to improve upon Plato's analysis of justice in the soul, I also think that by the modification he made in it, viz. by introducing the doctrine of the mean, he in fact largely spoilt it.

<sup>1</sup> III. xiv. 1234<sup>b</sup> 4. *ὅταν μὲν γὰρ καλῶς ἀνώμαλοι ᾖσιν, οἱ μέσοι γίνονται· ἐν τῷ μέσῳ γὰρ ἐστὶ πῶς τὰ ἄκρα.*



# ITINERARIUM MENTIS IN DEUM

GERALD CATOR

Console thyself, thou wouldst not seek Me hadst thou not found Me.

PASCAL.

*Prefatory. The Logic of Theism.*—Our world, the thing or complex of things, which is continuous and co-ordinate with our present perception, is self-transcendent. The proof is from observation, from our reactions, which are often more sensitive than our direct observations, from the testimony of philosophers, expert psychologists, and poets (cited in the text).

To say that our world is self-transcendent is to say that it presents itself to our minds as indigent of *some* sort of supplement or complement having *some* sort of ontological status which it implies in *some* capacity.

The problem of the Logic of Theism is the problem of determining, assigning a definite value to, these "somes." In other words, the proof of God is the proof that what "our world implies" when it is made determinate corresponds with the received conception of God in such a way as to justify the substitution of the name God for the indication "what our world implies."

We begin with "what our world implies" as a determinable, and we proceed to determine it, that is to say, to make clear, distinct, and explicit what it is obscurely, confusedly, and implicitly from the first onset. We explore by various methods (see text).

To illustrate my meaning, and only to illustrate my meaning, let me suppose that we are successful in determining that "what our world implies" is (a) as regards ontological status something *existent* (existence, since it was in question, here counts as a determination of the determinable); (b) as regards relation, related to our world as its supreme cause; (c) as regards intrinsic character; endowed with such attributes as omniscience, omnipotence, and perfection; then we should be justified in giving to the determinable "what our world implies" now determined as "something existent, supreme cause of our world, having intelligence, will, and goodness," the name God. We should have proved the existence of God, or should have shown that the existence of God can be inferred from our world. Or rather, I will say that if we proved the existence of a Being in whom the most salient and important features of the received notion of God were realized, we should have proved the existence of God for all practical purposes, inserting this limitation because it



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might seem that our determinable still further determined might develop characteristics incompatible with the received notion of God (e.g. such a unity as to be *incompatible* with triunity). However it may be with this speculative difficulty, which I do not personally believe to be insuperable, if we could get so far as I have described, then as a matter of practical perplexity and controversy the issue as between Theism and any available alternative construction of reality would be decided.

These prefatory remarks are not intended as a summary of what will be attempted in the body of the paper. They are intended to strip the mystery from the process of proving the existence of God, and to suggest that it consists in the determination of a determinable which in its most indeterminate and obscure form is a given fact of observation.

What a fact, or a complex of facts, implies is a property of it, and belongs to it in its own right, whether or not any mind which is aware of the fact is also aware of the implication.

But when a fact which has implications is present to a mind, then since the fact, so to speak, solicits of the mind the recognition of its implications, and this solicitation, being a sort of action emanating from the fact cannot be entirely inefficacious, there is produced in the mind *at least* an incipient inclination to recognize the implications, and this inclination reflected back by the mind on to the fact which is its origin causes the fact to seem to the mind to be charged with interrogation and surrounded by a sort of aura or fringe of suggestion.

In other language, the fact produces in the mind a state of wonder, and itself seems wonderful. This state is the beginning of reflection.

If there is a God occupying such a position in Reality as monotheistic religion assigns to Him, He will be implied by every fact at least in the capacities of its exemplar, final and efficient cause, and therefore, on the theistic hypothesis, and in accordance with what has been said above about the inclination evoked by implication, every fact will be accompanied by *at least* an incipient reference of itself to God in the above-mentioned capacities, and therefore, correlatively, by an incipient awareness of God as terminating this reference.

By inference I shall mean that spontaneous reaction of the mind by which the given object is enlarged by being recognized as surrounded by a field of implication. This is much less than is ordinarily meant by inference, but I adopt this terminology to introduce my contention that while this first act is ampliative and irreplaceable (since it inducts us into the intelligible world), what follows on it,



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which I shall call the development of the inference or the development, may be carried out in more than one way. In my view the totality which is constituted by the original given object, together with its field of implication, is co-extensive with the universe, and it has a structure such that there is within it a "proper place" for everything nameable. All therefore of what I am calling the development consists in filling in this original schema out of its own implicit resources.

The ways of development are Meditation, Logical Education,<sup>1</sup> and what I will call Dialectical Meditation. Logical education has certain advantages (communicability, recoverability, verifiability), in virtue of which it may be regarded as *primus inter pares*, but it is no more than this. It is one way of doing what may be done otherwise, and not all the advantages are on its side.

*Meditation.*—This method consists in making the mind sensitive, docile, responsive, to the solicitations of the object, in purifying it and freeing it from diverting and obstructive pre-occupations so that it can take in the messages which things are striving to communicate, the most important and pervasive, though not the most strident and insistent of which is "He made us." This is the way of the Saints, and hence, as Joubert says, "The great Saints are great Metaphysicians." Hence also it is that the clean of heart see God.

*Logical Education.*—Meditation is a method of becoming aware of the implications of the object by enhancing the intrinsic sensitivity of the mind. Logical education is a dodge for making the object as if it was more insistent than it is. It does for the mind what a telescope or microscope does for the eye. By logical education the implications of the object are enhanced up to perceptibility level by being apperceived in terms of simpler implications, or, in the ideal limiting case of a perfect logical demonstration, by being apperceived, *via* intermediaries if necessary, in terms of elementary implications which are, for every mind, inseparable from the object. Logical education does for the clear of head what meditation does for the clean of heart.

*Dialectical Meditation.*—This method has in common with Meditation that it proceeds by intending the mind on the object, and in common with education that it proceeds by steps or stages, but the terms required for these steps are not links but stepping-stones, guides to the mind's eye. Ground is gained a little at a time, consolidated, and then made the basis for a fresh advance. This method can be applied both to the object and to the mind. Suppose I pick up a broken flint and am in doubt whether it is a sport of nature or an artefact, I may be able to resolve my doubt by comparing it, on one side with an undoubted sport, and on the other side with an undoubted

<sup>1</sup> Deduction is a sub-form of education, a way of effecting educations.



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artefact. The comparison, supposing the flint to be really an artefact, will bring out on the one side the absence of the marks of natural origin, and on the other side the presence of the marks of human workmanship. Or again, I may be discontented and restless, but unable to analyse my state of mind until I am led to compare my state of mind with that of St. Augustine, "Thou madest us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it repose in Thee." *Then I may be able to see in my mind what was there all the time, but what until aided by this comparison I was unable to discriminate.*

Any object which is such as to be capable of supporting an inference, afterwards to be developed by one of the methods already mentioned, must be pregnant with self-transcendence, and as a result of its effort to give expression to this self-transcendence it will be known, clearly or dimly, as in a context, a sort of logical analogue of space, surrounding it. This context is the universal of which the given object is a particular value or instance.

Thus Bosanquet<sup>1</sup> says, 'there is something in a curve as given which is capable of dictating a continuation and completion of its outline.'

Whitehead<sup>2</sup> speaks of Nature as exhibiting "entwined prehensive unities each suffused with the modal presence of others," and of "the brooding presence of the whole on to its various parts." This modal suffusion of the primary object, this brooding presence of the whole universe in each of its parts, is the character which is the basis of the possibility of inference. Again, Wallace<sup>3</sup> says, "All objects of science, all terms of knowledge, lead out of themselves and seek for a resting-point and centre. They are severally inadequate and partial, and crave adequacy and completeness. They tend to organize themselves and to constitute a system or universe."

Professor Stout has made this, to me, all important point, that of the given self-transcendence of the given, *the self-transcendence of the given as a given fact*, specially clear. I will therefore allow myself to quote from him<sup>4</sup> at some length. "The presentation in asserting itself, also asserts more than its own being. It does not present itself in isolation as something self-complete and self-existent. From the outset it is cognized as part of a system, having its existence only in relation to other parts of the system. The special context to which it belongs may be very vaguely apprehended." "Apart from classification, interpretation, and description, what is immediately given cannot constitute an object of thought at all. It is never an object by itself,

<sup>1</sup> *Logic*, vol. ii, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Science and the Modern World* (Popular Edition), pp. 104, 108.

<sup>3</sup> *Logic of Hegel*.

<sup>4</sup> *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*, pp. 309, 310, 373. See also p. 256, and *Analytic Psychology*, vol. i. p. 95 (Implicit and Schematic Apprehension).



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but only as part of a context. We have no means of defining it so as to draw a line of demarcation between it and its implication. This is impossible, because in defining it we must describe or characterize it, and in describing or characterizing it we must include its connection with what is other than itself." "The process through which the parts of the Universe are successively revealed must start from primary objects, which ultimately specify for thought all other objects. These primary objects can be nothing else than those modes of immediate experience which we have call presentations. But this implies not only that presentations are essentially fragmentary, and so related in various ways to being which transcends their own existence, but also that they are *apprehended* as being incomplete, and therefore as related to objects which are not themselves presentations falling within the experience of the moment."<sup>1</sup>

The entry on the Itinerarium to God may be an impression in consciousness of an implication of the primary object which in respect of clearness and distinctness is far below the level at which it can be introspectively identified. It may emerge at first only in the form of a vague, rudimentary, spordic aurge.

There is in the *Ingoldsby Legends*—I must surely ask many pardons for introducing such an illustration in such a connection, but I can think of no other equally telling—a recipe for a salad which ends, "some onion atoms lurk within the bowl and unsuspected animate the whole." So I would say that the first rudimentary, subconscious reference to God orients and animates the whole of our mental life.

We may lack something and yet be unaware that we lack anything. Mr. Chesterton<sup>2</sup> has described the consciousness of the Graeco-Roman world as being haunted by a sense of "the presence of the absence of God." This seems to me convincingly true, but they may well have been unaware, not only of *what* they lacked, but that they lacked anything.

I said to heart,  
How goes it?  
Heart replied,  
Right as a Ribstone Pippin,  
*But it lied.*

BELLOC.

It lied indeed, I should like to gloss, but I may have lied in the most transparent good faith.

Professor James has described vividly the way in which a forgotten name haunts and teases us, "there is a sort of gap in

<sup>1</sup> This ultimate specification by presentations gives the true and acceptable sense of the anti-Platonist slogan, "Nothing is in the intellect which was not previously in the senses."

<sup>2</sup> *Everlasting Man*, Part I, chap. iv.



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consciousness and in the gap a sort of beckoning wraith of the name." I think that there was in the Pagan consciousness, though at a low level of insistence, a sort of disturbing beckoning wraith of the Self-Same. And all our thinking can ever do is to make the gap relatively definite till it outlines a silhouette. God is ever present to us as ever inaccessible, immanent as transcendent. I have read of a lady named Blanche who suffered from some sort of aphasia which prevented her being able to recall her own name, but she knew it because she could explain, "It's what you do to almonds by scalding them." So with us, the word that solves the riddle of the Universe escapes us, and yet in some sense is pervasively present to us, "Deo quasi ignoto conjungimur."

There is something about our world, a sort of ambience. It presents itself from the first as self-transcendent, instantial, fragmentary. It challenges, solicits, provokes the mind. It will not let us make an inventory of its content of facts and let it go at that. We react to a quite universal and inevitable impression when we speak of an open secret, or of the "Riddle of the Universe"; we do not speak of the riddle of the meaning of a number of weathering marks on a rock surface, but we do speak of the riddle of the meaning of a half-obliterated inscription.

The solicitation of our world on us varies in insistence according to the favourableness of inner and outer conditions. Sometimes it is no more than a perfunctory stirring only just distinguishable from sheer matter of factness, sometimes it needs only just a touch of enhancement to become the successful delivery of an entrusted message, "He made us." The most favourable outer conditions are morning and evening calm, when objects are distinct enough to support thought, and yet the mind is not distracted by a profusion of noonday detail.

Whether or not man is definitely a religious animal, he must be willing to fly in the face of all the facts who will deny that man is a *meta*-physical animal, an animal in whose object-consciousness the natural and physical is impregnated and internally qualified by an awareness of the numinous, the mystical, the supernatural.

If this is not clear from a casual introspection of our ordinary daily business consciousness, all doubt is at once removed if the power of consciousness is a little heightened, say, up to the Wordsworthian level so that it becomes sensitive to the less intrusive exigencies of the object—to those implications emanating from the object which tough-minded realists in philosophy overlook to their irreparable loss.

What I may call the Wordsworthian consciousness may be used as a sort of illustrative middle term to make a bridge between the



business consciousness and the full-blown theotropic or mystical consciousness.

Who is there who, when his habitual level of consciousness is even only a little heightened, is not aware of "moving about in worlds not realized"? "Obstinate questionings of sense and outward things," "the presence and the power of greatness," "sense sublime of something far more deeply interfused." Is it not true that we do at some moments, our clearest and best, "dimly guess what time in mists confounds." <sup>1</sup>

Intensify the business consciousness, that is, make it more responsive to the message of the object, and it becomes Wordsworthian. Repeat the operation on the Wordsworthian consciousness and it becomes theotropic; the diffused awareness of something numinous immersed in nature becomes liberated and concentrated into an awareness of God subsistent in Himself as referred to by nature.<sup>2</sup> The whole process is a process of condensation or precipitation. Of making explicit the implicit. Of achieving a successful expression of a haunting problematic presence. Something is at first subconsciously active as an urge, then emerges into consciousness as a diffused pervading quality (the numinous), and finally is precipitated as a transcendent, adorable object "present as absent."

Wordsworth's Nature contains God as it were diffused and in solution. The primary object implies, in implying it refers, in referring it refers upwards (the *metaphysical* is the *supernatural*). In referring upwards it refers to the absolute goal of its reference. In referring to the absolute goal of its reference it refers to its absolute measure in respect of entity and worth, therefore to a subsistent concentration of reality and perfection, therefore to that which in respect to it (the primary object) is supreme cause of its reality and worth, therefore to its adorable, transcendent Creator; since no other status of the referred to object can give the reference the requisite finality, absoluteness, and uniqueness. We are looking really, though at first unconsciously, for something, then we look consciously. In the adorable, transcendent Creator we find what absorbs every detail of the reference, and is therefore then recognized as its proper object from its first dim beginning.

I remember reading that Carlyle, on being told that one of the New England Transcendentalists had said that she "accepted the Universe," commented, "Gad, she'd better." No doubt this remark of the sage's was rewarded with the looked-for laugh. But really it

<sup>1</sup> *Hound of Heaven*.

<sup>2</sup> Something like the argument I am here attempting is to be found stated in a masterly way in *The Natural and the Supernatural*, by John Oman. I refer in particular to pp. 134, 136, 138, 169. See also the whole of chap. ix, on "The Individual and Individuality."



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was rather cheap. To accept because resistance is hopeless is not really to accept, and willing acceptance as a duty indicates a pre-science of a factor in the Universe which, when it is successfully discriminated, is recognized as Him "in whose will is our peace." It is this same prescience which no doubt is the cause that, as Bosanquet has remarked, none of the major philosophers end on a note of rebellion and defiance, and that, may I add, those minor ones who do so end, strike us as theatrical *poseurs*.

I must apologize if some part of these last pages seems rather headlong and breathless. I will now try to corroborate by way of logical eduction the results reached, and in doing so I shall hope to remove at least some of the obscurities.

Let me call "P implies Q" the inferential complex. This complex is triune because any variation in any one of its three elements entails a sympathetic compensating variation in each of the remaining two. The whole structure of the complex is therefore implicit in each of its elements. In the mode of development which I have hitherto been employing the procedure has been to develop P, the primary object, and, for us, independent variable, of the complex, and to obtain as a result a compensating development of the remainder. Now suppose the initiating wonder to take not the form "What does the World imply?", but the form "What is the relation between the essential world and God?". I say essential because there is yet no question of existence. Both God and the world may be mere floating ideas. The object of the technique called logical eduction is to educate the mind's eye to perceive (if such is in fact the case) that the relation between God and the world is a relation of implication such that if P in the inferential complex is given the value "the World," then Q will receive the value "God." This is like educating the eye to perceive the artefact character of the doubtful flint.

The ideally satisfactory procedure would be to begin with an elementary implication, and to enrich it gradually till it perfectly fitted the case of the world and God. I must content myself with attempting something less, namely, to show that the form of development of an inferential complex is such that it culminates in a reference identifiable in a very crucial characteristic with the form of the reference of the world to God.

An object implies in virtue of its being an instance of a universal. What it implies is primarily that part of the area of the universal which it does not itself occupy. In fact the primary implicate is the "other" of the implicans within the area of the universal. The relation of what implies to what is implied is therefore (a) positive on the basis of the universal, and (b) negative and complementary



within the universal; but (c), and this reacts on (a) and (b), so long as the mediating universal has any residual character of its own besides its character of relating P and Q, the implication is not a pure case because in these conditions the universal having its own positive character affects the implication and forms, as it were, a matter within which it is immersed. When therefore the implication is perfectly relevant and pure, the whole content of the universal is absorbed into the terms, and therefore the universal as having an independent status vanishes. It is to this vanishing, in the interests of implication, of the universal which is the basis of implication that I wish to call special attention. Orthodox theology, Thomism is the most prominent instance, finds itself committed to what at first sight appear to be intolerable paradoxes, if not open contradictions, in its account of God. It has to say that though the world is relative to God, God is not correlative to the world. This is saying that the relation between P and Q is not a relation between Q and P. God is the Absolute Being. He is not in any class, however general. There is nothing univocally in common between Him and any creature. In all propositions about God the terms have a special appropriated, one might almost say Pickwickian, sense. All our rational equations seem on the point of refusing to work, and of talking nonsense, e.g. the coincidence of opposites.<sup>1</sup> Now I shall try to show that the culminating and limiting case of implication exhibits these same paradoxes so that they prove to be not irrational but essential to any construction of Reality which is a really successful expression of that implication with which the primary object is pregnant from the first.

The following extract from St. Bonaventure's famous treatise, from which, of course, I have taken my title, will serve as an introduction: "The intellect understands signified terms when it understands what each is by definition. But definition is in terms of the superior, and this superior must in turn be defined by its superior until we reach the supremest and most general knowledge which being lacking it is impossible to understand thoroughly the inferiors. Therefore, unless we know the definition of *ens per se* we cannot thoroughly know the definition of any special substance. . . . Being can be known as fractional and complete being. As imperfect and perfect being, as being in potency and being in act, as *secundum quid* and *simpliciter* as in part and totally, as transient and abiding, as *per aliud* and as *per se*, as mixed with non-being and as pure, as dependent and absolute, as posterior and prior, as mutable and immutable, as simple and as composite. And as privations and defects can only be known in terms of the correlative perfections, our intellect cannot

<sup>1</sup> This is specially emphasized in *S. Thomas D'Aquin*, by Père Sestillanges, O.P., by which I have been much influenced, partly by way of suggestion, partly by way of reaction (see vol. i, pp. 142, 162, 182, 189, 275).



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fully understand any created being unless in relation to understanding of the most pure, most actual, most complete and absolute being, which is simple and eternal being, and in whose purity are the ideas of all things" (*Itinerarium*, Cap. III).<sup>1</sup>

The primary object implies in two dimensions. First, it implies, laterally so to speak, other possible primary objects on a level with itself in respect of ontological status, and which together with it make up the finite world of which it is a member; second, as a representative of this world it implies in the direction of the non-transfinite. This second dimension of implication is the direction in which the implication of God is to be looked for, and is the only one which will concern us. The correlates in the first direction may be called co-ordinate correlates of the primary object, the correlate in the second direction is the unity which is correlative to the multiplicity of the actual and co-ordinate possible primary objects, it is therefore universal in comparison with the primary object and as universal superior and dominant. The more clearly its implication is perceived the more it tends to become separate and subsistent as well as dominant. The universal idea is a tendentious surrogate for the universal cause. I shall call it at first the superior correlate.

Now take the world as implying merely, if we like, as a fact in the phenomenology of mind, such a superior correlate. If this correlate has anything univocally in common with the world, then this correlate and the world form a second multiplicity which again bespeaks as its correlate a second unity of a yet higher order. If we can significantly say God *and* the world, additively, a unity of this multiplicity is implied which will be intensively and in unity the counterpart of what God *and* the World is extensively and in multiplicity. Now I do not propose to say "this cannot go on to infinity," because so far as the abstract serial form is concerned it may be equally true that it cannot do anything else either, and we shall have arrived at an impasse. But this series has direction (orientation), it is therefore part of its internal and positive meaning that it *refers* to. A reference to nothing is no reference. A reference of which the finite is the basis is *ipso facto*, and as a matter of description a reference of which the transfinite is the goal. The finite does as a matter of description carry this transfinite reference, whatever the interpretation may be, therefore it can. From fact to possibility the inference is valid. What is actual cannot be impossible. I think that those who deny this transfinite reference are either uncultivated in respect to the appreciation of implication, or are blinded by a theory to a plain fact. The most plausible way of escape is to allow the term of this

<sup>1</sup> It is evident from these antitheses that Spearman's third neogenetic principle, the Eduction of Correlates, was thoroughly familiar to St. Bonaventure.



transfinite reference only a formal, or *als ob* or *focus imaginarius* status. My answer to this way of escape I can best put in the form of a criticism of Kant. This criticism has been suggested to me by reading Norman Kemp Smith's *Commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason*. Its essence is that these are two tendencies in Kant, a sceptical and an idealist, and that one or the other must have its way entirely. Kant was convinced by the history of metaphysics that no science of metaphysics was possible; he was also convinced by the history of natural science that this is possible (for it is actually in being). Being then convinced, or all but convinced, of the fact, he was not too exacting when he found what seemed like a theory which seemed to place the boundary of the knowable in about the right place. That is so as to include Science, which has no enemies; and to exclude Theology, which has no friends. I say "what seemed a theory," because to limit knowledge to the sphere of possible experience is merely to limit it to objects which in some undefined respect are like material things, and I cannot see that this limitation need exclude anything in heaven or on earth. If an electron is includable, why not an angel.

If Kant's sceptical tendency had had its way he would have professed a solipsism of the specious present, or less than that; he would have allowed only *als ob* reality to other human minds (are these objects of possible experience?) to all the absent in space, and to all the past in time. He would have said that the historical reality of Queen Elizabeth consists in the present being "as if" she had preceded it. I knew a priest who used to say that Adam might have been created with a half-digested pork chop from last night's dinner in his stomach. I suppose the wine of Cana of Galilee had a specious past, and that some local connoisseur may have rolled it round his tongue and identified the vintage.<sup>1</sup>

So far, then, for Kant's sceptical tendency. Now as to his rationalist or idealist tendency. If this had had its way, he would have made the ideas and then the Ideal of Reason dominate and measure the sensible world. He would have allowed the sensible world such reality so conditioned as the ideas prescribe for it, and *not conversely*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It is, says my authority, "... not as having existed in itself, that even the immemorial past course of the world can be represented as real ... a similar interpretation has to be given to all propositions which assert the present reality of that which has never been actually experienced" (*Commentary*, p. 503). The passages from Kant which are quoted in support are from the *Antimony of Pure Reason*, sec. vi (Kemp Smith's translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 442, Kant, A 496, B 524).

<sup>2</sup> Our awareness of the conditioned as being conditioned presupposes, over and above the categories, an antecedent awareness of Ideal standards; and to that latter more fundamental form of consciousness all our criteria of truth and reality are ultimately due" (*Commentary*, p. 416). I wish to reiterate that I do not advance this as a substantive criticism of Kant. I am not competent.



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Of the two apparent options open to Kant, one, the sceptical, is really self-negating. If we follow the second way to the end we have to crown it *vi formae* by positing the inaccessible and indispensable Ideal of Reason, first as exemplar cause of the whole realm of essences, the absolute and separate unity of all multiplicity. The universal to become definite must become substantial and separate, (see Stout, *op. cit.*, p. 218), but to get what we want as we want it we should have to pass the off scale of being *at the upper end*. God therefore is known as unknown, present as absent, immanent as transcendent, satisfying as baffling, intimate as ultimate baffling.

Then, since however long we go on determining this world of essences, beginning from a mere schema and tending towards concreteness, we can never in this way clothe it with actual existence, and since actual existence is given as a fact (and is also implied as the ideal limit of fully determined essence), we have to endow the Ideal of Reason with a function corresponding to the bestowal of actuality on the inherently only possible. This function in an intelligence, and a subsistent intelligible is self-intelligible, is causality through will. The Ideal of Reason as the seat of efficient causality is therefore actual. God as the *total* cause of beings which are not capable of entering into an additive relation to Him is Absolute Being, Creator *ex nihilo*. Grand Separé, Ganz Andere, Cor Cordium. A monistic construction of reality is impossible because it does not allow of a successful expression of the negativity which is indubitably there. A dualistic construction denies the indispensable absoluteness of the Absolute. Theism is able to do justice to the finite and to the infinite, to provide, as it were, a proper place for each so that neither have finite things to be depressed into appearances or illusions in the interest of the integrity of the Absolute, nor has the Absolute to be dissipated to maintain the reality of appearances.

The status of creaturehood solves an otherwise insoluble philosophical riddle. The creature is no *other* to God, and thus dualism is avoided. The creature is not nothing, and thus acosmism is escaped.<sup>1</sup>

But I have as a convenient device presented my ideas in the form of a criticism which, as a criticism, may or may not hit the mark. My main point is that if we are to respect reason at all we must go all the way with it, and must let it and it alone prescribe its limits. Either we must surrender ourselves unreservedly to the implication of the primary object and take what it gives to us as the standard and not as the subject of judgment, or else we must deny it from the beginning, and then, except as a result of inconsequence, we shall have no available beginning to deny it from.

Two criticisms of Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* show what a difficulty he had in dealing with Appearances which he was not willing to substantiate into Creatures. Professor Pringle-Pattison in an early review illustrated Bradley's treatment of Appearances by quoting from Tacitus, "they make a solitude and call it peace." Mr. Schiller gave one of his anti-absolutist gibes the title, "On preserving Appearances."



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I am aware of the danger that, in this last part, I may appear to some to have been indulging in sterile logic-chopping. Let me therefore in conclusion sum up so as to try to show that the logical interest of the last part is continuous with the religious interest of the first part. (1) What the primary object implies is inseparable from what it is. (2) The primary object objectively and solicitously, though not in the early stages as a matter of subjective appreciation, implies God in such and such capacities, (3) It is impossible to produce a fully satisfying description of the primary object, one which expresses it intimately, except by making patent the tension of implication which is latent in it. (4) There are three techniques for releasing this implication. In all of them the mind and the effect form a conservative system, and assistance from without, though indispensable, is purely ministerial and obstetric. (5) What logical eduction yields is an abstract or extract of the more massive and polydimensional satisfaction which is yielded by meditation.

The whole personality of the Saint is the vehicle of a development which is reproduced schematically in the intelligence of the Philosopher



## KANT'S ETHICAL FORMALISM

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THE generally accepted interpretation of Kant's formula "act only on that maxim which thou canst at the same time will to be a universal law," is roughly as follows:—

Our moral experience is fundamentally a consciousness of the difference between Duty and Inclination, between "doing what we ought to whether we like to or not, and doing merely what we like whether we ought to or not."<sup>1</sup> When we have open to our choice different acts, there are some which we would like to do, others we would not like to do, and perhaps others towards which we are indifferent; or we like to do any one of them, or we may dislike all, or we may be indifferent to all. But we must ignore our inclinations, our aversions, our attractions, and our indifferences. We must ask ourselves which of the acts open to our choice *ought* we to do, no matter what our feelings in the matter may be. But how are we to know what act we *ought* to do? Since our inclinations are no guide to what we *ought* to do, i.e. no guide to what our duty is, we must derive our knowledge of what our duty is from reason. It is the function of reason to concern itself with law. In the sciences reason tries to discover the laws which connect together all phenomena; in the sphere of human action, the function of reason is to prescribe law in accordance with which man ought to conduct his life. But what law of conduct does reason as the source of our moral guidance tell us to conform to? All men ought to do their duty, therefore all men can; and if they all can, then all must know what their duty is. Duty must therefore be a law which is known by all. The only law which can be known by all is the abstract form of law, or the general nature of law itself. The general nature of law is that it holds universally. We ought only to do that act which we can will to be a universal law.

Furthermore, Kant's distinction between the motives of our acts and their consequences is understood somewhat as follows: The consequences of our acts consist in those concrete values which are related to human needs. If I tell the truth, I satisfy someone's need to know; if I give away a loaf of bread, I satisfy someone's need to eat. But the concrete values should never be the motives of my act. Even if my act will secure some particular good thing for others, or even for all mankind, such as health, for example,

<sup>1</sup> Professor Hoernlé's lecture notes quoted from memory.



the securing of this particular good thing should never be the reason why I act as I do. In other words, when I select out a particular act as one I ought to do, my reason for selecting it should never be that it will make anyone wiser, or healthier, or happier. I must ignore whatever consequences my act may have. My sole reason for selecting out any particular act as my duty should be that it is intrinsically capable of being conceived of us a universal law; as an embodiment of the principle that what I conceive of as obligatory for me, I must be able to conceive of as obligatory for all, no matter what results from fulfilling such an obligation. Reason demands of all men conformity to the same laws, not because such conformity would increase human happiness, but because conformity is an end in itself. All men should, *qua* moral beings, be treated alike, irrespective of what effect such-like treatment will have upon our human needs and desires, because such-like treatment is an end in itself. I cannot secure this like treatment, but I can at any rate do that which would be required of me if such-like treatment were established. My motive would be "like treatment for all as an end in itself"—treatment not to be considered with reference to its consequences.

Finally, the object of Kant's examples in which he illustrates the application of his moral formula is usually taken to be this, viz., to show how, independently of social traditions or moral upbringing, we can pick out from all the possible actions open to our choice those which alone could be moral duties for anybody. If this conventional interpretation of Kant's theory be correct, then Kant's ethics is ludicrous. In order to make sense of Kant's theory I feel compelled to give it a fresh interpretation and to criticize his commentators.

My objection to the conventional interpretations and criticisms of Kant's formula is that they are preoccupied with its value as a practical guide, and that they misunderstand the kind of guidance Kant meant his formula to afford. This misunderstanding is due to a misunderstanding of his formalism as expressed in his dictum, and illustrated in his examples.

The aim of this article is to show that the primary aim of Kant's formula and of his examples is not to provide us with a rule of thumb which can be the sole and complete guide of our conduct, but to express scientifically the essence of morality and to illustrate its nature.

I shall show what kind of guidance Kant's formulistic conception of duty *can* give. I shall then show that if we believe in an absolute standard of duty, unvarying and alike for all, we can yet maintain that different individuals and different peoples might have their own ideas as to what their particular duties are, and yet all alike



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be moral if they act in accordance with their consciences. Finally, we shall suggest why, and in what sense, Kant believed that if we listen to our consciences we must all necessarily come to recognize the same duties.

Every act may be viewed from two standpoints: (a) from the standpoint of the particular changes the act is intended to effect and the part these changes might possibly play in promoting the good of humanity; (b) from the standpoint of the impartiality and disinterestedness with which the act is undertaken, i.e. from the standpoint of the principle. We must therefore apply two standards in judging the worth of an act: (a) how far will what we intend to do promote the good of mankind; (b) did we honestly believe that our act would help to make human life better and happier, and is this why we undertook it, or did we undertake the act because it suited ourselves or because it might benefit someone in whose favour we happen to be prejudiced? These two standpoints are not identical. The first will vary with different individuals according to their insight into what constitutes the true good of mankind. The second standpoint is absolute. Did the agent ignore the effects his act might have upon himself, or upon those whom his feelings tend to favour, and did he judge, well or ill, from an impartial point of view that the changes he intended to effect would really be good for mankind? Judged by the effects an act really has upon the happiness of mankind, it may be worthless. But judged from the standpoint of the man's will to promote the good of mankind, the act may be morally good.

When Kant applies the test of consistency he really means "Is the act I intend to do consistent with my nature as a reasonable and therefore an impartial being?" If I am to act morally, then reason and not my likes and dislikes should be the motive of my conduct. The function of Reason is to take an objective standpoint. If we are to act consistently with our nature as rational beings, we must not measure the value of an act and judge its right to be effected by its appeal to our feelings, prejudices, and self-interest. We must transcend the subjective point of view and try to discover if an act is really worth while while doing whether we like it or not. Although we ignore our likes and dislikes and our prejudices, our reason may fail to come to a true decision as to what is objectively the best, but we can, at any rate, be impartial, according to our lights and therefore reasonable. A reasonable man may have a very imperfect conception of what is best for the welfare of mankind, but he may know when he is reasonable and impartial, and this reasonableness is the most important element of man's true good. To make mistakes is not inconsistent with our nature as rational creatures, but to put our own interests or those of our favourites first is. There is



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no absolute standard by means of which we can test whether any action is, under the circumstances, the best suited to improve human life. But there may be an absolute standard of reasonableness or impartiality. All men may know what reasonableness is, and be able to attain to it, and reasonableness may be the same whenever found, although it may find expression in different acts and may be variously enlightened as to what are the best acts in which to display itself. Can we state clearly the essence of reasonableness or impartiality so that we may test whether or not we have acted in a spirit of reasonableness, quite apart from the question, "Is what we have actually done really going to improve human life?" Of course, if we are reasonable we will try to find out if what we propose to do is really going to improve life, and our criterion of reasonableness must be able to test if we have really done our best to find out; but our moral criterion cannot tell us whether what we think best really is so. With these preliminary remarks we may turn to Kant's conception of the essence of morality as expressed in the formula, "act only on that maxim, etc.," and try to show that *Kant intended this formula as a criterion of reasonableness; as a test of our principles and not as a rule of thumb by means of which we can without fail single out those acts which alone can be an expression of the good will.*

Kant's formula merely attempts to make precise that minimum amount of knowledge which is possessed *a priori* by every rational being, and enables him to live a moral life. To be moral we must be fair and square in our dealings; we must genuinely *judge* what is the best we can do, instead of doing what we want to and finding moral excuses for it afterwards. In a word, we must act in accordance with the spirit of reason. Now Kant holds that we cannot be acting reasonably and impartially unless we are willing that, what we propose to do, should become a universal law. By asking ourselves, "Can I will that this act should become a universal law?" we rise to the rational plane; we examine an act from a *universal* or impartial standpoint. If I really believe an act is supremely good, then I would be only too glad to see it become a general practice, *i.e.* a universal law. If I am unwilling that my act become a universal law, it means that I do not really believe the act is good for all, but good only for me or from my point of view, *i.e.* only subjectively and not objectively good. By applying Kant's formula then we can test whether we have really *judged* the value of what we have purposed to do, from an impartial point of view. The rejoinder which most readily suggests itself is this: It is our duty to do the best *under the circumstances*; but that does not mean that if we judge a particular line of action to be the best in the circumstances, we must be able to wish that everybody would do likewise at all times; for under different circumstances the act will have a different value.



But, as we shall see later on, this criticism has force only if we think of the act in a very specific way. When Kant says we must be able to universalize our acts, he is thinking of those acts which are always a means to some ultimate end which all recognize as good, or of the quite general act of promoting the ultimate end. The acts which we cannot universalize, and which we may nevertheless feel morally obliged to do, Kant regards as variable means. For the time being it is sufficient to mention this point, as it will be discussed in full later on.

To sum up: May Kant not really have meant, though he does not explicitly say so, that the changes we will to effect are objectively good or bad? They cannot be both (it is possible, of course, that part of the changes may be good, and part bad), and that an act is morally right if it is directed towards the disinterested promotion of what appears to us to be the greatest amount of objective good. If we are aiming at the disinterested promotion of what we really believe to be the greatest amount of objective good, we would will that all aimed at the same objective good we are trying to promote. The rightness of our act is affected neither by the value of the results which do actually follow nor by the soundness of our judgment with regard to what we believe to be the greatest amount of objective good. Is there not underlying Kant's theory an extremely objectivistic theory of value, viz., that if we judge an act to be the best possible, we must believe that it is best for all to do it? If I really believe an object is square, I must believe it is square not merely for me, but for all; it is the same with regard to objective values. If we would not wish to see others do as we are doing, it means that we really think that our act had better be excluded from human conduct; this is tantamount to believing that the act is really bad, but we propose to do it because it happens to suit us or those in whose favour we are prejudiced.

But the willingness to promote the good impartially cannot by itself tell us what is good and worth promoting. Whence do we derive the conception of a good the willingness to promote which, disinterestedly and impartially, constitutes our moral goodness? Certain possible acts must first of all suggest themselves to us. These suggestions come from our various needs and experiences through which certain ends come to appear worth while. We require experience and that employment of reason in which it compares and correlates in order to arrive at the conception of values in relation to which we must take up an objective point of view. There is nothing in Kant's formula against his holding that our choices will vary with our experiences and our powers of comparing and correlating one value with another. But we cannot judge how good or bad a man is from the *moral point of view* by



what he *believes* to be the best he can do, or by what he achieves. All that we are entitled to extract from Kant's formula, so far, is that it cannot be morally right to aim at any ideal unless we can uphold it as an ideal for all. If we recognize an ideal as worthy of being realized, we should regard its realization as an obligation to be adhered to, and not sneak out of the obligation when it happens to inconvenience us or our friends. This would be putting our own convenience or that of our friends first, which is unfair and therefore immoral.

If we now turn to Kant's examples we shall see how readily they yield to the interpretation suggested in this article, and we shall understand why he seems to apply his formula, quite arbitrarily, in a negative way. However mistaken Kant may be in his notion of what constitutes impartiality, however mistaken he may be in his adherence to an extreme objectivistic theory of values, and however confused he becomes when he tends to regard the objective attitude itself as the only objective value, the function of his examples is to bring out the contrast between being biased or irrational, which is the essence of immorality, and being impartial or reasonable, which is the essence of morality; a contrast we often hide from ourselves both when selfishness inclines us to act contrary to what conscience or impartiality commands, and also when it does not.

The reason why Kant does not show the positive application of his formula is that his examples presuppose this application. His examples are instances of obligations we recognize, but from which we propose to exempt ourselves because they press heavily on us. Kant then proceeds to show that this exempting ourselves is immoral because motivated by partisanship, as may be shown by applying the test of impartiality.

Immorality implies a recognition of what, from an impartial point of view, appears to us to be right and a resolve to do something else. This exempting of ourselves, so Kant believed, means that we shut our ears to the voice of reason and give way to a weakness we have for ourselves or for our favourites. We recognize the obligation to be impartial and yet act from partisan motives. The incompatibility is between two different motives. But motives are the inner aspect of conduct and do not disclose themselves unmistakably in our acts. A tradesman may believe that it is a duty to be honest, but at the same time he himself may be honest because it happens to prosper his business. A selfish act may, from an external point of view, be the same as that which our conscience requires of us. It is from the inner side, from the point of view of motives, that the two are opposed. But the opposition cannot be illustrated forcefully when both motives lead to the same act. On the other



hand, if what selfishness inclines us to do is opposed to what our conscience requires of us, then it is easier to illustrate the incompatibility between impartiality and favouritism, justice and injustice; an incompatibility we try to hide from ourselves because if we see it we are in a dilemma: Either we may uphold our dignity as a moral being by fulfilling our obligation and sacrificing a cherished wish, or we may satisfy our selfish wish at the expense of our moral integrity. Suppose our hypothetical tradesman who recognizes honesty as a moral obligation, but fulfils his obligation from selfish motives, finds that he is being ruined, but can save himself by dishonesty. If now he decides to cheat because he thinks that under the circumstances he is justified in exempting himself from the obligation to be honest, we can show that he is acting contrary to the spirit of impartiality, which must be wrong if impartiality is right. In this way we can illustrate the incompatibility between the two motives of all human conduct, favouritism, which to Kant is always favouritism towards oneself, and impartiality. Our tradesman, as an impartial judge, believes that all men ought to be honest, and yet shirks the common obligation when it happens to be troublesome to him. His conscience is opposed to his actual conduct. But he will probably not only shirk the obligation he recognizes, he will probably say to himself, "I recognize the obligation to be honest, but under the circumstances I feel justified in exempting myself." There will then be a contradiction in the man's soul. A contradiction is always a sign of falsity, and the falsity here is moral evil; a "lie in the soul." The man is moved by two contradictory motives, neither of which he can whole-heartedly surrender. But that he has acted from a partisan motive, and has therefore really surrendered the moral principle to which he has paid only lip service, may be shown as follows: Would he be willing to see cheating become a general practice? Certainly not if he is proposing to cheat from selfish motives. For then he puts his interests first, and he cannot at the same time be willing that others should try to hinder him in his selfish purpose, by cheating in favour of *their* interests. His motive will not stand the test of impartiality, and must therefore be selfish. We cannot be impartial in our selfishness. If it is right for me to be selfish, then it must be right for all. But this is a self-contradictory proposition, for if my interests come first, the interest of others cannot also be first.

Kant's theory, as far as we have examined it, does not necessarily imply that every man who wills to do good must arrive at the same judgment with regard to what in particular ought to be done. A complete ethical theory ought to show as far as possible who the good will may enlighten itself with regard to the end it ought to promote. But this problem belongs rather to applied Ethics



than to the metaphysical basis of Ethics. The *Critique of Pure Reason* shows that our scientific knowledge is based on the Causal Principle, and tries to justify the validity of this principle. The causal principle cannot tell us what the particular cause is of any particular event, and it is not the business of pure logic to show how we can get a content for our empty form, "Every event must have a cause." But at any rate we cannot suppose a set of conditions as the cause of an event, if such a supposition is directly inconsistent with the causal principle. For example, if the conditions are found to be absent while the event is present, it would be nonsense to speak of them as the cause of the event, saying that sometimes they are the cause and sometimes not. This amounts to a denial of the causal principle. Similarly, it is not the business of a treatise on the "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals" to point out what ends a reasonable man ought to promote. We can no more state dogmatically what conditions are best suited for the promotion of man's complete good than we can say with absolute certainty what the particular causes of particular events must be. In the *Metaphysics of Ethics* we are dealing with the nature and justification of first principles, viz. the *a priori* principle of conduct considered in abstraction from the particulars to which it has to be applied. Our loyalty to this principle, which constitutes our moral goodness, does not vary with the various applications of the principle. Furthermore, this purely formal principle does not leave us without *all* specific guidance, for in a sense the command "Be impartial" does tell us what to do. It prescribes one act at least which is obligatory upon all, namely, "Be reasonable and not prejudiced in whatever you do." This is in itself an act. It is that inner decision of the will for which we are ourselves entirely responsible, because we do not depend on experience to teach us what this act of good will is, nor how to do it. Nor does this act change, however much, with increasing knowledge and experience, the channels in which the good will issues may change. This guiding of the good will is the variable element in the moral life, and depends on factors other than the good will itself. Now while admitting that the absoluteness of dutifulness is compatible with different opinions as to what our particular duties are, we might nevertheless argue that there will be a tendency to recognize common moral obligations.

We will come to a working agreement about certain ends, and therefore about certain general laws which will on the whole secure the promotion of those ends. It may be that of no law can we say that it ought to hold always. But law there must be. We can but frame such laws as appear best to our limited wisdom and abide by them. If someone should think that the generally recognized



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body of laws is bad, that does not mean he should be allowed to make a change which from an impartial point of view he believes to be good, if the laws forbid the change. His impartiality would be a mistaken one, he would be favouring his own judgment; nor would he be impartial if he forced on others a change which he alone wanted, even though he believed it to be one which ought ultimately to be made, *e.g.*, if he lived in a country in which people had conscientious objections to giving children sex instruction, he would not be justified in instructing all children he came in contact with, no matter how much he realized what harm is caused by being secretive about sex. He would at most have the right to persuade others to his point of view, and thus perhaps be instrumental in bringing about a new general agreement.

While then the formal commandment to be impartial need not lead to absolutely uniform and unchanging laws everywhere, yet in so far as men obey the commandment it does tend towards some uniformity. Even where we have different societies obeying different laws, there will be a tendency towards uniformity. Different societies are bound to come into contact with each other, and under the repeated urgings of conscience the members of the different groups will recognize each other as moral beings. Their sense of duty or impartiality will lead to co-operation for the formation of general laws for all.

On the other hand, we must remember that all that our formal moral principle can tell us is the spirit in which we must conduct our lives, it does not and need not by itself tell us what in particular we must do. We have all of us to be guided by experience as embodied in the social traditions into which we are born. It is highly improbable that Kant meant that his formula was a means by which any individual could, on his own initiative, draw up his own moral code for the guidance of his conduct. But this limitation of conscience to the merely formal injunction "Be impartial" is no defect as far as morality is concerned. The *a priori* conception of duty may be an infallible guide to the moral aspect of our lives, though not a complete guide to the whole of life. It can tell us in what spirit we must act, but not what acts we must do. However changing and defective our knowledge may be with respect to what acts we ought to do, it is not defective with respect to the spirit in which we should do them.

We may interpret Kant then in such a way as to allow for the absoluteness of the obligation to be dutiful, without denying that man's opinions as to what in particular ought to be considered obligations may vary and improve, and without justifying moral anarchy on the grounds of the relativity of moral ideas. But why then did Kant insist that we must all *necessarily* recognize the same



moral obligations, if he did insist on this? We have shown how on Kant's theory we can explain a tendency to uniformity, but no more than a tendency, which in fact has not resulted in complete uniformity of social codes. But why, or rather let us ask, in what sense does Kant believe that every conscience which is honest with itself must recognize the same moral laws?

The first line of thought is somewhat as follows: We should select as duties and make obligatory those acts which are absolutely necessary for the promotion of that ultimate end which we all recognize as indisputably good, *e.g.* human happiness. But, it would seem, if acts are to be selected only in so far as they promote certain ends, such acts cannot be made into rigid laws, because the exact repetition of an act which at one time secures the required end may quite fail to do so when circumstances have changed. We may, however, avoid the difficulty, if we take our act abstractly enough, *e.g.* promote the happiness of mankind. Such an abstract law allows of a great variety of different acts, all of the same general type in that they are all directed to the same end. In fact, our duties will be expressed in terms of general ends (those ends which are ingredients of happiness) rather than in terms of either particular acts or general types of acts. The different acts which are required at different times for the promotion of happiness may be regarded as means to happiness, although they are really the changing constituents of happiness. We might then say that it is the means (*i.e.* our particular duties) which are relative, but the ultimate end and the moral obligation to promote it is absolute. These means are hypothetical imperatives, their imperativeness is conditioned by the Categorical Imperative of Duty which we may now express in terms of an end, namely "promote human happiness." What we shall consider as means will be conditioned by our circumstances and knowledge, so that our particular duties are conditioned both with respect to their content and to their obligatoriness. But through these changing means we express our dutifulness, our will to promote happiness; this will is an absolute good, an end in itself, apart from the happiness which it may or may not succeed in promoting.

In support of this interpretation of Kant's thought, the following extract may be given from his *Metaphysical Elements of Ethics*, Section III, Of the Reason for Conceiving an End which is also a Duty. (Abbot's Translation, page 295.)

"An end is an object of the free elective will, the idea of which determines this will to an action by which the object is produced. Accordingly every action has its end. . . . Now since this act which determines an end is a practical principle which commands not the means (therefore not conditionally), but the end in itself (therefore unconditionally), hence it is a



categorical imperative of pure practical reason, and one therefore which combines a *concept* of duty with that of an end in general.

"Now there must be such an end and a categorical imperative corresponding to it. For since there are free actions there must also be ends to which, as an object, those actions are directed. Among these ends there must also be some which are at the same time (that is by that very notion) duties. For if there were none such, then since no actions can be without an end, all ends which practical reason might have would be valid only as a means to other ends, and a categorical imperative would be impossible; a supposition which destroys all moral philosophy.

"Here, therefore, we treat not of ends which man actually *makes* to himself in accordance with the sensible impulses of his nature, but of objects of the free elective will under its own laws—objects which he *ought to make his end*."

What are the Ends which are also Duties? They are: our own Perfection; the Happiness of Others. Kant then goes on to point out that we cannot invert these and claim that it is also our duty to promote our own happiness and the perfection of others. Duty implies constraint, and we cannot force ourselves to promote our own happiness, for we are naturally inclined to do so; then again it is impossible to promote the perfection of others because this perfection is an end which they must choose of their own accord. This point, however, does not concern us here. The passage quoted is in agreement with Hume's statement that "no act is virtuous or morally good unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it distinct from the sense of its morality," a statement which *does* imply, even though it does not emphasize it, that "the sense of its morality" should form part of the total motive. Kant would of course have insisted on emphasizing "the sense of its morality." We should promote the happiness of others because this happiness is a good which ought to be. On the other hand it is not the only good; the disinterested *will* to promote happiness impartially is itself a good, and the making of this act of will is of more value than the happiness it might foster.

Kant does, however, insist that there are certain acts much more specific than the very general act "promote the happiness of others," which duty requires of us, *e.g.* telling the truth. But he does so insist because he regards such specific acts as necessary means to happiness, and therefore necessarily required of all men who *will* to promote the happiness of mankind. Telling the truth is good because it is always a means to happiness; it is therefore a particular embodiment of the *will* to do good which cannot be varied. In his article "On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives," Kant writes that if I tell a lie to save the life of an innocent man from a murderer, then though I may be doing no wrong to the murderer, and I am benefiting the innocent man, yet by making a false statement . . . I do wrong to mankind in general in the



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most essential point of duty, for I wilfully cause, so far as it lies in my power . . . that declarations in general find no credit, and hence that all rights founded on contract should lose their force, and this is a wrong which is done to mankind. A lie . . . always injures another; if not another individual, yet mankind generally, since it vitiates the foundations of justice, upon which, we may add, the happiness of mankind depends. My duty to tell the truth may conflict with my duty to promote the happiness of others, because I am considering the happiness of only a limited number. If I take a long enough view, then it may become apparent that strict veracity is a *sine qua non* of the happiness of mankind in general.

What justification has Kant for assuming that we know *a priori* any end which is also a duty; that there is any end which by its very notion must be a duty? Then again can Kant really prove that the particular acts which he chooses and regards as invariable means to these ends are always so, and that these different means will never conflict? These questions may legitimately be raised, but they are irrelevant to this paper.

In conclusion we may trace another line of thought which underlies the "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals." In the "Fundamental Principles," Kant tends to regard impartiality, the objective attitude, or the *will* to do good, as itself the only objective value. The value of the particular ends which the good will sets before itself is relative to human desires. Particular acts are means through which the good will tries to promote the happiness of others. But our knowledge of the means is extremely uncertain, and our ability to effect them very limited. Not the best will in the world can do much to promote human happiness. But not only is there very little happiness; what is still more regrettable is that its distribution is so unfair.

On the other hand, man's sense of justice demands equity. If we could satisfy our sense of justice only by an equitable distribution of the joys and sorrows of life among all, then our craving for justice is in a sorry plight. It seems to be humanly impossible to establish this equity. How then is our sense of justice to be satisfied? We may give up all attempt at a fair distribution of happiness in life and seize upon something we can distribute equally, namely, certain obligations which we can all fulfil. No matter what intrinsic or instrumental value these obligations may have, by requiring the same tasks from all, we can display our impartiality. If anyone refuses to take his fair share, nevertheless the fair share is there for him to take. We cannot in the same way apportion to each man his fair share of happiness and say to him, "if you are miserable and unhappy, it is your own fault; your share was there and you



can't complain of being unfairly treated." But if all are to fulfil the same obligations, although this fulfilment increases the happiness of some and the miseries of others, the assignment of the same tasks to all would seem to be anything but an equitable distribution. We may solve this difficulty by regarding happiness and unhappiness as of no importance, and forthwith ignoring them. If we make ourselves believe that neither joy nor sorrow matters very much, a law which causes joy to some and sorrow to others will cease to be unfair. If the spirit of impartiality is the only thing which counts, then it does not matter what laws we make nor what effect the laws may have as long as we require all to fulfil the same laws. Laws which require the same tasks of all will give us an opportunity of showing our impartiality by voluntarily accepting these same tasks, and in comparison with this spirit of impartiality, joy ceases to have much value and sorrow loses its sting.

True enough some will make the attainment of joy and the avoidance of suffering their chief aim in life; they will therefore try to exempt themselves or others from the common obligations if thereby they can bring some joy into life or diminish some suffering. These are the great betrayers. They have dared to emphasize the value of happiness, and have thereby reminded us of the good things of life which we have denied in the interests of a fictitious justice. These traitors threaten to take away the peace which we have attained by crying "sour grapes" to happiness, and by consoling ourselves with a sterile equity. But we will console ourselves, nevertheless, and count ourselves better off with our righteousness than they with their joys of life. Besides, we have renounced happiness for awhile only. We shall have our reward hereafter, whereas they have had their reward already without paying for it by doing their joyless duty. But they will have to pay for it yet. Perhaps it is some such compensatory psychological process which has partly vitiated Kant's ethical thinking. It is fairly obvious in most rigoristic moralists, and it also seems to fit in with Kant's rigoristic tendencies. Kant would, of course, never have agreed that we may make any laws we like, provided we all agree to abide by them. Kant does seem to have upheld a particular moral code as the only true one, a moral code which, if taken quite generally, seems to have been widely recognized throughout the history of mankind. But, like most of us, he absorbed this code unreflectingly early in life, and with it the sentiments with which it was regarded by those responsible for his moral upbringing. His ethical theory, or at least a certain phase of it, is an attempt to find "bad reasons for what he already believed on instinct." In trying to justify his feelings of approval for a particular moral code, he found he could not justify them on the



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grounds that this moral code was a means to human happiness. Thus the moral code he approved became for him solely the expression of man's good will or will to be fair and law-abiding, and in this, it seemed to Kant, lay not only the primary, but also the sole value of the moral code.



## THE METAPHYSICS OF WONDER AND SURPRISE

By R. V. FELDMAN, M.A.

PHILOSOPHERS, accounted wise in their generation and even beyond their generation, have enthroned the unchanging and sung the praises of fatality and acquiescence. But there is a voice even more authoritative than that of the sages—the voice of the Life-Shaper himself. Perched on the height of the human soul, he has set two watchmen, more sagacious and knowing than the Metaphysicians who weave words “About it and about” in the taverns beneath; their names are Wonder and Surprise. Wonder spies out novelty, and Surprise discerns change. Wonder arises at that which is *beyond* expectation; Surprise at that which is *contrary to* expectation. What could completely surpass expectation save the completely novel? What could so drastically dismantle expectation save the hurricane onset of change?

To attach a revelatory significance to spokesmen of the soul so humble as immediate emotions may seem risky; and risky it possibly is. Yet is Philosophy so well off that she can afford to ignore any by-path to the real? The fatalist who accepts all ought to accept, at least as a venture, the possibility that nature (I had almost said Providence) has endowed Wonder and Surprise with oracles that tell no lies. Are the emotions such faulty spies of the promised land? Just as boredom tells us truly that the organism needs a change, may not Wonder and Surprise tell us truly that the Real is on the move and has fresh miracles up its sleeve?

It may be said that the naïver promptings are not blind; but, even so, they must be superseded by the “larger vision” of Philosophy. Yet it would be strange if those extended poems which we call Philosophy were allowed to gag or stifle the more spontaneous oracles. Philosophy itself (as Plato knew so well) is a child of Wonder. All invention and science are the offspring of the Surprise that prompts curiosity to ask questions and explore. Are we melodramatically to posit a pre-established disharmony in which the children are invited to parenticide? Is Philosophy wantonly to upset the bowl from which she herself drinks the waters of life?

We have been content, so far, simply to suggest that the testimony of “immediate” emotions, such as Wonder and Surprise, should be treated with respect. That this particular track is not without pitfalls is painfully obvious. What these pitfalls are we shall



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indicate further on. But, the reader may enquire, what is our metaphysical interest in such a wild-goose chase? The answer is, that we humans seem rather badly off when we examine our intellectual tentacles into the Real, and that therefore the evidence of any fresh witness should not be overlooked. We have already learnt from Locke that, though we know our station and its duties sufficiently well to live a life pleasing both to God and Man, we run up against obstacles when we meddle beyond. "Critical" Philosophy, in its turn, has confronted Speculation with a "So far and so far only" notice. Nowadays, Biologism rubs in our Metaphysical ignorance. Our senses, our instincts, our intellections are all instruments of adaptation; our vision has been constricted in order that we may survive. Some philosophers, indeed, proudly credit the mind with a long list of indigenous categories. What more can we want? But if identity, difference, causality, etc., are offered us in abstraction from experience, we dangle nought but notional luxuries. Such collocations of adjustable terms are delightful to analyse, but they do not lead us beyond our own thoughts. If, on the other hand, we predicate them of experience, we are never sure if they are rightly applied. Identity is identity, but what we treat as identical may really not be so. Our notions are neat and simple, but we may manipulate them with clumsy fingers. Other philosophers favour Intuition, but their opponents must be allowed the intuition that this Intuition is an honorific name for irresistible beliefs for which we are too lazy or too wise to seek the reasons. The future is unknown, but it is comforting to delude ourselves that we possess a private insight into the "Not-Yet" Others, again, endow "Practical Reason" with wings by which she soars aloft into the Transcendental; but though all agree that "Right is Right," or "one ought to do one's duty," the thing that interests us is the actual situation, and we are never certain that any of our actions was unconditionally right: "With God alone is the truth."

Our range of certitudes is thus very limited, and those that we possess hold good of abstract formulae or significant collocations of words. This poverty of our resources I have stated "maliciously," captiously, and somewhat too much in the manner of an advocate. But I have done so purposely, in order to send up the price of any information given by a fresh source. Let us at this point ascertain the rôle of Wonder and Surprise.

Our lives are governed by expectations and anticipations built into the soul by need, convention, and routine. Expectations are unruffled and faint; anticipations are more eager and vividly coloured. But both alike, be they relaxed or keyed up, presuppose a fixed order of things into which the future will fit. Events which



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are likely to be "Non-Conformist" do not trouble their calculations. Pleasure and pain, success or unsucess, we come to take for granted, and each outflowing, as it springs to the surface, we tend to attribute unconcernedly to the fixed and immutable scheme of things. Yet, against ourselves, against our interest, against the propaganda of fixity, which the mere stress of living drums into our ears, the Disposer of destinies pulls up the blinds and startles us in spite of ourselves. Change, bare, unqualified change, darts suddenly before our gaze and evokes bare unqualified Surprise: "Surprise-in-itself," neither pleasurable nor painful, but simply Surprise. Novelty, also, like a sudden raincloud, bursts upon us unforeseen and unawares, and from novelty, simple and unqualified, arises the Wonder which is momentary, uncomplicated, and unmixed. Both attitudes, in their instantaneous apparition, are unadulterated either by pleasure or pain; and yet, as psychologists have insisted, they are such that, at their very inception, we succumb to an apprehension that shoots through and unsettles. Whence springs that less than painful malaise? The reason is that both alike overtake us "in spite of ourselves," not indeed contrary to what we desire, but contrary to what our mental habits might have led us to desire. "In spite of ourselves" they force us into wonderings externalized in gesture or let loose to ruminate through the mind. So much, indeed, are they "in spite of ourselves," contrary to our accustomed idolatry of the static, that we are surprised at our own surprise and wonder at our own wonder. We had drawn the curtains and retired snugly into our own "Nil admirari," when novelty, like the Cupid described by Anacreon and Herrick, stepped up to our door and "knocking, us molested."

I hinted above that certain pitfalls endangered an enquiry such as the present. The most insidious of these I shall now explain. The "relativity of our emotions"—who is not familiar with this phrase? It will be said that Surprise is simply "baffled curiosity" in the spectator, that wonder is nothing but a mental leak in a mind that yet has much to learn. With knowledge surprise evaporates, with experience wonder is pensioned off. Both are illusions that wisdom must smile away. Each argues an attitude in the subject, but neither discloses a quality in the object. Doubtless such an objection states what seems true of events when the initial upheaping has vanished and we review them again at a distance and in retrospect. Possibly the quality that was adjectival to the happening may itself be neither surprising nor wonderful. The essence that broke through that spurt of becoming may reject or disown our untutored valuations. But the actual moment of occurrence, the vanishing transience through which the essences broke loose as wild horses through some unfastened gate—these in their



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bare suddenness and surface-breaking novelty were, I think, the true causes of the emotions that flashed up, lit their light, and passed away. Again, it should count in favour of Surprise and Wonder that they are what have been termed "Neutral emotions." They do not say "choose this" or "avoid that"; they are not pre-disposed to prefer one quality to the exclusion of another; they do not act as danger signals to the organism; their message is not sweetly tendencious in the interests of some vital well-being; they do not evaluate, they simply accept. May not such a disinterested receptivity have some keener organ of its own to seize the Real before preference has selected and sorted out?

A second objection might be this. The emotions seem too low in rank to possess an eye of their own. Subservient to organic conservation, they are but instrumental to faculties less preoccupied and more highly endowed. They are not feet to climb and peer beyond the wall, but simply ladders by which Reason, Insight, or whatever is first of the speculative aristocracy, may mount upward and look.

Such an *a priori* helotization of our passional attitudes might have seemed conclusive in some more tightly graduated age, when hierarchies were fixed and men believed in Reason and Reason alone. But nowadays the "landmarks are removed," and every faculty is given a chance and given likewise a high-sounding name. Even before Bergson we had heard of a "clarified sentience" for which no antinomies would remain. The phrase clung to our memory, but what precise mental attitude it denoted, what visions it would unfold, was less evident to the uninitiated. That it was more than a roundabout invitation to read writers Ruskinian or Pateresque we suspected, but further than such a suspicion our knowledge did not extend. Have not Wonder and Surprise something at least vaguely reminiscent of that Bradleyan term that comes to stay and remains to perplex? Are they not at least "Sentience" unmixed and unadulterated by self-feeling and the insignificance of actional valuations? "Clarified" indeed they are not: they are still ruffled and not smoothed out. But if not "clarified," they are at least clarificatory—the initial collision between convention and creativity which both challenges and reveals.

In the *Theaetetus* (155 D), Plato with characteristic grace says Thaumás (Wonder) was the father of Iris. This genealogy is all the more apt if we remember that Iris is the messenger of Heaven who penetrates into the Stygian realms which for us will symbolize conventional darkness and mental death. Wonder begets tidings that dazzle like the rainbow, uniting heaven and earth; and the divine powers to which it ministers are novelty and change. In another way also Wonder reminds us of the rainbow goddess. For



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as the soul is agreeably stricken by Wonder, so also "our hearts leap up when we behold a rainbow in the sky."

*Note.*—I have not troubled in this article sharply to distinguish between Wonder and Surprise. Such distinctions are competently stated by Drever and Shand. There is no need to reduplicate what is already achieved. For the views of earlier moralists I would refer the reader to Brown's *Philosophy of the Human Mind*—an old-fashioned work which is meritorious enough to deserve mention but not arresting enough to deserve quotation.



## PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

### PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

F. ENRIQUES and G. de Santillana have begun in collaboration the composition of a general history of scientific thought. The first volume of this work, which has been recently published, is concerned with the science of antiquity,<sup>1</sup> and to a large extent covers the same ground as the history of ancient philosophy, as the frontiers of philosophy and natural science, at any rate until the time of Aristotle, were not yet clearly differentiated. But the two historians are interested in bringing into prominence a great many problems and personalities that the history of philosophy generally leaves on one side, although they help to complete and vivify the picture of the mentality of the ancients. Mathematics, medicine, geography, astronomy, applied mechanics, and physics, in short all the particular scientific studies that were just beginning to detach themselves from the parent trunk of general philosophy are studied by the authors in their individual developments and through the personalities of their cultivators. The explanations are clear and simple and can be followed even by readers unversed in science; the information is at first hand and is supplemented by a careful discussion of sources. The scientific questions are not isolated from the historical setting of the civilization of antiquity, but are shown in relation to matters of philosophy, religion, art, and moral and political life. The bibliography, intended for the more purely scientific and technical departments of philosophy, forms a very useful and timely completion of the bibliography of philosophic thought in general.

In the study of historical personalities traditionally numbered among the philosophers the authors follow the method introduced by Gomperz, Tannery, and Burnet, which consists in passing over the more dialectical and metaphysical aspects of their works in order to bring out more clearly their physical, astronomical, or biological significance. It is a method that has undeniable advantages; by its means the history of the presocratic thinkers, for example, has been thoroughly revised in the last decades. Previously it dallied too much with the formulas of abstract metaphysics, and by its very abstraction gave rise to fallacies and anachronisms in the transposition of ancient and modern problems. Present-day researches, on the other hand, by showing that those formulas were attached to well-defined physical views, have helped to objectify them in time and space, and have given them a more concrete sense. But these advantages are counterbalanced by corresponding defects, which consist in regarding as adventitious and negligible the dialectical and metaphysical translation of physical problems, although it is essential for fixing the logical structure of the physics of antiquity. The pure science of being and not-being, of the one and the many, of identity and difference, ought to be studied in its vital bearing on the physical problems of the empiric world, in order to gain a true understanding of Greek thought. Otherwise there is a risk of bringing in evidence only the modern anticipations of the science of antiquity, and of considering as an aberration or failure the whole *corpus* of Aristotelian physics and astronomy. The authors of the history

<sup>1</sup> F. Enriques e G. de Santillana, *Storia del pensiero scientifico*, vol. I: *Il mondo antico*, Milano, Treves, 1932 (8 gr., p. 682).



under review, like their predecessors, have not escaped this danger, which is inherent in the method. When they have to do with Parmenides, the Pythagoreans, Democritus, the scientists in the modern sense of the word, that is according to the modern ideal of science, they have not asked themselves why this science has waited twenty centuries before seeing the light which it was on the verge of greeting. The truth is that, behind the suggestive analogies with modern science pointed out by the authors, there were logical and metaphysical problems of a different kind, which came to be fixed afterwards in the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. These doctrines are compared by our authors with excessive haste and a somewhat negative judgment unsatisfactory to our historical sense. They concede to Plato some "formal" anticipation of the physico-mathematical science, but treat Aristotle somewhat cavalierly, and even omit to disclose the principles that informed his physics (for example, the conception of movement in his typical logical structure), confining themselves to retracing the more obvious aspects of his view of the world. They will be obliged to take cognizance of this deficiency when, in the course of their work, they come to study mediæval science, which is based wholly on the Aristotelian models.

A philosophical undertaking on a large scale has been begun in Italy in the translation of Zeller's classic *Philosophie der Griechen*. It is being continued down to our own times with the addition of notes and supplementary chapters. The first volume has already been published, under the editorship of Mondolfo, and comprises the introductory part of the work (relations with the Orient: internal and external sources; religious, moral, and social life; the characteristics of the Greek genius).<sup>1</sup> Mondolfo's additions bulk much larger than the original text and contain a precise and exhaustive critical survey of the whole philological and historical literature from 1891 (the date of Zeller's fifth edition) until the present day. A similar work had been partially effected in Germany by Lortzing and Nestle for the sixth and seventh German editions, but the Italian editor's completion is much fuller and is extremely useful for the student, as it sets before him, together with Zeller's standard text, all the most recent developments of particular philological and historical questions. In this introductory section the survey of studies in Greek religious thought and the Greek genius generally is of special importance. Zeller had denied or minimized the philosophical importance of the mystery religions, in particular the Orphic cult, and had been one of the most authoritative upholders of the "classical" view of the Greek world. Now all the most recent researches from Rohde onwards have successfully endeavoured to bring into prominence those elements of the Greek genius that we might call "romantic," which are most conspicuously in evidence in the mystery religions. The historical picture is thus greatly enriched, and Zeller's "classical" view—as Mondolfo appositely remarks—has been superseded in so far as it is one-sided, but not fundamentally disproved. Rather might it be said that it has acquired greater force by the very fact that "classical" form (the sense of limit, order, harmony, etc.) is not understood as an independent value but as a force that binds to itself a content of realistic and passionall life and succeeds in triumphing over it. Greek idealism in this synthesis with realism acquires much more depth.

An important contribution to the history of political philosophy is made

<sup>1</sup> E. Zeller, *La filosofia dei Greci*: Parte I, I presocratici, vol. i: Origine, caratteri e periodi della filosofia greca, Traduzione e aggiornamento a cura di R. Mondolfo (La nuova Italia Editrice, Firenze, 1932, pp. xv, 425).



by two small works recently disinterred by Croce and composed in 1791 and 1793 by an Italian of Trieste, Antonio de Giuliani, an Austrian subject who studied with an alert and unprejudiced mind the political and economic vicissitudes of Europe in the period between the enlightened despotism of Joseph II and the outbreak of the French Revolution.<sup>1</sup> From his first writing, "*Saggio politico sopra le vicissitudini inevitabili delle società civili*," Giuliani, who in his youth had shared in the generous illusions of illuministic rationalism, already appears disillusioned, as if he no longer believed in the power of reason to regulate and guide the course of human events. According to him, man believes that everything is guided by reason because he reasons on everything that happens. On the contrary, the forces that govern the interweaving of events are much more elemental and natural, and politicians are rather passive instruments than active artificers of the course of history. There is an elemental principle of life that regulates the life and death of social groups. This principle is as much hidden from politicians as the principle that animates living species is concealed from physicians. Man falls sick and dies despite the efforts of much vaunted science; and societies languish and die in spite of the efforts of politics and legislation. This principle consists in the fact that there exist two classes which ought to balance one another—the class that produces economic goods, and the class of consumers that only exists by virtue of the former, and which corresponds to a certain extent with the "sterile" class of the physiocrats. As long as the two classes balance society has a prosperous and harmonious life, and these conditions are usually found in the less progressive phases of an historical period when the mass of production sufficiently covers consumption. But in the periods that are generally considered most progressive, when population is rapidly increasing and great urban agglomerations begin to appear, Giuliani is on the contrary inclined to note a beginning of decadence and dissolution. "The equilibrium of the two classes begins insensibly to alter; men multiply without any restraining law to regulate the increase of population according to the means of subsistence. Instead the politicians hail with satisfaction the increase of population and do not perceive that in nature the various living species are balanced by mutual destruction, while man, with whom no other animal can enter into competition, is condemned to regulate his species himself, and to be the author of his own destruction." Hence revolutions, wars, commercial rivalries, and all those vicissitudes of human history that are usually named from their apparent causes, though they have at the same time a hidden reason disguised in the undeviating order of nature.

The English reader will easily recognize here the characteristic traits of the doctrine of Malthus, but it is Malthusian doctrine *avant la lettre*, as it antedates by seven years the famous *Essay on Population*. There are wanting in Giuliani the mathematical determination of the two series, arithmetical and geometrical (which is anyway the most arbitrary part of the *Essay* of Malthus), and the counsel of moral restraint. Nevertheless both authors are equally alive to the complex consequences resulting from the disproportion between population and the means of subsistence, and both have, as Croce says, "the merit of having considered not only the paradisiacal aspect of, *crescite et multiplicamini*, that of placid, increasing, and idyllic prosperity, but the demonic and revolutionary aspect as well." Croce also asks whether Malthus might have come across Giuliani's essay, which was published in French and German as well, but even if a direct relationship is excluded it

<sup>1</sup> A. de Giuliani, *La cagione riposta delle decadenze e delle rivoluzioni* a cura e con introduzione di B. Croce, Bari, Laterza, 1934 (pp. xxviii, 108).



is still certain that the ideas of the *Essay on Population* were in the air towards the close of the eighteenth century. In any case this would not diminish the originality of Malthus, because the merit of a thinker does not consist in the arbitrary invention of problems, but in the interpretation of the exigencies of his own time and in the focusing of ideas that are circulating widely in a vague and indeterminate form. Finally, we may note the characteristic that Giuliani, like Malthus, deduces from his economic principle a political attitude that is not only conservative but to some degree reactionary. Giuliani's second essay, written in 1793 and addressed to the National Convention of Paris, is an indictment of the French Revolution. It is, however, clearly differentiated from the arraignments of a Burke or a de Maistre because it is not a *laudatio temporis acti*, but a judgment on the vanity of abstract proposals for the reformation of humanity, and on the injustice of the ferocious revolutionary condemnations of men and systems that, far from being the artificers of social evils, are themselves the unconscious instruments and victims of greater forces.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(Translated from the Italian by CONSTANCE M. ALLEN.)

## PHILOSOPHY IN RUSSIA

PHILOSOPHICAL literature in Soviet Russia displays the same arid uniformity as before and is almost entirely confined to the exposition of dialectical materialism. That can be seen from the very titles of the books published within the last year: *Dialectical Materialism—the Philosophy of the Proletariat*, by V. Pozner; *Dialectical Materialism*, extracts from Marxist classics, selected by the students of the Institute of Red Professorship; *Marxism and Natural Science*, a collection of articles; *The Problem of Causality in the History of New Philosophy and in Dialectical Materialism*, by B. Bogdanov and Mihailov. The latter is a digest of papers read at the seminars on the history of philosophy at the Institute of Red Professorship and does not contain a single original idea or throw any fresh light on what has already been said on the subject by Engels, Lenin, Byhovskiy, and others. The very quotations from Engels and Lenin are the same as are generally made in Soviet works on dialectical materialism. Arzhanov's *Hegelianism in the Service of German Fascism* is a critique of neo-Hegelian theories from the orthodox Marxist point of view. But although Hegel's name is often used merely as a bludgeon against the infidels, the non-Marxists, there is a genuine interest in Hegel's work in U.S.S.R. and a desire to introduce it to the general public. In 1929 the Marx and Engel Institute undertook the publication of a Russian edition of Hegel's works, except his lectures on the "Philosophy of Religion"; this year two volumes of Kuno Fisher's *History of Modern Philosophy*, dealing with Hegel (first translated into Russian by Lossky thirty years ago), have been republished.

As before, dialectical materialism is contrasted with idealism on the one hand and mechanistic materialism on the other, and just now it is perhaps the latter that is attacked more bitterly. The latest formulation of the official Soviet philosophy is to be found in Pozner's book, *Dialectical Materialism—the Philosophy of the Proletariat*. Like other U.S.S.R. writers on the subject during the last five years, Pozner argues that the world-process is a creative evolution, leading from the lower stages of being to the higher—from the



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inorganic matter to the organic, and then, further, to social life. The content of the cosmic process and the laws that govern it cannot be reduced to a mere summing up of elementary mechanical processes, as the materialists of the old school imagine. The chief condition of evolution is the struggle of the opposites, the presence of inner contradictions inherent in every event. This inner struggle is to be found even in inorganic matter which contains a faculty akin to sensation. The human mind can and does influence material processes; man's spiritual achievements, though they have their roots in economic relations, can in their turn affect and modify the economic basis. The stress laid in dialectical materialism upon the supremacy of the human factor over material environment has a practical bearing: it justifies the Soviets' belief in their power to reconstruct Russia according to plan, and is therefore in keeping with the Communist creed. Pozner makes continual excursions into politics in order to show how well his philosophy fits in with "the general line" of the party. He is so anxious to emphasize the importance of collective units as against individuals that he introduces it even into his account of sensation. Lenin taught, says Pozner, that sensation was an image produced in the mind owing to the affections of the sense-organs by an external object, but "dialectical materialism goes further: according to it sensation results from the interaction between the *social* man and his material surroundings"—whatever this may mean!

The most remarkable book that has appeared in the *émigré* literature during the last year is unquestionably Father Sergey Bulgakov's *Agnels Bozhi* (*The Lamb of God*), published by the Y.M.C.A. Press in Paris (460 pp.). It is one of the best things Father Sergey has written. The style is clear and straightforward—which is not always the case with his earlier books—and he faces the problems at issue with the intellectual fearlessness characteristic of the Russian mind at its best. Many of his contentions are highly debatable; some of his fundamental ideas—of matter, of time and eternity—are not sufficiently thought out; now and again there are curious lapses into a sort of Sunday-school theology, as, e.g., in the argument about free will on page 169; but in spite of all this, *Agnus Dei* is a great book. It is professedly theological, but there is a freshness and originality about it which one does not as a rule associate with books on theology. Much of what the author says is of purely philosophical interest and must be tested by the ordinary canons of logic and reason, and not by an appeal to the authority of the Scriptures. Bulgakov sets out to show the metaphysical implications of the central fact upon which the Christian religion is based—the Incarnation of the Logos. He does not question the fact itself, for his initial standpoint is that of an Orthodox Christian, but he goes on to ask what it means and how it is possible. In trying to answer this, Bulgakov works out a system of philosophy that is reminiscent of neo-Platonism and Vladimir Solovyov, but carefully avoids any approach to pantheism. He argues that we must distinguish in God His self, which is Tri-Personal, and His nature or *ousia*, which is the all-embracing and inexhaustible fullness of being. God creates the world which is co-eternal with Him because He needs it as the object of His love. The positive content of the world is the Divine nature itself, Sophia, the all-in-unity or the perfect organism of Ideas. Creation "out of nothing" means that God posits this divine world as a *becoming*, plunging it into the stream of time and thus introducing into it an element of relativity, of non-being. The "nothing" is a *state* of being, the "not-yet" aspect of it, the potentiality of becoming. The act of creation is thus an act of voluntary self-limitation or *kenosis* on the part of God. Beside His own absolute existence He posits an existence that is relative, but is called to share in



the fullness of the divine life. This requires a long and laborious process of development in the course of which every created entity becomes in and for itself that which it was for God from all eternity. The purpose of the cosmic evolution is that the created world should become one with its heavenly prototype. The possibility of this final union with God rests upon the fact that in its essential nature the world is divine. Man is made in the image of God, and his final end is *theosis*, deification. Human nature is "conformable" to the divine, and, in becoming man, the Logos sanctifies it from within, not only individually in the person of Jesus Christ, but for all men, since Christ is the living centre of mankind.

The chapters dealing with the divine *kenosis* and with the union of the two natures in Christ are the best in the book, and will be read with absorbing interest by all who want to understand the meaning of the Christian dogma. And if those who regard it as mere moonshine could be induced to read the book, they would at any rate see that at the bottom of the dogmatic definitions of the Church lies not an unreasoning faith but deep and subtle thought.

Most of the articles in the recent numbers of *Put* are concerned with religious questions, and a good many are devoted to the consideration of social and political problems from a Christian standpoint. There are, as usual, excellent reviews of current philosophical literature, both Russian and foreign.

NATALIE DUDDINGTON.



## NEW BOOKS

*Beauty and Other Forms of Value.* By S. ALEXANDER, O.M., Litt.D., F.B.A., Hon. LL.D., D.Litt., Litt.D. (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1933. Pp. x + 305. Price ros. 6d. net.)

Professor Alexander's new book is based upon numerous papers published by him since *Space, Time and Deity*. It is not a set of independent essays, however, but a continuous work containing additional subject-matter, and the wider public which awaits eagerly the words of his voice and his pen—equally distinguished and equally unabated in beauty and vigour—will be grateful for this new systematization and consolidation of his thought. The more so because though this new work is mainly on aesthetics it is by no means exclusively so; we are given Professor Alexander's synoptic view of the values and their place in reality.

The book is divided into three parts: I. Beauty; II. Truth and Goodness; III. Comparative Value in General. The order, as can be seen, is from "higher to lower" values. This is convenient for some purposes, but Professor Alexander insists that it is not to be taken as implying that the lower can only be understood in terms of the higher.

Value (or "higher" value in general) is described sometimes as arising out of the satisfaction of some impulse or other, sometimes as being that satisfaction itself. The value of beauty—or of the beauty of fine art which is chiefly considered—arises from (or is) the satisfaction of the impulse of construction diverted from practice and become contemplative. Being contemplative it is "disinterested." The beautiful object also gives rise to illusion (admittedly an unhappy epithet), it has "significant form," unity in variety, and it is individual. But the full significance of such terminology can only be understood if we remember always the importance of the *material*. Fine Art, Professor Alexander rightly urges, is not mere translation, for purposes of communication of ideas or images in the mind; fine art has no existence prior to material embodiment—though, of course, more or less perfect or imperfect images of this embodiment may occur and may facilitate construction. "What does exist is the subject which detains the artist, and fixes his thoughts and images and passions and gives his excitement a colour and direction which would be different with a different subject-matter. Excitement caused and detained by this subject, and at once enlarged, enlightened and inflamed by insight into it, bubbles over into words or the movements of the brush or chisel" (p. 59).

The most original part of the section on Beauty is, I think, the application of the ideas of "prose" and "poetry" to the arts other than literature. Here is no mere analogy. Painting, sculpture, architecture, music, have their real poetry and their real prose, the difference depending upon the proportion between the formal and the representative elements. Poetic art is primarily lyrical, dramatic; springing up spontaneously in a self-contained, autonomous life. Prose art is analytic, purposeful, instrumental to an end outside itself. Salisbury Cathedral or St. Mary Redcliffe at Bristol, to take architecture only, are like plants or trees growing out of the ground, culminating in their spires. Somerset House, on the other hand, is prose—though good prose in



its unity and organic character. Its rows of windows reveal its function as an office. All architecture, it is true, has uses; but poetic architecture "lives out" its uses, prosaic architecture "displays" them. This all seems to me interesting, important, and, I think, sound. (I agree, however, that the pretty suggestion of a prose and poetry in *biscuits* (digestives and Bath Olivers) is "merely an analogy"!)

I have no space even to enumerate the topics of the greater part of the rest of the book. I may simply mention the discussions of beauty and greatness (depending on form and subject), the objectivity of beauty, and some topics of the last two shorter sections—on science and history, on the nature and value of truth, on morality (after Adam Smith), on psychological and on sub-human values. Indeed, I find it difficult to criticize Professor Alexander without many reservations and qualifications, not because I do not often believe him to be profoundly wrong, mainly in matters I have not mentioned, but because his language is elusive, and he seems to unsay here what he says there. It may be the very felicity, even the occasional poetry, of his words, "living their own autonomous life," which dumbfounds me. Whatever the reason, I know that I do not know him as I could wish, and I expect he could refute my criticisms by quoting antitheses to my theses.

I find Professor Alexander's now familiar metaphor (is it more?) of the mixing of mind and matter interesting, particularly where he shows how in fine art the two factors are fairly evenly balanced, whilst in science reality rather than mind, and in morals mind rather than material, is in control. But I doubt if it helps to call science or morality "an art, though not a fine art," and I think the importance of the instincts of construction, curiosity, and so on, is exaggerated.

Again, satisfaction may possess value; value may arise out of satisfaction. But is value satisfaction, and can we say that satisfaction is the only thing (in the realm of "higher values") which possesses (not to say is identical with) value? There is valuable satisfaction in finding truth, but surely truth, if it is a "value" at all, is not the "objective satisfaction of the impulse of curiosity . . . become contemplative"? (p. 194). Truth is, in the words of a phrase previous to this, "true knowledge," and true knowledge or science is (or is something like) "a faithful representation of reality. . . ." But I am still, after careful study of conflicting accounts, in the dark as to what Professor Alexander means by truth, and by the value of truth. His view of goodness, "Goodness is the character which good conduct possesses of satisfying the social impulse, and of being approved" (p. 265). I think I do understand better. I can only reply to it (for it involves a whole philosophy) in the words of the second remark of the caterpillar to Alice after her repetition of, "You are old, Father William." The problem of beauty is much more complex. I agree in the main with Professor Alexander's analysis, but it seems to me not to go far enough. He rightly rejects the view that beauty is the expression of "emotion." And he makes much of "subject-matter." But I wish he had gone further and had analysed the grounds of the artist's excitement and emotion about his subject-matter. I suspect he might have found beauty to be an embodiment of many grades of values, some of them objective and not subjective—which would have led to a very different theory. On the other hand, if Professor Alexander could see Spinoza's view of good (p. 10) reversed, he would not be himself, and we should not have had this book, with its provoking charm, nor Professor Alexander's general philosophy, which is an art, and sometimes a fine one.

LOUIS ARNAUD REID.



## PHILOSOPHY

*The Balfour Lectures on Realism.* By A. SETH PRINGLE-PATTISON, LL.D., D.C.L., F.B.A. (Edited, with a Memoir of the Author, by G. F. BARBOUR, D.Phil.) (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, Ltd., 1933. Pp. x + 258. Price 7s. 6d.)

All who knew Professor Pringle-Pattison, and many glad now to know something of this most distinguished Scottish philosopher, will be grateful to Dr. Barbour for the painstaking and restrained Memoir which occupies nearly two-thirds of the present volume. The rapid rise of Andrew Seth to the premier chair of Logic and Metaphysics in Scotland is seen by the reader to have been predestined: no other fate could have befallen this pre-eminent student of Campbell Fraser. But it was a strange turn of destiny which—in middle life—made the grave scholar Laird of a broad and beautiful domain in the Borders, and gave him the name by which he is known to our generation, but which baffled a public already familiar with several volumes written by Seth. The Memoir, it is sufficient to say, adequately reflects the dignity, generosity, and quiet good humour with which Pringle-Pattison lived and worked in his dual station. Concerning his development as philosopher a paragraph may be permitted here.

His early studies allied him with the then gathering school of Anglo-Hegelians. A reaction from the narrow associationist orthodoxy of the time was inevitable; but from the first he adhered to the extreme right-wing of the new party, criticizing alike the pseudo-philosophy of Bain, the subjectivism of the German neo-Kantians, and the materialism of the Hegelian left. His own deep-grained realism, inherited from generations of Scottish philosophy, moved him to welcome Hegel's repudiation of the *noumenon* on behalf of the intrinsic validity of knowledge. But he soon rejected—if he ever consciously adopted—Hegel's mode of assuring this validity by identifying knowing and being. Thus in the first series of Balfour Lectures (*Scottish Philosophy*, 1885), and steadily thereafter, he insisted upon the necessity of a realist epistemology to the exposition of which this third series (now published for the first time in book form) is devoted. In the intermediate course (*Hegelianism and Personality*, 1887) he so sharply attacked the "Master" and brought into such high relief positions antithetic to Hegelianism—notably his emphasis upon the integrity of persons in respect of one another and the all-enveloping, Absolute—that, in my belief, he could never thereafter be deemed an Hegelian. Dr. Barbour appears to suggest a considerable subsequent return upon earlier positions, and a larger measure of substantial agreement with the school, but—if I am not mistaken—he under-estimates the cleavage between the two doctrines; and it is certain that Pringle-Pattison never abated his main differences with Hegel. The "qualification" he offers in *The Idea of God* (1917) of the notorious phrase, "impervious in a fashion of which the impenetrability of matter is a faint analogue," is rather a concession to further knowledge of the nature of matter than a diminution of his position with respect to finite persons. To this the well-known controversy with Dr. Bosanquet (who represents, I suggest, the most moderate Hegelian position) bears witness. To the end he insisted that, while personality is measurable by the kind and degree of its interconnections with other persons, these interconnections constitute the conditions of a personal entity and not its cancellation.

He did, however, withdraw his semi-deist view of the relation of these persons and their Maker; and from this extreme he tended farther toward a pure immanentism than would appear fully compatible with his own ethically formed philosophy. He therefore expressed himself strongly against all notions of the transcendence and creativity of God. These lectures, *e.g.*, close with the characteristic phrase, "There is no region outside of God into which he could



extrude his creatures, and cut it adrift from himself." But (it may be asked) does not this type of denial follow a lapse in Pringle-Pattison's ideal anthropomorphism toward conceptions more appropriate of spatio-material than of the personal entities by which he purports to account for the world? This feature is, perhaps, an idiosyncrasy rather than an integral element of his position. And—on the other side—those who hold that immanentism is inadequate, and that creaturely *dependence* is something real, must do so with full awareness of the abysmally mysterious character of the relation between the Creator and the creature, which, nevertheless, they feel compelled to postulate.

In the four *Lectures on Realism* Pringle-Pattison justifies the prepossession of contemporary philosophers with epistemology, expressing the conviction that without clearness in this field "we can hardly expect to make satisfactory progress in philosophy" (p. 182). His chief contention is that once epistemology and metaphysics are clearly distinguished it is manifest that in the former realism is alone tenable (or even statable). "Idealism," he observes, "exists only as a criticism of Realism. When developed itself as a substantive theory, it leads to a view of existence which is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the doctrine in question. . . . Realism is left in possession of the field, and a critical or carefully guarded Realism is established as the only satisfactory, indeed the only sane, theory of knowledge" (p. 192). Hegelianism he describes as an "hypothetical divine epistemology" masquerading as a "metaphysics of existence." "But," he adds, "if Hegel swamps Epistemology in Metaphysics, the Realism of Scottish philosophy often errs in an opposite direction" (p. 181). The defect of the school of Reid is that it takes the duality of knower and known for the basis of an irreconcilable metaphysical dualism. Such a "metaphysical dualism would cleave the universe in two, leaving two absolutely non-communicating worlds. But the possibility of knowledge "becomes, on the other hand, the surest guarantee of metaphysical monism—of a unity which underlies all differences" (p. 256). And further, "Epistemological investigation . . . must tacitly presuppose this metaphysical unity of the subjective and the objective, or, to put it more strictly, the harmony of the subjective function with the universe from which it springs" (p. 258). On this view, then, knowledge is seen to presuppose a transsubjectivity which is the basis of an epistemological dualism, but which points also (unless we are content with a total scepticism) to a metaphysical monism.

Professor Pringle-Pattison, however, derives his metaphysical idealism not from this indeterminate harmony between the knower and the known, but from a wider "ideal anthropomorphism" which lies at the root of all—in the widest sense—idealist theories. His metaphysic is not developed in these lectures which conclude with the opinion quoted above; but it is present in outline in the preceding series, and its general tone may be gathered from the observation (p. 193), "If we take away from Idealism personality, and the ideals that belong to personality, it ceases to be Idealism. . . ." This observation may throw a little light upon the somewhat obscure controversy now conducted in an American contemporary as to the nature of idealism. In view of the confusion raised about this term it may well be time it was dropped, but that the type of philosophy it imperfectly designates is perennial cannot for one moment be doubted. Professor Pringle-Pattison would be the last to suggest that theories of universal nature so founded afford certainty (for he enjoyed a full measure of Scottish caution), but he could point out that in this they are at one with every alternative, and that on this level the decision can only go with what proves most congenial in the long run to the generality of cultivated and critical minds.



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In the closing pages of the Memoir Dr. Barbour prints a letter to Pringle-Pattison from F. H. Bradley. It records a surprising agreement with the essentials of *The Idea of Immortality* (the Edinburgh Gifford Lectures, 1922), and contains the remark that, "The mood in which my book" (*Appearance and Reality*) "was conceived and executed was, in fact, to some extent a passing one. . . . I cannot alter the book now, though I would not repeat all of it. And in particular I certainly would *not* say now that 'a future life must be taken as decidedly improbable.' "

We are deeply indebted to Dr. Barbour for what has evidently been a labour of love.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

*The Emergence of Novelty*. By LLOYD MORGAN, D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S. (London: Williams and Norgate. 1933. Pp. 207. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

Professor Lloyd Morgan has written this volume in response to requests from those who have found difficulties in his already published views. He attempts by his A B C method to show that what is required of him and that what he seeks to do is to give an exact but purely interpretative and in no way metaphysically explanatory account of what happens in terms of the notion of emergence. It is interesting to note the frank recognition of the need of the Aristotelian conception of potentiality and the attempt to define it in accordance with the requirements of modern empirical science.

The main subject of discussion, however, is the idea of *emergence in mind*. Professor Lloyd Morgan is anxious to maintain that there is such a thing as emergence in mind. He speaks, of course, on the basis of a wide experience as a psychologist; and yet it is here where it is most difficult to follow him. For instance, following James Mill, he argues that "mental space" is emergent in mind. Value is an emergent in a relational field of which mind is a constituent, and thus would seem to be supra-mental; yet it is "possessed by mind" and also characterizes the object or objects which are the other constituents of the relational field.

There are several reasons why one feels difficulty with this view. There is an obscurity in the term *mind*; the difference between Professor Lloyd Morgan and Professor Alexander is largely due to a disagreement as to what is mental and what is non-mental. There is an obscurity in the phrase *emergence of mind*; it seems at times to come perilously near signifying *what mind apprehends* or what is meant by the word emergence in the phrase *the emergence of an idea in the mind*. There is a further difficulty, to which these two obscurities no doubt conduce, expressed in the question whether emergence in mind is in any way analogous to emergence in the non-mental, and whether therefore the term emergence is ambiguous. Molecules are supra-atomic; crystals are supra-molecular; but would Professor Lloyd Morgan speak of emergence in atoms? On analogy, value would have to be spoken of as *possessing mind*. The difficulty arises from the possibility that mind, because of its nature, plays a rôle which makes it impossible to consider emergence in mind and emergence in the non-mental as being in any way analogous.

These difficulties are ultimately of a philosophical nature, and therefore attention must be re-directed to the A B C method. The method may serve to mark the difference between philosophy and science; but Professor Lloyd Morgan intends it to elucidate what he is going to do. He claims to follow a scientific method. The particular points to which he refers, namely Activity, Directive Causality, etc., may give support to his method, even though his



theory does thereby become complicated through duplicate meanings of these terms; but these philosophical concepts do not exhaust all the philosophical issues that arise. Because of the philosophical assumptions involved, which a scientist need not make, Professor Lloyd Morgan's theory cannot be admitted to be purely interpretative. It comes under the A category, and not merely under the B and C categories.

B. M. LAING.

*The Challenge of Humanism.* By LOUIS J. A. MERCIER. (New York and London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. vi + 288. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

Those who are not directly acquainted with the philosophical work of Professor Irving Babbitt and Professor Paul Elmer More in America and of Baron Seillière in France will find in this volume a very interesting exposition of their views and of their affiliations with Plato, Aristotle, and the Scholastics, and with Christianity and the Neo-Scholastic revival. But there is another purpose behind this exposition. As expressed in the title, the book is intended to be a challenge of this type of philosophy, called by the author *Humanism*, to every other kind of philosophy, all these being labelled together as *Naturalism*. This sharp distinction of all philosophical thought into humanism and naturalism, if admitted, certainly presents a challenge; but it will seem to many to be an over-simplification that is harsh, arbitrary, unsympathetic, and provocative. Certain idealists may be left to speak for themselves.

Humanism is a term that is coming to have various meanings. Students of literature have their "humanism," which is to be understood in reference to the Renaissance and to which most who argue for humanism philosophically claim to turn for their fundamental meaning. There is a "new humanism" in America which the present author opposes and criticizes. Professor J. S. Mackenzie, in his *Lectures on Humanism* (1907), regards pragmatism as one of the special forms of humanism. F. C. S. Schiller, in his writings, regards pragmatism and humanism as identical. Mr. Mercier opposes humanism in his sense to pragmatism; but that the issue is not so clear-cut as this opposition might suggest appears from the author's remark that all those who are not monists might be included under humanism (p. 273). Yet the author makes it quite clear what humanism in his sense stands for. It refuses to merge God, man, and nature, and hence is opposed to monism. It insists upon the possibility of discovering standards raised above the realm of change, being thus opposed to naturalistic relativity, though it recognizes that, since man lives in a changing world and is part of the process, these standards are flexible. It stresses the need of a principle of restraint in human nature, for, contrary to what naturalistic theories maintain, man's impulses are disordered, prone to excess, and incapable of attaining balance and righteousness instinctively, and he is therefore not naturally good. Naturalistic theories, by abandoning these principles, have been disastrous; they have led to a disintegration of individual character, have dechristianized Europe, are dechristianizing America, and are making any religion whatever impossible. They are accused of leading to the World War of 1914; though to the reader this causal rôle is not obvious, and the case of naturalism ought not to be prejudiced by assigning to it without careful analysis any such causation.

It may be admitted that one of the most pressing problems of the day is that of standards. It may be admitted that there is much in humanism, as expressed by the author, which is valuable. Whether, however, man is or is not naturally good is a proposition difficult to decide, partly because of the



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obscurity of the term natural and partly because it is not clear whether a *de facto* disorder in human nature must be accepted as ultimate or has causes of a natural kind. Where questions relevant to human life and conduct are being discussed, two vices of philosophical discussion require to be avoided—the barren method of assertion and counter-assertion and the device of having recourse to powers or faculties of a pretended higher kind. The really vital thing is not whether such powers or faculties do or do not exist, but what propositions or principles are to be formulated as true or sound for human guidance. It is necessary to put the test question, what specific difference does it make for the individual in his life and conduct whether he accepts humanism or naturalism. How does the choice affect his activities, the functions he is to perform, and the performance of them?

B. M. LAING.

*East and West in Religion.* By S. RADHAKRISHNAN. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1933. Pp. 146. Price 4s. 6d.).

Sir S. Radhakrishnan has become a recognized and authoritative exponent of Indian philosophy, and is often quoted as an example of the quality of Eastern thought. It would be more correct, however, to regard him as the example of the blending of Eastern and Western thought. In these essays, the New Testament, both actually and by implication, is more in evidence than the Veda. Radhakrishnan is a Hindu, but no Hindu who had not been deeply influenced by Christianity could have written such a book as this. It consists of a couple of lectures, delivered when on a visit to England, a couple of sermons, both incidentally from Old Testament texts, also given in this country, and an address on Rabindranath Tagore, delivered in Calcutta. Despite the varied character of the contents, there is a unity throughout, created by the spiritual, mystical, kindly, and tolerant outlook on life adopted by the author. Of controversy and argument, as we Westerners understand it, there is not a single trace, and yet in the subtlest way the essays are controversial. There is no denunciation, no challenge, not even irony, and yet as certainly as if he had employed all these methods, and one suspects more effectively, Radhakrishnan gets his points home. For example, the controversial European might desire to remind the East of some of its crimes. He need not. Radhakrishnan anticipates him. "We burnt widows, indulged in human sacrifices, enjoyed execution and torture, demanded hara-kiri; and we accepted them all as part of the recognized scheme of things. When any line of conduct is in conformity with social opinion, we feel we are exempt from personal responsibility." That is an acknowledgment and a confession, but the next sentence simply adds: "To-day a State sacrifices millions of its citizens with a clean conscience in the name of war." There is not the slightest attempt to point the moral, but it points itself. The controversialist would rejoin to the West that if the East burnt widows by the thousand, the West makes them by the million. That is not Radhakrishnan's way. He quietly and objectively sets out widow-burning and widow-making, without saying who did either, as examples of the law that the social conscience abrogates the individual conscience. Similarly he quotes St. Paul's saying that if meat makes a brother to offend, he will eat no meat, and without saying so manages to bring to the reader's mind a remembrance of the offence we give to the Hindu by our lusty beef-eating. He tells us that it is the duty of the strong to help the weak, and adds, without a single word to emphasize the contradiction, that it is understood that backward nations should serve the stronger



## NEW BOOKS

Powers. It is a very subtle and effective method of passive resistance to Western superiority. Tough indeed must be the skin into which these unbarbed shafts do not penetrate. Out of our own mouths we are judged, without a word of judgment being passed on us. Let us at least acknowledge the justice of the proceeding.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

*Christianity and Economics.* By A. D. LINDSAY, Master of Balliol. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1933. Pp. vii + 177. Price 5s.)

This little book is big with ideas, developed in five lectures, which were first delivered in 1930, and again in the U.S.A. in 1932. Dr. Lindsay's philosophy is based upon the distinctively Christian principle that our belief in the Fatherhood of God carries with it the implication that we are all children of one father, that economics is a branch of ethics, and our theology should be the best expression of ethics. The business of the State is to provide a framework within which men shall have room themselves to lead the good life. Whether they do so or not depends upon the extent to which they are influenced by ethical considerations, which, for most of us, must have a religious basis, and involve active membership of a religious body, with all the obligations which that implies.

Religion and politics have separate aims, but neither can operate effectively without the active co-operation of individuals, drawing inspiration from either side, moral obligations being inculcated by the one, "rights" and, to a less extent, duties being proclaimed by the other, though it is clear that every "right" enjoyed by one man entails the discharge of duties by others if it is to be enjoyed.

There is no situation in life which has no moral bearing, but it does not follow that economic relations should be transformed into ethical relations, but rather that they should be informed by ethical principles operated by men of their own free will in true freedom and not under compulsive laws. The failure of the present economic system under which we live is a moral failure. Economic relations are impersonal, but if they are to endure, the men and women who have entered on them must be in a moral relationship to each other. That is too seldom the case at present, and when the economic supersedes the moral aspect there is danger. Exchange rather than the simple processes of production dominates our civilization, which is so complicated that it eludes our grasp and drives men either to accept it complacently or to desire its destruction without, in either case, full understanding of the system or its implications.

"Where your treasure is," said our Lord, "there will your heart be also." A scale of values based on the standard of others, on the ground that "a thing is worth what it will fetch," is not a true scale; it has no greater validity than the assumption that the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice—by eight votes to seven—has any greater claim to acceptance than temporary expediency.

Dr. Lindsay sets forth (p. 83), in language which I personally accept as true and adequate, the distaste and antagonism felt by many to a system which makes great numbers of men in large-scale industry feel that they have lost status or personal dignity because they have no share in responsibility, and are, whether employed or unemployed, mere automata whose bodies "the State" has undertaken to keep alive, but whose personalities are no one's concern.



No Government, he says, has ever been successful which did not involve loyalty and personal respect, real mutual relations between men. Economic relations are not enough. So far as Communism, Capitalism, and State Socialism depend upon the intensification of economic relations they will fail. So far as politics and religion appeal to the loyalty of men to leaders who expound ideas which are worthy, in their eyes, of loyalty, they will continue to appeal, and rightly so, to active minds. Our sentiments are as real as any facts set forth in a Blue Book or a Balance Sheet.

Dr. Lindsay describes "wage-slavery" as a cant term, but emphasizes the underlying truth that so far as men are treated as instruments, and their personality disregarded, they are slaves, and so far as they lack security of employment, and therefore of a full life, they are worse than slaves. He refuses to condemn competition; it is not inconsistent with co-operation, and he holds that to eliminate competition would entail other evils. He deals firmly with those who object to profit. "The distinction between production for use and production for profit is only between production for a known and an anticipated demand"—the latter a genuine and essential social service (p. 93). Inequality in function and of fortune is inevitable, but produced in excess it causes divisions and misunderstanding which are certainly evil if only because they divide us who are of one family into two nations, as Disraeli noted eighty-eight years ago in *Sybil*. "To be friends with people," says Aristotle, "you have to live with them." Almost every town-planning scheme is devoted to making it impossible for employer and employed to do so.

The author combats the deterministic view of economics, as an admission of human failure and a denial of our Christianity, which cannot acquiesce in the view that man is irredeemable any more than that road accidents are inevitable, that the birth of children is independent of human volition, and that the doctrine of evolution knows nothing of symbiosis and commensalism.

A democratic society is one in which each cares for all. The measure of the success of the religious bodies in England is the degree of brotherliness and lively care for the common good which informs our lives. The measure of Bolshevik ruthlessness is the measure of the failure of the Christian Church in Russia. Mechanization, technical skill, and administration can never make life, they can only magnify and sustain it, whether they are managed by the State or as a public utility or for profit. Inspiration must come from above—from the urge which can inspire men to give to others willingly of their best.

Upon one point only would the present reviewer be disposed to differ from Dr. Lindsay, viz. his estimate of the Co-operative Movement (p. 123). So far as it is locally managed it is, or may be, all he says. So far as it is centralized, and managed by men at a distance and out of touch with the shareholders, it is neither better nor worse than other chain stores, whilst the emphasis on profits rather than on quality and the widespread avoidance of some lines (e.g. retail coal supplies) has weakened the moral prestige that the movement once enjoyed. But this is a small point in a great book.

"The English Nation sit enchanted," wrote Carlyle a hundred years ago, "the poor enchanted so that they cannot work, the rich enchanted so that they cannot enjoy." Dr. Lindsay comes near to Carlyle's view in his application of ethics to politics and in his general analysis of the position to-day. "Leave the high pulpit and the safe cloister," wrote Carlyle. "Down into the market place and see what is to be done." Politics would be enriched by Dr. Lindsay's presence in Parliament; he has done the next best thing and sent his son there.

A. T. WILSON.



*The Will to Fuller Life.* By J. H. BADLEY, Headmaster of Bedales School.  
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1933. Pp. 282. Price 10s. 6d.)

Plato held that there could be no health in States till rulers were philosophers. But before there can be philosopher rulers there must be a body of citizens out of which they can come and by which, when they have come, their mandates can be recognized as the demands of what is best in itself. Before that, again, we must have a race of teachers who are also philosophers. This book, coming from one of our most distinguished schoolmasters, lends substance to the hope that this dream is already beginning to be realized. It is a study of man's life as in its essence a striving towards the values which in the depths of his being he knows to be the highest, and of the conditions that are necessary to secure the success of such a striving. What gives it especial value is that, as the author tells us, it is based on his own experience as a teacher, and is the direct outcome of discussions which he has conducted with his higher classes. It falls into three parts. The first is occupied with a general statement of the nature of values as such, and of those which are called spiritual in the sense of being apprehensible only by a being who can raise himself above himself to the vision of forms of good which transcend the needs of mere existence or are merely instrumental to some further good. The second is occupied with a detailed treatment of the three main forms of spiritual good, the familiar trinity of truth, beauty, and goodness. The third part consists of a short section on "Looking Forward," in which the present state of civilization and the dangers which threaten it are submitted to analysis, and the way to something better shown to depend on the union of a faith (in its essence religious), that these values are not merely relative to human needs but have objective reality, inasmuch as they are that which gives the universe its meaning, with the knowledge of the conditions under which we can best contribute to actualizing them in the life about us. The treatment, however, is subject to two admitted limitations. Though dealing with philosophic subjects, the author disowns any attempt to put forward philosophic solutions of the deeper questions raised by them; and with regard to the most important of them, the nature and place of religious experience, this is "left for separate treatment" (p. 9 n.)—as we hope in a future volume. Readers of *Philosophy* may think that these are serious limitations in a book of this kind (and I cannot help thinking that they are right), and that they leave one with a certain sense of not getting to the root of the matter, e.g. when in the treatment of pleasure this is described as "the fundamental element of value" (p. 55) (how, we might ask, could this apply to truth?), or again when moral value is distinguished from others by the apprehension of what ought to be (p. 187), regardless of the view (which may be right or wrong, but is supported by great authorities) that it is intrinsic to *all* value to come to us with the sense of something that ought to be; or finally, with regard to the main point, which I understand the writer to hold to—the objectivity of the great values,—how is this consistent with the declaration that "the real nature of the universe may have little relation to either our logic or our feeling"? (p. 112). But it would be a mistake to allow any such discontent to blind the reader to the great value the writer has managed to import into what he modestly calls "a cursory discussion" of his subject. The book is written with an ease and grace of style that would put many specialists in philosophy to shame. It is full of penetrating analyses, suggestive observation, and forceful statement of truths that are far too liable to be overlooked. Particularly fresh seems to me the treatment of Moral Good, which occupies Chapters VIII and IX. Ethics has too long been waiting for



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just the sort of treatment we have of it here as merely one department of the wider science of Axiology. If in this excellent section one thing deserves a mark of special excellence it is, I think, the fine treatment of love, defined, in contrast to justice or giving all their due, as giving to each "all that we can," and as a "radiant goodness" that is at once "the Creator and the revealer of values," belonging to "a region in which the sense of claim gives place to the free outpouring of life for its own sake." If, as I hope, I am right in interpreting the note already referred to as meaning that Mr. Badley intends to follow this book up with a fuller discussion of the nature of religion and the Reality which is its object, there are others besides his colleagues in the teaching profession to whom it will be welcome.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

*Indian Psychology: Perception.* By JADUNATH SINHA, Professor of Philosophy, Meerut College. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1934. Pp. xvi + 384. Price 15s.)

This work, apparently, though not explicitly, the firstborn of more to follow, is to be welcomed as an attempt to parallel what others, German, Italian, and English, have tried to do for European Psychology. The European writers have confined themselves to an historical survey of Western psychology from the date of the breakaway of their subject from philosophy in general. They have left the centuries of non-specialization in psychology to histories of philosophy. Their works are in consequence rather "cuttings" (in garden parlance) than trees. Professor Sinha has sought to give us a "tree." He is fully aware of the fact that never in India has there been our modern specialization in philosophy. He insists that the "Hindu mind is essentially synthetic . . . never destroys the organic unity of a subject." Hence, as a loyal son, he has seen in his task "an exposition and interpretation of the fundamental problems of perception in their logical development." He takes various aspects of perception—physical basis, objects and conditions, recognition, space, time, and movement, the universal, the self, ab- and super-normal perception, etc., and sets one school of thought in each section over against others.

Such a Vergil may make the man he leads a little dizzy:

*Ma io perchè venirvi? o chi 'l concede?  
Io non Eneo; io non Paolo sono . . .*

but the result certainly is that he gets more of a purview than if he follows along one path, as I had perforce to do twenty years ago in my little Buddhist psychology.

But the synthetic purview may be attained at too heavy a cost. Namely, the book is not, the author avows, "an historical survey of the subject." This compels him to fix on this or that school of thought at a certain date in a certain region and call that by the general name of the school, Buddhist or other. But it is fairly obvious that every school—none more than the Buddhist—has its history of changing values. By what right, then, is any one stage to count inclusively as "Buddhism"? Or as any other school? It is the weakness of your metaphysician pure and simple that he often fails to allow Time-value for the growing organism of the collective mind, or, better said, for the changing values in teachers of different periods. Indian writers, as synthetic, are peculiarly liable to this myopia, and tend to write of "systems" as so many ready-made boxes of puzzles, each completed at a given date.



In the next place, when the author claims a metaphysical basis for Indian psychology, and leans upon metaphysic in the perception of the self, he adds that this psychology is also "based on introspection." But if so, is there really any need for metaphysic? Among the data of introspection there is surely nothing more introspectively immediate and inexpressible than this; that in any awareness of a percept we say: "I see it!" "I hear it!" etc. I perceive it. And that however near some tongues may seem to bring us to just "see it" (*tam passāmi, hoc video*), the man-who-sees is *never absent from introspection*. For me it will be a happy day for philosophy when this Privy-Council-Chamber of "metaphysic" gets banished once for all from our mental apartments.

Lastly, a word on Supernormal Perception, where the author rightly places the rapt musing known in Buddhism as *Jhāna*. It is as yet unfortunately characteristic of Indian writers to be uncaredful of what anyone they quote has been publishing up to date. A writer who is good enough to speak of my little work of twenty years ago as "monumental"—(I feel rather like an urn)!—should have taken the trouble to find out what this author has been saying in more recent years. The theory I have been for five years putting forward about the *object* of *Jhāna* he ignores. It is true everybody else has so far ignored it. So I must say it over again. But not here. Here I do but repeat, it is based on passages in the earliest Buddhist scriptures as yet ignored (in a double sense) by writers on Buddhism. Professor Sinha may say: Well, your theory is not in Buddhist Yogācāra literature. I reply: So much the worse for that—and for you, sir. You are displaying, as Buddhism, a puzzle-box composed of my little immature book and that far, far later literature, and you hold this ill-assorted pair up and say: Here is Buddhist psychology! Now there is plenty of interesting, if very crude, immature psychology in the older books, the Pitakas, but the monumental manual hasn't got it all in. There is psychology of a sort in Yogācāra literature, but it had *lost the early Buddhist standpoints*. Here is the price you pay for refusing to make your survey historical.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

*The Aesthetics of William Hazlitt. A Study of the Philosophical Basis of His Criticism.* By E. SCHNEIDER. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. vii + 200. Price 8s. 6d.)

Miss Schneider writes of Hazlitt the thinker, as distinct from the artist, the critic, or the essayist, and her work falls into three main divisions. The first deals with his general philosophical outlook; the second with his theory of art, and in particular of the painter's art; and the last with his theoretical explanation of literature, poetry, and literary criticism.

Who remembers now *An Essay on the Principles of Human Action*, published by a young artist-philosopher of twenty-seven, or the *Prospectus of a History of English Philosophy*, launched by the same dauntless fellow after his first book had issued still-born from the press? Almost no one. It is the unique and admirable distinction of Miss Schneider to have unearthed the obscure roots of the Hazlittian philosophy, and to have introduced its author to the world not, like his other devotees—W. P. Kerr, H. W. Garrod, George Saintsbury, Nichol Smith, or, most recent of all, Virginia Woolf—as a literary connoisseur, a familiar essayist, or a forceful personality, but as a thinker pure and simple.

Versatility at last has received its due of justice. And let no man dismiss



Hazlitt the philosopher as a mere plagiarist of his friend Coleridge; some ideas, no doubt, were transmitted in the fire of conversation, but the kernel of his philosophy was already ripe before the two had met, and the viewpoint expressed in it is fundamentally Hazlitt's own. Miss Schneider does well to explode a legend that deceived even Saintsbury.

There is something essentially commonsensical and English, something solid and superbly unimaginative, about the philosophy of Hazlitt. He regards religion with the respectful but critical eye of the agnostic, and the rhapsodical theism of Coleridge strikes no chord in his soul; he clips the wings on which philosophy rises towards the infinite and the eternal, and confines its flight to the near-by regions of epistemology, psychology, ethics, and aesthetics.

Miss Schneider calls him a "realist"; and this much-abused term is justified if she simply means that his criticism of eighteenth-century rationalism forestalls in many respects the views of modern scientific philosophy. He refused to believe that the mind is a *tabula rasa* or a mosaic of mental atoms, and notes with finesse the activity of memory and volition in ordinary perception. Steeped in Rousseau—he had shed hot tears over Julie, through the "Confessions" which he loved best of all—he asserts boldly that man is not a purely or even a primarily rational animal, and that "feeling" is an indispensable feature of human personality. He also champions "natural disinterestedness" as against all those, including Hobbs, who were persuaded of the unswerving selfishness of the motives of man.

Miss Schneider rightly affirms that these are the two notions in his general philosophy that bear most directly on his aesthetics. But what a pity she fails to follow up the scent! It would have been so easy to show that sympathetic feeling was the very foundation of Hazlitt's unerring taste in literature, poetry, and painting.

His theory of art is cloaked in the traditional formula, hallowed by a lineage reaching back to Aristotle and Horace, that art does and should "imitate nature." But he rescues it from confusion with anything so inartistic as exact reproduction by the original and profound meaning he gives to "nature"; for this concept is equivalent to reality, and includes that which dwells within as well as without the mind of man, so that "the more ethereal, evanescent, more refined and sublime part of art is the seeing nature through the medium of sentiment and passion." Such is the gist of Hazlitt's whole attitude towards the arts.

One would like to mention, besides, his interesting views on genius, on imagination, on taste and its standards, on comedy and tragedy; but space forbids. The authoress is to be congratulated on a monument of thorough, accurate scholarship, an original contribution to our knowledge of Hazlitt that no lover of the great essayist can afford to overlook. But, suggestive as his philosophical ideas undoubtedly are, we cannot subscribe to her view that they represent the last word on aesthetics. We would advise her to pursue the movement of aesthetic speculation from Hazlitt's decease to the present day, paying special attention to Germany.

Her book concludes with two valuable bibliographies; the first, a list of Hazlitt's reading, will go far to dispel the illusion that he was an ignoramus, while exposing his unfortunate deficiency in German and Greek; the second is an admirable account of his own works and of the general interest taken in him by the literary world. But why does she not include the charming all-round *Selections from Hazlitt*, produced in 1930 by the Nonesuch Press, and furnished with a graceful introduction by Geoffrey Keynes? And why is not the title of her work the "Philosophy" rather than the "Aesthetics" of Hazlitt?

LISTOWEL.



*The Headquarters of Reality. A Challenge to Western Thought.* By EDMOND HOLMES. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1933. Pp. x + 207. Price 5s.)

In this truly pioneer work, short though it be, the author has placed English reading philosophers under no small debt to him. Till to-day our purview of philosophy either has ignored the Eastern philosophers, or has mentioned them only to apologize with Ueberweg: "philosophy could not originate among 'the Orientals,' who were . . . content simply to retain culture in a spirit of passive resignation," and, with Burnet: "they had no philosophy to be borrowed from." It was, I believe, Paul Deussen who, in his *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie* (1906-8), without protest and just as truth which had become evident, opened up for our century a new perspective, and led off by giving us an Indo-Germanic philosophy, where *ātman* of India greets *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸν* of Plato, and in which, as an act, so to speak, of historical revenge, it is Western philosophy which, to be colloquial, doesn't get a look in. Deussen is on our library shelves; Edmond Holmes, readjusting the balance in treatment, writes for Everyman's leisure hour a brief, lucid, most readable examination of the Greek concept of Reality, the mystic's concept of it, and the concept of it gathered by quotations from the Immanence theory of the Indian Upanishads. If this book gets read as it deserves, our cultural curricula will come to be rearranged. Till this is done, the philosophical vista of British youth will get but half-way between West and East, halting at Levantine ports to greet Thales and his brethren, as it still does.

The author's 'challenge' consists in an arraignment of the Greek spirit (as typified in Aristotle) for a 'word-bound sense-bound' contentment with the world of sense-perception as the ultimately real, and with a regulation of man's thought within this world by a triune law of logic, which "is effective just when there is no work for it to do." That is, when we are seeking reality outside the normal visible world, when we have to deal with words as alive and growing in meaning, when we have to be creative in charting perceptions yet uncharted, we find that 'identity' is a shifting quantity, that 'contradiction' cannot deal with opposites, that the 'excluded middle' only serves for a world of word-bound things. Such, too, is syllogism.

My Greek lore is rusty, yet I do not readily admit that Aristotle ever sought more than to guard *consistency* in thinking (not reality) with his 'analytics.' Nor was more than a similar regulation sought, surely, by J. S. Mill in his guarding Inductive thought. But both are concerned with weighing and valuing what is known, what has come to be known. And our author is, with deeper vision, more concerned with reality, as something we are in process of coming to know and coming to be, and as such, is subjective rather than objective. He is more interested in intuition than in intellection. (I miss Bergson in his pages, and would fain see the effect of that genius on his thought.) He is feeling in intuition after a range, stunted in most of us, of other-sense perception. And he finds it necessary to substitute it, where intellectual apperception is too slow, as *e.g.* in the mental adjustments made by a batsman facing the swift bowler, or a pedestrian crossing a busy thoroughfare. I venture to think he may here be confusing the nature of the two activities. In the flash of intuition, man is creating. He reacts, it is true, to a given conjuncture. But he does not create by way of fusing adjustments  $x, y, z \dots$  with such swiftness, that they are as like an act of sense as are the inferent sensations. The act is the man's fiat; the subsequent identification of  $x, y, z \dots$  is the expository act of intellection, is a purely reflective operation, and can only be theoretically supposed to have been the mental work preceding the act itself.

The intuition itself is perhaps the nearest we can get to the unseen, not



yet understood, process which is Reality. And that is 'the man as becoming.' Both East and West have tended to see in reality too much what 'is' in the sense of 'stands still for you to look at it'; too much, to use Bergson's phrase, as 'perches,' too little as the flying. (He said 'flights'; I prefer 'flying.') Reality is a journeying towards the Real, and the journey will take us all our time, and not these few years only. The Upanishads show us Indian culture as feeling after this, but they dropped the quest, and contracted in Yoga. Plato, as representative of the opposite side of Greek thought, felt after it; Gotama called the Buddha felt after it; Hegel, Bergson, Holmes . . . they will the way in the Real (*satya*), that is, in becoming in a More wherein 'the face is set towards' a Most.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

*The Psychology of Effective Speaking.* By T. H. PEAR. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1933. Pp. xiii + 232. Price 6s. net.)

That the problems which Professor Pear raises and discusses in this book are of the very highest importance must be apparent to every psychologist who, in spite of his studies, has managed to retain an interest in actual human activities. As Pear is never tired of saying, broadcasting and the "talkies" have made the influence of the voice and of speaking much more obvious and perhaps much greater than ever before in human history. Yet if, having read the book, we ask, "What is Effective Speaking?" it is still not quite easy to find the answer.

At the beginning of his argument, on p. 21, Pear refers to a classification of the functions of speech once made by Professor Grace de Laguna, "Speaking conveys emotion, it issues commands, and it communicates news concerning which no immediate action need be taken." It is perhaps fair to assume that he regards this classification as satisfactory, for he returns to it with appreciation in several other places as well. But so vague a classification obscures a lot of important points. Emotion may be conveyed, as, one perhaps believes, by Adolf Hitler, or aroused, as by an actor who remains perfectly cool in face of a raging audience. Commands may be equally effective though they come by way of delicate hints, by barking insistence, or by conventionally accepted phrases. The eye-witness of an important event may communicate news, and so, in the sense in which the word has to be used here, may the light and cheerful conversationalist. These different cases demand a different technique, and in any one of them the effectiveness of the speech has its own peculiar basis and conditions.

Or take again the two chapters headed *The Criteria of Effective Speaking* and *Getting it Across*. The first makes the following list of Criteria and adds comments: Clear Speaking; Interestedness and Disinterestedness; Suitable Pace; Naturalness; Avoidance of Marked "Dialect," Geographical or Social; Sincerity; Intimacy. It is an excellent list and as long as need be; but the comments are very scrappy and anecdotal, and although I have tried hard, by reading them several times over, I cannot clearly understand what Professor Pear considers to be the psychological bases of, for example, naturalness, sincerity, and intimacy, or how they produce their effects. The chapter on *Getting it Across* is constructed on the same plan, but here Professor Pear merely takes chapter headings from a book by Professor Overstreet and comments on them. It may sound ungracious, but I cannot help thinking here, as at several other points in the book, that if only Pear had dropped some



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rather indifferent pilots and gone out upon his voyage of discovery himself, he would have found landmarks more permanent and important.

At least half the book and the great majority of its thronging illustrations are about broadcasting and talking films. It is an extraordinary thing that a remote voice, often maintaining a long monologue and issuing from an electrical instrument, should yet be able to convey an impression of unobjectionable friendliness. The technique seems to lie somewhere between that of the "old fashioned" public speech—as it is rapidly coming to be called—and the intimacy of face to face conversation. Does the adoption of a friendly voice, or the recognition of the friendliness of a voice, when both speaker and hearers are outside the range of vision and belong to different social groups, set up a reciprocally friendly attitude? This might be a subject for experiment, but if it does, the international character of broadcasting may have some very far-reaching social effects. It may, for example, do more for the establishment of peace in the world than the most elaborately guarded official organizations. Pear hints at this kind of problem many times; I cannot help wishing that he had discussed the matter more thoroughly.

The parts of the book that do not deal with broadcasting seem to me to be less satisfactory. Some of the topics discussed are Effective Speaking in Schools, Debates and Discussions, Lectures and Lecturing, and Humour in Public Speaking. A good many of the arguments seem to assume that everybody, or nearly everybody, ought to be trained for some kind of formal public speaking. The conversation, as a form of effective speaking, gets little consideration, though it is far the commonest and certainly not the least important form. Professor Pear does not much like debates, mainly because he thinks they overstress dialectic and, among other things, lead to a terrible waste of time on public committees. It would be interesting to know whether debaters do actually waste more time on committee than other folks. I doubt it, and the view that they do seems to demand a kind of transfer of training upon which doubt is rightly cast in other parts of this book.

University lecturers are most drastically treated. No doubt many are chosen for reasons which have nothing to do with effective speaking, but my impression is that the bulk of teachers in a University shake down to a style and an audience that meet the needs of their case. On both sides of this perennial controversy more facts are needed, but in the meantime the serious suggestion that young University teachers should be handed over to University Education Departments to be trained to lecture seems little short of fantastic.

The chapter on Humour is full of good fun. Humour is regarded as a very good thing in public speaking within limits. But the limits are not very clearly stated.

I seem to have grumbled my way through this review. This may be partly because Professor Pear, in a chapter on Spoken and Written Style, remarks, apparently with disapproval, that "British psychologists are not criticizing each other." I think this book is like a glass of sherry or a tasty savoury before a meal, or like a brilliant curtain-raiser before a serious play. It is full of notes of interrogation without the answers. It skirts problem after problem and then runs to a new one. I hope lots of people will read the book, and more than anything else I hope that Professor Pear will return to this topic on which his own magnificent gifts as a speaker make him peculiarly fitted to write, and then that he will find the definitive answers to many of the very vital questions which here he sets before us.

F. C. BARTLETT.



*Religion and Communism.* By JULIUS F. HECKER, Ph.D. (London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd. 1933. Pp. xii + 303. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

In this volume the writer gives on the whole an adequate and interesting and, as far as my knowledge justifies a judgment, an accurate account of the relation of Communism in Russia to Religion. In the first chapter he states the problem: a brief historical survey leads him to the conclusion that Communism is opposed to religion as such, not only to the abuses of a reactionary religion, but even more to "any of its modernized and philosophically improved forms" (p. 11). In the following three chapters he describes the religion of the people, the relation of Church and State, and Nonconformity in Russia. It is an appalling picture of superstition, corruption, and oppression which he paints. Orthodoxy was so close an ally, and so servile an agent of autocracy, that revolt against the latter led inevitably to the rejection of the former. The fifth chapter deals with the beginnings of the anti-religious tradition. Here the author deals more fully than seems to me necessary for his immediate purpose with the Foreign Sources of Russian Atheism, as he is covering already well-known ground. In Chapter VI he passes to deal with the first encounters of Religion and the Revolutionary Movement. Not all the intellectuals who were forced to abandon the teaching of the Church surrendered religion altogether; the seventh chapter deals with the "God-wrestlers" and "God-seekers" among the Intellectualists. The movement of the *Neo-Christians*, the opponents of Communism are sympathetically described; but their failure to stem the tide is marked. A brief but clear account is given in the eighth chapter of Tolstoy's Religious Anarchism.

With the ninth chapter we pass to the present conflict. The Communist Theory of Religion is described. Its antecedents are stated in one sentence: "German Hegelian philosophy merged with the French materialism through the influence of Feuerbach, who interpreted religion anthropologically and prepared the ground for the Marxian development of Dialectical Materialism," in which Marx gave to religion "a social-economic interpretation characterizing it as 'the opiate of the people'" (p. 174). Not only was there thus a theoretical opposition between Communism and Religion, but, as Chapter X shows, the Russian Church identified itself with the old order of Czarism, and challenged the new order of Communism. Inevitable was the conflict of the Church with the Revolution; and the Church played its game so badly that it lost. Of the compromise in the Living Church movement a more sympathetic account is given than is usually allowed to reach us here in Great Britain, as many of the losers in the game are as exiles carrying on an active propaganda against it. The Sobor (the Supreme Church Council) of 1923, under the control of this party, "assured the Government of its undivided sympathy and loyalty, declared capitalism a deadly sin, and pronounced the social revolution just. In this way it annulled the anathemas of the previous Sobor, and recognized the decrees of separation of Church and State, of nationalization of Church property, and even these limitations on the rights of citizenship which were imposed upon the clergy and the Church as a punishment for counter-revolutionary activities" (p. 213). This submission has not saved the Church from further oppression. Since 1929 all social activity or religious propaganda of the Church is forbidden, as is the education of youth in religion; only worship is allowed, although under many pretexts hindered.

On the contrary, the next three chapters give the record of the anti-religious movement, show how the collectivization of industry is made to subserve the atheist propaganda, and how thoroughly the anti-religious propaganda is being organized, and how effective are the methods adopted. The author



shows, however, that, despite these seeming advantages, there is a waning interest among the young in the anti-religious movement, and that "the constructive programme of the Five-Year Plan" is absorbing their interest. "The more thoughtful," he says, "are beginning to ask the eternal questions of 'whence' and 'whither,' and have not received satisfactory answers. The old anti-clerical agitation does not appeal to them any more, they desire something more constructive and interesting, and in this respect the anti-religious movement has so far failed to meet the demand" (p. 223). What I miss in this otherwise competent record is a more adequate recognition of the severity of the persecution of ministers of religion, the hardships and sufferings imposed on them under the pretext that they are not discharging any socially useful function, and the constant pressure on the people to abandon their religious belief and worship—facts of which there is ample, trustworthy evidence.

In the last chapter on the Outlook the author states his own conviction that there is no future for the former established Church of Russia, although it may linger longer than its Communist opponents expect, nor yet for the Evangelical Sectarians, because of their fundamentalism, their refusal to adapt themselves to the new situation. Indulging in prophecy he forecasts the probable future thus: "Step by step, in place of the abandoned cults and traditions, the new life creates its own social and cultural forms. We see, therefore, no reason why the former institutions of organized religion should not disappear altogether and be replaced by something new, a higher synthesis in form and content of the obscure cults and ideologies of the past. A few centuries hence historians and sociologists, in analysing the superstructure of classless society, will point out that there are many survivals, rudiments and developments of what once used to be called religion" (p. 271).

Recognizing the value of the volume as history, I shall close by discounting the author's prophecy by two comments. It is not so certain that the present economic social order in Russia will endure throughout the centuries. It is not so improbable that a revived and reformed Christianity of the Orthodox Russian type may again win the mind and the heart of the Russian people; for this many outside as well as within Russia are working, praying, and hoping. Which of these alternative anticipations the reader will be inclined to adopt will depend largely on the estimate of value he forms of Communism on the one hand and Religion on the other. Mine is not the author's.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

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*Science and God.* By BERNHARD BAVINK. Translated by H. STAFFORD HATFIELD. (London: G. Bell & Sons. 1933. Pp. ix + 174. Price 5s.)

This little book is weightier in thought and suggestion than its slight bulk would indicate. It sketches in a lucid manner the world-picture of the classical physics, traces the events which led to its collapse, and outlines a "programme for the solution" of certain central philosophical problems in the light of this scientific revolution.

The conclusion drawn from physics is that the world consists of "completely independent units of action," and therefore that no *laws* concerning the behaviour of these or of macroscopic objects can be established. The scientist as such asserts that these "actions" are undetermined, or a matter of "pure chance" (p. 118), but on other grounds he is at liberty to say that they are "freely determined" by God, and that their nature is spiritual (analogous to our acts of will). The author does so conclude, thus tentatively resolving the "most indigestible of all our philosophic problems" (p. 21).



The most important suggestion of the book is that these actions exist only as elements "of a more comprehensive Gestalt or form, which alone would have real existence" (p. 111). A hierarchy of such forms is thus postulated in which the highest are individual and unrepeatable—and so incalculable. This is the basis of life and freedom, which can thus be accounted for without "bad vitalistic reasoning." For the effective study of a universe so constituted a Gestalt mathematics is required (of which the rudiments are already provided in the "newer logic").

The doctrines of the "free determination" of the unitary "actions" by God, and of a hierarchy of "forms," are not effectively integrated, but the author sees clearly that this problem leads immediately to that of God's will in relation to such other wills as may be operative.

Obviously these matters cannot be discussed here, and the issue most sharply raised—namely, that of causation—concerns not this book only but the whole of contemporary philosophy of science. Perhaps it may be observed, however, that in just this case (of the causal principle) the physicist's generally justifiable habit of denying the existence of what he cannot observe or deduce may be out of place. This principle is certainly not observed or deduced, but is the presupposition of both, and our final inability to calculate the behaviour of "Planck's  $h$ " (or the unit of action) may not—as Planck himself argues—affect the question as to the validity of this principle.

Certain of the author's observations on contemporary theology are wise and timely; but some passages and phrases—e.g. about Aryans, Bolshevism, etc.—accord so well with the present temper of Germany as to seem quaint in cool English print.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

*Life Beyond Death in the Beliefs of Mankind.* By JAMES THAYER ADDISON. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1933. Pp. x + 309. Price 8s. 6d.)

Mr. Addison has collected from manifold sources the leading types of belief in life after death. About a third of the book is given to primitive faiths, and the remainder to the beliefs of the more developed religions, treated comparatively by grouping the teaching round the various ideas embodied in these faiths, such as heaven, hell, judgment, transmigration, and so forth. His objective is the general reader, although the book will perhaps be of most service to theological students and others preparing for examinations in the Comparative Study of Religions. The first part is work of a kind that has been done much more fully by Sir J. G. Frazer and others, but in the larger works the amassing of evidence sometimes bewilders the more casual reader, and Mr. Addison's shorter account may be more valuable to them. It is well done, considering the limitation of space, and presents a representative account of the chief types of belief in primitive races.

The second part is commendably impartial, even where the controversial is touched upon, as in the case of the doctrines of purgatory and indulgences. The chapter on belief in hell shows what unimaginative dullards the Western literalists have been in comparison with the thought of the East, which has invented hells of every type, hot and cold, and torments that make the European mediaeval hell a health resort in comparison! Naturally, heaven is made to match on the opposite side, whether it be the Sultan's palace of Muhammad, or the Pure Land of Amitabha Buddha.

Mr. Addison has succeeded in marshalling his array of material in such a manner that justice is done to all the leading religions, and in providing a



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good bibliography has made further study easier. It would not be difficult to point out omissions, and occasionally one might criticize the importance of some of the passages cited, but judging the book by what it offers, it must be admitted that it has succeeded in giving what it intended in a manner that may justly be called admirable, and one congratulates Mr. Addison accordingly.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

*Modern Tendencies in World Religions.* By CHARLES SAMUEL BRADEN, Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1933. Pp. xi + 343. Price 10s.)

Such a book as this must necessarily soon be outdated, but at the moment it is full of interest. It is said by some that the awakening of the East is superficial, and that below the surface things are unchanged. Dr. Braden's book will not be found to confirm that view. He deals with Islam, Hinduism, and Judaism, as well as the religious life of Japan, China, and Russia, and finds everywhere the ferment of ideas. In some cases nationalism is a factor, for racial pride is touched when the religion inherited from the fathers is patently out of line with progress, as in the case of the position of child wives and widows in India. Islam in Turkey has suffered because it has proved a barrier to the Westernization of that land. Japan seems inclined to a composite notion of religion mingling Shinto, Buddhist, and Christian ideas, if we are to judge from some of the authorities quoted. But the real difficulty in assessing Dr. Braden's book is just this question of authorities. It would be misleading if the currents of thought in the Church of England were judged simply from one of the papers which represent its various bodies of opinion, and one thinks that some of the articles quoted by Dr. Braden represent few beside their authors. No one man can have personal acquaintance with so many different faiths, and Dr. Braden and his readers must accept much that is said here as subject to revision. Yet, even so, the book is singularly readable and interesting. Not the least important chapter is that which deals with Russia. No one knows precisely what is happening to religion there. The Japanese Government, in its fear of communism, has tried hard lately to encourage religion, just as Russian communism has tried to destroy it. That the atheist policy of the Soviet has had some success is undeniable, but unless it can make a record in history by substituting the State for God, its difficulties are yet ahead. Dr. Braden's book affords abundant material alike for the student of religion and of sociology, and deserves the attention of both.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

*The "De Sacramento Altaris" of William of Ockham.* Edited by T. BRUCE BIRCH, Ph.D., D.D., Professor of Philosophy in Wittenberg College. Latin Text and English Translation. (Burlington, Iowa: The Lutheran Literary Board. 1930. Pp. xlvii + 576.)

In the Introduction we have a brief account of Ockham's life, a still briefer account of the MSS. and printed editions of his work *De Sacramento Altaris* (or *De Corpore Christi*, as it is called in the Balliol MS.), and a long series of quotations from modern writers setting forth their opinions of Ockham, his importance, and his influence, especially on Luther. A page from the printed edition, published at Agrigentum in 1491, is reproduced. Also a page from



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the Balliol MS., which is in the reproduction quite illegible, whereas the MS. itself is in excellent condition and by no means illegible.

The text is based mainly on the printed Strasburg edition of 1491 and on the Balliol MS. 299. The passages which I compared with the manuscript agree word for word with the original. The critical apparatus is printed at the end of the book, together with the notes and a long and useful bibliography.

The chief merit of this edition of Ockham's treatise on the Eucharist lies in the text, which has hitherto been accessible only in MSS. and in black letter editions full of abbreviations and difficult to decipher, save to the expert. Though the work purports to be theological, its groundwork is philosophical. We have in it a clear account of Ockham's views on mathematics and on quantity, of conflicting theories which he repudiates, and of the bearing of these philosophic doctrines on the doctrine of the Real Presence. Incidentally, Ockham stands revealed in it as an original, but not as an unorthodox, thinker; for, as the editor remarks, there is "a ring of sincerity in all his declarations of belief in the fundamental doctrines of the Church." He accepts the Church's teaching on the Eucharist, but seeks to simplify the philosophic interpretation of it, which in his view is unnecessarily cumbrous. Nowhere is the application of his famous "razor" more plainly manifest than it is in this interesting work.

The chief defect of the edition is in the translation, which is full of mistakes and is often quite misleading. *Nullo modo* is rendered by "in no mode"; *simul* is translated "at the same time" even when it refers to magnitudes which are coincident; *inexistens alteri*, which means to exist in something else, is translated "non-existent to another"; parts which *nec faciunt aliquod unum* are said "not to make some one"; *natum* with the infinitive is translated "created to"; *unum per accidens* = "one by an accident"; *sine omni mutatione* = "without an entire change"; *anima intellectiva* = "rationable soul"; *contingere* is translated by "to touch," even though the context makes it clear that it means "to happen"; and so forth, not only in words and phrases, but in whole sentences, which make Ockham appear to be talking nonsense, whereas in reality he is at least trying to talk sound sense.

LESLIE J. WALKER.

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*Psycho-Analysis and its Derivatives.* By H. CRICHTON-MILLER, M.A., M.D. M.R.C.P. (London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd. 1933. Pp. 255. Price 2s. 6d. net.)

This book meets a definite need. Psycho-analysis has successfully survived that initial period of intolerance and persecution which is apt to be the fate of any new ferment of thought sufficiently powerful to compel adaptations in other branches of knowledge, and it is time that the man in the street should be able to acquire a good general idea of what it is all about. The series in which this book appears has that particular aim, and it may be said at once that this book is fully up to the general standard of the Home University Library. The subject is particularly difficult of condensation, but a clear account is given of the three main theories—of Freud, Adler, and Jung—and in spite of the stress laid on their differences, a newcomer to the subject will gain a strong impression of the richness and permanence of the soil which has already produced three such varying theories. A liberal use is made of quotations, which are aptly dovetailed into the text, and greatly assist the march of the arguments. The book should be of especial service to the medical profession, since owing to the absence of any provision for a



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training in psychology, they must, in the mass, unfortunately be still regarded as members of that public for whom the book is primarily designed.

J. H. SHELDON.

*Crime, Law, and Social Science.* by JEROME MICHAEL, Professor of Law in Columbia University, and MORTIMER J. ADLER, Associate Professor of the Philosophy of Law in the University of Chicago. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1933. Pp. xxix + 440. Price 15s.)

This is a treatise, written at the request of the School of Law of Columbia University, to determine whether it is desirable to establish an institute of criminology and criminal justice in the United States, but the considerations urged and the conclusions reached are of equal importance to the criminologists of this country.

A protracted investigation, conducted with exhaustive patience into the problems of crime, based upon practical and theoretical knowledge, results in certain conclusions as follows: First, that there is no scientific knowledge in the field of criminology; no knowledge of the causes of criminal behaviour exists, and psychology and sociology have not yet developed anything more than what the author calls "raw empiricism."

After the premature generalizations of Lombroso and other *a priori* writers, this is surely a refreshing modesty!

But, secondly, the authors hold that we have some knowledge descriptive of the processes and institutions of criminal justice—we have learned that the notion of retributive justice is untenable and that criminal law should be directed towards social good and not toward punitive retribution. Offenders should be divided into three classes, incorrigible, corrigible, and potential.

To construct a science of criminal law, where science is now absent, as well as such a science, historical and controvertive studies of criminal law are essential, and therefore the authors favour the establishment of an institute devoted to research both theoretical and empirical.

Common-sense knowledge has proved itself inadequate to cope with the practical problem of controlling crime—that is to say, new historical records and statistics do not really assist to prevent the growth of the criminal mind.

In conclusion, the authors are driven to the view that the department of psychology dealing with crime and criminals is non-existent, and that the whole task remains not only to be completed but even to be begun.

It is typical of a certain modern approach to these problems that in the index neither the word "sin" nor the word "religion" appears. This is not due to any insufficiency in the index, but arises from a complete absence in the text of any theological consideration of crime and wrongdoing. A painstaking but essentially uninspired book.

HENRY SLESSER.

*The Structure of Our Apprehension of Reality.* By C. LAMBEK. Translated from the Danish by AGNETE KORTSEN. (Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard; London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 1933. Pp. 95. Price 4s. 6d. net.)

This work by a Danish writer who has for more than thirty years carried out investigations into the structure of the psycho-physiological processes aims at the exposition of the necessity and nature of a dynamic approach to the study of our apprehension of reality. Regarding cognition as an endeavour to master future experience, he insists upon the epistemological



importance of the fact that we are living beings who in need of controlling future experience require an apprehension of reality and cannot abandon an inquiry into real coherence. The essay, though modest and unpretentious, and though presumably only a preliminary epistemological effort containing promise of further elaboration, is valuable because of its attempt to examine notions that play an important part in life and knowledge, and to shape and appraise philosophical issues in accordance with its dynamic standpoint.

B. M. LAING.

*Conversion: the Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Nippa.* By A. D. Nock. (London: Oxford: Clarendon Press; Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. xii + 309. Price 15s. net.)

Such a volume as this—so wide in its learning, so clear in its style, so well-arranged in its matter, so competent in its handlings—claims grateful welcome and confident recommendation. My only criticisms are that the title does not adequately cover the varied contents, that the Notes are relegated to the end, and that for me at least the attitude of the writer seems too detached. To whet the appetite of the reader, the Contents, of which there is a good Table, may be briefly indicated. After in the first chapter distinguishing Conversion as a thorough change of mind and life from social acceptance of the current religion and adhesion to a new cult without abandonment of the old, this idea of conversion is shown in the second chapter to be absent from Greek religion before Alexander the Great, an absence typical of the Greek mind. The conquests of Alexander are in the third chapter shown to have led to closer contacts of Greeks and Orientals, and consequently to “the creation of new mixed forms of worship.” The same result followed from the opposite current, described in the fifth chapter: “the migration of Orientals and orientalized Greeks into great cities.” Similarly, as Chapter V shows, was the path to Rome taken by such Eastern cults; but here there was more State control and more Romanization. How these travelled to Rome is described in the sixth chapter. Chapter VII discusses the Appeal, and Chapter VIII the success of these cults. They had the attraction of novelty; they promised divine protection in the larger and stranger world presented in expanding knowledge; they afforded some assurance regarding the hereafter; and they gratified the inquisitiveness about the supernatural and the desire for revelation. An instance of what may be described as a conversion is offered in Chapter IX, that of Lucius as told by Apuleius. The Last Phase of Paganism—conversion back from Christianity—is illustrated in the tenth chapter in the cases of Porphyry, Julian, and an unknown senator. The following chapter, the eleventh, should have special interest for the readers of this Journal, as it deals with the more frequent instances of conversion to philosophy. “Philosophy held a dominant place because (1) it offered intelligible explanations of phenomena; (2) it offered a life with a scheme, a discipline, and a goal; (3) it produced the saints of antiquity; (4) it had the influence of the living teacher; (5) it made a literary appeal” (pp. xi-xii). Passing in the last three chapters to Christianity, the author first describes the spread of Christianity as a Social Phenomenon, next its teaching as viewed by a pagan, and lastly three types of conversion, Justin, Arnobius, and Augustine. Its success he ascribes to its power to satisfy the current religious needs, as indicated in the previous chapters, rather than to “the human personality of Jesus as portrayed in the Synoptic Gospels.” While most of its doctrines were intelligible to the thought of the age, the idea of incarnation did seem strange, as also the doctrine of the



resurrection of the body. "In general, Christianity could be represented as the cream of the best thought of antiquity" (p. xii). The mass of the material included can be commanded by the use of the excellent Index. The treatment throughout is so objective that it would be difficult to ascertain whether the author himself accepts the Christian faith or not. His last sentence would at least appear to negative any such assumption: "'Here we have no final revelation of truth,' said John Inglesant, and this applies to any of our attempts to follow the history of man's gropings after ultimate reality just as fully as it must needs to those gropings themselves" (p. 271).

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

*Science and the Spirit of Man.* By JULIUS W. FRIEND and JAMES FEIBLEMAN. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1933. Pp. 336. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

"There are symptoms on all sides that the modern cosmology has reached the zenith of the possibility of its accomplishment and is already at the beginning of its decline. Never was empiricism more desperately defended; never was positivism more clamorous. . . . Yet despite the clamour of empiricism, faith is falling away from salvation by the control of physical nature, and also from subscription to irrational action. In the affairs of Western man, as empiricism is about to fall and nothing yet crystallizes to take its place, confusion is the burden and despair sets the moral tone. In physical science developments have taken place which call for a departure from empiricism, the very emotional substance by which science was nurtured, and for which it seemed to stand" (pp. 120-1). The present book is an attempt in a situation thus envisaged to push over the old fabric of cosmology and provide a map to help the new order on its way. But, just as the view attacked would be better called "naturalism" than empiricism, what the authors wish to put in its place is not anything that would ordinarily be described as a variety of rationalism, but rather a form of pragmatistic humanism strongly opposed to physical realism. However, although the book is in some respects very well and even brilliantly written, it is far from easy to discern the precise views expressed owing to a constant vagueness in the use of language. The authors employ words like "significance," "value," "concept," without showing any sign of having made up their minds precisely what they mean, and thus pass unjustifiably from the proposition that these are *in some sense* or *other* involved in the determination of what is objective to the proposition that all science and all the facts of nature have objectivity only relatively to human needs or human values. (It is surely an extravagantly loose way of speaking to describe, *e.g.*, sense and time indiscriminately as "values.")

This is not to say that the book is without many instances of fine philosophical insight and many suggestive points that might bear excellent fruit if further developed and clarified. The second chapter (on "The Historical Background") gives a fine bird's-eye view of the whole development of thought in certain respects, though it is very misleading to treat the subject as if the idealist school never existed and as if the history of modern thought were reducible simply to the progressive triumph of naturalism. The third chapter consists of an argument to show that recent scientific theories, especially the relativity theory, make physical realism impossible. It is ably argued, but the authors pass too rapidly from results valid for science to results valid for philosophy, and at several points there seems to me to be a *non-sequitur*, as in (a) the transition from the proposition that a characteristic can only be measured relatively to standards of reference to the proposition



that it can only exist thus relatively; (b) the assertion that causal laws are truisms following from a definition; (c) the transition from subjectivism about the physical world to the conclusion that no true theory can come in conflict with "the most basic human needs" or "insult human dignity." (I think the authors are here again misled by the ambiguous word "value.") No doubt there were some arguments in their minds intended to establish these conclusions, but such are not elaborated. In Chapter IV, on Psychology, they ably reassert the place of reason in human life, while denying that it can be an end-in-itself, and emphasizing the progressive and partial character of truth. This chapter contains many points of value. The last and more metaphysical chapter, while it suffers from the defects mentioned above, again contains fine passages and highly suggestive ideas, especially in the account of art and religious experience. While we must once more protest against the careless use of language and the too frequent occurrence of vague rhetoric, the book as a whole is an inspiring, if uneven, essay on philosophy, containing some fine ideas, and we might look for much from the authors if they would train themselves to make up their mind what they mean by words and use them precisely.

A. C. EWING.

*The Meaning and Truth of Religion.* By EUGENE WILLIAM LYMAN. (New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1933. Pp. xvi + 468. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

The purpose of this excellent volume, which I have read with great interest and almost entire accord, and which I can very warmly recommend, is timely. "The task of reconstructing our whole social order is upon us, and there is imperative need for such an interpretation of religion as will make clear its relevance to that task" (p. ix). While this practical purpose is kept steadily in view, the theoretic discussion is no less thorough on that account, but adequately informed and competently discerning. In the Introduction this purpose is more fully discussed; and the following three parts deal with Religious Experience, Religious Knowledge, and Religious Beliefs and their Rational Grounds. The first and second parts exhibit the meaning, and the third the truth of religion, or its value and its validity.

Religion, it is claimed, is fitted for the task assigned to it, because, when it is not merely conservative but creative, it can produce courage, reason, and love (p. 16), and so can prove itself a creative energy. Religion can deal with the present social problems, as it by memory preserves its past inheritance, enters by experience into the possession of its present resources, and on these bases its future expectations. "Men of the present may be inspired with such creative faith as will enable them to deal victoriously with the problems of war, of social justice, of race relations, and as will give them open-mindedness and resourcefulness for each of the social problems with which they are confronted" (p. 47). The vital characteristics of religion are "an experience of *kinship* with a human group" (p. 53), of "*power* (inspiration, enthusiasm, newness of life)" (p. 56), of "*insight* into truth and value" (p. 60), of "*integrity* (salvation)" (p. 63), by "the way of loyalty and obedience" (p. 65), "the way of realization" (p. 66), "the way of transformation" (p. 67), "the way of wonder" (p. 68), which is creative of "beauty in the presence of the mysteriously meaningful" (p. 69). The definition of religion resulting from this analysis is that—"religion is an experience of kinship with the Deepest Reality in the Universe, and hence of membership in an infinitely meaningful



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world and of sharing in an ever-unfolding life" (p. 74). Space forbids as close an analysis of subsequent chapters, but this will indicate the writer's method.

One chapter discusses the relation of religion to ethics, and another to mysticism. Christianity is recognized as creative religion because it synthesizes the four types of religion: the ethical, the mystical, the aesthetic, and the philosophical; it relates goodness, truth, and beauty to the reality of God. That religion can claim to be the way of truth is shown in the second part on Religious Knowledge: first, the right of religious faith alongside of scientific inquiry is established; second, the relation of value and validity is shown; and, third, a place is claimed for intuition, not as a rival to but as an ally of reason.

This claim is further discussed in the third part, which seeks to show that there are rational grounds for religious beliefs in God, in Man and his Ideals, and in a Spiritual Universe. Naturalism and Pantheism are both rejected and Theism is accepted. It is shown that the new cosmology is not hostile but rather favourable to Theism. Evolution can be so reinterpreted as to lead to Theism, and so can Human History. Human personality can be so conceived as to justify the affirmation of liberty and immortality, and its ultimate values can be related to ultimate reality, since for the Problem of Evil such a solution can be found as justifies faith. The two extremes of the assertion of the transcendence of God and of the emphasis on His immanence must be avoided. "The counterpart of the insight that God is both transcendent and immanent is the conception that the universe is spiritual in respect to its ground and at the same time presents to all finite spirits a great task of spiritualization. . . . The comprehensive goal for this creative synthesis we may best apprehend as the Building of the Beloved Community" (pp. 436-7).

The writer thus gets to the goal of his practical purpose. "A faith which discovers that the transcendent God, who is the ultimate creative ground of the universe, and whose inherent nature is Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, is also immanent in human aspirations and idealistic strivings, and is most fully manifested in human personalities completely dedicated to the building of the Beloved Community, cannot be other than the supreme spiritual dynamic. . . . Such a faith can make religion both the supreme way to spiritual fulfilment and the supreme spring of spiritual power for mankind through the ages" (p. 456). It has been impossible to show in detail how solidly the conclusions indicated are based on adequate up-to-date knowledge, and how competent the author has proved himself for his task. Amid the doleful voices in the present distress, it is refreshing and cheering to meet with the intellectual confidence, moral courage, spiritual reliance of the "creative faith" of the author, which I fully share with him, and for the confirmation of which by him I am truly grateful.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

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*The Psychology of Infancy.* By VICTORIA HAZLITT, D.Litt. (London: Methuen & Co. 1933. Pp. ix. + 149. Price 5s. net.)

During the last few years a very large number of books have appeared dealing with the early development of children, so that we probably now know more in detail about the first three years or so of the child's life than we do of any other period of human existence. It is clear that Dr. Hazlitt had made a very exhaustive and critical study of the literature up to the time of her death, and as the books that have been published since that time have made little alteration in the general picture, Dr. Hazlitt's attempt



at a synthetic and critical study remains of great interest and value. Dr. Margaret McFarlane, who has edited this book with great care and efficiency, points out that it is based not only on a study of the existing literature, but upon much first-hand observation, and no instructed reader could doubt this fact. But no parade is made of the patient original investigation that must have gone into the making of the book. Dr. Hazlitt seems throughout more willing to give credit to others than to assume it for herself.

The book deals first with the development in the child of sensorial and muscular control, then with the acquisition of walking, speech, and other habits, next with the growth of the higher mental processes, and finally with the architecture of character. Throughout Dr. Hazlitt never expresses an opinion without giving the facts upon which her opinion is based, and never criticizes another writer without a careful consideration of the concrete evidence that is available. Perhaps in consequence of this admirable caution her general notion of the psychology of the young child is neither quite in line with the view that growth comes by the building up of more and more complex structures and reactions out of originally discrete elements, nor with the view that the earliest reactions and objects are already organized. Further, while she is fully alive to the importance of active and seeking reactions she is somewhat sceptical in regard to many of the more extreme Freudian formulations.

Undoubtedly in various ways and places the book remains incomplete. One feels that Dr. Hazlitt would have added much both to the critical and to the constructive value of her treatment had life afforded her the opportunity. Particularly is this the case in her most suggestive discussion of recognition, memory, and thinking. She here seems to me to get far nearer than most people have done to the actual mental processes of the infant, and it is greatly to be hoped that some students who knew and were attracted by her way of approach will carry her hints much farther than she was able to do.

The book was well worthy of publication. It will stand as a record of what a thoroughly level-headed and competent psychologist can do in this field. I think that probably more than any other work by its author it will bring home to us how great a loss British psychology suffered by her untimely death.

F. C. BARTLETT.

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*The Organism of the Mind.* By G. RICHARD HEYER, M.D. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1933. Pp. xiii + 271. Price 15s.)

This book, which is described in the sub-title as "An Introduction to Psychotherapy," is not so much an introduction to psychotherapeutic practice as an exposition of the principles upon which psychotherapy should, in the author's opinion, be based. The book falls into two parts, of which the first is devoted to "organ neurosis," *i.e.* psychogenic disturbances expressing themselves characteristically as impairments of bodily function. From his study of this class of symptom the author concludes that "the bodily and mental worlds are not two distinct fields of being (a false assumption which has given rise to such fundamentally erroneous theories as that of psychophysical parallelism, that of reciprocal action, etc.)." "It behoves us," he continues, "to regard 'mind' and 'body' as merely two phenomenal forms of one and the same 'life.'" Life is regarded as manifesting itself in a series of psychophysical 'cycles' or 'spheres' corresponding to the level of development or phase of differentiation reached. These cycles, which correspond both to historical phases of organic evolution and levels of animal life, are represented



in the individual not only as stages of development but also as layers of mental structure. Dr. Heyer recognizes four great 'cycles' constituting a hierarchy in the human organism, viz.: (1) the vegetative cycle of nutrition which manifests itself particularly in the gastro-intestinal functions; (2) the animal cycle of circulation, which mediates the dynamic 'thymic' world of impulse and in particular of sexual impulse; (3) the pneumatic cycle of respiration, in which the polarity of rhythm already established at the circulatory level reaches consciousness, and in which the "spiritual" (N.B. *spiritus*) is foreshadowed; (4) the truly mental cycle associated with the higher differentiation of the nervous system—a cycle which is only as yet feebly represented in the life of modern man. The organic neuroses are regarded as expressions either of undue repression of the urges belonging to the lower vital cycles or of undue surrender to them on the part of the spiritual ego. This type of interpretation is reminiscent of the Freudian concepts of 'fixation' and 'regression,' but Dr. Heyer rejects the sexual orientation of Freud's "libido theory."

The second part of the present volume is devoted to the consideration of psychotherapeutic methods. The theories of Freud, Adler, and Jung are each considered in turn, but no systematic exposition is attempted. A tribute is paid to Freud as the pioneer whose researches into "depth psychology" have laid the foundation of modern psychotherapy, and dealt a death-blow to the barren rationalism of the nineteenth century by revealing the non-rational basis of life. The author feels, however, that, by surrendering to the reductive "nothing but" method of analysis, Freud failed to rise above the limitations of "the bourgeois century." Freud is also criticized on the grounds that, while appreciating that life is based upon non-rational instinctive urges, he recognized no basic urges except those belonging to the sphere of sex. This, of course, is unfair to Freud, whose main endeavour during the past ten years has been to emphasize the basic function of the aggressive impulses. It is surprising that Dr. Heyer should have completely ignored this characteristic aspect of Freudian thought—particularly in view of the importance attached to the concepts of 'rhythm' and 'polarity' by Dr. Heyer himself. One might have expected the Freudian antithesis of 'love-hate' to have appealed to a writer who attaches such importance to the polarities of 'systole-diastole' (cycle of the circulation) and 'inspiration-expiration' (cycle of the respiration), and who finds the keystone of his system in the notion that the development of life out of the *prima materia* has been inseparably accompanied by the formation of polar opposites. However, it is to Jung rather than Freud that Dr. Heyer looks for his inspiration. Whilst denying that his book is an exposition of Jungian doctrines, he admits that his own system of thought "has grown out of that of Jung and has been fertilized by his ideas." It would appear that he has also been directly influenced by Oriental thought quite apart from the Oriental influences mediated by Jungian psychology. Such influences explain the mystical atmosphere which pervades the book and which manifests itself in the author's interpretation of the numerous drawings of patients, which are reproduced in an appendix. It is characteristic that Dr. Heyer should consider the objective methods of modern science as inadequate for the understanding of mental processes and as requiring to be supplemented by intuitive appreciation.

In general the book is interesting and stimulating; it is well worth reading if only for the glimpse it gives into the vast fields which the study of psychogenic disease opens out to investigators who possess psychological and philosophical insight as well as medical qualifications.

W. R. D. FAIRBAIRN.



*Psychical Research.* By Professor HANS DRIESCH. (London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd. 1933. Pp. xvi + 176. Price 5s.)

Such scanty interest as is accorded to the subject of *Psychical Research* by the majority of scientists and philosophers is wont to exhaust itself in asking the mere initial question: Is there, indeed, any reliable evidence in the matter at all? And this question too often remains without a definite answer. One cannot expect an analysis of the evidence to be undertaken in a book whose avowed aim it is to deal with the methodology of the subject and to act as a guide to the experimenter; but one is well rewarded in finding an outspoken expression of the author's opinions on the evidential question together with the conclusions which he draws from them.

Professor Driesch has divided his book into two main sections. In the first of these he enumerates and classifies the various forms of deception which have to be encountered and overcome; while in the second he discusses the theoretical headings under which the phenomena fall. If we agree with him that telepathy is a proved fact, his argument shows that a deep and far-reaching philosophical importance attaches to it. "We have," he says, "spontaneous telepathy as a quite certain fundamental phenomenon. Nobody who has thoroughly studied *Phantasms of the Living* (Gurney) and its supplements, as well as the remaining good literature, can doubt it." And in the following pages he proceeds to demonstrate the failure of any attempt to explain telepathy on a physical basis. Exhibiting, as it does, an independence of distance, and a selectivity so complete as to exclude as percipients all individuals except the relevant person; and transmitting (if the word is permissible) its meanings unclothed in any discoverable form of symbolism, it differs essentially from any physical method of communicating ideas.

This fact necessitates the hypothesis of a "mental field"—"a non-spatial connecting framework for many souls, a framework which must now, however, be expressly valid as a field for *single causal* happenings." Such a non-spatial and non-sensuous type of interrelation (which, as Professor Driesch holds, is foreshadowed by the *entelechy* of his vitalistic biology), he thinks to be sufficient of itself to refute the theory of psycho-mechanical parallelism.

There arise, however, further facts and difficulties out of the "metagnomic" acquisition of the contents of other minds, and these drive us, so the author holds, to a choice between two ultimate hypotheses. We must either postulate the existence of a universal, supernormal *subject*, which "contains in itself all the plans of the lives of all human beings," and to which the sensitive or "metagnome" has access; or we must accept the spiritualistic theory of personal, post-mortem existence and action, to which he prefers to give the name of "Monadism." These theories make about equal claims on conceptions which are new to science, and the final choice between them can be decided by further research alone.

The translation is by Mr. Theodore Besterman, and there is an appreciative foreword by Sir Oliver Lodge.

G. N. M. TYRRELL.

*Functional Affinities of Man, Monkeys, and Apes.* By S. ZUCKERMAN, D.Sc., M.R.C.S. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1933. Pp. xviii + 203. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

In spite of the great amount of work that has been done on the subject, there is still a good deal of uncertainty as to the relationships and evolutionary history of the animals belonging to the great mammalian Order of the Primates, which includes the lemurs, monkeys, apes, and man. The morpho-



logical and palaeontological evidence is insufficient to decide the questions at issue, and, particularly with regard to the evolution of man, there is still considerable divergence of opinion among the experts. Thus Professor Wood Jones holds the heterodox view that man developed from a simple generalized form like *Tarsius* quite independently of monkeys and apes.

Dr. Zuckerman, who recently published an excellent book on *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes* (1932), has in this new volume attempted to supplement the morphological evidence as to the relationships of the Primates by collecting together what is known about their "functional" characteristics, that is to say, their physiology and behaviour. Accordingly he deals among other things with the various mechanisms of reproduction found within the group, with the reactions of their blood, the physiology of their sense-organs, and generally with their behaviour in relation to the development of their brain. The sections on behaviour are perhaps the most interesting to the general reader.

Evidence is accumulating that at least some monkeys (of the genus *Cebus*) are little if at all inferior to chimpanzees in "intelligence" as judged by their power of utilizing various objects as tools.

On the whole, the functional data brought forward by Zuckerman are consistent with the orthodox view of the relationships of these forms, as reflected in the commonly accepted scheme of classification given on p. 17.

E. S. RUSSELL.

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*Modern Theories of Law.* VARIOUS. (London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. vii + 229. Price 8s. 6d.)

This book contains the text of ten lectures delivered at the London School of Economics in 1932. It is intended to provide an introduction to modern legal theory. There is a somewhat rambling re-examination of Austin by Professor Manning; a pleasant summary of the achievements and limitations of Sir Henry Maine by Dr. Robson; Mr. Meyendorff provides a fascinating glimpse of Leo Petrazycki, "the only one who has undertaken to re-examine the process of human motivation, and having analysed the dynamics or mechanism of the urges and repulsions which have a normative power, has begun to discover the process by which the individual and the community come to share or to differ in their legal and moral concepts, and form moral and legal averages never changing, some decaying, others in formation" (p. 28). Sir Maurice Amos provides a brief summary of the work of Dean Roscoe Pound. Professor Goodhart has little difficulty in showing the confusions into which some American realists have been led by their misunderstanding of scientific method and their misuse of physical analogies. Mr. Wortley provides a short account of the work of Francois Geny.

Interesting as these lectures may have been, it is probable that the student will turn with more eagerness to the critical examination of Renard, Stammler, Kelsen, and Duguit provided by Dr. Jennings, Professor Ginsberg, Dr. P. Lauterpacht, and Professor Laski respectively. It is probable also that he will be a little disappointed. For it is obvious that the lecturers were more interested in their subjects' criticisms of other theories than with their actual contribution to a theory of law. Dr. Jennings finds that the Institutional school of Renard and Hauriou suffers from "a confusion of method," failing to distinguish sociology and philosophy. "The real value of Renard's work consists partly in its renewed emphasis upon the disappearance of individualistic law . . . and partly in the numerous incidental but fruitful comments



which the author almost casually throws out." It is just these "incidental but fruitful comments" which a brief survey cannot give. Professor Laski, while agreeing with Duguit's criticisms of the classic theory of sovereignty, considers that as soon "as he embarked upon the task of discovering a constructive alternative, he missed the central necessity of his theory—a criterion of justice to which the specific commands of positive law must conform" (p. 66). To Dr. Ginsberg "the task of legal philosophy would seem to be not to rest content with the idea of justice as a remote idea of reason, but to endeavour to give it concrete form by defining the proximate conditions of the harmonious realization of human purposes" (p. 49). But he does not think that Stammler has succeeded where Kant failed in working out the implications of the idea of rationality in relation to human conduct. All students will be grateful for Dr. Lauterpacht's lucid statement of Kelsen's pure science of law, but whether they will be helped to a clear understanding of the nature of law is more doubtful. Kelsen, he tells us, "does not regard the law conceived as the sum-total of legal rules as a will. Neither does he regard it as a command or a psychological process or even a social reality. It is the product of a mental operation . . . the science of law is a branch of normative sciences as distinguished from natural sciences; . . . the legal rule is concerned with what the positive law shall be, and not with the question why positive law is obeyed or what the positive law ought to be" (p. 108). If we ask why the constitution should be obeyed, the only answer that can be given is that it should be obeyed because we have adopted as an initial hypothesis of the legal system the fundamental norm that the constitution shall be obeyed (p. 109). This fundamental norm is not grounded "in a material ethical value, for instance, that of justice" (p. 111). But once adopted, it constitutes the beginning of an autonomous system governed by its own specific—not by causal—laws (p. 111). But just what is the nature of these specific laws is not made clear. The normative rules of logic, grammar, ethics, aesthetics, are discovered by reflecting upon the nature of thought, language, morals, beauty. But upon what must we reflect to develop the normative science of law: the existing social system, or our conception of justice?

K. SMELLIE.

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*Social Development in Young Children: A Study in Beginnings.* By SUSAN ISAACS. (London: Routledge & Sons, 1933. Pp. vii + 480. Price 15s.)

This volume is the second of a series of three, and is based on the records of children who attended Dr. Isaacs' School in Cambridge over a period of three years. In Volume I the records are examined with reference to the children's intellectual growth. In the present volume the social development of the same children is the main theme. Dr. Isaacs is careful to point out, and rightly too, that the two aspects cannot be treated in complete isolation, and that in the present study the background discussed in the first volume must ever be remembered.

The main theme of the treatise is that although "social instincts" do not appear until a later age in the child's development, these do not emerge suddenly, but have a pre-history, and it is this pre-history which Dr. Isaacs seeks to trace and unravel.

The book is divided into two parts. Part I contains the records of the children and their interpretation. Part II deals with educational problems.

Part I is subdivided into three chapters. Chapter I is a short introductory chapter, but of importance in that it contains the writer's attitude to the



experiment, and her reasons for studying the whole child and his reaction to whole situations. Chapter II contains the actual records of the sayings and actions of the children concerned in so far as these show "social" behaviour. The records are arranged under two main heads: (1) love and hate in action; (2) the deeper sources of love and hate. Under the first head are included instances showing the child's primary ego-centric attitude, his hostility and aggression, and finally his friendliness and co-operation. Under the second head are examples of the various forms of sexuality, and illustrations of guilt and shame.

On first reading, these records seem rather wearisome, for they occupy 174 pages. But on a second reading their real significance emerges. They show clearly the thoughts and actions of a group of normal children and form a background to which isolated instances of behaviour can be referred. Thus a parent worried over the peculiar behaviour of his young child finds on glancing through the detailed records of his group that his own child is no exception to the rule, and that his shocking behaviour is merely an ordinary manifestation of normal children of his age. This, I think, is one of the most valuable parts of the book. On these records, too, Dr. Isaacs bases her interpretation of the theory of development which is contained in Chapter III, again a lengthy chapter of 195 pages, and one of great practical importance, arranged according to the same logical scheme as the previous chapter. The interpretation throughout is psycho-analytical in character, and some of the findings may not be acceptable to all. But the writer is to be congratulated on having written an outstandingly lucid and interesting account of child behaviour. All the aspects of the data collected are treated against the background of modern psycho-analytic theory, but all through the reader is impressed by the open-mindedness and unprejudiced attitude of the writer. She does not force her facts to fit the theory, nor strain them too far. Where the data are fragmentary, she has no hesitation in admitting this, and throughout the book her own observations are supported by observations from other writers. A very valuable portion of the chapter is devoted to projection, another to aggression, and another to play, to single out only three of the many topics discussed. All of these throw new light on children's attitudes, and ought to be known by all who come into close contact with children. The section devoted to the discussion of sexuality is treated with restraint, and should be of interest not only to psychologists, but to all educators and parents.

Part III of the book attempts to show the relationship between psycho-analysis and education in the light of the findings already set forth in the preceding chapter. The author rightly deprecates the use of an amateur psycho-analysis by the educator, and points out the harmful effects which inevitably follow. She condemns, too, the policy of absolute freedom for the child. "The idea that if we leave the child entirely free to do what he likes we are thereby 'avoiding repression' is a mistaken one" (p. 424). This should give the advocates of complete freedom for the child food for thought. There is also an interesting section on play and its effect in easing strain and tension.

The whole book well repays careful study. It is not written in popular language, for it is not intended to be a popular presentation. It is addressed to the scientific public as well as to students of psychology and education. It cannot be read hurriedly, nor does a cursory glance do it justice. It requires to be read slowly and carefully, and then it reveals a wealth of information about child-life and behaviour which will be of inestimable value to all concerned.

MARY COLLINS.



*The Psychology of Laughter: A Study in Social Adaptation.* By RALPH PIDDINGTON, M.A. (London: Figurehead Press. 1933. Pp. 227. Price 10s. 6d.)

This book is badly proportioned, no less than 130 of its admirably printed, but rather slight, pages being devoted to the statement and criticism of the views of far too many people, not all important. In consequence, the writer treats his own views too cursorily, and in spite of his evident erudition and ability his book appears superficial. We would have been content to sacrifice the greater part of the critical sections if we could have had a fuller examination of his thesis that laughter at the ludicrous protects society by making an anti-social event harmless. For "the ludicrous is always anti-social, a sudden blow to social sentiments centred about objects and traditions of minor importance." Laughter shows that we can ignore the fact for practical purposes. This view might be developed with a wider range of instances, as, for example, to show that the conservative need not reorganize his social reactions so long as he can find pleasure in the contrast between a proposed novelty and his familiar world, while the mere fact of laughing will render him less able to think of reasons for reconsidering his convictions.

A. W. WOLTERS.

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Books received also:—

- L. TOLSTOY (Tr. A. Maude; Introduction by The Hon. Mrs. A. Lyttelton). *A Confession and Gospel in Brief*. Vol. 11 of the Works of Leo Tolstoy. Pp. xxiv + 539.
- L. TOLSTOY (Tr. A. Maude; Introduction by Lady Sybil Smith). *On Life; and Essays on Religion*. Vol. 12 of the Works of Leo Tolstoy. Pp. xxix + 412. London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1934. £9 9s. for 21 volumes. Not sold separately.
- S. V. KEELING, M.A., D. ès L. *Descartes*. London: Ernest Benn Ltd. 1934. Pp. xi + 282. 12s. 6d.
- H. D. OAKELEY, M.A., D.Lit. *History and the Self*. London: Williams & Norgate Ltd. 1934. Pp. 286. 10s. 6d.
- C. D. BROAD, Litt.D. *Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism*. Cambridge at the University Press. 1934. Pp. 48. 2s. 6d.
- J. L. STOCKS. *On the Nature and Grounds of Religious Belief*. (Riddell Memorial Lectures, sixth series.) London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. 47. 2s. 6d.
- J. E. TURNER, M.A., Ph.D. *Essentials in the Development of Religion: A Philosophic and Psychological Study*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1934. Pp. 308. 12s. 6d.
- L. SEIF. *Individual Psychology and Life Philosophy*. London: The C. W. Daniel Co. 1934. Pp. 59. 2s. 6d.
- W. R. WILLIAMS, F.R.C.S. *Science and its History*. Printed for the author by E. J. Burrow & Co., Cheltenham and London. 1933. Pp. 19.
- J. S. HUXLEY, M.A., and G. R. DE BEER, M.A., D.Sc. *The Elements of Experimental Embryology*. London: Cambridge University Press. 1934. Pp. xiii + 514. 25s.
- W. PATER. *Marius the Epicurean*. (Introduction by O. Burdett.) London: J. M. Dent & Sons. 1934. Pp. xviii + 267. 2s.
- R. B. BAKER, Ph.D. *The Concept of a Limited God. A Study in the Philosophy of Personalism*. Washington, D.C.: Shenandoah Publishing House, Inc. 1934. Pp. 234. \$3.



## NEW BOOKS

- Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*. Vol. IV, *The Simplest Mathematics*. (Ed. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss.) Cambridge, U.S.A.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. ix + 601. \$6; 25s.
- C. PLEYDELL-BOUVERIE. *The Cosmic Awakening*. London: Williams & Norgate Ltd. 1934. Pp. 183. 7s. 6d.
- F. S. RODKEY, Ph.D. *An Historical Approach to the World Problems of To-day*. Urbana, U.S.A. Printed by Urbana Courier Co. 1934. Pp. 24. 25 cents.
- G. P. GOOCH, D.Litt., F.B.A. *The Unity of Civilization*. London: The Ethical Union. 1934. Pp. 19. 2½d.
- A. K. ROGERS. *Ethics and Moral Tolerance*. London: Macmillan & Co. 1934. Pp. 323. 10s.
- H. MCLACHLAN, M.A., D.D., F.R.Hist.S. *The Unitarian Movement in the Religious Life of England*. (1) *Its Contribution to Thought and Learning, 1700-1900*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1934. Pp. 317. 10s. 6d.
- VARIOUS. *Creativity, Politics, and the a priori*. (Symposia of Joint Session of Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, 1933.) London: Harrison & Sons Ltd. 1933. Pp. 219. 15s.
- L. S. STEBBING, D.Lit. *Logic in Practice*. London: Methuen & Co. 1934. Pp. ix + 113. 2s. 6d.
- J. H. LEUBA. *God or Man? A Study of the Value of God to Man*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1934. Pp. xii + 338. 10s. 6d.
- MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, D.Litt., M.A. *Indian Religion and Survival. A Study*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1934. Pp. 96. 3s. 6d.
- W. M. KRANEFELDT. (Introduction by C. G. Jung; Tr. by R. M. Eaton.) *Secret Ways of the Mind. A Survey of the Psychological Principle of Freud, Adler, and Jung*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1934. Pp. xl + 188. 6s.
- Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1932*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1933. Pp. xiii + 497. 70 cents.
- L. S. STEBBING. *A Modern Introduction to Logic*. [Revised edition.] London: Methuen & Co. 1933. Pp. xx + 525. 15s.
- R. BAYER, D. ès L. *Léonard de Vinci. La Grâce*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1933. Pp. 303. 30 frs.
- R. BAYER, D. ès L. *L'esthétique de la Grâce*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. Tome 1: Pp. viii + 635. Tome 2: Pp. 581. 2 tomes ensemble 100 frs.
- J. DE LA VAISSIÈRE. *Méthodologie scientifique*. (*Archives de Philosophie*, Vol. X, cahier III.) Paris: G. Beauchesne et Fils. 1933. Pp. 109. 24 frs.
- E. AUGIER. *Mécanismes et Conscience*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1934. Pp. 355. 30 frs.
- J. IWANICKI, Dr.theol. *Leibniz et les démonstrations mathématiques de l'existence de Dieu*. Paris: J. Vrin. 1933. Pp. 316.
- E. DUPRÉEL. *La Cause et l'Intervalle, ou Ordre et Probabilité*. Bruxelles: M. Lamertin. 1933. Pp. 51. 8 frs.
- M. BLONDEL. *La Pensée*. (I) *La Genèse de la Pensée et les Paliers de son Ascension Spontanée*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1934. Pp. xli + 421. 60 frs.
- M. NÉDONCELLE. *La Philosophie religieuse en Grande-Bretagne de 1850 à nos jours*. (Préface par A. Rivaud; Supplément: P. Archambault, J. Soulairol, M. Prélôt.) Paris: Bloud & Gay. 1934. Pp. 233. 20 frs.
- E. WIND. *Das Experiment und die Metaphysik. Zur Auflösung der kosmologischen Antinomien*. Tübingen. Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (P. Siebeck). 1934. Pp. xii + 120. Im Einzelverkauf M.7.; in Ganzleinen geb. M.8.80.



- Verhandlungen des dritten Hegelkongresses vom 19. bis. 23 April, 1933 in Rom. Im auftrag des Internationalen Hegelbundes herausgegeben von B. Wigersma. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck); Haarlem: N/V.H.D. Tjeenk. Willink. 1934. Pp. 278. Mk. 14.50.*
- F. S. VARANO. *Vincenzo de Grazia*. Napoli: Libreria Editrice Francesco Perrella S.A. 1931. Pp. 109. Lire dieci.
- F. S. VARANO. *L'Ipotesi nella Filosofia di Ernesto Naville*. Gubbio: Scuola Tipografica "Oderisi." 1931. Pp. 52. Lire cinque.
- F. S. VARANO. *Il Problema della Storia in Xenopol*. Gubbio: Scuola Tipografica "Oderisi." 1931. Pp. 55. Lire cinque.
- A. MASNOVO. *Da Guglielmo d'Auvergne a San Tomaso d'Aquino*. Vol. 2. *L'Origine delle cose da Dio in Guglielmo d'Auvergne*. Milano: Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero." 1934. Pp. vii + 203. Lire quindici.
- G. GENTILE. *Preliminari allo Studio del Fanciullo*. Appunti: Quarta edizione riveduta. Firenze: G. C. Sansoni. 1934. Pp. vi + 96. L.6.
- G. GENTILE. *La Filosofia dell'Arte in compendio*. Ad uso delle Scuole. Firenze: G. C. Sansoni. Pp. 182. L.7.
- G. GENTILE. *Discorsi di Religione*. Terza edizione riveduta. Firenze: G. C. Sansoni. Pp. viii + 105. L.6.
- A. CARLINI. *La Religiosità dell'Arte e della Filosofia*. Firenze: G. C. Sansoni. 1934. Pp. x + 227. L.24.
- F. MELI. *Spinoza: e due Antecedenti Italiani dello Spinozismo*. (Prefazione di G. Saitta.) Firenze G. C. Sansoni. 1934. Pp. viii + 197. L.18.





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DR. BROAD's address to the Institute on February 13th, entitled "Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism," is now published by the Cambridge University Press. Price 2s. 6d.

SUMMER TERM begins on April 24th and ends on June 26th. The following course of lectures has been arranged for the Summer Term of the Session 1933-34:—

"REAL VALUES," a course of six weekly lectures by Professor J. H. Muirhead, LL.D. (Fellow of the British Academy), on Wednesdays at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C.1, beginning May 2nd. Fee for the course, 12s. 6d. Members free.

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